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"... the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the commitment of the United States."

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a pleasure and privilege to be with you on this occasion, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the journalism program of your School of Public Communications.

As a public official, I am unavoidably aware of the immensity, the range and variety, the power, and the insatiable curiosity of American journalism and journalists. I am aware of these every waking hour, and sometimes in my sleep. I am accustomed to reading, or hearing, many things that I already knew, many that I didn't know but prove to be true, and a few that were not and never become true—that remain "exclusive" forever. Now and then I read, or hear, predictions or comments about myself—some critical, some favorable—with which I am not always able to concur.

From time to time I have been invited to deliver a lecture on the press and its role in foreign affairs, but I have steadfastly refused to engage in that task. I prefer to take my crises one at a time. Perhaps, if you will invite me to your 75th anniversary, I might be willing to oblige.

As a matter of fact, I know of no people better served by our media of information than are the American people. And I must confess my complete respect for the intelligence, the energy, and the breadth and depth of information which mark the ex-

traordinary press corps assembled in our National Capital.

Among the journalists I would place high in that company is your distinguished alumnus who introduced me tonight, John Scali. He has made his mark in both written and spoken journalism. And he has also served, on one notable occasion, as what might be called a "covert Ambassador-Extraordinary"—in October 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis.

We in Government share with the media of information the broadest common interest in informing the public. I sometimes regret that the available space and time—and indeed the time of the reader or listener—do not permit as wide a coverage of important matters as some of them might deserve. I particularly have in mind the unsung 80 percent of our work which has to do with the quiet, persistent, constructive, and deeply satisfying process of building a decent world order and a decent life for man.

It is also true that there is an inevitable tension between officials and reporters about that tiny fraction of our business—some 1 or 2 percent—which is or ought to be secret, at least temporarily. I do not suggest that there should be a treaty between officials and reporters on this subject because the very tension itself is wholesome, over time, in the public interest. Without the inquiring reporter, some in Government would be tempted to be quiet about matters that ought to be known. So I would expect

¹ Made at the Founder's Day banquet of the Boston University School of Public Communications at Boston, Mass., on Mar. 14 (press release 49).

the reporter to seek information, and I would expect officials to keep their mouths shut about those matters on which they ought not to talk. Actually, secrets are not secret for very long—at least in the United States. And I can tell you quite honestly that I do not know of any secrets which could have a significant effect upon the judgments which citizens or commentators are able to make upon matters of policy or public interest.

I wish to talk to you quietly this evening about Viet-Nam. Some of you may feel that enough has been said on that subject, but it remains dangerous and overshadows many other relationships in the present world scene.

One hears a good deal about the word “confusion” these days. Let me say, I hope without too much presumption, that I am not confused—and President Johnson is not confused—about the facts, the issues, United States policy, and the present attitude of Hanoi and Peiping. We are concerned, as any rational man would be, but we are not confused. It is my impression that there are some who, when they say, “I am confused,” really mean, “I do not agree.” It is important that all who debate these issues declare, and not conceal, their major premises—otherwise we are not able to understand what else they are saying.

Source of Assault on South Viet-Nam

It is altogether clear from irrefutable evidence that the assault on South Viet-Nam was organized and has been directed by the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam. It has involved not only ordering into action Communist cadres left behind for that purpose when Viet-Nam was divided in 1954 but the infiltration from the North of tens of thousands of trained men and increasing quantities of arms. For well over a year the forces infiltrated from the North have included organized units of regimental or larger strength of the regular army of North Viet-Nam.

And it is not just South Viet-Nam and the United States which hold that view. At

Manila, in April 1964, the SEATO Council of Ministers declared² that the attack on South Viet-Nam was a “Communist aggression . . . (an) organized campaign . . . directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.” They declared “that the defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia.”

The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan, as well as the United States, subscribed to those declarations. Similar—but generally stronger—declarations were made by the SEATO Council of Ministers in London in April 1965³ and by the ANZUS Council of Ministers in 1964⁴ and 1965.⁵ And these views have been endorsed by many other governments.

SEATO and Other Defensive Alliances

I have mentioned SEATO—the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization. Recently I have read some curious comments about it and our other defensive alliances.

I have read that I said that the obligation of the United States to oppose an armed attack against the territory covered by the Southeast Asia treaty “did not depend on all other members agreeing to oppose it.” That is neither novel nor remarkable. It is based on the plain language of the treaty and the official explanations which accompanied the consideration of the treaty by the Senate. If action under the treaty required a unanimous vote, then one or more members—the smallest or the most distant—could veto action by the rest. This impediment was not written into SEATO, nor was it written into NATO.

Let me pause for a few moments to reflect upon the events of the past four de-

² For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of May 4, 1964, p. 692.

³ *Ibid.*, June 7, 1965, p. 923.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 19, 1965, p. 135.

cares. I graduated from college in the year when Japanese militarists seized Manchuria. It seemed a long way away, and little was done by the nations of the world to defend the peace against a flagrant aggression. In 1935 Mussolini launched his aggression against Ethiopia, and it was not even possible to organize an oil embargo against him. Then Hitler moved into the Rhineland, unopposed, and went on to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and World War II erupted with its frightful costs.

Before the guns were silent in that war, the nations of the world thought long and hard about how such a war had come about and how, in the words of the U.N. Charter, we can "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." The lesson of World War II was that it was necessary to organize and defend a peace—not merely to wish for it—and to "unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter is utterly fundamental and, although some may think it old-fashioned to speak of it, I should like to remind you of what it says:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; . . .

Unhappily and tragically, the ink was not dry on the United Nations Charter before it became fully apparent that Joseph Stalin had turned to world revolution and a policy of aggressive militancy. The first major issue before the Security Council was his attempt to keep Russian forces in Iran. Then came guerrilla operations against Greece, pressure on Turkey, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean aggression. These moves led to defensive action by the free world and a number of mutual defense treaties—the Rio Pact, NATO, the ANZUS treaty with

Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral treaties with the Philippines and Japan.

Under President Eisenhower we concluded the Southeast Asia treaty, which, by a protocol, committed us to help the three non-Communist states of former French Indochina—South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia—to repel armed attacks, if they asked for help.⁶ Under Eisenhower we also entered mutual defense pacts with the Republic of Korea⁷ and the Republic of China on Formosa.⁸

All of those commitments to oppose aggression—through the United Nations and through our various defensive alliances—were approved by the Senate by overwhelming majorities of both parties. And these and related obligations have been sustained over the years by authorizations, appropriations, and other supporting measures enacted by bipartisan votes in both Houses of Congress.

The Backbone of World Peace

I have read that I have drawn "no distinction between powerful industrial democratic states in Europe and weak and undemocratic states in Asia." The answer is that, for the Secretary of State, our treaty commitments are a part of the supreme law of the land, and I do not believe that we can be honorable in Europe and dishonorable in Asia.

I do believe that the United States must keep its pledged word. That is not only a matter of national honor but an essential to the preservation of peace. For the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the commitment of the United States.

There would be no possibility of preserving peace if our allies—or, even more important, our adversaries—should come to believe that the United States will not do what it says it will do. Doubt about that could lead to catastrophic miscalculations by our

⁶ For text of the treaty and protocol, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 204.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 899.

adversaries. Let me illustrate by two examples. It was necessary for both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to inform Mr. Khrushchev that the United States would not yield to an ultimatum concerning Berlin. Had Mr. Khrushchev not believed that, there would have been war. Again, in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, had not Mr. Khrushchev believed it when President Kennedy said those missiles must go, there might have been war.

I am honored to have my name associated with the doctrine that the United States must honor its pledged word. But I am convinced that the American people subscribe to that doctrine.

Yet I read recently that the SEATO treaty is just a scrap of paper. There were no quotation marks around "a scrap of paper" and no other indication of any sort that that is an historic phrase: that for more than half a century it has been associated with black infamy—that it was what the Kaiser's Chancellor called the solemn pledge of Germany and others to observe the neutrality of Belgium.

God help us—and the cause of freedom and peace—if our Government should ever agree with those who regard our commitments as "scraps of paper."

The SEATO Treaty

I read lately that I had suddenly rediscovered the SEATO treaty, that I had shifted my explanation of the legal basis of the American commitment in Viet-Nam because somebody thought the administration was relying too much on the congressional resolution of August 1964.

The fact is that I have always treated the SEATO treaty—which the Senate approved with only one dissenting vote—as an important part of our commitment to defend South Viet-Nam.

That treaty was carefully considered by the Foreign Relations Committee. And its report,⁹ urging that the Senate give its "advice and consent" to ratification, said:

⁹ S. Ex. Rept. 1, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Now, I have never asserted that the Southeast Asia treaty comprises all of our commitment to the defense of South Viet-Nam. I have cited the statements of three successive Presidents, the various aid bills approved by Congress against the background of those statements, and the SEATO treaty, as well as the congressional resolution of August 1964.

When the President asked Congress to pass such a resolution he specifically cited "the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty."¹⁰ And that resolution—adopted by a combined vote of 504 to 2 in the two Houses—contained this language:¹¹

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

So the assertion that the administration has suddenly rediscovered the SEATO treaty is not based on fact. If I have talked about that treaty a little more lately it is partly because North Viet-Nam has been escalating its aggression into a full-scale armed attack directly and unequivocally raising the solemn commitment which the Senate had approved—by an overwhelming vote.

¹⁰ For text of a message to the Congress from President Johnson, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 261.

¹¹ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 268.

I do not regard our policy in Viet-Nam as based only on past commitments. I believe that it is now just as much in our interest—and that of the free world—to repel Communist aggression there as it was when we made those earlier commitments.

Support of Free-World Nations

Now, I turn to the attitudes of other free-world nations toward the struggle in Viet-Nam and our support of South Viet-Nam. Assertions to the effect that we stand alone, that most of our allies disapprove, et cetera, are incorrect.

Let me quote from a speech made in London a year ago by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Hasluck:

Twice in this generation, without hesitation, Australians have come to fight against aggression in Europe because we saw a war started in Europe was a danger, not only to Europe, but to the whole world. Today, we see aggression in Asia as being just as much a danger to the whole world as it is to those of us who live in or near Asia. Indeed, today the risk of a world war starting is more immediate in Asia than in any other continent. Southeast Asia is today the front line in the struggle for world security.

Recalling that Australia had contributed air forces to help break the blockade of Berlin, Mr. Hasluck said:

Vietnam today is no less fateful to the future of the world than was the Berlin crisis, and Western Europe is as closely concerned there in Vietnam as we ourselves were concerned with Berlin.

Taking this view . . . Australia sees the actions of the United States in Asia as an acceptance by that great power of the world-wide responsibilities which came to it simply because it is great. We honor them for what they are doing in Vietnam and we support them in it.

Australia has had some 1,400 combat troops in Viet-Nam, fighting valiantly at the side of the Vietnamese and ourselves. They have contributed to the security of Southeast Asia in other respects including the deployment of troops for the defense of Malaysia. And they have been training Vietnamese officers in Australia and supplying surgical teams and cash aid. Last week Prime Minister Harold Holt announced that Australia was trebling its combat forces in

Viet-Nam. We warmly welcome this additional effort by our staunch allies in Australia. New Zealand has contributed an artillery company. The Australians, the New Zealanders, and we are bound together not only by treaty commitments but by common interests, institutions, and ideals. And we know from previous wars that they are courageous allies—very good people to have at your side when the going is tough.

And here is a quotation from the distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman:

We profoundly realize that nowadays, as in the past, no "peace in our time" can be bought by sacrificing a free nation, be it South Viet-Nam or Southeast Asia or, for that matter, any other nation in the world. On the contrary, the chances for an enduring peace will become greater if we can see to it that aggression against free nations, either in overt or covert form, shall not be profitable. . . .

Thailand has already been designated by Peiping as the next target. And I would emphasize that Thailand is contributing much more than eloquent words to the security of Southeast Asia. Its military forces help to guard the heart of the Southeast Asian peninsula—and the flank of Viet-Nam. It is helping to train South Vietnamese aviators and is cooperating generally in the defense of Southeast Asia.

The vital significance of the struggle in Viet-Nam is well understood in the Philippines. President Marcos has requested the Philippine Congress to approve the dispatch to Viet-Nam of military engineers with their own security forces—some 2,000 men.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia has publicly declared that "countries which subscribe to the United Nations Charter must help" South Viet-Nam to repel the "aggression" from the North.

The Republic of China on Formosa is contributing technicians and commodities.

The Republic of Korea has sent a full division plus a regiment of military engineers with their own security forces. The Koreans have fought with great gallantry and professional skill. Recently President Park asked the South Korean legislature to

approve the dispatch of a second division. This would make Korea's troop contribution, in ratio to population, greater than our own.

But, of course, the main burden of the fighting has been carried by the South Vietnamese, and will continue to be. They have nearly 700,000 men under arms. And, every day, they are engaged in many more ground actions than are the troops of the United States and their other allies.

Contrary to some assertions I have read, the Government of Japan has understood our policy in regard to South Viet-Nam and is deeply conscious of how it relates to peace in Southeast Asia, in which Japan has a vital national interest. Japan has consistently supported efforts to bring Hanoi to the conference table and has extended for many years now valuable economic and strong political support to the Government of South Viet-Nam. Anybody who thinks that Japanese confidence in us would be increased by a failure to repel the aggression against South Viet-Nam is seriously mistaken.

And the same is true of most of the Asian nations which are trying to adhere to "non-alignment." They know that they have a vital interest in the outcome of the struggle in Viet-Nam.

The head of one nonaligned government recently said privately to a representative of the United States that success in repelling the aggression against South Viet-Nam would assure the peace of Southeast Asia for a generation.

Contrary to some assertions our role in Viet-Nam is not opposed by most of our allies in other parts of the world. With very few exceptions, the governments of free Europe understand and support our position. The United Kingdom has done so, under both its Labor government and the Conservative government which preceded it. Although it has no troops in Viet-Nam, it has substantial military forces in the area, most of them committed to the defense of Malaysia.

We have the support of the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, a state-

ment from the office of the Federal Chancellor in January said: "The German Government has always maintained the view that the defense of the freedom and independence of Viet-Nam by the United States of America is of the greatest importance for the entire Free World." The Federal Republic has made substantial nonmilitary contributions to South Viet-Nam and recently announced that it would send a hospital ship.

Some of our NATO allies have feared that the struggle in Viet-Nam might compel us to reduce our forces in Europe. Manlio Brosio, the distinguished Secretary General of NATO, has correctly said:

... a setback for the United States in Asia, for example, in Vietnam, would also be a grave setback for the whole of the West. Not only this, but an American retreat or a humiliating compromise in Vietnam, far from ending United States commitments in Asia, would extend them on an even greater scale to all sorts of other areas, from Thailand to the Philippines.

In a recent article the former Italian Minister of Defense, Giulio Andreotti, said:

America could have left its Viet-Nam ally to its own destiny, but it would have been a morally criminal act, without mentioning the psychological consequences in Asia and elsewhere. . . . the Communists . . . would do well to remember that Americans did not give in to isolationism when, 25 years ago, they decided to come to fight and die on our continent. . . .

A week ago tonight, in a speech in Brussels, one of the most eminent statesmen of Europe, Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, referred to the Soviet menace to Europe following the Second World War and said:

At that time . . . nearly all of us were delighted to see the United States come to our help. . . . Is there anyone who would dare suggest that the free peoples of Asia are not menaced by Chinese imperialism? How can we fail to understand that . . . the world role of the United States "obliges it to take in Asia a position identical to that taken previously in Europe?"

Mr. Spaak emphasized the importance of the argument that if the United States does not observe one of its commitments how can the rest of the world believe that it will

respect other engagements? He said he thought that argument was "essential" and that the leaders of the United States were right. He said also: "I do not know why people cannot understand that much more is at stake in the Viet-Nam conflict than simply the independence or the servitude of South Viet-Nam." And he went on to say:

I am astonished and stupefied when I receive . . . petitions asking the United States to make peace in Viet-Nam. . . . It was not the Americans who wanted war. . . . Today it is they who offer to take peace under reasonable conditions and it is their adversaries who refuse to do so. . . .

The truth is that there should be . . . a broad movement of people from all of Europe and of all parties and beliefs to affirm that the conditions proposed by the United States are reasonable and that those who should be pilloried are those who refuse to examine those conditions and to enter upon a policy of peace.

I think most Americans would wish to join their Government in thanking that great Belgian champion of freedom for his outspoken support.

No, the United States does not stand alone assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam to repel an aggression. The facts about the cause and nature of the struggle there, and the vital stakes involved, are increasingly realized throughout the free world. I know from my own contacts that a great majority of non-Communist governments understand and support what we are doing, even though some, for various reasons, have not yet said so publicly. And I think you will see more and more governments of the free world offering, or increasing, tangible assistance to South Viet-Nam.

Nearly all the governments of the free world—and, I venture to say, some in the Communist world—understand that the United States has made persistent and extraordinary efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam—that it is Hanoi and Peiping which have barred the road to peace. We continue to seek a peaceful settlement. It must, of course, assure to the people of South Viet-Nam their right to choose their own government and order their own affairs in their own way.

Quite frankly, I cannot understand those

who say that when somebody is shooting at you, and you ask him to stop, you are asking for "unconditional surrender." That seems to me to be an abuse of language. We are not asking the other side to change their regime, or to surrender a single acre or single individual. All we are asking them to do is to stop shooting at South Viet-Nam.

The Right to Independence and Peace

It is not true that we believe that the United States should become involved in every crisis or disturbance. On the contrary, we don't go around looking for business. We much prefer to see disputes settled by regional organizations or the United Nations or mediation or negotiation between the parties. There have been many, many disputes in the last 5 years in which the United States has not been involved.

But when major aggression occurs, or is threatened, against those to whom we have commitments, and the intended victims lack the power to defend themselves and seek our help, we become involved. Had we not done so—from the assault on Greece and threat to Turkey through the Berlin blockade and the Korean war and now the threat to Southeast Asia—vast areas and populations would have fallen under the domination of the Communist world revolution.

And, to go on to a related point, I can see no possibility of a stable peace through spheres of influence. Who is to determine which are to be the "master" nations—and which their vassals? And what happens when the "master" nations engage in struggles among themselves about spheres of influence? I cannot imagine a surer path to war—and much more devastating wars than the world has ever known.

I would think that the United Nations Charter is right—that every nation, large or small, has a right to live in independence and peace, even though it is next door to a great power. I would think that, in the age of intercontinental rockets and thermonuclear warheads, the prospects for the survival of the human race are dismal unless that fundamental proposition is upheld. And, I sub-

mit, no other policy is consistent with the principles for which the United States has long stood and to which we are solemnly committed through the United Nations Charter and many other international agreements, including those which govern the relations of the Western Hemisphere.

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social Development in Asia

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON¹

This is a moment in which history and hope meet and move on from here as partners. Less than 1 year ago, on April 7, 1965, I asked for the creation of the Asian development plan to seek economic advance and social justice for all of Asia.² I pledged the full support of the United States of America to that task.

Today we have begun to redeem that pledge. The act I sign this morning authorizes the United States of America to ratify the charter of the Asian Development Bank.³ Seldom have nations joined together in a collective venture that is so endowed with promise. For that reason this moment is a very special one for so many people.

First, for the Asian leaders, who conceived and organized the bank and who are so ably represented here today by the ambassadors from their countries; for the people of those non-Asian nations which have signed the charter and whose ambassadors have come this morning to bespeak again their vision and generosity; finally, for my great friend, a true American, Eugene Black, whose energy and tact have been as indispensable as his experience and

wisdom; and to the Congress of the United States and the members of both parties, who have acted to invest in this enterprise not only the resources but the faith of 190 million people whom they represent.

This act is an economic Magna Carta for the diverse lands of Asia. Its charter links 31 countries in a union against the involuntary economic servitude imposed on the people of Asia by time and circumstance, and by neighbor and nature. There is also a deeper meaning. This billion dollar Bank is a symbol that the twain have met, not as Kipling predicted, "at God's great Judgment Seat," but at the place of man's shared needs.

It is no longer possible to be a mere observer at that place. It is not possible and it is not right to neglect a people's hopes because the ocean is vast, or their culture is alien, or their language may be strange, or their race different, or their skin another color. Asia must no longer sit at the second table of the 20th century's concern.

The economic network of this shrinking globe is too intertwined. The political order of continents is too involved with one another. The threat of common disaster is too real for all human beings to say of Asia, or any other continent, "Yours is another sphere."

I believe that those who make that case are no less patriotic and no less sincere than those who believe that we cannot shorten the length of our reach into the world.

But I believe equally as firmly that those people are wrong. And while I expect they will continue to make their argument of isolationism, for we all are determined to preserve their right to speak up in this land, I hope they, too, expect me to try to keep on making my case for realism. That, I think, is the right of the President of this country, and the President feels that is his duty.

And what is that case? It is simply that there is no rest from the trials of freedom, there is no recalling what the pace of change has done to the map of this big world, there is no reducing our responsibilities while the

¹ Made at the White House on Mar. 16 (White House press release; as-delivered text) upon signing the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-369).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015; Feb. 14, 1966, p. 255; and Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

challenges of progress will not permit us to name the site for our duel or the weapons that we use. It is that we cannot turn from the place of shared needs and expect either peace or progress to follow us.

So today we have come here to the historic East Room of the White House and gathered at this place to start a journey together. The Asian Development Bank is the first step of what I conceive to be a very long journey.

We are taking another today by announcing that we have pledged a half of the \$24 million that is needed to construct the large Mekong River project, the Nam Ngum tributary project in Laos. Seven other countries—Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Thailand, Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand—are joining us in that effort.

For the United States it is our first major commitment under our promise to expand economic and social development in Southeast Asia. The Nam Ngum project is the Mekong Committee's highest priority undertaking and, like the Asian Development Bank, it represents a major accomplishment in joint cooperation in the world.

The first phase of the project will include a dam and power station with an installed capacity up to 30,000 kilowatts. Additional generators up to 120,000 kilowatts can be installed as they are needed. An international transmission line, with a link across the Mekong River, will connect the power station with the capital of Laos and north-east Thailand.

This is just one example of how the fruits of technology and the ingenuity of cooperation can bring new life to whole new regions of the world. More, yes, much more, awaits our response. Schools and hospitals can be built. Rivers can be tamed. New crops and new breeds of livestock can be developed. There are no bounds to the possibilities, if there are no limits to our dreams.

It has been said that no statue was ever erected to the memory of a man or woman who thought it was best to let well enough alone. So it is with the nations that we represent here today. We seek no statues

to our memory. We seek only one real monument, a monument with peace and progress for its base and justice for its pinnacle. Together, your lands and mine, we will build it.

**ANNOUNCEMENT OF PLEDGES
TO MEKONG RIVER PROJECT**

White House press release dated March 16

The United States and seven other countries have pledged \$24.1 million to construct the largest Mekong River project to date—the Nam Ngum tributary project in Laos. The United States pledge of half this amount is the first major commitment under President Johnson's program to expand economic and social development in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. contribution will be provided by the Agency for International Development.

The Nam Ngum project is the Mekong Committee's highest priority undertaking and represents a major accomplishment in international cooperation in the Far East. The United Nations took the lead in raising funds for the project, and the World Bank has agreed to administer the project. Thailand and Laos have signed a convention providing for an exchange of electric power.

The first phase of the Nam Ngum project will include a dam and power station with an installed capacity of up to 30,000 kilowatts. The dam is designed so that additional generators—up to 120,000 kilowatts—can be installed as needed. An international transmission line, with a link across the Mekong River, will connect the power station with Vientiane, Laos, and northeast Thailand, where part of the power will be used.

The following amounts have been pledged:

Japan	\$4,000,000
Netherlands	3,300,000
Canada	2,000,000
Thailand	1,000,000
Denmark	600,000
Australia	500,000
New Zealand	350,000

The United States matched the total of these contributions, as well as an additional

\$315,000 pledged by Japan on a bilateral basis to Laos, in accordance with an earlier offer made to the Mekong Committee.

The total pledged for the project is \$24,-130,000.

The contributions from all the developed countries were made on a grant basis. The Thai contribution is in kind: cement—to be repaid by electrical power after completion of the project.

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in Asia

Address by Vice President Humphrey¹

As you know, I returned a few days ago from a mission on behalf of the President to nine Asian and Pacific nations.² Today I would like to share with you some of my conclusions about what is happening in that part of the world and about our policy there.

I will begin with words from Confucius: "If a man take no thought about what is distant, he will find sorrow near at hand." The war in Viet-Nam is far more than Neville Chamberlain's "quarrel in a remote country among people of whom we know nothing." It is the focus of a broader conflict which involves the whole Asian Continent. It also involves basic principles of international conduct.

I will return to this later.

Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are in South Viet-Nam to repel and prevent the success of aggression against the Government and the people of that country.

We are there to help assure the South Vietnamese people the basic right to decide their own futures, freely and without intimidation.

We are there to help those people achieve a better standard of living for themselves and their children.

We are there to help establish the principle that, in this nuclear age, aggression cannot be an acceptable means either of settling international disputes or of realizing national objectives. If aggression is permitted to go unchecked, we cannot in good faith hold out much hope for the future of small nations or of world peace.

This is why we are in Viet-Nam.

We are not there to build an empire, to exercise domination over that part of the world, to establish military bases. We are *not* there to impose a government or way of life on other peoples.

That last point is worth dwelling on. The National Liberation Front claims to be an authentic nationalist movement, representing the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese people. I agree with only one part of the NLF's contention: That it is a *front*.

There was a time, in the colonial days, when the old Viet Minh movement contained authentic nationalists. (Many of them are now, I might add, members of the South Vietnamese Government.)

Today there are a few non-Communists in figurehead Viet Cong posts. The nominal leader of the NLF, for example, is not

¹ Made at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., on Mar. 11.

² For a memorandum to President Johnson from the Vice President, see BULLETIN of Mar. 28, 1966, p. 489.

known as a Communist. But most of the Viet Cong soldiers—at least those defecting or captured—don't even know his name. (It is Nguyen Huu Tho.) But they all know Ho Chi Minh.

There are in the NLF leaders of alleged non-Communist parties. But they are parties without any apparent membership.

There are a good many well-known and recognized nationalists in South Viet-Nam outside the present government. Quite a few of them opposed the late President Diem and suffered in prison for their opposition. To this day not one of these people has identified himself with the National Liberation Front. Yet it would be easy for any one of them to slip into Viet Cong territory and do so. None has. And you can be sure the National Liberation Front would tell the world if any one of them did.

The same is true of religious leaders, Buddhist and Catholic alike, of trade union officials, of student leaders. They differ widely among themselves—the Vietnamese are an articulate and argumentative people. But on one thing at least they are agreed: They don't want to live under Communist rule.

Contrary to what many people believe, you do not have to have overwhelming, or even majority, support to wage a guerrilla war. A determined, highly disciplined, trained, and well-organized minority can do that.

Without massive American aid to the Greek Government after the war, Communists would have taken over that country. Yet subsequent elections have shown them to be a small minority.

Without the aid of British and Gurkha troops over a period of many years, Communists would have won in Malaya. But subsequent elections have shown them to be an even smaller minority than their Greek comrades.

Without outside aid, the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese people would have no hope of self-determination. They would be ruled by force and coercion, as they are today in areas under Viet Cong

control. We are giving aid: military aid and political/economic/social aid.

Allied Military Progress in Viet-Nam

On the military front, the Vietnamese, together with American and Allied troops, have made substantial progress in the past few months.

A series of defeats have been inflicted on main-force units of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers.

Allied forces have been able to move in on Viet Cong strongholds which had previously been immune to attack.

We have been able to open up stretches of highway and railroad which the Viet Cong had long controlled.

Mobility and firepower of Allied forces is impressive. Coordination among Allied forces has markedly improved.

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese casualties are difficult to determine. But the best available figures show that they have doubled over 1964 and are now running several times current allied casualties.

The defection rate for Viet Cong has also increased—partly because of a special South Vietnamese program to encourage defection. Defectors were being received at a rate of about 2,000 per month while I was in Saigon.

Defectors report shortages of food and low morale. They report that the accuracy and impact of our artillery and bombing have been devastating.

But we don't have to rely on the word of defectors alone. An article published in the January issue of the Viet Cong theoretical journal and broadcast over its radio complains of difficulty and confusion in the ranks. It says that Viet Cong agents, having organized a protest movement in the villages, sometimes lose control of it and even allow it to be transformed into an anti-Communist demonstration. It warns that, although its agitators must use all sorts of people "partially and temporarily" in carrying out the struggle, they must wipe out the "influence of reactionary elements belonging

to various religious organizations" and "be-ware of trade union leaders."

A number of articles and broadcasts warn against defeatism and "pacifism" in the ranks.

General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Defense Minister] has publicly complained from Hanoi that the American commitment to Viet-Nam has given rise to "an extremely serious situation." And an article recently published in Hanoi denounces "a small number of comrades . . . (who) see only difficulties and not opportunities (and) display pessimism, perplexity, and a reluctance to protracted resistance. . . ." Peking, in more general terms, has acknowledged that "in some lands, revolutionary struggles have temporarily suffered reverses, and in others the political situation has taken an adverse turn." It blames these setbacks on "imperialists, colonialists, and neo-colonialists, headed by the United States."

We have been subject to some harsh words by Asian Communists. But, as President Johnson has said: "We can live with anger in word as long as it is matched by caution in deed."³

Things are better in Viet-Nam, militarily, than even a few months ago. Though we must be prepared for military setbacks and disappointments ahead, I believe we have reason for measured encouragement.

Viet-Nam's Social Revolution

There is no substitute for the use of power in the face of determined attack. There are times when it must be used. But the use of power, necessary as it is, can be counter-productive without accompanying political effort and the credible promise to people of a better life.

The peasants of Viet-Nam—and, indeed, of all Asia—are rebelling against the kind of life they have led for ages past. They want security. But they also want dignity

and self-respect, justice, and the hope of something better in the future.

The Communists, in their drive for power, seek to use and subvert the hopes of these people. If they succeed, we could win many battles and yet lose the war.

The struggle will be won or lost in rural areas. We have said this so often it has become a cliché. But it must now be proved by programs of actions.

The Chinese have a saying, "Lots of noise on the stairs, but nobody enters the room." There have been, as I am fully aware, many promises made to the peasants over many years—but painfully little performance.

The hour is late. The need for deeds as well as words is urgent. That is why the Vietnamese Government, with our support, is pressing the "other war" with vigor—the war against poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance. This is the theme of the Declaration of Honolulu,⁴ and I believe that the Honolulu Declaration could be a milestone in the history of our policy in Asia.

They are beginning in earnest the struggle to win and hold the allegiance of the people who live in rural South Viet-Nam, in more than 2,600 villages and approximately 11,000 hamlets, subject to years of Viet Cong subversion and terror. This is hard and dangerous work. In 1965 alone, 354 of the people engaged in it were assassinated and something like 500 wounded.

I do not for a moment minimize the practical difficulties of carrying out the social revolution to which the Republic of Viet-Nam is now committed.

Viet-Nam has experienced a quarter of a century of almost constant warfare, generations of colonial domination, and a millennium of Mandarin rule.

History has endowed it with no full and readymade administrative apparatus to undertake such a monumental task. It will have to be carefully built. But there are a number of well-trained and educated high-

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305.

and middle-level officials to form the nucleus for this effort.

The important thing is to begin, and this the present government has done. Responsibility has been fixed, a spirited attack upon inertia and corruption has begun. There is determination that the whole chain of social and political action will be conceived and administered with hardheadedness and efficiency—beginning in the ministries in Saigon and going right down to the village and hamlet level. High standards of performance have been set and are expected. And we are working with the South Vietnamese Government at each level to help see that the product matches the expectation.

South Vietnamese cadre in hamlets and villages will be doubled to more than 45,000 by the end of this year. Today, they are still outnumbered by Viet Cong activists. But the gap is steadily closing.

Today, the South Vietnamese Government—late in the day, it is true—is trying to meet the pressing needs of the country. Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky was candid with me when he said, "Our social revolution is 12 years late—but not too late."

Some 800,000 people have fled to Government-controlled areas in South Viet-Nam during the past year and a half. Almost 300,000 have already been resettled. The South Vietnamese Government, with allied help, is working to house, feed, and clothe these refugees.

In the countryside schools and hospitals are being built.

In Saigon a new constitution is being framed, and the Government is working toward a goal of national elections by the end of the year.

In short, a forced-draft effort is being made to create a new society to replace the old. It deserves and requires our support.

Meanwhile, the country faces staggering economic problems, the most severe of which is the problem of inflation.

Despite today's inflation, the long-term economic prospect is good. There is new business investment in new industries. South

Vietnamese land is rich and productive. The people are industrious, ambitious, and quick to learn new skills—and they are learning. Communications, port facilities, and transportation are being expanded.

But full economic development certainly will not take place until an environment of violence and conflict is replaced by one of stability and peace.

A "Message of Encouragement"

My observations of Viet-Nam are not the product of a weekend visit to Saigon. To be sure, my visit there was informative. It gave meaning to what I had read and to the deliberations of government in which I had participated.

As student, professor, Senator, and Vice President, I have been intellectually and directly involved in matters of national security and foreign policy. I have read too many books, attended too many hearings and meetings, and participated in too many discussions at the highest levels of government to arrive at any instant solutions to complex problems or to be naively optimistic about a troubled world.

Having said this, I have reason to bring home a message of encouragement about Viet-Nam.

I know that our opponents are diligent and determined. They are well-organized, and in many areas have a long head start on us.

Thus far they have not responded to our unconditional offer of negotiation—an offer which still stands—nor have they responded to the good offices of other nations, of the United Nations, of the Pope and other religious leaders who seek to bring the conflict to the conference table.

And they have not responded, I am sure, because they still believe that time is on their side, that we will ultimately tire and withdraw, either abandoning South Viet-Nam or accepting a settlement which will give the Viet Cong an open road on one of its three publicly declared routes to victory.

The first two routes—a general uprising and the famous Mao-Giap three-stage guer-

rilla war—have been stymied by resistance of the South Vietnamese Government and her allies. The third declared route to power is through a coalition government.

Should there be any doubt in Hanoi, let me make it once more clear: We will neither tire nor withdraw. We will remain in Viet-Nam until genuinely free elections can be held.

If the Viet Cong, in those elections, gain honestly a voice in the government, so be it. But prior to elections, this Government will not be a party to any settlement which amounts to a preelection victory for Communists which cannot be won at the ballot box. I, for one, doubt that the South Vietnamese people will give that victory to the Communists. No Communist government has ever come to power through free election, and I doubt that one ever will.

We will pursue, with patience and persistence, the difficult course we have set for ourselves—the course neither of withdrawal nor of massive escalation but of measured use of strength and perseverance in defense both of ally and principle.

As the President has said: “. . . the pledge of Honolulu will be kept, and the pledge of Baltimore stands open—to help the men of the North when they have the wisdom to be ready.”⁵

Asian Communism, a Clear and Present Danger

At the beginning today, I said the conflict in Viet-Nam was the focus of a wider struggle taking place in Asia.

During my recent mission I was struck by the depth of feeling, among almost all Asian leaders, that Asian communism had direct design on their national integrity and independence. Almost all cited examples of subversion and in many cases direct military involvement by Communist troops within their countries. And none—without any exception—questioned our involvement in Viet-Nam. There were questions about aspects of our policy there but none concerning the

fact of our presence there and our resistance to aggression.

Among the leaders with whom I spoke, there was repeatedly expressed a deep concern as to whether our American purpose, tenacity, and will were strong enough to persevere in Southeast Asia. Public debate in America was sometimes interpreted as a weakening of purpose. I emphasized not only the firmness of our resolve but also our dedication to the rights of free discussion and dissent.

For we know that John Stuart Mill's advice remains valid: “We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”

Asian communism may be a subject for discussion here. In Asia, it is a clear and present danger. No single, independent nation in Asia has the strength to stand alone against that danger.

I believe that the time may come when Asian communism may lose its fervor, when it may lose some of its neuroses, when it may realize that its objectives cannot be gained by aggression. But until that time I believe we have no choice but to help the nations of Southeast Asia strengthen themselves for the long road ahead.

I also said, at the beginning today, that some very basic principles of international conduct were under test in Viet-Nam. Some people think not.

Of them, I ask this: Were we to withdraw from Viet-Nam under any conditions short of peace, security, and the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people, what conclusions would be drawn in the independent nations of Asia? In Western Europe? In the young, struggling countries of Africa? In the nations of Latin America beset by subversion and unrest? What conclusions would be drawn in Hanoi and Peking?

I have heard it said that our vital national interests are not involved in South Viet-Nam as they are in Europe. I heard it said 30 years ago that our vital national interests

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

were not involved in *Europe* as they were in the Western Hemisphere. This time we cannot afford to learn the hard way. No continent on this earth is any longer remote from any other.

And, may I add, the principles of national independence and self-determination should be no less dear to us in Asia than they are in Europe.

We live in a time when man has finally achieved the ultimate in technological progress: Man today possesses the means to totally destroy himself. Yet our time also offers man the possibility, for the first time in human history, of achieving well-being and social justice for hundreds of millions of people who literally live on the outside of civilization.

Being an optimist, I have some faith in the ability of man to see this safely through.

And I, for one, believe that it will not be seen safely through if those who seek power by brute force have reason to believe that brute force pays.

Finally, may I add two additional observations.

First, Asia is astir with a consciousness of the need for Asian initiatives in the solution of Asia's problems. Regional development and planning are increasingly being recognized as necessary for political and economic progress. The power of nationalism is now

tempered by a growing realization of the need for cooperation among nations. Asians seek to preserve their national identity. They want gradually to create new international structures. But they want to pursue such aims themselves. They want foreign assistance when necessary, but without foreign domination.

Second, the American people, as well as their leaders, need to know more about Asia in general and Communist China in particular—the relationships of that nation with her neighbors in Asia and the Pacific, the nature of Chinese Communist ideology and behavior, and the operational apparatus of Communist parties under Peking leadership or influence. The intellectual and political resources not only of the United States but of the entire free world should be mobilized for this effort. In this regard, I want to commend the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its hearings on China.

We have not set ourselves any easy tasks. But the tasks, and responsibilities, of the most powerful nation in the history of the earth are not—cannot be—will not be easy.

Let me close by making this prediction: Ten or twenty years hence historians will mark Viet-Nam as a place where our nation—and free peoples—were faced with a challenge by totalitarianism and where they met the challenge.

"Slow by slow, in the long of time, we will success." So wrote a Vietnamese student, undaunted by the frustrations of learning English. In these words, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson told a Canadian audience, are displayed the patience and determination that are the strength of the people of South Viet-Nam.

The Issue and Goal in Viet-Nam

*by U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹*

I am deeply honored at this opportunity to discuss Viet-Nam before such a distinguished Canadian audience. I know that, just as with my own countrymen, many of you are concerned with the situation there and have difficulty in sorting out seemingly contradictory assertions and conflicting news reports regarding Viet-Nam. Perhaps all too often people on one side of the issue or the other succumb to the temptation to make categorical statements that this course or that course is the only honorable course of action. I hope to avoid this temptation today and rather to discuss with you out of my own experience as factually as I can what is going on there and the role of the United States.

I first want to state plainly why we, the United States, are in Viet-Nam; then to address some of the other questions.

Why are we in Viet-Nam? The real question is not whether Viet-Nam, or indeed Southeast Asia, is of such political, strategic, or economic importance as to justify the loss of American lives and treasure. Rather, the question is the worldwide issue of prevent-

ing the Communists from breaking by force any of the lines that were drawn in the various postwar settlements.

Since the end of World War II, when the United States was propelled onto the center of the world's stage as a leading power, our goal, which is to say our policy, has been to develop and maintain a stable relationship among the world's powers in this uncommonly volatile period of the world's history. Since 1945 we have committed the integrity of our nation to a variety of agreements specifically designed to maintain that stability, a stability whose purpose is to preserve the freedom of each nation to devote its assets and energies to its own development.

As far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, acting through our representatives, we committed ourselves by a Senate vote of 82 to 1 to the SEATO treaty of 1954, reaffirmed by a vote of 502 to 2 in Congress as a whole in 1964.² (In assessing attitudes in the United States, you will want to note that 2 weeks ago a motion to repeal this latter resolution was defeated 92 to 5 in the Senate and was never brought to a vote in the House.)

This is the issue. This is the goal. This

¹ Address made before the Canadian Club of Montreal at Montreal, Canada, on Mar. 14 (press release 50).

² For text of a joint resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

is our purpose. And our ability to honor these commitments is, we believe, critical to the well-being of every free man, woman, and child—for failure to honor our commitments one place cannot but call into question our commitments elsewhere and thus encourage miscalculation by the other side.

Many of the questions coming out of the present debate concern the NLF, or the so-called "National Liberation Front." Statements are made that what is going on in South Viet-Nam is a purely internal revolt against an unpopular government by a discontented population. Any discussion of the NLF also involves the issue of whether or not the Viet Cong represent an indigenous uprising. What are some of the facts?

Before 1960 no one in or out of Viet-Nam had even heard of the NLF. It was in that year that Hanoi Radio announced the formation of the NLF. Perhaps a bit of history is in order here.

The Historical Background

In bringing about the termination of hostilities in Viet-Nam, the Geneva agreement of 1954³ separated North and South Viet-Nam from each other by a 5-mile demilitarized zone. The northern part of the country, with its capital at Hanoi, was under the control of the Viet Minh, while Saigon became the capital of what had been central and South Viet-Nam. The two separate entities were obliged not to interfere with each other until agreement could be reached between them on when and how they could be unified. In this, the situation was very similar to that of Germany and Korea.

However, we have since learned quite dramatically that Ho Chi Minh's government in Hanoi never had any intention of allowing the South Vietnamese freely to choose their own government and run their own affairs until agreement could be reached on unification. There were areas of South Viet-Nam nominally under Viet Minh control at the time of the 1954 agreement. These Viet

Minh were ordered by Hanoi to hide their arms and to do what they could to frustrate the attempts at administration made by the South Vietnamese Government. Ho Chi Minh was reasonably convinced that the South Vietnamese Government would easily crumble with the help of the subversion which he directed.

In connection with the charge that the United States violated the 1954 Geneva accords by not supporting elections in 1956, I might note that such elections were indeed the goal set by the final declaration of that conference. The declaration stipulated that free elections should be held throughout Viet-Nam in July 1956 under international supervision.

In 1955 and 1956 the South Vietnamese Government maintained that it would agree to such elections if they were genuinely free and internationally supervised throughout Viet-Nam and not just in South Viet-Nam. The United States, although not a party to the Geneva accords, consistently favored genuinely free elections under U.N. supervision, as has been our consistent position and that of most members of the U.N. with respect to Korea. It was clear, however, in 1956 that no more than any other Communist government was the Hanoi government prepared to allow such elections, and accordingly the elections were not held. Thus it is a travesty on the truth to allege that the present situation was brought about by the failure of the South to carry out the 1954 accords. In fact, it was the North that was not willing to submit itself to the test of free elections under international control.

By 1956 Ho Chi Minh had realized that he would be unable to subvert the Saigon-led government without military action. As a result, in 1956 Hanoi began rebuilding, reorganizing, and expanding the military machine which they had left behind in South Viet-Nam when the Viet Minh had supposedly withdrawn to the North. To supplement the revitalized Viet Minh in the South, southern-born former Vietnamese who had gone north were conscripted for intensive training and political indoctrination and were

³ For text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

returned to South Viet-Nam to serve as the hard core of the so-called "indigenous force" of the Viet Cong.

By 1959-1960 Hanoi had built up a military capability in the South which enabled them to step up their actions considerably beyond the small-scale guerrilla activity to which they had confined themselves up to that time.

Origin of National Liberation Front

Their hopes of a cheap and easy victory now gone, the Communist regime in the North made some far-reaching decisions which they made no effort to conceal.

At the Third Lao Dong (Communist) Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, Ho Chi Minh said that the North must "step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South." Other similar speeches were made, and at its conclusion the Party Congress called for the formation of a "National United Front" in the South. Three months later, that is in December 1960, Hanoi radio announced the formation of a "Front for Liberation of the South."

This is the origin of the so-called "National Liberation Front" in South Viet-Nam. It was then, and still is, a pure creature and tool of the North Vietnamese regime. Its so-called "leadership" contains not a single nationally known figure. In a true sense, it is as faceless to the outside world as it is to the Vietnamese people. Thus it is not a "national front," and it is certainly not a "liberation front," for its purpose has nothing to do with "liberation"—quite the opposite.

Of real significance on this point is the fact that no one South Vietnamese political figure of any note whatever has ever associated himself with the NLF. No member of any Saigon government has ever defected to the NLF. And religious, labor, and student leaders have consistently refused to associate themselves with the movement.

It is also important that we understand the distinction between the NLF and the Viet Cong armed forces. The NLF has little or nothing to do with the command of the

Viet Cong, especially the main force, or regular Viet Cong battalions and regiments in the South. These main-force units and other Viet Cong elements are supported, supplied, and controlled from Hanoi, and only Hanoi can direct them to cease their aggression. The NLF is purely the political facade or, as the name plainly states, the political front for Hanoi. It cannot bring about an end to the fighting. This can only be done by Hanoi itself.

Aggression From North Viet-Nam

The movement of military personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South became so flagrant after 1960 that it was noticed and publicized by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, which, as you know, is composed of India, Poland, and Canada.

The Legal Committee, with only Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

... there is evidence to show that arms, armed and unarmed personnel, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South.

... there is evidence that the PAVN (i.e., the North Vietnamese army) has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.

I might note that at that time there was not a single American combat soldier in Viet-Nam or elsewhere on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961 the North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the South. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964 North Viet-Nam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam. Today we have every reason to believe that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in South Viet-Nam. So you can clearly see that our whole involvement in South Viet-Nam

is based on the fact that the Viet Cong is not an indigenous revolt—quite the contrary. It is as much a case of outside aggression as if Hanoi had boldly moved those nine regiments in marching formation across the 17th parallel.

That is the heart of our involvement.

Question of a Coalition Government

Another question frequently raised in recent days is the attitude of the South Vietnamese toward now entering into a political coalition with the NLF or the Viet Cong as a means of bringing the fighting to an end.

To understand the attitude of the South Vietnamese leaders in this regard they do not have to refer to the experience of Czechoslovakia, Poland, or other such Western experiments in the postwar period. They look to their own experience.

The Hanoi government, or the Viet Minh, as recognized by the French in 1946, was originally a coalition of both Communists and non-Communist nationalists opposing the French. But the image of the Viet Minh as a true representative government vanished in the eyes of anti-French but non-Communist Vietnamese as they were systematically liquidated or expelled in the period between 1946 and 1950. Many of the political leaders I met in South Viet-Nam spoke with great bitterness of their experience in seeking to work with the Viet Minh during that period and of their relatives and friends who were dispossessed or assassinated as the Communists sought to establish their absolute control. It is thus not hard to understand how they feel on this subject.

It is also interesting to note what the Viet Cong has publicly said on the ways to gain control of the Government. They have said that there are three ways. One method is to have a general uprising if the proper political base can be prepared. In this they have clearly failed. Another method is the famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary guerrilla war; that is the strategy they are now pursuing. Or the third possibility is for

the Viet Cong to become a part of a coalition government. This they would clearly prefer if it became possible.

Also pertinent to the South Vietnamese attitudes is the brutality and terrorism which they have experienced at the hands of the Viet Cong. From 1958 to the present the Viet Cong has assassinated or kidnapped an estimated 61,000 Vietnamese village leaders and Government representatives. Just this last January, for example, Viet Cong terrorists massacred 26 men, women, and children and wounded 56 others in a brutal sweep 40 miles south of Da Nang. The Viet Cong has systematically intimidated anyone who had a position of leadership in the community. Their war is not just directed at the South Vietnamese Armed Forces but equally important against the administrative structure of the Vietnamese Government. One must bear this fact in mind when assessing the performance of the Vietnamese Government, which is also faced by the problems of any newly independent country, especially one that had no real preparation for independence.

The Common Commitment

Others have raised the question of whether the United States is fighting in Viet-Nam when the non-Communist Vietnamese will not fight for themselves—or whether the United States is “going it alone” in South Viet-Nam.

The simple truth is that this is just not the case. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces are at a strength of approximately 600,000 men. Eleven thousand South Vietnamese soldiers lost their lives in battle last year—and it is very much their cause. All but two members of SEATO are substantially and directly contributing to the cause, and one nonmember, Korea, has already contributed more than one full division and has announced plans to contribute another division of ground forces.

The Government of South Viet-Nam is very much aware that the battle they fight is only partially a military one. They realize that if they are to gain and hold the po-

litical confidence of an ever-increasing portion of the population they must assure that a real social and economic revolution takes place successfully in Viet-Nam. This is the problem that they took the initiative in discussing with us at Honolulu last month.⁴ I want to quote to you from the Declaration of Honolulu, for this sets forth more succinctly than anything else I know our purposes there:

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again:

to defense against aggression,
to the work of social revolution,
to the goal of free self-government,
to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease,
and to the unending quest for peace.

Of particular significance is the fact that this statement came almost verbatim from Prime Minister Ky's own opening statement at the conference. Prime Minister Ky and his government are keenly aware of the magnitude of the task they face.

The Saigon Government is faced with not only fighting a war but with making compatible the complicated regional differences between the Southerners, the Northerners, and the people of the center. They must deal with a great diversity of racial groups, such as the Khmers, Chams, Nungs, as well as the so-called mountain peoples.

Add to this the complication of the ever-growing refugee population. Even without the present fighting, they were already faced with caring for nearly 1 million refugees who fled to the South from North Viet-Nam following the 1954 Geneva agreement. In recent months hundreds of thousands of other refugees have left Viet Cong-controlled areas, particularly in the central part of the country.

Another significant but relatively unpublicized development in recent months has been the success of the *chieu hoi* or "open arms" amnesty program of the South Vietnamese Government. This is a program de-

signed to persuade the Viet Cong and their supporters to return their loyalties to the Government. While this program has been nominally conducted since 1963, it has this last year begun to enjoy the kind of success that had been hoped for.

The 1965 results are most impressive. More than 42,000 persons defected from the Viet Cong to seek Government protection last year. A substantial percentage of these were full- or part-time Viet Cong military and sympathizers. These figures represent a dramatic increase over 1964, and the first 2 months of this year indicate that the number seeking Government protection continues to grow.

In this connection you should not be misled by the figures sometimes published on so-called desertion rates in the South Vietnamese forces. As with any young army this is of course a problem and a serious one, but this should not be mistaken for popular sympathy with the Viet Cong. Many of these "deserters" are what you and we would term AWOL or "absent without official leave." Many return to their home areas to tend their crops and then reenlist in the citizens militia in a local unit, or return to their own units. Some leave to tend to family matters for a time and then reappear. Defection to the Viet Cong is very rare.

We are all hopeful that an ever-improving *esprit de corps* will steadily decrease the number of men who absent themselves in this manner.

Purpose of U.S. Air Raids

Now just a word on the bombing of North Viet-Nam. The purpose of these air raids has been and remains an attempt to restrict the ability of the North Vietnamese to move, equip, and supply their troops in South Viet-Nam. At no point has it been the mission of these air raids to destroy the North Vietnamese regime.

Our action has consisted of a careful, precise, and restrained application of air power against military targets and military lines of supply and communication in North

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

Viet-Nam. It is not directed at the civilian population of North Viet-Nam but at the means by which the Hanoi government is attempting to support its aggression in the South. It is not directed at the destruction of North Viet-Nam but rather at the will and ability of the leaders in Hanoi to continue their aggression.

While retribution or revenge is not its purpose, many of the people of South Viet-Nam feel that it is small repayment for what Hanoi's agents have inflicted on them over the years—the sabotage and destruction of the thousands of bridges, and miles of roads and railroad, and the tens of thousands of victims, military and civilian. I am satisfied that this action, together with the action in the South, ultimately will assist in demonstrating to Hanoi that their present course is untenable.

Bombing raids were suspended on December 24 and remained suspended until January 31. Many had said that such a suspension of air raids would open the door for negotiations with Hanoi. We had been told that such a move could possibly result in the suspension of North Vietnamese efforts to infiltrate South Viet-Nam or could reduce their attacks there. The result was quite the opposite. During the pause in the bombing, they stepped up their supply activities and made every possible move to reinforce their garrisons in the South. There was no reduction in the level of their terrorism and military activity in the South.

As their supply efforts intensified, our decision to renew the action against facilities and supply routes supporting their aggression in the South became imperative for the protection of all of the forces opposing the Viet Cong in the South. When announcing the resumption of air action, President Johnson said:⁵

Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world, but not in Hanoi and Peking. From those two capitals have come only denunciation and rejection. . . .

The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that was published 3 days ago. They persist in aggres-

sion. . . . Throughout these 37 days, even at moments of truce, there has been continued violence against the people of South Viet-Nam, against their Government, against their soldiers, and against our own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We yield to none in our determination to seek peace. We have given a full and decent respect to the opinions of those who thought that such a pause might give new hope for peace in the world.

Economic and Social Development

No one in the United States Government believes that the real victory in Viet-Nam is primarily to be a military victory. For we know that any significant, lasting peace—the kind of peace that will permit individual and social growth—is so intricately woven to the complex patterns of political, social, religious, and economic life as to make reforms in these areas mandatory, even while the necessary military pursuits are taking place.

You are all familiar with President Johnson's oft-repeated pledge of \$1 billion in economic aid to the Southeast Asian region, including the rebuilding of the war-torn land of South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. You know of the provisions recently made through the Asian Development Bank to further similar goals.⁶

In fact, even our programs and personnel are taking every opportunity to try to improve the poor economic and social conditions under which so many of the Vietnamese people live. United States armed forces have to date given medical treatment to 4½ million Vietnamese. They have distributed over 1,600,000 tons of foodstuffs plus 100,000 tons of other commodities. New hospitals are being built in many parts of the land. The United States AID Mission is rapidly expanding its medical assistance programs. During the past year these programs included training some 270 Vietnamese doctors and nurses, providing serum for the inoculation of 7 million persons, mostly children, and furnishing logistical support and medical supplies for Army

⁵ *Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 222.

⁶ See p. 521.

medical teams operating in six provincial hospitals.

On the conviction that a truly free people must be literate people, a significant portion of our aid to Viet-Nam is now in the area of education. School enrollment has dramatically increased so that now over 2 million students are enrolled in schools as compared to just over 1.3 million in 1960. With assistance from Australia and the Republic of China, we have produced some 8½ million school textbooks written in Vietnamese by Vietnamese educators for the benefit of these and future students. By the end of this year we hope that 14 million texts will have been distributed—at least four books for each child in school.

The Government of South Viet-Nam is keenly aware that economic growth and land reforms are imperative. The industrial production index rose 2½ percent between 1962 and 1964. Since 1957, 600,000 acres of farmland have been distributed to 115,000 farmers, and Prime Minister Ky has recently inaugurated a new phase of the program which will distribute a further 650,000 acres to some 150,000 farmers.

Herein lies the irony of the whole predicament. President Johnson pinpointed this for us in a speech last week⁷ when he said: "It is more than a shame; it is a crime—perhaps the greatest crime of man—that so much courage, and so much will, and so many dreams must be carelessly flung on the fires of death and war."

I am convinced that, with our continued support, these valiant and courageous people will be freed from violence and terror to pursue that normal life to which every man under God is entitled.

Part of the strength of these people without question is their patience and endurance. Theirs is the kind of patience and determination displayed in a letter recently received by one of my staff from an Asian student. The student, undaunted by the frustrations of learning English, wrote, "Slow by slow, in the long of time, we will success."

If Thomas Paine were alive today, he could indeed say that "These are the times that try men's souls." But which of us would not agree with the words of the late President Kennedy when he said, "I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation."⁸

The "14 Points"

The integrity of freedom and peace in Southeast Asia is no less important to free people than it was in Berlin or Korea. Aggression is no less aggression because it is taking place in what seems a distant Viet-Nam. We need not repeat the words of Neville Chamberlain, who described the German assault on Czechoslovakia as "a quarrel in a far-off country between people of whom we know nothing." Aggression is no less aggression because it moves by stealth beneath an Asian jungle cover or in the dark of the night.

The U.S. Government has and will continue to meet this situation soberly and responsibly, as I am convinced this is what the American people always expect of their Government. As with any enterprise worth our blood and treasure, there are risks. We have and will continue to do all we can to minimize these risks, but we cannot shrink from those not of our making, for to do so would leave the field to the aggressor. This, I am sure, is not the wish of most Americans. An essential element of this course is at all times to leave open the door to an honorable, just, and peaceful solution. This we have done and will continue to do. As Secretary Rusk said the other day, we have offered everything except to turn South Viet-Nam over to the Communists. It is my conviction that the American people do not want to do that. We ask for no surrender by Hanoi; we ask only that they stop what they are doing to the people of the South.

Our Government has made its position known repeatedly around the world in our recent and continuing peace efforts. Our of-

⁷ BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1966, p. 441

⁸ *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

officially stated position has come to be known as the "14 points."⁹ Perhaps a reiteration of these points is in order:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;
13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."¹⁰
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

I do not minimize the trials that may lie ahead. However, I do feel that the tide has begun to turn and that, with a determination and perseverance no less than that of the other side, we can achieve the objectives of ourselves and the free people of South Viet-Nam without a larger war. I am satisfied that the American people do have that determination and perseverance. When

Hanoi and Peking are convinced that this is the case, a peaceful solution can be found. I am sure that you join me in the hope that that day will soon come.

14 NATO Nations Declare Alliance Essential to Common Security

Following is the text of a joint declaration agreed upon by 14 member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was released simultaneously in each of the nations on March 18.

White House press release dated March 18

The following declaration has been agreed between the Heads of Governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the organization established under it are both alike essential to the security of our countries.

The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its efficacy as an instrument of defense and deterrence by the maintenance in peacetime of an integrated and interdependent military organization in which, as in no previous alliance in history, the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the organization are not merely instruments of the common defense. They meet a common political need and reflect the readiness and determination of the member countries of the North Atlantic community to consult and act together wherever possible in the safeguard of their freedom and security and in the furtherance of international peace, progress and prosperity.

⁹ See also *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

¹⁰ At a new conference on July 28, 1965.

President Hails Fifth Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated March 14

My fellow citizens of the hemisphere: Since becoming President, I have often restated my own, and our country's, resolute commitment to the goal of a better life for all the people of the Western Hemisphere.

Many Presidents have worked to shape that goal.

We are proud of the good-neighbor policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President Eisenhower broke new and fertile ground with the Act of Bogotá in 1960—an act growing from the understanding compassion of one people for another.

President Kennedy built on these efforts and gave them increased emphasis with the announcement of the Alliance for Progress on March 13, 1961, 5 years ago.

Today, by word and deed, Americans are helping to fulfill the hopes of those who have little and pray that one day they can have more.

The Johnson administration seeks history's description as a time when, the dreaming and the planning having laid the foundations, the doing and building were underway.

The last 2 years of this vast cooperative effort between the United States and the nations of Latin America are solid evidence that deeds are matching our words. During these 2 years Latin America has achieved a per capita growth rate of 2.5 percent. The average rate for the preceding 3 years was less than 1 percent. This recent increase of 150 percent is a fact which friends of the hemisphere must note with pride—and new hope for the future.

In fiscal years 1965 and 1966 those Latin American countries cooperating with U.S. programs of action are putting visible results before their people. Together we are:

- improving 7,000 miles of road
- building 130,000 dwelling units
- irrigating 136,000 new acres of farmland

—adding 530,000 kilowatts to power generating capacity

—providing classrooms for 1 million students

—building 450 new health facilities

—spending \$200 million to provide financing for expansion and construction of over 5,000 industrial firms

—spending \$250 million in providing agricultural credit to 450,000 farmers.

Equally important, reforms are changing and modernizing the institutions in Latin America essential to the growth of a sense of community that stretches throughout the hemisphere. Governments, business concerns, labor unions, and cooperatives are working with the people of our hemisphere to attain economic and social progress under free institutions.

—We are building the machinery of co-operation through the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.

—We are enlisting the support of private groups and voluntary agencies in ever-increasing measure. The Peace Corps, Partners for the Alliance, Council on Latin America, AFL-CIO, private foundations and universities are making vital contributions.

—We are introducing the principle of mutual aid among the Latin American nations. We are giving new energy to economic integration within Latin America. The Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro,¹ approved last November, gives impetus to these concepts.

—We recognize that fulfillment of all our goals will require continuation of our joint efforts beyond 1971. I said last November that the United States is prepared to extend mutual commitments beyond the period originally foreseen in the Charter of Punta del Este.² Self-help and mutual aid will be yardsticks in determining the scope of our contribution.

In country after country, nations in the hemisphere are acting to mobilize resources for public and private investment, to reform

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998.

² *Ibid.*, p. 987.

and modernize the institutions, to expand trade and market opportunities within and outside the hemisphere, and to provide a solid base for the support and cooperation of imported capital and technical assistance.

External support is also coming in increasing measure from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and its affiliates, and the United Nations. This support has increased by about \$200 million in the last 2 years.

For its part, the United States has already committed nearly \$5 billion to the nations of Latin America to assist them in their struggle to modernize and achieve a better life for their people. In recent months significant steps have been taken to give Latin America greater access to our markets:

—This administration has insisted that our participation in the International Coffee Agreement be more effective.

—This administration recommended the Congress withdraw the special import fee on sugar.

—This administration removed the quota restrictions on lead and zinc.³

After a temporary period of setback, there are now most hopeful signs of a renewal of large-scale private foreign investment in Latin American development, often in joint ventures with Latin American associates. Business leaders interested in Latin American investment have been invited to the Cabinet Room frequently to discuss steps to help the people of the hemisphere.

Three years ago the 19 Latin American countries were deeply concerned over their trade position in the world. During the past 2 years the trend has changed.

Our experts now predict that export earnings for 1965 will show an increase of \$1

billion over the 1963 level, providing additional resources for investment in development.

Yet we must do more than provide money and technical assistance and improve trade. Investments must be made directly in human beings. In every forum I have advocated and directed that American resources be invested in education, health, and improved living and working conditions. Such efforts are not easy to organize. They require the mobilization of human resources in scarce supply. But they are among the most rewarding of all investments.

Today I want to issue a new call to our sister nations in the hemisphere to enlarge our truly revolutionary cause—the cause of enlarging the lives of all our people.

I am determined to contribute America's resources to this spirit of change—a spirit now slowly, surely, confidently growing in the Western Hemisphere.

All of us in the Organization of American States have seen and understand the lessons of history. Together we are strong. Divided we are weak. Together we must shape the future to our hopes.

In every nation in the hemisphere the needs and the beliefs and the prayers are the same. We want peace and opportunity—the chance to live in dignity, to choose and plan and work and achieve the best for our families.

I believe that in the next 5 years we will see a continent constantly growing in prosperity and in unity, growing in its capacity to meet the desires and needs of its own people and in its contribution to peace and freedom in the world at large. That is what Bogotá and Rio and Punta del Este were all about.

For my own part, I want to help make all this a reality and “to create out of the human spirit, something that did not exist before.” This is fulfillment. And this is our commitment.

³ For a statement by President Johnson on Oct. 22, 1965, and text of Proclamation 3683, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 795.

America and Britain: Unity of Purpose

by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹

We are taunted by some that we are standing alone in Southeast Asia. This is obviously not true when we consider that your commitment in Malaysia and the commitment of the United States and its fighting allies in Viet-Nam are the major elements looking toward stability and resistance to aggression in that troubled area. The presence of valorous contingents of fighting men from the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, and, last but not least, the Government of South Viet-Nam is the soundest guarantee of an ordered and peaceful world that we have today. But even if it were true that we stood alone in Viet-Nam, we recall that England a quarter of a century ago proved to the democratic world that to stand and fight alone is not necessarily final proof of a country's immorality and decadence.

Professor A. J. P. Taylor, with whom one need not always agree, expressed it in rather epic fashion in his recent work *English History; 1914-45*. If I may quote him:

The British were the only people who went through both world wars from beginning to end. Yet they remained a peaceful and civilized people. Tolerant, patient and generous. Traditional values lost much of their force. Other values took their place. Imperial greatness was on the way out; the welfare state on the way in. The British Empire declined; the condition of the people improved. Few

sang "Land of Hope and Glory." Fewer even sang "England, Arise." England has risen all the same.

So writes Professor Taylor.

England stands and so does that alliance forged by our histories, by our literature, our cultures, by our peoples. Whatever our disagreements have been, they have never threatened this compact based upon mutual faith and trust.

For one thing, we are agreed on certain basic concepts of law and our dedication to the rule of law, both domestically and in the world. And we are agreed on the meaning of freedom, too. It was Abraham Lincoln who said that freedom seldom means the same thing to a wolf as it means to a lamb. Build a shelter to protect the lambs, and the wolves protest that the lambs have lost their freedom. Our peoples understand the true meaning of freedom and what must be done to conserve it. Unlike the Communist theoretician, Nikolai Bukharin, we are agreed that an unhampered multiparty system or a two-party system is an inseparable part of democracy. Before he died in one of Stalin's purges, Bukharin said about the Soviet Union, and I quote: "We might have a two-party system, but one of the parties would be in office and the other in prison."

A World of Interdependent Nations

Our involvement in Southeast Asia is no more in Southeast Asia than was your involvement in the Danzig Corridor an involvement in Danzig. Our involvement in Greece and Turkey in 1947 was not pri-

¹ Address made before the Pilgrim Society at London, England, on Mar. 4 (U.S./U.N. press release 4817).

marily geographic, nor was our involvement and yours during the 1948 Berlin blockade, any more than were your risks and your involvement for a decade in Malaya. Our involvement in Korea in 1950 and our involvement in the Cuban missile crisis were not merely geographic. All this should be obvious to anyone who has watched the free world since 1945 seeking peace and relaxation of tensions. Our involvements overseas have been uppermost a part of the integral concomitant of our search for peace, the consequences of a lesson learned and expressed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent upon the well-being of other nations far away. . . . We have learned to be citizens of the world. . . .

What President Roosevelt said in 1945 is as true today as it ever was. Should Britain have yielded to aggression in Malaya and have turned over the government to the Communist guerrillas as the sole representative of the people of Malaya? Yet voices are heard in the world today demanding sole representation be given to those who have unilaterally enunciated a doctrine of so-called "liberation wars" and by terror, subversion, intimidation, and infiltration now seek to enforce that doctrine in South Viet-Nam.

I'm sure you all remember what Alice tells the White Queen in *Through the Looking Glass*: that "one can't believe impossible things." To which replies the White Queen: "I daresay you haven't had much practice. When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."

There are moments when, in reading certain of the criticisms against our presence in South Viet-Nam, I feel that the White Queen would feel right at home with some of the critics, except that even she might be astounded at how many, many more impossible things they believe before and even after breakfast.

The most unspoken and unuttered—almost concealed—thought of some in the fight

against the American involvement in Southeast Asia is: First, America cannot win the war in South Viet-Nam; second, while South Viet-Nam or, indeed, Southeast Asia may be important to American interests, these areas are not crucial to those interests. Therefore, since we cannot win in a war theater where the territory is peripheral to American interests, let us retreat, let us withdraw with no further nonsense.

In my view, the complete answer is that there would be no greater danger to world peace than to start segregating mankind and the countries they live in as either peripheral or crucial. Perhaps in those halcyon days when the Congress of Vienna was the supreme example of intelligent diplomacy, such distinctions had meaning. The introduction of Marxism-Leninism into world society and the visible determination by its militant exponents to implement that doctrine through "wars of national liberation" has today obliterated such distinctions. So has the expansion of technology, which has made this a shrinking world of interdependent nations.

U.S. Seeks No Wider War

Some who question our involvement in Viet-Nam express their fears in terms of escalation of the war. No responsible official of my Government favors unlimited war nor is against a peaceful or "satisfactory" settlement. If I may say so, the real issue is withdrawal or resisting aggression until a just settlement based on principles is reached at the conference table.

President Johnson has said over and over again that we seek no wider war. In his address on the occasion of receiving the National Freedom Award just a few days ago, he said:²

First, some ask if this is a war for unlimited objectives. The answer is plain. The answer is "No."

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

Second, some people ask if we are caught in a blind escalation of force that is pulling us headlong toward a wider war that no one wants. The answer, again, is a simple "No."

We are using that force and only that force that is necessary to stop this aggression. Our fighting men are in Viet-Nam because tens of thousands of invaders came south before them. Our numbers have increased in Viet-Nam because the aggression of others has increased in Viet-Nam. The high hopes of the aggressor have been dimmed, and the tide of the battle has been turned, and our measured use of force will and must be continued. But this is prudent firmness under what I believe is careful control. There is not, and there will not be, a mindless escalation.

... some ask about the risks of a wider war, perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China. And again the answer is "No," never by any act of ours—and not if there is any reason left behind the wild words from Peking.

We have threatened no one, and we will not. We seek the end of no regime, and we will not. Our purpose is solely to defend against aggression. To any armed attack, we will reply. We have measured the strength and the weakness of others, and we think we know our own. We observe in ourselves, and we applaud in others, a careful restraint in action. We can live with anger in word as long as it is matched by caution in deed.

Attitude of Communist China

But President Johnson has spoken to ears which hear only the echo of their own doctrine. It is not Dennis Healey nor Robert McNamara but the Red Chinese Minister, Marshal Lin Piao, who wrote 6 months ago, and I quote:

We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, and suffering on the people. (But) the sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole nations. . . . war can temper the people and push history forward. In this sense, war is a great school. . . . In diametrical opposition to the Khrushchev revisionists, the (Chinese) Marxist-Leninists . . . never take a gloomy view of war.

Marshal Lin Piao's statement didn't come out of thin air. In his book *Problems of War and Strategy* Mao Tse-tung wrote, and this was before 1949:

The seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of an issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution.

When Mao wrote these words, he lacked

nuclear capability. Today the story is different, and the implications of his words and those of Marshal Lin are more dreadful.

Unlike Mao and the Chinese Communist leadership, we seek the path of peace and an end to the war. Our objective, unlike theirs, is limited, and our desire for peace is constant. And, therefore, consistent with and in continuing recognition of our obligation to world peace and our responsibility to open a door where possible to peaceful settlement, we have said that we are ready to go to Geneva to discuss peace in South Viet-Nam or any other part of Southeast Asia.

But it is said by some that American policy is not sufficiently defined. This I dispute. As one with some experience in negotiations, I would say that the matters of further definition at issue are better left to the negotiating table, particularly since we do not possess the mandate—nor would we assert one unilaterally—to determine the fate of South Viet-Nam without reference to the free expression of their will and determination.

We are taxed with being inflexible about Communist China, and it is said further that this is a barrier to peace. Yet I made clear, and most recently at the United Nations General Assembly, that we are ready to participate in an exploratory group, including Red China, to examine the prospects for a World Disarmament Conference.³ And, perhaps, I should remind skeptics that our diplomats have conferred with Red Chinese diplomats at the ambassadorial level on 128 occasions; the longest and most direct dialog of any major Western nation with Communist China. And we intend and we want to continue these meetings in the hope that something may come of them. We have invited Red Chinese journalists to visit the United States and determine for themselves the attitude of the American people.

I can assure you, the question of Communist China is surely one of the most freely discussed subjects in my country, as

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1029.

it is in your country. We have nothing to fear in our open society from contending opinions about China, or any other country. We are asked to reappraise our China policy. But when and where has Red China demonstrated by concrete acts its interest in a policy of conciliation which would justify such a reappraisal?

The torrents of abuse over Radio Peking, which intimidate no one, whether in Moscow, Paris, London, or Washington, voice hostility not conciliation. The cold shoulder to countries which have extended recognition to Red China does not encourage us to follow the example. Mass blatant intervention by force and stealth in Africa, in India, in our own hemisphere, call for resistance not recognition. Our admiration for the Chinese people has in no way been attenuated by the announced policies of its ruling caste. America is not engaged in any belligerent acts toward Communist China. It is Communist China, not the United States, which, by the belligerent doctrines of its present leadership, seems to have declared a permanent war of so-called "liberation" against its neighbors in Asia and against Africa, Latin America, and Europe. The recent setbacks experienced by Red China in these areas show the increasing awareness of many of the dangers to world peace and security of Chinese policy. It is being systematically rejected.

U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

We are ready peacefully to coexist with any and all countries regardless of ideology, but we are strongly of the view universally shared by many others that it is no longer possible to countenance aggression against peace-loving peoples under whatever pretext—"liberation" or so-called "peoples' wars." It has been suggested that in 1984 we shall intone: "War is peace, slavery is freedom"; but this is not 1984, and we do not intend to sit idly by and let 1984 happen.

We pray that there be no mistaking our resolution and purpose in Southeast Asia.

There is some dissent in America from our policies in Southeast Asia, but grave problems do not demand unanimity of opinion for their solution. We are a people of many opinions and of many voices. I believe in this freedom of expression as a great source of our strength. I would suggest, however, that Peking and Hanoi should make no mistake about America's basic unity of purpose in opposing force and aggression. They should not be misled by seeing in action a freedom they cannot understand and dare not allow.

There is a consensus in America in support of the policy of the United States in Viet-Nam, which policy I would summarize in this fashion:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam as soon as South Viet-Nam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Viet-Nam, that the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Viet-Nams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples and that the United States will honor the results of such self-determination.

The differences in our national debate are concerned with how these objectives are to be achieved, not with the objectives themselves.

Those who say that our Viet-Nam policies are the product of a sterile anticommunism misconceive our purpose and our philosophy. We believe in and we prefer our system, but we do not thereby seek forcibly to over-

throw or subvert Communist countries. On the contrary, we seek common understandings, common undertakings, and peaceful resolution of all differences. We have no designs on North Viet-Nam, a Communist country. We do insist that this Communist regime cease its attempt by force, terror, and infiltration to enslave South Viet-Nam.

We take our stand in Viet-Nam because we believe a minimum rule of law must prevail in the world. The rule of law today must be defined as providing that no nation may, by force or by the dispatch of troops across internationally recognized borders or demarcation lines, overthrow another government. If such a rule of law does not prevail, anarchy and, ultimately, war will replace an uneasy and less than universal peace.

That is why my Government regards the United Nations as a worthy instrument for the establishment of a rule of law. We realize that the U.N. cannot yet provide the final answer nor can it yet guarantee world peace, but this is not the fault of the U.N. As has wisely been pointed out, the U.N. is but the reflection of the world as it is. Sir Alexander Cadogan once pointed out that it takes a musician to get harmony out of a Stradivarius violin, but if he does not use it well, "there is no sense blaming the instrument—still less smashing it to pieces."

As I draw to a close, this would be the moment to conjure up wild images of a clock with the minute hand approaching the zero hour of midnight. We are far, far from such a reality. Because of some misplaced optimism? No, because I believe that mankind will not allow its noblest work to be extinguished in a puff of time; because, regardless of our differences in ideology, we know the awful fate which awaits us if we fail in our peacekeeping. Somehow I find solace in the words of our great Chief Justice John Marshall who wrote:

There are principles of abstract justice which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of His creature, man, and which are admitted to regulate in great degree the right of civilized nations.

And a great solace and hope comes from

this faith which our two nations have in each other. Our friendship and our respect for each other and for other peoples are in sharp contrast to those countries which, despite factitious ideology and vaunted idealism, have chilled comradeship into enmity and fragmented an awesome monolith into a cascade of polemical shards. Our own hopes have not been so ambitious. Rather it has been the modest ambition which Milton expressed in his *Areopagitica*:

For this is not the liberty which we can hope, that no grievance ever should arise in the Commonwealth, that let no man in this world expect; but when complaints are freely heard, deeply considered, and speedily reformed, then is the utmost sound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for.

These eloquent words speak for you as they do for my country and for those countries which enjoy and cherish and jealously guard a rule of law. It is for this faith that we do battle today as you have done in the past and will in the future.

United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Exchanges Agreement for 1966-67

Following is the text of a joint U.S.-Soviet communique released on March 19 (press release 59) after the signing of an agreement¹ on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields at Washington on that day.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have signed today, March 19, 1966, an Agreement on Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields for 1966-1967.

The Agreement was signed by John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, for the United States, and by A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United

¹ For text, see Department of State press release 59 dated Mar. 19.

States, for the Soviet Union. The Agreement entered into force upon signature with effect from January 1, 1966 and is the fifth in a series of two-year exchanges agreements between the two countries.² The first of these was signed in Washington on January 27, 1958.

The Agreement provides for exchanges in the fields of science, technology, agriculture,

public health and medical science, education, performing arts, publications, exhibitions, motion pictures, radio and television, culture and the professions, and athletics.

At the same time, as a part of the Exchanges Agreement for 1966-67, Agreements were negotiated between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as well as between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., providing for the continuance of contacts between American and Soviet scientists and scholars.

² For text of the agreement for 1958-60, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243; for 1960-61, see *ibid.*, Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951; for 1962-63, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5112; for 1964-65, see TIAS 5582.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences¹

Scheduled April Through June 1966

Inter-American Juridical Committee: Special Meeting . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . .	Apr. 1-30
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade: 2d Part of the Resumed 1st Session.	Geneva . . .	Apr. 4-13
UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning in Arab Member States.	Tripoli . . .	Apr. 9-14
OECD Agriculture Committee . . .	Paris . . .	Apr. 12-15
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 6th Meeting . .	Washington . . .	Apr. 12-16
Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group . . .	Geneva . . .	Apr. 12-16
First Pan American Congress of Soil Conservation . . .	São Paulo . . .	Apr. 12-29
The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Extraordinary Session.	The Hague . . .	Apr. 13-26
Economic Commission for Europe: 21st Plenary Session.	Geneva . . .	Apr. 13-29

¹ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Mar. 15, 1966, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April-June 1966. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these are referred to the *World List of Future International Meetings*, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT, International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IAIAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

ICAO Aeronautical Information Services, Aeronautical Charts Divisional Meeting.	Montreal	Apr. 13-May 7
ITU CCITT Study Group XI	New York	Apr. 14-22
IAIAS Governing Board: 5th Meeting and 11th Technical Advisory Council Meeting.	Bogotá	Apr. 17-24
FAO Group on Grains	Rome	Apr. 18-20
Inter-American Permanent Committee on Social Security: 13th Meeting.	San José	Apr. 18-22
IAEA Panel on Genetical Aspects of Radiosensitivity	Vienna	Apr. 18-22
FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program: 9th Session.	Rome	Apr. 18-26
PAHO Executive Committee: 54th Session	Washington	Apr. 18-26
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Subcommittee on Science and Technology.	Geneva	Apr. 18-29
FAO Meeting on Dairy Problems in Africa	Nairobi	Apr. 18-30
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission	Ecuador	Apr. 19-20
Special Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	Washington	Apr. 19-21
OECD Special Committee on Iron and Steel	Paris	Apr. 19-21
UNESCO Coordinating Council on International Hydrological Decade: 2d Session.	Paris	Apr. 19-25
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission	New York	Apr. 19-May 4
CENTO Ministerial Council: 14th Session	Ankara	Apr. 20-21
ECE Committee on Gas: Meeting of Rapporteurs on Natural Gas Reserve.	Geneva	Apr. 20-22
UNCTAD U.N. Sugar Conference: 2d Session of the Consultative Committee.	Geneva	Apr. 21-29
ECE Steel Committee: Working Group on the Steel Market	Geneva	Apr. 25-26
Inter-American Development Bank Board of Governors: 7th Meeting.	Mexico City	Apr. 25-29
ITU CCITT Study Group XIII	New York	Apr. 25-May 3
WMO/ECAFE Interregional Seminar (Assessment of Magnitude Frequency of Flood Flows).	Bangkok	Apr. 25-May 9
International Coffee Council: 8th Session	London	Apr. 25-May 13
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development	New York	Apr. 26-May 9
ECE Steel Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group of Rapporteurs on World Market for Iron Ore.	Geneva	Apr. 27-28
ECA Conference on North African Industrial Harmonization	Tangier	April
OECD Fiscal Committee	Paris	April
FAO Seminar on Cooperative Farming for English-Speaking Countries of Asia and the Far East.	New Delhi	May 1-5
FAO Maritime Safety Committee: Special Session	London	May 2-6
FAO Atlantic Tuna Conference of Plenipotentiaries	São Paulo	May 2-14
UNESCO Executive Board: 72d Meeting	Paris	May 2-31
UNCTAD U.N. Cocoa Conference: 2d Session	New York	May 2-June 3
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	May 3-5
ICEM Council: 25th Session	Geneva	May 3-14
ICEM Executive Committee: 27th Session	Geneva	May 3-14
19th WHO Assembly	Geneva	May 3-21
ITU CCITT Special Study Group B	New York	May 4-6
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices	Paris	May 4-6
2d Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor	Maracay, Venezuela	May 7-14
ECE Coal Committee: Group of Experts on Opencast Mining	Geneva	May 9-11
ITU Administrative Council	Geneva	May 9-June 10
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 4th Meeting	Edinburgh	May 10-13
Economic Commission for Latin America: 11th Meeting	Santiago	May 10-13
U.N. Committee on Space Research: 9th Plenary Meeting and 7th International Space Symposium.	Vienna	May 10-19
ECAFE Asian Development Bank: Preparatory Committee	Bangkok	May 11-13
ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 10th Meeting	Manila	May 11-16
International Secretariat for Volunteer Service: Council Meeting.	Warrenton, Va.	May 12-14
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 15th Session of Executive Committee.	Geneva	May 15-25
ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture.	Geneva	May 16-18
International Rubber Study Group: 18th Meeting	Rome	May 16-19
IMCO Council: 16th Session	London	May 16-20
BIRPI Committee of Governmental Experts on Administration and Structure Matters: 2d Meeting.	Geneva	May 16-27
ITU Seminar on Satellite Communications	Washington	May 16-27
UPU Executive Council	Bern	May 17-28
UNICEF Executive Board	Addis Ababa	May 19-28
FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Code of Principles Concerning Milk and Milk Products.	Rome	May 20-25
ILO Governing Body: 165th Session	Geneva	May 20-28

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled April Through June 1966—Continued

WHO Executive Board: 38th Session	Geneva	May 23-30
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	May 23-24
PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety	Washington	May 23-27
ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning	Geneva	May 24-27
ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Nationality and Registration of Aircraft.	Dakar	May 25-June 15
WMO Executive Committee: 18th Session	Geneva	May 26-June 10
PAHC Technical Committee on Financing	Caracas	May 31-June 3
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	May
U.N. Committee on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24).	New York	May
ECA Conference on West African Industrial Harmonization and Economic Cooperation.	Niamey	May
ECA Conference on Central African Industrial Harmonization and Economic Cooperation.	Léopoldville	May
GATT Consultations on Fresh Grapefruit	London	May
CENTO Council for Scientific Education and Research: 15th Meeting.	Pakistan	May
Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Session	Montevideo	May
OECD Working Party on the Adjustment Process	Paris	May
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II	Paris	May
OECD Conference on Utilization of Scientific and Technical Personnel.	Paris	May
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 33d Session	New York	May or June
FAO Group on Oils, Fats, and Oilseeds: 1st Session	Rome	May or June
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 40th Session	Rome	May or June
International Cotton Advisory Committee: Plenary Meeting	Lima	May or June
50th ILO International Conference	Geneva	June 1-23
ILO Governing Body: 166th Session	Geneva	June 1-23
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 16th Annual Meeting.	Spain	June 5-11
NATO Ministerial Council: 37th Meeting	Brussels	June 6-8
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 10th Session	Rome	June 6-9
ECE Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	June 6-11
6th World Forestry Congress	Madrid	June 6-18
UNCTAD U.N. Committee on Tungsten	New York	June 7-10
PAHC Technical Committee on Planning and Routing of Highways.	Rio de Janeiro	June 7-11
U.N. Development Program: Governing Council	Rome	June 13-14
ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs	Geneva	June 13-14
FAO Committee on Fisheries: 1st Session	Rome	June 13-18
UNCTAD Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes: 1st Session.	New York	June 13-23
PAHC Technical Committee on Terminology	Buenos Aires	June 14-18
ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Foodstuffs.	Geneva	June 15-17
ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods	Geneva	June 20-28
UNESCO/ECLA Conference of Latin American Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning	Buenos Aires	June 20-30
UNCTAD Expert Group on International Monetary Issues: 2d Session.	New York	June 20-July 1
FAO 2d World Land Reform Conference	Rome	June 20-July 2
PAHC Technical Committee on Development of Governmental Highway Agencies.	Lima	June 21-25
11th ITU CCIR Plenary Assembly	Oslo	June 22-July 22
SEATO Council: 11th Meeting	Canberra	June 27-29
Whaling Commission: 18th Annual Meeting	London	June 27-July 1
UNCTAD Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities: 1st Session.	Geneva	June 27-July 15
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 7th Session of Statistical Commission.	Bangkok	June 29-July 12
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	June
UNICEF Program Committee	New York	June
ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning	Geneva	June
OECD Special Committee for Oil	Paris	June
OECD Energy Committee: 9th Session	Paris	June
ECE Coal Committee: Subcommittee on Mining Problems	Geneva	June
ITU CCITT Asian Study Group	Tokyo	June
GATT Committee III on Trade and Development	Geneva	June
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	June

U.S. Welcomes Security Council Views on Viet-Nam Situation

Following are texts of a statement by Arthur J. Goldberg released at New York on February 26 upon receipt of a letter addressed to members of the Security Council from Akira Matsui, President of the Security Council.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4812

The United States welcomes the letter which the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Matsui of Japan, has addressed to its members at the conclusion of his consultations with them on the problem of Viet-Nam. On behalf of my Government I should like to express my deep appreciation and that of my Government for the high purpose, the zeal, and the objectivity with which Ambassador Matsui has pursued these consultations on so difficult, complex, and controversial a subject.

These consultations have demonstrated once again a legitimate and essential United Nations concern with the maintenance of international peace and security, wherever and however threatened. We are confident this will help to inspire Security Council members and others to continue and to intensify their efforts for a peaceful settlement.

Indeed, we are both gratified and encouraged that the Council's proceedings of February 1 and 2 and the consultations undertaken thereafter have revealed a substantial though not unanimous consensus on two points:

First, "There is general grave concern and growing anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a strong desire for the early cessation of hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam problem"; and

Second, "There appears also to be a feeling that the termination of the conflict in Viet-Nam should be sought through nego-

tiations in an appropriate forum in order to work out the implementation of the Geneva Accords."

My Government has consistently pursued these ends and still does so. In my statements to the Security Council in the debates on February 1 and 2 I said on behalf of my Government that we are prepared to go to Geneva at once to seek a settlement on the basis of and in implementation of the Geneva accords.¹ Indeed, it was with a profound desire and determination to move toward such a conference that my Government decided in late December of last year to undertake a peace offensive unprecedented in intensity and scope.

When that peace offensive was brutally rejected by President Ho Chi Minh in his letters of late January, we decided to invoke formally, as we had for some time sought informally, the assistance of the United Nations organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In taking this step, our purpose was to make it unmistakably clear that, despite Hanoi's rejection of our offers to negotiate unconditionally, their unwillingness to match in any way our unilateral reduction of military activities, and their continued insistence that negotiations are possible only after their sweeping preconditions are met in full, the United States will never rest and will leave no path unexplored until it has succeeded in its endeavor to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

We deem it of importance that a substantial majority of the Council supports the view that negotiations in an appropriate forum are the way to peace in Viet-Nam. While Hanoi has not responded to the United States invitation to such a peaceful settlement, it cannot be unmindful of this expression of world opinion.

President Matsui's letter properly points out that the Council remains seized of the problem. We shall continue to cooperate

¹ For background and texts of statements, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

with the other members of the Council in seeking other constructive steps toward peace in Viet-Nam.

The policy of the United States remains constant and may be summarized as follows:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam as soon as South Viet-Nam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Viet-Nam, that the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Viet-Nams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples and that the United States will honor the results of such self-determination.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR MATSUI

U.N. doc. S/7168

FEBRUARY 26, 1966

As you know, at the 1273rd meeting of the Security Council on 2 February 1966, following the adoption of the agenda for that meeting, namely, the letter dated 31 January 1966, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America (S/7105),² I suggested that informal and private consultations be held in order to decide on the most effective and appropriate way of continuing our debate in the future, and that, to this end, the meeting be adjourned until an exact date and time could be arranged for the next meeting.

That suggestion was approved without objection and it was so decided by the Council.

Pursuant to that decision, I felt obliged, as President of the Council for the month of February, to

make myself available in arranging the informal and private consultations envisaged by the Council in its decision. I have endeavoured to carry out this task with members of the Council both individually and collectively. I have also conferred with the Secretary-General, who has expressed to me his own views of the situation.

It is clear to me that members of the Council have every right to be informed of the results of these consultations. I feel, indeed, that it is my duty, as President of the Council, so to inform members.

A useful exchange of views has taken place; on the other hand, some serious differences of views remain unresolved.

The principal difference among members on the procedural question at issue relates to the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam at this particular juncture. Although it was felt by a number of members that the Council might find some way to contribute towards a solution of the Viet-Nam problem, others took the position that consideration of the problem in the forum of the Council would not be useful under present circumstances; some members, adhering to positions they had expressed when adoption of the provisional agenda was discussed on 1 and 2 February, did not choose to participate in consultations.

These differences of views have made it impossible for me to report, at this stage, agreement on a precise course of action the Council might follow. They have also given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time and, rather than a formal meeting of the Council, a report by me in the present form has appeared to be the most appropriate step that could be taken. I have decided, therefore, to take this step under the present extraordinary circumstances.

It would not be appropriate for me to refer, in a formal and public document such as this, to the views that individual members expressed in the course of informal and private consultations. Nevertheless, throughout the Council's proceedings of 1 and 2 February and the consultations stemming therefrom, I believe I could detect a certain degree of common feeling among many members of the Council which might be summarized as follows:

1. There is general grave concern and growing anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a strong desire for the early cessation of hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam problem;

2. There appears also to be a feeling that the termination of the conflict in Viet-Nam should be sought through negotiations in an appropriate forum in order to work out the implementation of the Geneva Accords.

It is my understanding that the Council, having decided on 2 February to place on its agenda the

² For text, see *ibid.*

item contained in the letter dated 31 January by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America (S/7105), remains seized of the Viet-Nam problem.

May I conclude by expressing my personal hope that efforts will be continued, within and outside of the United Nations, by whatever means may be deemed appropriate, to find an early, peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam question.

I am requesting the Secretary-General to reproduce this letter as an official document of the Council.

I avail myself, etc.

AKIRA MATSUI

President of the Security Council

TREATY INFORMATION

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With United Kingdom

Press release 57 dated March 17

On March 17, 1966, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce and British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Walston signed in London a protocol between the United States and the United Kingdom supplementing and amending the convention of April 16, 1945, as modified by supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954, and August 19, 1957,¹ for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

The new protocol,² upon entry into force, would effect substantive changes in the existing convention which are considered desirable because of basic changes made in United Kingdom tax legislation. Under the United Kingdom Finance Act of 1965, applicable with respect to profits earned on or after April 6, 1964, a United Kingdom cor-

poration tax was instituted as a major element of the British tax system.

The protocol will be transmitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹
Signature: Cyprus, March 5, 1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia (with a reservation), January 28, 1966.

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28, 1966.

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28, 1966.

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28, 1966.

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.²

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28, 1966.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Done at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 1931. TS 834.

Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28, 1966.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. TS 941.

Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28, 1966.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28, 1966.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1546, 3146, 4124.

² For text, see Department of State press release 64 dated Mar. 22.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹

Signature: United Arab Republic, March 17, 1966.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the international sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London November 1 through December 23, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5933.

Signatures: Argentina,² December 23, 1965; Australia, December 21, 1965; Belgium,^{3,4} December 22, 1965; Brazil,⁵ December 20, 1965; Canada, December 21, 1965; China,⁶ December 20, 1965; Costa Rica,⁷ December 6, 1965; Cuba,^{3,4} December 17, 1965; Czechoslovakia, December 21, 1965; Denmark, December 17, 1965; Dominican Republic,³ December 20, 1965; Ecuador,⁸ December 21, 1965; France, December 22, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany,⁹ December 16, 1965; Haiti, December 23, 1965; Hungary,⁷ December 16, 1965; India,⁸ December 23, 1965; Indonesia,⁹ December 21, 1965; Ireland,³ December 22, 1965; Italy,³ December 20, 1965; Jamaica, December 15, 1965; Japan, December 16, 1965; Madagascar,³ December 22, 1965; Mexico,³ December 20, 1965; Morocco,³ December 22, 1965; Netherlands, December 23, 1965; New Zealand, December 22, 1965; Nicaragua,³ December 20, 1965; Nigeria,³ December 21, 1965; Philippines,³ December 10, 1965; Poland,³ December 21, 1965; Portugal,³ December 22, 1965; Sierra Leone, December 21, 1965; South Africa, December 21, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, December 21, 1965; Tunisia,³ December 20, 1965; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,⁹ December 17, 1965; United Kingdom,⁶ December 23, 1965; Upper Volta, December 23, 1965.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 27, 1965 (TIAS 5898). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago February 8, 1966. Entered into force February 8, 1966.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul March 7, 1966. Entered into force March 7, 1966.

Mexico

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative meteorological observation program in Mexico, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico February 4, 1966. Entered into force February 4, 1966.

Sierra Leone

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of January 29, 1965, as amended (TIAS 5762, 5831). Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown March 10, 1966. Entered into force March 10, 1966.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3150, 4392), between the United States and Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio February 16 and 28, 1966. Entered into force February 28, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

³ Signature is made on behalf of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

⁴ With a declaration.

⁵ Subject to acceptance.

⁷ Subject to reservations made upon accession to the International Sugar Agreement of 1958.

⁸ Subject to the declaration and reservations made upon accession to the International Sugar Agreement of 1958.

⁹ Subject to reservations made upon ratification of the 1963 protocol to the International Sugar Agreement of 1958.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 80 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

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49	3/14	Rusk: Boston University School of Public Communications.
50	3/14	U. Alexis Johnson: Canadian Club of Montreal.
†51	3/14	Further removal of restrictions on U.S. exports.
*52	3/14	Program for visit of Prime Minister of India.
†53	3/15	<i>Treaties in Force . . . 1966</i> released.
*54	3/16	Heymann designated Acting Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (biographic details).
†55	3/18	Sisco: "Hard Work Ahead for the U.N."
†56	3/17	Rusk: House Foreign Affairs Committee.
57	3/17	Supplementary tax protocol with the U.K.
†58	3/18	Members of Board of Foreign Scholarships sworn in.
59	3/19	U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges agreement (communique and text).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Heart of the Problem

Secretary Rusk, General Taylor Review Viet-Nam Policy in Senate Hearings

This pamphlet contains the statements made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in mid-February by Secretary Rusk and General Maxwell D. Taylor in which they discuss the interests and involvement of the United States in South Viet-Nam.

In his testimony Secretary Rusk emphasizes that the issues posed in Viet-Nam "are deeply intertwined with our own security" and that "the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children must live."

Three basic issues are discussed by General Taylor: what we are doing in Viet-Nam, what we are doing it, and how we can improve upon what we are doing.

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April 11, 1966

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Our View of NATO

*Address by President Johnson*¹

Mr. Secretary [Secretary Rusk], ladies and gentlemen: I am very pleased to address the Foreign Service Institute this morning and to come here to meet with so many Americans that are preparing to serve their country abroad. As one who believes that we cannot shorten our reach in the world, I am greatly encouraged by the number and the quality of those who are studying at this Institute. You have the gratitude of your countrymen and my own assurance of support.

We have come a long way from the day that someone observed that some diplomat no doubt will launch a heedless word and lurking war leap out. That was more than half a century ago, when diplomacy was often war by another name.

Today your task is different. Those of you about to go abroad represent a continuity of purpose in a generation of change. That purpose is to build from reason and moderation a world order in which the fires of conflict yield to the fulfillment of man's oldest yearnings for himself and his family.

Your job, wherever you serve, is peace. That is the task that faces all of us today.

The question, as always, is, How? How do we, for example, maintain the security of the Atlantic community upon which so many of the world's hopes depend?

For the answer, we must begin with the gray dawn of the world of 1945, when Europe's cities lay in rubble, her farms devastated, her industries smashed, her people weary with war and death and defeat.

Now, from that desolation has come abundance. From that weakness has come power. From those ashes of holocaust has come the rebirth of a strong and a vital community. The Europe of today is a new Europe. In place of uncertainty there is confidence; in place of decay, progress; in place of isolation, partnership; in place of war, peace.

The Design of Collective Security

If there is no single explanation for the difference between Europe then and Europe now, there is a pattern. It is a luminous design that is woven through the history of the past 20 years. It is the design of common action, of interdependent institutions serving the good of the European nations as though they were all one. It is the design of collective security protecting the entire Atlantic community.

So I have come here this morning to speak

¹ Made before the Foreign Service Institute at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., on Mar. 23 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

to you of one important part of that design. I speak of a structure that some of you have helped to build: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Let me make clear in the beginning that we do not believe there is any righteousness in standing pat. If an organization is alive and vital, if it is to have meaning for all time as well as for any particular time, it must grow and respond and yield to change. Like our Constitution, which makes the law of the land, the North Atlantic Treaty is more than just a legal document. It is the foundation of a living institution. That institution is NATO, the organization created to give meaning and reality to the alliance commitments.

The crowded months which immediately preceded and followed the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty 17 years ago had produced an atmosphere of crisis. It was a crisis that was born of deep fear: fear for Europe's economic and political vitality, fear of Communist aggression, fear of Communist subversion.

Some say that new circumstances in the world today call for the dismantling of this great organization. Of course NATO should adapt to the changing needs of the times, but we believe just as firmly that such change must be wrought by the member nations working with one another within the alliance. Consultation, not isolation, is the route to reform. We must not forget either in success or abundance the lessons that we have learned in danger and in isolation: that whatever the issue that we share, we have one common danger—division; and one common safety—unity.

An Alliance To Keep the Peace

What is our view of NATO today? We see it not as an alliance to make war but as an alliance to keep peace. Through an era as turbulent as man has ever known, and under the constant threat of ultimate destruction, NATO has insured the security of the North Atlantic community. It has reinforced stability elsewhere throughout the world.

While NATO rests on the reality that we must fight together if war should come to the Atlantic area, it rests also on the reality that war will not come if we act together during peace. It was the Foreign Minister of France who, in 1949, insisted that to be truly secure, Europe needed not only help in resisting attack but help in preventing attack. "Liberation," he said, "is not enough."

The success of NATO has been measured by many yardsticks. The most significant to me is the most obvious: War has been deterred. Through the common organization, we have welded the military contributions of each of the 15 allies into a very effective instrument. So convincing was this instrument that potential aggressors took stock and counted as too high the price of satisfying their ambitions. It has been proved true that "one sword keeps another in the sheath."

War has been deterred not only because of our integrated military power but because of the political unity of purpose to which that power has been directed and bent. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the bonds of culture, of political institutions, traditions, and values which form the bedrock of the Atlantic community. There is here a political integrity and an identity of interests that transcends personalities and issues of the moment.

If our collective effort should falter and our common determination be eroded, the foundation of the Atlantic's present stability would certainly be shaken. The mightiest arsenal in the world will deter no aggressor who knows that his victims are too divided to decide and too unready to respond. That was the lesson that we learned from two world wars. Yet a nation—not by the action of her friends but by her own decision to prepare and plan alone—could still imperil her own security by creating a situation in which response would be too late and too diluted. Every advance in the technology of war makes more unacceptable the old and narrow concepts of sovereignty.

No one today can doubt the necessity of preventing war. It is our firm conviction that collective action through NATO is the best assurance that war will be deterred in the Atlantic world.

Look at the Atlantic community through the eyes of those who in years past have yearned for conquest. The sight is sobering. Integrated commands, common plans, forces in being in advance of an emergency for use in any emergency—all of these testify to a collective readiness and the integrity of collective purposes. To other eyes, NATO can only be a clear warning of the folly of aggression.

NATO today, therefore, must be shaped on the experience of the past. Reliance on independent action by separate forces—only loosely coordinated with joint forces and plans—twice led to world wars before 1945. But collective action has proved successful in deterring war since 1945—during 20 years of upheaval and grave danger. We reject those experiences only at our own peril.

Preserving NATO's Deterrent Strength

For our part, the United States of America is determined to join with 13 of her other allies to preserve and to strengthen the deterrent strength of NATO.² We will urge that those principles of joint and common preparation be extended wherever they can be usefully applied in the Atlantic alliance.

We are hopeful that no member of the treaty will long remain withdrawn from the mutual affairs and obligations of the At-

² For a joint declaration released by the United States and 13 other NATO nations on Mar. 18, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

lantic. A place of respect and responsibility will await any ally who decides to return to the common task, for the world is still full of peril for those who prize and cherish liberty—peril and opportunity.

These bountiful lands that are washed by the Atlantic, this half-billion people that are unmatched in arms and industry, this cradle of common values and splendid visions, this measureless storehouse of wealth, can enrich the life of an entire planet.

It is this strength—of ideas as well as strength of arms, of peaceful purpose as well as power—that offers such hope for the reconciliation of Western Europe with the people of Eastern Europe. To surrender that strength now by isolation from one another would be to dim the promise of that day when the men and women of all Europe shall again move freely among each other.

It is not a question of wealth alone. It is a question of heart and mind. It is a willingness to leave forever those national rivalries which so often led to the useless squandering of lives and treasure in war.

It is a question of the deeper spirit of unity of which NATO is but a symbol. That unity was never better expressed than when, at the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, a great French leader declared that: "Nations are more and more convinced that their fates are closely bound together—that their salvation and their welfare must rest upon the progressive application of human solidarity."

And it is to the preservation of human solidarity that all of our efforts today should be directed. So let all of you of the Foreign Service Institute make it your task as well as mine.

Thank you and good morning.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 25

Press release 71 dated March 25

Secretary Rusk: I regret any inconvenience that might have been caused by the change in the hour for our press conference this morning.

President Johnson and I went to Andrews Air Field to bid bon voyage to President Gursel of Turkey. President Johnson has been anxious to afford every hospitality and every facility to President Gursel, but the Turkish Government and people wanted him to return to the land of his birth and the country which he has served with such great distinction for so long. And we wish him a very safe and pleasant voyage.

This is my first press conference since the induction of Dixon Donnelley as Assistant Secretary [for Public Affairs]. Under his guidance I expect to have perhaps somewhat more press conferences than I have had recently. I will take my instructions from him on this matter. So you can put your pressures on him.

I am very pleased, and I know you will be, to announce that my friend Robert McCloskey is being promoted to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and will remain as Department spokesman. I am very happy to salute my colleague who daily runs the gauntlet and who has served us so effectively and with such distinction.

I think I won't take your time with opening statements this morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I suppose we can now expect much more detailed, comprehensive answers from Mr. McCloskey, with his increase in rank. (Laughter.)

A. Well, I notice his transcripts from time to time, and I think you can expect him to continue his sterling performance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you talk a little bit about United States policy toward Communist China, and particularly whether there is a prospect of changing policy on U.N. membership or on recognition?

A. Well, these are not questions that can be talked about solely from one point of view. These are not one-sided questions. Relationships involve the other side.

We have tried over a considerable period of time to find particular points at which relationships between ourselves and mainland China could be improved. We have had a long series of discussions in Geneva and Warsaw. I have personally attended the Geneva conference on Laos, and the Foreign Minister of Peiping was present.

We have tried to encourage exchanges of newsmen, doctors, and scholars, and weather information, and all sorts of things.

We keep running up against the problem of Formosa, and this is an issue which the United Nations will encounter. Basically, the authorities in Peiping indicate that there is no prospect for improved relations unless we are willing to surrender Formosa.

We have a major, far-reaching, and dangerous disagreement at the present time on Viet-Nam.

They have indicated to the United Nations that the expulsion of the Republic of China is essential if Peiping is to consider membership.

They have told the United Nations that the General Assembly must apologize for having called them an aggressor.

They have suggested a reform of the charter to throw out what they call "imperialist puppets." I do not know what percentage of the present membership would

President Gursel Returns To Turkey

Statement by President Johnson, March 25

Our distinguished friend, President Cemal Gursel of Turkey, came to the United States on February 2 for medical treatment. There was hope that new therapeutic procedures only recently developed in this country would be useful in treating his illness of several years.

We were initially encouraged by his progress at Walter Reed Hospital, only to be shocked by the news on February 8 that his health had suffered a grave new blow. Our best talent, coupled with the skill of the eminent Turkish doctors who accompanied the President, was exerted to the utmost in the hope that the President might return to his home in fully restored health. We are saddened that this hope was not to be realized.

We have been deeply honored to have President Gursel come to our country to seek medical treatment. As he returns to his homeland, our prayers go with him.

be excluded on that basis in their verbiage.

So while it is useful and important that Americans consider among themselves what our relations with China ought to be, or are, or have been, we who are in government must deal with these questions on the basis of the attitude of the other side as well.

Now, I think that it is quite clear, in view of what has happened even in the last few days, that the authorities in Peiping are not very easy to live with in the world. The Communist world has found that; the Afro-Asian world has found it.

The agreements that we have made in 1954, and in 1962, apparently are not very seriously considered in Peiping.

The offer of unconditional discussions or negotiations without preconditions seems to be of no interest.

So we will continue to work at this problem and think about it, and it is important that other people do. But those of us who are carrying official responsibilities have some rather harsh facts to come up against,

and we have to deal with the situation as we can find it. And we do not find at the present time a serious interest in Peiping in improvement of relations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in their latest comment the Chinese Communists claim that the United States and Russia are collaborating in an evil plot to encircle the Chinese mainland. Are we?

A. Well, I see no evidence myself of any conspiracy or a plot. I think it is true that Washington and Moscow understand very deeply what war means. When Peiping calls upon what they call the "revisionists" not to take such a "gloomy view of war," I think both we in Washington and our opposite numbers in Moscow are inclined to take a rather gloomy view of war, because we understand what it could mean.

But I know of no discussions between ourselves and Moscow that could be fairly interpreted as a plot between the two Governments against China.

I think there is a certain prudence in Washington and Moscow and a certain recognition of the importance of keeping the great forces of violence under control, which had better be there and which all of us hope will continue to be there.

As far as Washington and Moscow are concerned, as far as our side is concerned, we continue to look for particular points in which we might improve our relations. It is not easy, because there are some important differences between Washington and Moscow.

But the continuing charge of collusion by Peiping represents, I think, a special ideological attitude of the authorities in Peiping and a harshness and a militancy which is hard to reconcile with a serious interest in peace in other parts of the world.

Hope for Nonproliferation Treaty

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, do you think that we are any closer at this point to a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons?

A. Well, it is hard to measure these matters in relative terms—closer or further away.

I do believe—I say this sincerely—that both the Soviet Union and the United States and, indeed, Great Britain, France, possibly even Peiping, are agreed that it is not a good thing to see the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think on that central underlying attitude there is a recognition on the part of nuclear powers that proliferation is dangerous and undesirable.

Now, we hope very much that if we can all concentrate on the issue of proliferation and not draw in extraneous or irrelevant questions, we could move toward a treaty and solicit general acceptance throughout the entire world of the idea of nonproliferation.

That alone is not all that is required. We would like very much to get on with more serious questions in the disarmament field, such as the reduction of armaments. We were beginning to make a little headway on that question, possibly through what came to be called mutual example—that is, some turning down of defense budgets. But then the Viet-Nam matter arose in a way that halted that possibility.

The burden of arms in the world is simply too great to be accepted as a part of nature, and we ought to turn to it as quickly as we can.

But I hope very much that we can move toward a nonproliferation treaty and promptly, and I am convinced that we can if we concentrate on the issue of nonproliferation and not confuse it with issues which are irrelevant and which have nothing to do with proliferation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you give us your reading on the weight and importance to be attached to the decision of Communist China not to attend the gathering of the Communist parties in Moscow next week?

A. Well, since that Communist Party meeting will be opening in just a few days, it would be rather hazardous for me to make comments which might prove to be wrong

within the week, and naturally I am a little reluctant to do that. But I think what they said about not attending once more reflected the bitterness and the militancy and the suspicion and the hatred which we have seen so long from Peiping.

There is no problem of encircling Peiping if Peiping is prepared to live at peace.

We have ourselves alliances with Korea and Japan, Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand. Those alliances only become operative if there is aggression, if there is an attempt made by Peiping to use force against its neighbors and to bring those alliances into operation.

Now, I would hope myself that the authorities in Peiping would look back over the experiences of the last year or two and conclude that militancy has no future, that it will not be accepted by the peoples and governments of the world, whether in the free world or in the Communist world, and that the overriding consideration is to learn to live at peace with neighboring countries. On that basis, relations could improve and many things could happen.

But the world just is not prepared to accept the doctrines or the threats or the efforts of intimidation which are coming out of Peiping.

German Disarmament Proposals

Q. Mr. Secretary, the German Government today sent a note containing disarmament proposals. Would you like to comment on that note?

A. Yes. We received that note this morning about 10 o'clock, and I believe that it is public, or is being made public in the course of the day.

I have not had a chance to study it in detail, although there has been some discussion of these matters in the NATO Council. But in my first reading of it, it seems to me that it is a very constructive and forward-looking communication and it is worth very careful study.

I think all of you will wish to give it very careful thought, because it is a forthcoming

and I think important statement of German policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you been informed in any way officially or unofficially of any change in Hanoi's attitude toward negotiations?

A. No. I have seen some press speculation on that subject.

I have said many times that channels are open and that a number of governments are taking part in an effort to find a basis for a peaceful solution. But I have seen nothing unusual in the last several weeks that would indicate a change in that situation.

I am not aware of the intensive diplomatic activity of Hanoi to bring this matter to discussions, for example. I just do not know what this is talking about.

France and NATO

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, sir, where in your view the bulk of the NATO members now move in their relations with France? Is it primarily a question of negotiating a removal, or does the United States, for example, accept the French thesis that the troops in Germany can revert to the 1954 agreement?

A. Well, I think the parliamentary position is—the diplomatic position is that France has indicated to the NATO governments certain intentions. We have commented on those intentions, but we have not received from France detailed proposals which would be presumably needed for specific negotiation. I presume that we will be getting more details in the near future about just what it is that France has in mind.

I would suppose that when we get that information, then the NATO allies will be in touch with each other and that more systematic formal discussions with the French Government will then take place. But we do not have those, and until we do get them, I think it would be premature for me to speculate on just what they might contain.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has

the problem of the resumption of military aid to India and Pakistan before it. Pakistan this week displayed some weapons of Chinese manufacture. Does this complicate the picture for this Government in resuming military assistance to both of those countries?

A. Well, I think that is a matter that as far as we are concerned is deeply rooted in the prospects for peace in the subcontinent. We were encouraged by the Tashkent agreements. We hope very much that they will be pursued. Indeed, we have been very pleased to see that a great many of the things agreed upon at Tashkent have in fact been carried out.

We will continue to follow the situation very closely, but quite frankly we have not come to a conclusion on the particular question of military aid.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. Yes.

Q. Yesterday President Johnson and General de Gaulle talked about unprovoked aggression. Do you think that the implication of this term would change the commitment of article V of the NATO treaty?

A. Well, you will recall that over the past four decades or more, a part of the general phraseology of security questions has involved this phrase “unprovoked aggression.” You find it in the discussions of the 1920's and the 1930's and the attempt to organize security systems since the war. It is my impression that this phrase was a traditional phrase and was not intended to modify the NATO treaty. But that is a matter that can be clarified in the discussions which we expect to be having with the French Government over the next several weeks or months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell me if any consideration is being given to the recognition of Outer Mongolia?

A. The word “consideration” has turned out on occasions to be a booby trap. Yes, we do think about that from time to time, and we do have that in mind as one of the

questions on our agenda. But I am inclined to repeat to you the phrase which Mr. Cordell Hull used to use on about half the questions he got on his daily press conferences: "You can be sure that this matter is under the most earnest consideration."

Peiping's Isolation Self-Imposed

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to China a moment, much of the discussion that has been going on relates to the problem of American policy in the years after the present leadership of Peiping has gone, given the age of Mao and company. This has produced the theory or thesis of containment without isolation, which the Vice President seems to have embraced. Looked at from a longer standpoint, are you prepared to accept such a formulation?

A. Well, I think it is difficult to compress complicated matters into such few words. I think I have already pointed out that in connection with the word "containment" we have a series of alliances. Those alliances were made following World War II and some of them in direct response to the aggressive attitude of Peiping. Some of them came out of the arrangements which were connected with the Japanese Peace Treaty; others out of the settlement or the hoped-for settlement of Southeast Asia in 1954.

Now, we have alliances in the Pacific and in Asia, because we have a vital interest in peace in the Pacific and in Asia. So that if the sum total of our commitments in the Pacific add up to the word "containment," then I have no particular objection to it.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. —But on the question of isolation again, the efforts that have been made to break through this isolation have not been availing. We have made a number of efforts since I have been in my present position with little or no response from the other side. A good deal of this isolation is self-imposed, and we see evidences of that almost

every day. But perhaps this situation will change. I don't know what the next generation of Chinese leaders will look like. We have perhaps too little information on just who they will be and what their attitudes will be. But in the longer run, I cannot help but believe that all peoples and governments will recognize that somehow peoples and governments must find a way to live at peace with each other.

Q. Can you define for us what is the United States policy toward trade with Communist China by the countries in Western Europe, using the steel mill issue as an example?

A. Well, I commented on that recently. We would hope that those who are considering the type of trade with Communist China which might add to their sinews of war, which might add to their warmaking capability, would take into account the problem of peace in that part of the world and be cautious about entering into arrangements which would make it more difficult to organize and establish a peace out there.

I think steel is relevant to this. It is true that it is not—what is being considered—is not on the COCOM list, but nevertheless a substantial increase in the steel-producing capability of mainland China is not a very comfortable idea for us at the time when China is doing nothing to bring about peace in Southeast Asia.

U.S. Policy Toward Latin America Unchanged

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the Panama OAS Working Committee and in Buenos Aires also, there have been some suggestions the United States is blocking economic reforms in Latin America. Could you comment on that?

A. Yes. I will be very glad to, because there seems to be some rather serious misunderstanding or perhaps even misrepresentation on that matter.

I was myself at the Rio conference, and we made it very clear that we had an urgent and an elementary interest in rapid economic and social development in the hemi-

sphere. And indeed you will recall that at that conference, President Johnson authorized me to inform our colleagues in Latin America that we would be prepared to see the Alliance for Progress extended beyond 1961—1971—and on the basis of full self-help and mutual assistance.¹ One of the very important, and to me rather dramatic, developments at the Rio conference was the acceptance by all members of the hemisphere that each should try to help the other in whatever ways possible, and there are many ways in which the Latin American countries themselves are now helping each other in these matters of economic and social development.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. Now, there is no difference in policy. We are committed to rapid change in both the economic and social fields in Latin America. Now, when we get into specific questions of incorporating such ideas into treaties, then we do have to look at our own constitutional structure and the responsibilities of the Congress and the extent to which we can go in imposing limitations upon our Congress by treaty, in matters affecting such things as trade and aid. And so there is a technical and a structural problem for us on this matter. But as a policy matter, there is no retreat at all. The great impetus for change has been coming through the Alliance for Progress, much of it out of this country, but with warm reception and a general commitment on the part of others.

Procedures on Travel of Americans Abroad

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Could you explain to us with what justification and on the basis of what authority the State Department orders the shadowing of some American citizens traveling abroad?

A. In the first place, we don't order the shadowing of American citizens. Let me

just put that matter in a little context if I can. We have about 3½ or 4 million passports outstanding at any given time. We send a constant stream of messages abroad about the travel of Americans abroad. Most of these are on such matters as supporting the efforts of businessmen and their activities, or opening doors for newsmen who are traveling or ask for our assistance, and then we have cooperation with the other governments in the international field of dealing with certain types of crime and things of that sort.

Now, over a period of many years, we have cooperated with other agencies in carrying out their own responsibilities and transmitting certain messages. In the case of the type of thing you referred to, perhaps 8 or 10 of such messages might go out in the course of a month. One of our duties in the State Department is to support other agencies and departments of Government in their needs overseas. There are some 40 or more separate departments and agencies who do become involved in relations with the rest of the world.

Now, I have personally begun an investigation—an examination of this particular issue of what ought to be said, if anything, to our embassies abroad about individuals who are traveling there about which some questions might have been raised. I'm not satisfied that our present procedures are exactly what they ought to be. I will be discussing those with the Attorney General, and we will establish criteria.

For example, I can tell you quite frankly I don't believe that we ourselves, or anyone else, should be transmitting abroad unevaluated information which has not been subjected to a real judgment as a matter of policy here in Washington. But this is a very tiny fraction of the total problem of supporting our interests overseas and clearing the way for the maximum enjoyment of the privileges of travel by American citizens.

I do intend looking this over, and I am sure the Attorney General agrees with me that we must give every protection to the legitimate rights and privileges of Ameri-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

can citizens in their travels abroad. I can't go into detail about what I will think about the particular incidents that have been reported, but I am looking into it personally and will be in touch with the Attorney General about it.

Q. Can you make a statement of public policy when you're finished with this review?

A. Well, that question will be one of those questions to be examined, Mr. Roberts [Chalmers Roberts, the Washington Post].

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Back in the early fifties, during the Harry Dexter White case, J. Edgar Hoover, testifying on the Hill, insisted that the FBI never did any evaluation but only collected material. Would you say that to characterize a man in an outgoing cable as having deep pro-Communist convictions was an unevaluation?

A. Well, I said in my remarks just a moment ago that I have serious doubts about whether we should pass along unevaluated information in this field. Now, I do want to be very precise about one point. We were not asked to conduct an investigation of anyone traveling abroad. And we have not asked our embassies to conduct an investigation of anyone traveling abroad. There is no question of surveillance, of tailing. The only question involved was—if you have any information, then pass it along. That was what was involved. But not a matter—we don't have facilities, for example, for such investigations or for a surveillance of people overseas.

Q. Did not that March 6 airgram request the Embassies in London—rather, in Paris and Moscow—to oversee the activities of this man in Moscow and to watch out?

A. No, not in the sense of surveillance or tailing or anything of that sort but rather to report if any information in that field were turned up. But, again, I want to look at that, because I think that these matters

do require evaluation. We are not ourselves—we have no responsibility ourselves for making such evaluations about citizens generally. Our own investigations, of course, are limited to our own employees and the maintenance of the security of our own Department, where almost every job is sensitive and where we recognize that there are continuing efforts to penetrate the Department.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. But this is something we will be looking into. I will personally be getting into it, because I feel very strongly that in these fields where we are in the most direct relationships with large numbers of citizens of our own country with respect to passports, and large numbers of citizens in other countries with respect to visas, that we should be fully alert to the policy implications and that we should have the procedures—and, if you want to call them that, even the routine procedures which are appropriate in our kind of system.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may return to NATO, could you give us a general idea of ways and means under consideration by your Government to strengthen and possibly extend the integrated structure of the alliance?

A. I think that I would not add anything to what President Johnson said last Wednesday² on that subject. We are discussing these matters with other allies. I think that there is no question that the overwhelming majority of the allies are determined to proceed with NATO on a strengthened basis, not necessarily because we think there has been a heightened threat from anywhere but because we think that the unity and the strength of NATO is a very vital part of deterring such threats and providing a basis from which one can hope to improve relations with, for example, Eastern Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Portuguese Premier

² See p. 554.

Salazar has expressed a dissatisfaction with NATO, and I was wondering whether Portugal has given any official indication of this either to the United States or other members of NATO, and do you see this as a further erosion of the organization?

A. I don't know what details Dr. Salazar might have had in mind. Portugal did take full part in the discussions that occurred in the NATO Council before the 14-nation declaration was made, and they adhered to that declaration.³ Of course, we have said for some years, literally years, that if any members of NATO wished to make suggestions about improving the organization and the structure of NATO, we would be very glad to consider them. But I have heard no details on what might be behind Dr. Salazar's remark.

Yes, sir?

The Situation in South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reading of the seriousness of the current series of demonstrations in South Viet-Nam? Is Premier [Nguyen Cao] Ky's government in trouble in your estimation?

A. Well, I think what is involved there is the fact that some weeks ago—and again in Honolulu⁴—Prime Minister Ky announced that he expected to move toward a council of some sort that would draft a constitution, that that constitution would be submitted to the people of South Viet-Nam on plebiscite, and that this would be followed by elections.

Now, the opening up of this path toward a more representative system there has undoubtedly led to certain discussions among

groups about what their positions are likely to be as that development goes forward. This is primarily a matter for them to work out among themselves, and they are in regular contact with all groups out there. We, of course, would hope very much that, whatever their differences might be among themselves about the details of their internal organization, they would not lose sight of the thing in which they all seem to agree, and that is that they don't want what Hanoi is trying to impose upon them. So we would hope this matter would settle down to a generally agreed basis before too long.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is recognition of Outer Mongolia in any sense an early possibility?

A. I wouldn't want to speculate on that question in terms of timing. As I say, this is one of those questions that we have not overlooked. We, too, are aware that the question is there. But I wouldn't want to speculate on it at this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. On the steel mill again, the German Government, after it first informed you about the upcoming deal, seemed to have the impression you had no objections but only pointed out the possibility of negative reactions in U.S. public opinion. Is that about correct?

A. Well, I don't want to get into what might have been said between the two Governments. We do discuss these matters, and we are discussing these matters. But what I suggested the other day was that we would hope that those who consider such undertakings think soberly about questions of timing and questions of the general peace in the area.

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation"

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on March 20 on the Columbia Broadcasting System's television and radio program "Face the Nation." Interviewing the Secretary were Martin Agronsky and Marvin Kalb of CBS News and Adalbert de Segonzac, North American correspondent for France-Soir.

Press release 61 dated March 21

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, we understand that in the past 6 weeks there have been repeated American efforts to start negotiations with Hanoi. Have there been new American efforts? Have they improved the prospects for negotiating the war?

Secretary Rusk: Actually, Mr. Agronsky, there has never been a time when there was any lack of contact with the other side. I don't identify anything special in the last 6 weeks. There have been many contacts with the other side, direct, bilateral, or through the efforts of third governments. Our problem is that, with all of these contacts, we have not yet found a desire for peace on the other side.

[Announcement.]

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, since we apparently have had no success with our own efforts, and the third governments on our behalf have had no success, what do you think of the proposal of New York's Republican Senator [Jacob K.] Javits today that the United States seek unconditional discussions with Red China now with the aim of ending the Vietnamese war?

Secretary Rusk: Well, this has not been in the way at all. We have in fact publicly and privately indicated that we would be prepared for unconditional discussions or, as

17 nonaligned nations put it, negotiations without preconditions.

We had our last talk with Peiping directly, bilaterally, last Wednesday in Warsaw. We are prepared to sit down at the table and talk if someone is prepared to come to the table and talk with us. But thus far we have no one at the table. As I have said many times, I would be in Geneva tomorrow afternoon if there was someone there to talk to.

Now, the question of conditions to such talks is not necessarily a real problem. We would be prepared to come to the table and let everyone say what is on his mind without any limitations or conditions of any sort whatever. When everyone has said what he has to say, then we could take a look at everything and see whether there are any threads out of which some sort of a peaceful solution can be woven. But we had talked with Peiping many times. We had the 129th bilateral meeting with their Ambassador last Wednesday in Warsaw. We are prepared to come to a conference on South-east Asia or any part of it. We are prepared for informal, private, discreet, preliminary discussions. But the difficulty is that the other side keeps hanging up the phone. It is hard to get anybody to the table to talk.

Mr. de Segonzac: Was this subject raised, this possibility of talking, of free talks, raised with the Chinese in Warsaw by your Ambassador?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the very fact that we sat down with them for a considerable period for bilateral talks indicated that we were prepared to talk, and I would hope these bilateral talks would go ahead, because even though we haven't made much progress in 129 talks, it is important that

we and Peiping keep in touch with each other. As a matter of fact, we have been in touch with them on more serious subjects and more persistently than perhaps any government that has diplomatic relations with Peiping, except perhaps with the Soviet Union. But we are prepared to discuss any question with Hanoi, Peiping. We have tried to talk about disarmament. We have tried to talk about Southeast Asia. We have tried to talk about a lot of things. But we don't get much response.

U.S. Policy Toward Communist China

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, last weekend Vice President Humphrey said that American policy toward Communist China might be described as containment but not necessarily isolation. Would you agree with this general summation of our policy toward the Communist Chinese?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that is a very shorthand way of saying it. Let us take the two words separately. "Containment." One does not have to go into some general theory of containment. The United States has specific alliances with Korea, with Japan, the Philippines, with Thailand, Australia, New Zealand. South Viet-Nam is a protocol state under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Now, the United States inevitably is concerned with peace in the Pacific. We are not just concerned with the Atlantic. We are a two-ocean country. We have to be. And that was demonstrated during World War II. So we have specific commitments and alliances, and we intend to make good on them.

Now, if one wants to summarize that by calling it containment, all right, that is it. On the question of isolation, we have tried for a period of 12 years to try to establish some sort of contact that would break through this sense that mainland China and the United States were not in contact with each other. President Eisenhower initiated these talks with Peiping. We tried first to rescue some of our Americans on the mainland, which is a fundamental obligation. We

tried to get a renunciation of force in the Formosa Straits between Formosa and the mainland. We have tried to exchange news-men. We will give any of you, three of you gentlemen, a passport today if the other side will give you a visa. We have tried to exchange doctors, scientists. We have tried, suggested, the exchange of scholars.¹ We have suggested the exchange of weather information. We have tried to break through some of these overriding political considerations to establish some direct and practical and operational contacts with the other side. But thus far the answer has been: "Unless you are prepared to surrender Formosa, there is nothing to talk about."

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, the critics of the administration on this whole China problem these days say that many of these overtures by the administration are, as they describe it, token overtures and that the root issues such as China's admission to the United Nations possibly or American diplomatic recognition are not really the issues that the administration is directing its attention toward.

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is—in the first place these overtures are in no sense in bad faith. These overtures have been in good faith, trying to establish some better contact with the people on the mainland. But it is true that on questions of recognition in membership in the United Nations, you come up against a hard question posed by Peiping, not by us. They say that there is nothing to discuss until we are prepared to recognize Peiping and surrender Formosa. Now, when we say that we are not prepared to surrender Formosa and the 12 or 13 million people on it, then the conversation gets to be very difficult.

In the United Nations there are a good many states there who would be prepared to vote for the admission of Peiping but who would not be prepared to expel the Republic of China on Formosa, and Peiping has made it clear that they are not prepared to come

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 28, 1966 p. 491.

into the United Nations on any such basis; so that everybody is confronted with the question, What do you do about the Republic of China on Formosa? Do you surrender these people or not? We are not prepared to surrender them. And that means, unfortunately, that there is very little prospect that the authorities in Peiping will be interested in improved relations between themselves and us or indeed any real participation in the international community.

Mr. Agronsky: Have we ever positively proposed the two-China solution?

Secretary Rusk: Both the Republic of China on Formosa and Peiping have completely rejected the two-China solution. Therefore, this is a fairly hypothetical and academic problem. We do not believe ourselves that Peiping shows any interest in this. There are major charter problems in the United Nations on the two-China solution, but there is no indication that Peiping will accept it or have any interest in it.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. Secretary, some of your allies have taken a different tack than the United States. Germany, for example, in the last few days has announced a deal of a steel mill with China. They seem to be putting trade ahead of discussions on recognition purposes. Do you feel, one, they are wrong, and two, that this may be another way for the United States to move—in trade?

Secretary Rusk: We would hope that our friends in Western Europe who have been engaging in these conversations about a steel mill would, when the time comes for action, take into account the problem of peace in the Pacific Ocean area and consider whether in fact Peiping is willing to live at peace with its neighbors in the Pacific. Trade, as such, is not an insuperable obstacle. President Kennedy at one point, you remember, in a press conference said that if we had an inquiry from Peiping about buying wheat in this country, we would give it consideration. But we are concerned about anything that would lead Peiping to believe that their policy is successful or anything that would add to the

strength of Peiping until there is some indication of change in their policy. So I would hope that our friends in Europe would keep this matter under review and before they get into a situation where they are producing 2 million tons more of steel for Peiping that they would give some thought to the problems of peace.

No Change in Peiping's Attitude

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, throughout the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings last week, when these Chinese experts were testifying, the implication through all the time was that we should re-evaluate American policy toward Communist China. The time had come for a reappraisal, for a new approach. Do you subscribe to that?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we appraise these things all the time, Martin. We have experts on China in Government. They are very accomplished and dedicated experts. But these are not questions that we can sort out by discussions simply among Americans, because there is Peiping. Now, we are dealing with a regime which has been thrown out of several countries in Africa, which had a debacle in trying to organize an Afro-Asian conference in accordance with their own views, which threatened to intervene in the India-Pakistan affair, which had a major setback in Indonesia because of their attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of that country, which has blocked the path for discussions or a conference on Southeast Asia.

Now, we have to deal with the attitudes of Peiping. It is not just a question of debating among ourselves, because those who say "Let's be nice to Peiping" can't speak for Peiping, and they are not able to deliver a different attitude on the part of Peiping.

Now, we are in touch with Peiping all the time. We have professional, direct, realistic conversations with Peiping, and so these are not matters that can be resolved solely by discussions on the American side. The Peiping factor has to be taken into account.

Mr. Kalb: Just following up that very

point, Mr. Secretary, does that mean that if there were a change of heart, one that we could detect, in the attitude of Communist China, changing its policy of belligerencies, would we be prepared as a nation to receive that change and make adjustments thereto?

Secretary Rusk: Well, when you speculate about a future policy of Peiping, you are getting into a hypothetical situation. But let me talk now about our side.

President Johnson, President Kennedy, President Eisenhower, and President Truman, in this postwar period, have always left open the door to peaceful relationships. They have always left it open. Now, if there is any indication that Peiping is prepared to live at peace with its neighbors—Mr. John Foster Dulles commented on this at one point—if there is any indication that Peiping is prepared to live as a loyal and decent member of the world community, then other possibilities do open up.

But I don't want to speculate on that unduly, because we see no indications from Peiping that they are prepared to be an active and a loyal member of the world community.

Let's take the recent Security Council consideration of the India-Pakistan affair. Had Peiping been sitting in the Security Council, they would have vetoed what otherwise was the unanimity of the Security Council on measures to bring India and Pakistan to a peaceful conclusion. Now, Peiping has not gotten along very well in the Communist bloc, in which it has been a member. It hasn't gotten along very well in the Afro-Asian world, in which it has been a regular attendant. So we have, on the official level—we have to consider Peiping, their attitude, what they are prepared to do, what their approach is, and not just think about it in terms of how we ourselves would debate this among Americans.

Mr. de Segonzac: On the other hand, Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a reassessment in Peiping of their actual policy. They have had a certain number of defeats, and they seem to be worried about it. Also,

Professor [Morton H.] Halperin, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the other day that the Chinese are frightened of being attacked by America. Wouldn't it be the moment to try and do something which can make them feel, if there is a group of doves in Peiping, to give them some support so as to bring that change of mind which you are looking for?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we haven't heard the flutterings of the wings of doves in Peiping, I must confess. They have put forward their program of world revolution with a militancy that has caused very great problems even inside the Communist world, quite apart from the problems it has caused in the free world.

Now, again, we are in regular contact with Peiping. But they keep coming back to one or two very fundamental questions: "Are you prepared to surrender Formosa?" Our answer to that is, "No, we are not." "Are you prepared to accept Hanoi's program for South Viet-Nam?" Our answer to that is, "No, we are not." Now, in the face of this, Peiping's attitude toward us is very adamant.

Now, the other countries, including yours, Mr. de Segonzac, who have diplomatic relations with Peiping—the conversations there are desultory and unimportant. There is no real contact between London, Paris, and these other capitals with Peiping. Maybe we in the United States have a special problem with Peiping, because when the Communists first came to power in 1949, their first object was to erase all traces of 100 years of good relations between the Chinese and the American people. There was a very affectionate relationship there. It reflected itself in health, in education, and in all sorts of ways.

We pursued the open-door policy, and we were opposed to the carving out of special spheres of influence in China by other world powers.

The Chinese even charged that the Peiping Union Medical College, which is a very distinguished medical institution in China, had engaged in human vivisection, in order

to discredit the American friendship with the Chinese people. So maybe we have a special problem. We cannot accept their attempt through Hanoi to seize South Viet-Nam. We cannot accept their effort to bring about the surrender of Formosa.

Under those circumstances, I can tell you that our relations with Peiping are difficult, and we don't see openings offered by Peiping that respond to the gestures and the openings or the probes which we have made on our side for the past 10 years.

Political Situation in Viet-Nam

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-Nam for the past week or so there have been reports of some considerable political unrest. I wonder, sir, if you can give us a progress report on how serious these were.

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the first place, Marvin, there are differences of view among different groups in South Viet-Nam on how South Viet-Nam itself should be organized and governed—the Buddhists and the Catholics and the sects and the *montagnards* and the other elements there. But there is one thing on which they seem to be united, and that is that they do not want Hanoi; they do not want the Viet Cong.

Now, Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky and his government have announced in recent weeks, and reaffirmed that at Honolulu,² that they wanted to move toward the drafting of a constitution this year, the submission of a constitution to the people of Viet-Nam this year, looking toward elections next year.

Now, in the process in moving toward a more democratic situation, the groups in South Viet-Nam want to know where their interests are and how they can maneuver and jockey for position. But I have no doubt at all that Buddhists, Catholics, and all the rest of them combine in rejecting Hanoi and the National Liberation Front.

And just today we had word that the Buddhist leaders in Saigon had indicated that they were not trying to upset the Government; but they are interested, as every-

one else is there, in how this process of building a constitutional and civilian government will in due course come about.

Mr. Kalb: Do you think that we are over the hurdle on this?

Secretary Rusk: Well, one keeps one's fingers crossed, quite frankly. But the one thing that the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese are united on is that this attempt by the Liberation Front and Hanoi to impose a political solution in South Viet-Nam by force must be rejected. And we would hope therefore that all of them would continue to join in resisting this effort by Hanoi. And then when they get a secure country of their own, then they can afford to sort of quarrel about who runs it and what their own internal affairs might be.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of confusion about where the administration stands at this point on the inclusion of the Viet Cong in peace negotiations. Where do we stand at this point?

Secretary Rusk: I think the basic position on that was stated by President Johnson last July³ when he said that if Hanoi stopped its aggression, that there should be no insuperable obstacle in permitting the views of the Viet Cong to become known.

Now, we start, Martin, from the basic knowledge, it is not just an assumption or speculation, the basic knowledge that the Liberation Front was a creation of Hanoi and that the Liberation Front is directly connected with the aggression being pushed by Hanoi against the South Vietnamese. Now, if Hanoi decides to stop its aggression, the infiltration of men, units, and arms into South Viet-Nam, then a good many other questions would fall into place.

You and I can't negotiate that question, because you and I cannot stop the shooting. I would be prepared tomorrow in Geneva to sit down with representatives of Hanoi and talk to them about this and any other questions they want to talk about.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

³ At a news conference on July 28, 1965.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, there are many more things we want to question you about. We will want to resume the questioning in a moment. [*Announcement.*]

France and the NATO Alliance

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, France's President de Gaulle has argued that one of the reasons he wants to pull French forces out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is that NATO no longer corresponds to present-day realities. Would you agree?

Secretary Rusk: Not really, because I can recall as late as 1961 and '62 that we were involved in a major crisis over Berlin. At that time the Soviet Union was threatening war if the West did not pull its troops out of Berlin, and I might say that at that time France was unwilling to take part in any discussions with Moscow to try to take the fever out of that situation and left it to the United States and the United Kingdom to engage the Soviet Union to try to resolve that crisis. I think it is too soon for us to say that there is a disappearance of the threat from Eastern Europe against Western Europe. I am aware of the fact that the air of tension has been diminished, that we do see some improvement in the situation, and I would hope that that would continue.

Mr. Agronsky: Do you feel that the Soviet Union still presents an aggressive threat to Western Europe?

Secretary Rusk: When Mr. Khrushchev was 70 years old we all celebrated his 70th birthday as an affable grandfather, but when he was 68 and a half years old he put missiles into Cuba, and when he was 67 years old he threatened President Kennedy with war if we did not pull our people out of Berlin; so I just do not think that we know enough about what can happen in the future.

I do believe, Martin, that in the West we have achieved three great central ideas:

That the deterrence of war in the North Atlantic community is a collective effort—

and we have invested enormous resources in that; the defense budgets of the United States alone since 1947 have amounted to something like \$850 billion;

That the determination to fight together in the event of a crisis is a collective effort;

And third, that the great issues between East and West have to be resolved on a collective basis.

And I think that one of the reasons why one can now quarrel a little bit about NATO is that it has succeeded. It has been an organization for peace. And since the threat has been apparently somewhat diminished, there is a certain luxury in turning to lesser questions and raising other issues outside the framework of an overwhelming threat from the East.

Mr. de Segonzac: You feel that the air of tensions, as you said, have diminished, NATO should stay exactly as it is, or that there should be some modifications such as, for example, including Asia in the responsibilities of the Europeans?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I do not believe that the NATO alliance itself should be extended geographically to include Asia. We have never suggested, for example, that Viet-Nam was an issue involving the NATO alliance as such.

We do think that every nation must consider as a matter of national interest what kind of result in these other parts of the world they consider would be in their national interest. But I must say that I do believe that it is vitally important for the 15 nations of the West to act in concert on the major issues that might obtain between, say, Western Europe and Eastern Europe and on the security of the area of the 15 nations, and the 14 have made it very clear that they do not really accept the announced intentions of President de Gaulle with respect to NATO.

Mr. Agronsky: Gentlemen, I am very sorry that our time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us to "face the nation."

Hard Work Ahead for the United Nations

by Joseph J. Sisco

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

I am fully aware of the tremendous contributions made to American education by the National Education Association and its various departments, such as the American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation. I just want to add my own note of appreciation for your efforts. Your work, inasmuch as it concerns itself with the building of a healthy youth and consequently a healthy America, is broadly related to my own. For the success of our foreign policy is intimately intertwined with a healthy citizenry. By that I mean one that is enlightened intellectually as well as in top physical condition.

No democracy can play its role in history, can be powerful and survive, unless it rests upon an informed public. When he briefs visitors to the State Department, Secretary Rusk is fond of pointing out that one of the two guiding stars which direct our course is that a government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. For this consent to be intelligent and vital it must be based on knowledge. And surely fundamental to this fact is a requirement that we have a healthy public. It is axiomatic that in a country where widespread sickness, disease, and ill health prevail you cannot have an alert, educated, and interested public.

Disraeli put it well back in 1877 when he said, "The health of the people is really the foundation upon which all their happiness and all their powers as a State depend."

But you have responsibilities going far beyond your role of giving this country a healthy citizenry. As educators, you occupy one of the most respected positions in the professional community, even if it is one of the poorest paid. And through your direct contact with the students of today, you are shaping not only the bodies but the minds of America's leaders of tomorrow. I wish that educators all over the world would never forget this, for peace-building, like nation-building, depends in the last analysis not on some kind of economic or historical or dialectical determinism but on what people can learn.

And learning is not only knowledge; it is also understanding. The search for understanding is a crucial educational problem for our times, and there is no broader, more difficult, or more important kind of understanding to achieve than international understanding.

Of course, this is a supremely difficult and complicated job. All of us are subjected today to a cacophony of discordant sounds on all frequencies and in all volumes. By press and radio and television and in a constant stream of books and other published materials, we are flooded with information. We run the risk of what Stephen

¹ Address made before the National Convention of the American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation at Chicago, Ill., on Mar. 18 (press release 55).

Spender has called "overwrite and underthink."

We all need to absorb as much as we can, understand as much as we can, and convey as much as we can to students and to our communities about America's role in the world today. For in this age of jets and rockets, nations literally live in each other's backyards. Rapid transport, rapid communication, have broken down the old boundaries of time and distance. A war in Kashmir, unrest in Cyprus, and infiltration in Vietnam can and do affect the lives of all of us here. We live in an age where there is always a clear and present danger that a small war left unchecked can grow into a conflagration with weapons that can literally snuff out all human life. This sobering fact reminds us constantly of the need to devote our best energies to making sure that world war III does not happen.

We shall do well if we can, through education, enable the next generation to cope with the conditions of its environment more effectively than the last one did. Several centuries ago we passed the time when a truly civilized man could have been said to know everything or to understand everything. But I hope we never pass the time when men can be trained to apply themselves to the tests facing them with balance, good judgment, and a feeling of moral values and civilized standards.

The concepts of moderation, of idealism, and a just political order are not outdated just because they found their origin among the ancient Greeks. These responses to growth and stress and strain are as necessary today as they ever were—perhaps more necessary because the danger to civilization is greater.

And so is the habit of analysis—the avoidance of action without full forethought. The educated man must avoid a knee-jerk response to provocation. He must not be satisfied with platitudes either in favor of motherhood or against the man-eating shark. He must analyze, earnestly and seriously, the problems of our day and seek to influ-

ence his government to act constructively in the cause of peace.

International Tasks Ahead

In this spirit I suggest that the educated man will wish to give thought to the great international tasks confronting us as we round out the 20th century. Let me list some of the most obvious.

First, we must—and I mean that we literally must—prevent the outbreak of nuclear war if we want to have any future at all. And this task involves not only preserving the peace among the present nuclear powers but preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them.

Second, we must find ways in which states can learn to live together and deal with their problems without resort to violence—simply because violence is so very lethal in the conditions of today.

Third, we have to deal with the problem of feeding and maintaining the exploding populations of the world. We seem to be heading toward a world of 7 billion people by the end of the century, and more beyond, unless family planning becomes a reality.

Fourth, we need to meet the growing expectations of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries and to assure them of a significant degree of material progress if we are ever to have stability in international affairs.

Fifth, we must find some way to conserve the irreplaceable natural resources of the planet and to prevent our atmosphere and our water from becoming irretrievably polluted.

And sixth, we must give to all nations and all peoples a sense of dignity, equality, and identity in a world still rife with prejudice and unwarranted privilege. Unless we do so, race conflicts and colonial problems arising from the domination of one state by another are bound to bedevil our future.

With this unfinished agenda in mind it is well to survey the international scene and to note where we stand.

Role of the United Nations

The United Nations has become a fixture on the world scene. Its charter, with its references to economic and social progress and the advancement of fundamental human rights and freedoms, is the greatest single statement of humanity's purpose developed in this century. That is why one of the first official acts of new nations, great and small, is to seek membership in the United Nations and to accept the obligations of the United Nations Charter in so doing. U.N. membership is a national status symbol and a token of at least theoretical acceptance of civilized rules of international intercourse.

The United Nations as an institution is both less and more than the charter. Less, because as an imperfect organization operated by fallible human beings, it has not been able to apply charter principles completely in the real world. More, because it has broadened its activities into fields envisaged only dimly, if at all, at the San Francisco conference.

Peacekeeping

In its first task—the keeping of the peace—the United Nations has had some impressive successes and some regrettable failures. It has prevented many disputes from erupting into conflict. Simply by providing a channel for negotiation it was helpful in ending the Berlin blockade and thus in helping to remove that greatest threat to peace in postwar Europe. It provided the arena for working out the terms for the settlement of the Cuba missile crisis, and the U.N. Secretary-General played an active part in reaching a solution.

What is perhaps more significant, the U.N. has been able to stop small wars and prevent them from developing into large ones. In widely separated areas—in Korea, in Indonesia, in Kashmir, along the smoldering frontiers around Israel, in Cyprus, in Greece, and in the Congo—U.N. personnel have kept the peace, supervised truces, and kept belligerents apart. With ingenuity and effectiveness, the U.N. has built up a solid

record in that vital area of modern statecraft known as “crisis management.”

Disarmament

Second, the United Nations has done what it could to help keep the nuclear genie in the bottle and to contain the destructive capabilities of modern science. Agreements for comprehensive and safeguarded arms control still elude us, and they are not likely to be found in a vast deliberative body like the U.N. General Assembly with its 117 delegations, large and small.

But what the Assembly does is to focus upon all the nuclear powers, in a very tangible way, the fervent desire of men of good will everywhere that general nuclear war shall never be unleashed upon the world.

An 18-Nation Disarmament Committee is today meeting in Geneva and discussing, among other things, ways to expand the test ban's scope and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The Disarmament Committee had its origin in the context of a General Assembly consideration of the problem of disarmament. The Assembly is also responsible for the passage of a resolution to which both the Soviets and Americans have subscribed, prohibiting the orbiting in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. And the Assembly has likewise set in motion the planning for a world disarmament conference which could be held in 1967.

Decolonization

Third, the U.N. has served as a catalyst in bringing about the transformation—with remarkably little violence—of colonial territories into independent states, and it has served a major role in combating race discrimination and the denial of human rights. Today, for example, U.N. pressures are manifest and important in opposing the consolidation of a “white supremacy” regime in Southern Rhodesia.

In our view, some of the actions taken or threatened in the U.N. have been unwise or ineffective. Yet the record of U.N. accom-

plishment in bringing nations to independence, while still incomplete, is a bright chapter in the history of the organization. And that record is amply complemented by the work the U.N. has done for the protection of refugees and the advancement of individual human rights and freedoms through its many declarations and conventions.

Improvement of Human Welfare

Fourth, the U.N. has moved in a significant way into the fields of economic and social development, helping to improve the standards and the quality of life and to raise underprivileged peoples above the survival level. The specialized agencies of the U.N. have attacked this problem on many fronts.

The World Bank and the International Development Association have made development loans totaling almost \$7.5 billion to more than 85 countries for projects ranging from power and transportation installations to educational facilities.

The World Health Organization is assisting public health programs and attacking communicable diseases in scores of countries.

The Food and Agriculture Organization is helping to modernize the archaic agricultural practices of backward areas, thus helping to ease food shortages, and to develop new sources of protein such as modern fishing industries.

Of particular interest to educators, UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] is working to eradicate illiteracy; a people unable to read can never master the techniques of modern living and modern production.

Look where you will—at labor, transportation, communications, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the quest for scientific knowledge in outer space, the process of industrialization, the problems of population control, urban planning, and regional development—you will find United Nations agencies actively engaged. It is in these fields that 80 percent of the money available to the U.N. is spent. These agencies en-

courage research, disseminate new knowledge, support political and economic and social development, and work in a multitude of ways to prepare the new nations to carry forward such activities on their own.

In all these ways the U.N. serves the national interests of the United States and the cause of peace.

Viet-Nam

You may say this is all well and good. But what is the U.N. doing about one of the gravest threats to world peace: Communist aggression in Viet-Nam?

Viet-Nam, of course, is of overriding concern to all of us. Our men are fighting by the tens of thousands on battlefields halfway around the world.

It is an unconventional and extraordinary conflict, quite unlike most of our previous military experience. It defies analysis in classical terms. South Viet-Nam is threatened by a massive attempt at subversion supplied, directed, and controlled from the North. This is not an internal civil war. We are aiding the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam to defend their territory and their right freely to determine their own future.

We have been committed under three Presidents to help preserve the independence of South Viet-Nam. Our troops are fighting alongside those of South Viet-Nam and our allies to demonstrate that we mean to honor our commitment. The integrity of the commitment of the United States is a foundation stone of the entire free world. We have made similar commitments to 40 allies, and if we flinch here, the validity of all those commitments is necessarily impaired. The effects of a defeat might be felt first in Southeast Asia, but the shock waves would travel clear around the globe.

We make no unreasonable demands for a settlement of the Viet-Nam problem. Our position is simply stated:

We are ready for unconditional discussions or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

We desire no continuing military presence

or bases in Viet-Nam.

We are prepared to withdraw our forces as soon as South Viet-Nam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference.

We believe the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes and that the question of reunification of the two Viet-Nams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

You are familiar with the intensive efforts we have made in the search for peace. We have been in touch, time and again, with most governments of the world and with many of them through special emissaries. There has been an overwhelmingly favorable response to these efforts, except from those who could in fact sit down and make peace.

Most recently we asked the U.N. Security Council to consider what it could do to contribute to a peaceful settlement.² While the Council took no formal substantive action, consultations among the members revealed overwhelming support for our view that a solution should be sought through unconditional discussions at a Geneva conference.

We have been waiting for some word from Hanoi that goes beyond the bitter invective or charges that talk of peace is a trick or a deceit or a swindle. We have been listening for sounds other than the sounds of bombs and grenades and mortars in South Viet-Nam. I regret that I cannot report to you any positive and encouraging response to the hopes of the overwhelming majority of mankind.

We intend, however, to continue our present course: to press for a peaceful solution and to pursue prudently our military action designed to bring a halt to Communist aggression.

Many people have asked whether the United Nations could not play a greater part in Viet-Nam if Communist China were a member of the United Nations. Frankly, in

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

our judgment whether Peking will agree to a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam depends on much more fundamental questions than admission to the United Nations.

We will continue our efforts to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China from the U.N. or its agencies. As long as Peking follows its present course, it does not fulfill the requirements set forth in the charter for admission to the United Nations. In actuality, Communist China is keeping itself out of the United Nations.

Among the conditions Communist China has set for its entrance into the organization are: (1) the expulsion of Nationalist China; (2) that the United Nations rescind a resolution passed in 1951 condemning Red China for aggression in Korea; and (3) the expulsion of the United States and "its imperialist puppets."

In view of these demands it is reasonable to ask whether Communist China seriously desires membership or whether it is only out to destroy the United Nations. We believe the United Nations must continue to approach this issue with utmost caution and deliberation.

Two Visions of the Future

Where, then, does our balance sheet stand? It is well over on the plus side.

Adlai Stevenson once said we either have peace or we have nothing. Regardless of its imperfections and shortcomings, the United Nations is working to assure that the children of the world family tomorrow will live in conditions of peace and have what many lack today.

It would be misstating a fact to imply that the United Nations has met every challenge or has accomplished all it should. This is an organization both of capacities and limitations. There have been and will be both successes and failures.

Perhaps Plato in his search for the perfect state would consider our efforts a failure since we are so far from the eternal verities of justice. But I am sure, too, that Aristotle, with his approach to political institutions as something natural and derived

from human experience, would agree that we are trying to reach that middle point between extremes which is a possible way of getting closer to truth and to peace. These observations are apt today, and I believe that without the United Nations our future would be bleaker than it is today.

We see two visions of the future. One is a world of unrestrained nationalist and ideological competition without any effective world organization. In such a world we would expect a steep descent into conflict, human misery, and destruction. Whatever the follies or aberrations of a few nations may be, we do not believe the bulk of the U.N. membership would tread this road.

The other vision is one of steady, if slow and gradual, implementation of the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. For never forget that the United Nations Charter represents the kind of a world that we want to live in, one free of aggression, one in which disputes are settled peaceably, one in which mankind has an opportunity to develop politically, economically, and socially. Slowly but surely it would bring us within sight of a world of law, of freedom, and of prosperity; a world not of dull conformity but of rich human diversity.

We put our trust in the capacity of man to better his life, and we do not think our faith is misplaced.

President Urges Careful Review of International Agency Budgets

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated March 15

I have just sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk directing him to undertake certain measures to improve our participation in international organizations.

No nation has been a greater supporter of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international organizations than the United States.

—Since the end of the Second World War, we have provided a total of \$3.6 billion in direct contributions.

—In the last 10 years our annual contributions have grown from \$100 million to an estimated \$237 million—an increase of 137 percent.

—We are today a member of some 65 international organizations.

We shall continue to meet our fair share of the financial requirements of these organizations. But we must apply to them the

same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that we do to our own Federal programs.

To strengthen these organizations and at the same time to make sure that the American tax dollar is effectively spent, we have an obligation to review carefully their activities and our participation in them. In my memorandum to the Secretary, I said that I would be looking to him to see that

—future expansion of the activities of the international organizations is governed by the tests of need and reasonableness,

—the programs of these organizations are carefully reviewed so that funds are allocated to high-priority projects which are in the best interests of the international community,

—each international agency operates with a maximum of efficiency, and

—we clarify the objectives of our membership in each organization and organize

ourselves for more effective participation in international organization affairs.

I have asked the Secretary to direct and coordinate the activities of the U.S. departments and agencies involved in these organizations. He will instruct our representatives along the lines I have indicated above.

All departments and agencies will cooperate with him in carrying out this responsibility.

TEXTS OF MEMORANDUMS

To Secretary Rusk

White House press release dated March 15

MARCH 15, 1966

The Federal Budget for 1967 contains this statement:

... we intend to play an increasingly active role in reviewing the program and budgetary proposals of the various international organizations.

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth what I believe that increasingly active role should be.

No nation has been a greater supporter of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations than the United States. We are today a member of some 65 such agencies.

Our continued strong support is necessary and desirable

—if the world community is to live in peace,

—if we are to cooperate internationally in extending the benefits of modern agriculture, health, and education to the less fortunate, and

—if international problems in such fields as meteorology, telecommunications, and aviation are to be given the joint attention required for their resolution.

The United States has by far been the largest financial contributor to the international organizations.

—Since 1946, we have provided a total of \$3.6 billion in direct contributions.

—Since 1956, our annual contributions have grown from \$100 million to an estimated \$237 million for the next fiscal year, an overall increase of 137%.

Moreover, we can expect the programs and budgets of these international agencies to expand further in future years to meet the growing needs of the world community. The United States shall continue to meet its fair share of the financial requirements of these organizations.

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping to strengthen the international agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we must apply to them the same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that we do to our own Federal programs. Our purpose in this undertaking must be to see that

—future expansion of the activities of the international organizations is governed by the tests of feasibility and reasonableness,

—the programs of the organizations are vigorously scrutinized so that funds are allocated only to high priority projects which we are convinced are in the interests of the international community and of our own country, and

—each international agency operates with a maximum of effectiveness and economy.

To achieve this purpose, we must

—decide what we can best accomplish through multilateral action, as compared to action through our own direct programs,

—clarify the objectives of our membership in each international agency,

—organize ourselves for more effective participation in each organization, and

—insist that the money we spend through international agencies is in our national interest and in the best interest of the world community.

I expect you to continue to direct and coordinate the activities of the U.S. departments and agencies involved in international organization affairs and to instruct our representatives to those organizations. I shall look to you to direct this Government's work in

—reviewing and establishing our long-term policy objectives in each major international organization,

—analyzing and determining the U.S. position on programs and budgetary needs of each organization on a timely and continuing basis, and

—recommending steps to improve the effectiveness of each organization in contributing to the objectives of the world community and the United States.

Ambassador Goldberg has unique responsibilities in a wide range of matters relating to the United Nations system. I shall continue to rely heavily on his advice and counsel.

The heads of other Federal departments and agencies have significant interest in activities of the various international organizations. I expect them to provide you with expert assistance in their specialized fields. In this work, the close cooperation of all agencies is needed to provide the essential unity of our effort.

I expect the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to work with you and other agency heads to help assure that the positions we take on the budgets of international organizations reflect a searching scru-

tiny of requirements and priorities for the expenditure of funds.

I am sending copies of this memorandum to all department and agency heads.

To Department and Agency Heads

White House press release dated March 15

MARCH 15, 1966

I have today sent the attached memorandum directing the Secretary of State to take certain actions which I believe are essential to effective participation by the United States in international organizations.

I expect the heads of all departments and agencies that contribute to the Government's activities in this field to give their full cooperation to the Secretary of State in carrying out my instructions.

This work must receive high priority and the personal attention of the responsible officials in all agencies concerned if this Nation's interest in improving international organizations as instruments for peace and progress is to be fulfilled.

President Signs Supplemental Military Authorization Bill

Remarks by President Johnson¹

The bill that we have come here to approve this morning authorizes appropriations of more than \$4,800,000,000 for the support of the Defense Establishment of the United States of America. Later today the Congress will act upon the appropriation of some \$13 billion.² This is authorization for only a part of that appropriation, but this bill will help to meet the military needs that we have in Viet-Nam.

I also believe that it will do something else. By its overwhelming vote on this measure, I believe the Congress has repeated its declaration to the American people that they stand behind our fighting men in Viet-Nam. Let me remind you that it was

¹ Made on signing the supplemental military authorization bill (H.R. 12889) on Mar. 15 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

² On Mar. 23 the Congress approved an act (H.R. 13546) providing supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and sent it to the President, who signed the bill into law (P.L. 89-374) on Mar. 23.

just 25 years ago that the Congress extended the Selective Service Act by only 1 vote. That was in August, as I recall it, before Pearl Harbor in December. On the eve of Pearl Harbor the House of Representatives, of which I was then a member, by a vote of 203 to 202 turned this country from the brink of the cliff and saved the Army from being dismantled.

We had refused to fortify Guam a short time before that. We had sent several false impressions throughout the world by our action. Now in contrast, this supplemental military authorization bill passed the House of Representatives, under the bipartisan leadership of the Armed Services Committee and its members, by a vote of 392 to 4; it passed the Senate by a vote of 93 to 2. This overwhelming vote is visible confidence in our modern Defense Department and the civilians and the military who direct the destinies of that department.

In all the history of military movement, there has never been the equal of the Defense Department's accomplishment of moving more than 100,000 men 10,000 miles in 150 days and moving them with equipment, doctors, housing, ammunition, vehicles, planes, and support materiel. In speed, quantities, and efficiency, history recalls no similar achievement of that kind, and it deserves the recognition and the gratitude of every single American who lives securely in the United States today.

The overwhelming vote on this measure also testifies that we may have learned something from recent history. It is a lesson which we should have learned long ago, for it was really one of our Founding Fathers, John Jay, who warned us: "It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it."

I believe that many of the world's nations have since learned the final futility of war. Most of the world's leaders today, I believe, genuinely desire peace, but there are still a few who do not. So to those who ask what our present struggle in Viet-Nam

really means, let me say: Our purpose is to demonstrate to the remaining advocates of violence that there is more human profit to be had from peace than there is from war.

That is the real purpose of the more than 200,000 brave Americans who are at this moment risking their lives 10,000 miles from home. That is the real purpose of the Congress in registering such dramatic support for legislation of this kind. That is the only purpose of the President and this administration in Viet-Nam.

How sad it is that such great sums must be spent for the bombs and the planes and the gunpowders of war. How joyous it would be if these great resources could be put, instead, to the service of peace. We have said this and we have repeated it time and time again, and we will never tire of saying it, and I repeat it now: The people of Viet-Nam, North and South, have the same basic human needs. The people of Asia and the people of China have the same basic human needs.

They need food, shelter, and education. They need an end to disease and to disaster. They need a future for their children. They need hope. They need peace. These are the very simple things, the basic things, the building blocks of life and of civilization. They are the vital and fundamental things that all men have in common, that all men can together seek and together achieve.

In my Baltimore declaration of April of last year,³ I said to the people of the world how much we would welcome taking some of the funds that we are now spending in bombs and bullets and putting them in efforts to rid that area of disease and disaster and provide education and training. At that time I recommended the study and the creation of a Southeast Asia Development Bank, which will soon come into being as a result of the efficiency of this Congress.⁴

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁴ For the President's remarks on signing the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966 into law on Mar. 16, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.

So, again, this morning I repeat that we look forward with hope and with prayer to the day when the leaders who provoked and the leaders who continue this aggression in Viet-Nam will finally abandon their hopeless attempts at conquest. It is my greatest wish to some day stand here and sign another bill, one that is designed to bring progress and fulfillment to a Southeast Asia which is at peace with itself and also at peace with the rest of the world.

Department To Hold Conference for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department of State announced on March 25 (press release 70) that it will hold a national foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters at Washington April 28 and 29.

Secretary Rusk has extended invitations to editors and commentators of the daily and periodical press and the broadcasting industry in the 50 States and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will address the conference and has invited Vice President Humphrey to participate in the program. Among other high officials expected to participate are: George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency for International Development; William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U. S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress.

There will be opportunity for discussions in depth with other senior officials of the Department of State, AID, USIA, and the Department of Defense in concurrent round tables on the morning of April 29. Subjects to be covered in these sessions are Communist China, the U.N. and the developing countries, the Geneva disarmament conference, East-West trade, "As Others See Us"—USIA programs abroad, and food and population problems.

The United States and the Warsaw Convention

*Statements by Andreas F. Lowenfeld
Deputy Legal Adviser¹*

OPENING STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 1

When your chairman asked me this morning after the meeting whether the United States would like to lead off the discussion this afternoon, I readily agreed. We are well aware of the part that the United States has played in bringing this conference about.

Ours has been the most pronounced and expressed dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Convention. We have made clear our view that the Warsaw Convention, or, to be specific, the limits of liability set forth in the convention, have outlived their time. We think the large and distinguished attendance here is testimony to the general recognition of the need to reexamine anew the convention concluded in 1929 and only very modestly brought up to date in the middle of the last decade.

We should not wonder that there is now a need for a general reexamination. There is, after all, hardly a field as fast growing and fast developing as civil aviation. Let me say that the United States agrees with the observation of Dr. Binaghi [Walter Binaghi, President of the ICAO Council] this morning that the Warsaw Convention was an excellent compromise between the world's

various legal systems. With that compromise we have no quarrel. Our quarrel rather is with the other compromise contained in the Warsaw Convention: the compromise between the interests of the airlines and the interests of the traveling public.

The principal concern of my Government now is to safeguard and protect our citizens, who are in ever greater numbers and at nearly all economic levels taking advantage of the opportunity of international travel by air. Our endeavor, then, at this conference is to redress—to bring up to date—the compromise between the airlines and the traveling public, hopefully without disturbing the underlying legal regime of the Warsaw Convention, but in any event, as the President of the Council suggested this morning, with imagination.

U.S. Notice of Denunciation

We are sorry that we have had to take a step that many of you considered abrupt: serving notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention in advance of this meeting.² Let me make clear, then, that this step was taken not in any spirit of defiance of this organization or of our treaty partners. The United States stands steadfast in its commitment and dedication to cooperation in in-

¹ Made at the Special International Civil Aviation Organization Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, held at Montreal, Canada, Feb. 1-15. Mr. Lowenfeld was chairman of the U.S. delegation.

² For a Department announcement of Nov. 15, 1965, and text of the notice of denunciation, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 923.

ternational law and in international civil aviation.

The step that we took last fall was simply the inevitable result of our growing concern about the great numbers of our uninformed and unprotected traveling public. The prospects for this conference were just too uncertain, and the Warsaw regime, as we saw it, was just too far out of line with today's conditions. Thus the United States felt we simply could not let any more time pass without doing something about the situation.

A bit of history may be in order. As many of you know, the Hague Protocol has been the subject of a great deal of debate and discussion in the United States since the 1955 Hague conference. This past summer the United States executive branch made a final attempt to secure ratification of the Hague Protocol. Since the \$16,600 limit of liability per passenger was almost universally thought in our country to be far too low, we made an effort to secure approval of the Hague Protocol by coupling the request for ratification to a request for compulsory accident insurance in addition to the Hague limits. This plan would, by force of law, have been applicable only to the United States flag carriers; by force of competition and persuasion, it was hoped, the plan would gradually have come to cover other international airlines as well.

This effort on the part of my Government failed. The compulsory accident insurance legislation could not even secure a hearing in our Congress. Neither our Congress nor our executive branch supported the Hague figure without additional protection, and had the Hague Protocol come to a vote in our Senate, there is little doubt that it would have been defeated.

The debate over the Hague Protocol and the Warsaw Convention became widespread in the United States. Not only the executive and legislative branches of the Government but the press and public generally, as well as the courts, became stirred up about the problem. Thus, as I have said, the United States Government could not let another

year go by without taking some action.

Given the 6 months' notice requirement in article 39 and the rather uncertain responses from the other governments we consulted in the late summer and early fall of 1965, the United States had no choice but to give its notice of denunciation of the convention when it did so. But let me repeat: The action of the United States was taken not in any spirit of defiance or of arrogance. We welcome this meeting, as we said when it was first proposed, and as we said in our notice of denunciation. We hope the results of this meeting will permit us to withdraw our notice of denunciation and will permit us to remain within the Warsaw treaty system.

If our action has given impetus to a prompt and serious reconsideration of the problem of the Warsaw Convention, then we are very pleased. If by our action, that some have called "precipitate," we have offended some of our friends, we are sorry, sincerely sorry. In any event we look forward to a full discussion here of all the facts and all the issues, free of rancor, free of prejudice, and in the spirit of a common endeavor to address a complicated and difficult problem.

Issues Before the Conference

To come now to the merits, I should like today just to give you a brief outline of the way the United States looks at the issues before this conference.

We are mindful of the fact that the Warsaw Convention is one of the most widespread and most significant conventions in the area of private law. We appreciate the contribution made by the convention to the development of international aviation and, to a certain extent, to uniformity of interpretation and practice. But the overriding issue in the Warsaw Convention, as we see it, is that it was entered into in the late 1920's, when international aviation was hardly over the experimental stage and when the primary need was a means to prevent the growth of international aviation from being choked off by one or more catastrophic accidents. Today, in contrast,

international aviation is big business. We are over the experimental stage. We are over the infant industry stage. Equally important, the techniques, equipment, and experience of our current international air transportation are such that the hazards of flying have been very much reduced and are actuarially predictable.

For these reasons the United States believes that there is no longer justification for a convention which tips the balance heavily in favor of the industry and against the consumer. We believe that our objective should be an agreement that does not tip the balance one way or another but achieves a true balance between the interests of the traveling public and the interests of the aviation industry.

We hope very much that it will be possible to work out such an agreement. When the time comes—and I hope within a day or so—we shall have some specific proposals to make. In general, of course, the United States position is well known. But for today I would just like to sketch some of the considerations that we believe all of us should keep in mind in seeking to achieve the true balance that we have been speaking about.

First—*The Question of Air Safety*. The fears of 1929 are certainly over today. The accident rate today is approximately 0.61 passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger-miles. For the period 1925–1929 the comparable rate was 45 passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger-miles. In 1964 the ICAO figures show 284 persons killed in international passenger flights. Thus, despite the great increase in the size of aircraft and the prospective further substantial increase, we can hardly be concerned, as we were 35 years ago, about the serious economic consequences for the industry of a single air disaster.

Second—*The Volume of Air Traffic*. Air transportation has grown to absolutely fantastic proportions, with no sign of letup. Our latest figures show that 38 million persons traveled in scheduled international air transportation in 1964 for a total of 76 billion passenger-kilometers, roughly 46 billion

passenger-miles. This compares with 400 million passenger-miles total for the 5-year period 1925–1929, counting domestic as well as international air transportation.

Thus the possibility of distribution of risk by airlines and, through the medium of reinsurance, among many airlines, is very great. Let us be clear on this point: We will hear at this conference about the question of insurance. The real question in this regard, it seems to us, is how to spread the risk most fairly and most economically and with the least possibility of having persons (or their families) who for one or another reason did not make specific provision for disaster suffer terribly for this. In short, it seems to us that whether they absorb the cost, pass it on indirectly in the fare, or make a special charge, the airlines as a group are the best locus of responsibility. It is the airlines, therefore, who ought to have the primary burden of taking out insurance for air accidents.

Third—*Cost of Insurance*. The insurance industry, as many of you must have noticed, is extraordinarily reticent with figures. As a result, a number of misconceptions seem to have grown up about the cost of insurance. Our estimates, which we wish to discuss further in the course of the conference, indicate that insurance costs are approximately 1 percent of operating costs. If these costs rose by, say, 50 percent (our rough estimate at a limit of \$100,000 under the Warsaw-Hague system), the increase in costs would be roughly from 1 to 1½ percent of operating costs. Thus it seems to us that the fear of substantial additional cost to the carriers as a result of higher limits of liability is, to put it mildly, rather exaggerated.

Fourth—*What Do We Mean by Limits of Liability?* In some of the communications the United States has received from foreign governments, it has been said that the United States is seeking to impose its standards of living upon all the countries of the world. Nothing of the sort, Mr. Chairman and delegates. When we speak of *limits* of liability, we do not think of *average* recovery. Only

when the limit has been very low, as under Warsaw, has the limit tended to be the average—in fact generally the automatic—sum at which claims are settled. We mean by an acceptable limit of liability a figure that will permit most people in most countries to establish, in accordance with the legal system of the country where they and their families reside, a monetary value for the loss or injury they have suffered as the result of an accident.

Recovery for death or injury would presumably be based on some combination of earning power, life expectancy, and (in the case of death) degree of dependence of the survivors. We would expect a realistic limit of liability not to be near the average recovery for the world or, indeed, near the average recovery in the United States. We would expect the limit, rather, to be well above the average. We are, in other words, speaking of a true limit. If a person has a low income or a short life expectancy or no dependents or resides in a country whose legal system does not provide for substantial compensation for accident victims, an increase in limits should have no appreciable effect on his recovery or on the airline which carries him. We should not, in short, seek to arrive here at this conference at a limit based on average recoveries, since by definition an average means that 50 percent of persons affected would have been adversely affected.

Fifth—*Why Do We Have Limits of Liability?* I would be less than candid if I did not say that there is a good deal of question in my country as to why there should be limits of liability at all on international air transportation. As most of you know, the United States does not in general have limits of liability in domestic air transportation, on rail, bus, or automobile transportation, or, for the most part, on marine transportation. A question that was more and more asked during the debates of last summer to which I made reference earlier, is "Why single out international air transportation?" To put it in the most concrete terms, why should, say, American Airlines operate

under a different regime of liabilities from Pan American or Air France or BOAC?

We find this question not easy to answer. We have examined the matter thoroughly and have concluded that, under current jurisprudence in the United States, the advantages provided by the present convention—shift in the burden of proof, stated places of jurisdiction, and exclusion of contractual or statutory provisions limiting carriers' liability—are not, on the whole, very significant. Our law, in other words, grants the greater part of these protections without a convention. You may be sure that had we not reached this conclusion, the United States would not have taken the step of giving notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.

For the United States, then, the question comes down essentially to a balance of interests. Among these interests, a heavy one is the cooperation and understanding of our friends around the world in the international aviation and international law fields. We hope in the days ahead to be able to share with you all the results of our thorough, and I think you will find careful, studies. If on the basis of our joint discussions we can arrive at common conclusions, it ought to be possible to arrive at a consensus on a revision—and therefore preservation—of the Warsaw Convention. We hope very much that this will be the case.

SECOND STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 1

Mr. Chairman, a number of delegates have expressed the wish that the United States come forward with a positive specific proposal and with the justification for that proposal. Let me do this now.

We propose that the limit of liability under Hague or under Warsaw be increased to \$100,000 per passenger. We are prepared to consider this figure as an inclusive limit, that is to say, without additional provision for legal fees. Thus we would be prepared to see deletion of article 22(4) of the convention, as it was amended at The Hague.

The justification for our proposal, it seems

to us, has two parts: *first*, to show that injustice, in a significant number of cases, would result from continued effectiveness of the Warsaw Convention, whether at the \$8,300 level, at the Hague level of \$16,600, or at some other relatively low level such as \$50,000 per passenger; and *second*, to show that a convention with a limit such as we propose in the area of \$100,000 per passenger would not work economic hardship, either on the airlines or on the traveling public.

Just Compensation for Accident Victims

Different countries and indeed different courts or administrative bodies within the same country often approach the question of compensation for accident victims in somewhat different terms. Basically, however, it seems fair to say that the common objective of a system of compensation for accidental injury or death is to provide in monetary terms for the loss suffered by the victims or, in the case of fatal accidents, by the survivors.

Let us, just by way of example, see what this means concretely: Suppose a man supports a wife and minor children on an income of \$10,000 a year and he is killed at the age of 35, with a prospective earning capacity of, say, 30 years or until age 65. What is the thinking process of the court or administrative officer or an insurance company negotiating a settlement in arriving at a just figure to compensate for the loss of the life of this person?

One might start out typically by multiplying 30—the number of years he may be expected to work—by \$10,000—his annual earnings. The result would be a figure of \$300,000. From this would be deducted the cost of living of the deceased himself, the amount that the minor children might be expected to earn when they reach maturity and no longer need to be supported by their parents. Possibly, chances of remarriage of the widow might be taken into consideration, and in some countries or some cases the benefits payable to the survivors through

the working of some social insurance or social security system might be deducted. Finally, it may be appropriate to deduct income or other taxes that would have been paid over the period by the deceased.

Now I am not suggesting that a court, a jury, or an administrative official or an insurance company in each case goes through each of these computations. But it gives us an idea of what it is that we are talking about. The theory of compensation is, after all, to restore the survivors, to the extent money can do so, to the position that they would have been in but for the accident. There is no attempt to punish the person responsible for the accident.

The Effect of the Warsaw Convention

We realize that for many of the countries represented here the inhibiting effect of the convention in aviation accidents is not easily demonstrated. This is so in some cases because there is no domestic air transportation in the country or, in other cases, because the international limit, or something very close to it, is applicable also internally. Moreover, we are fully aware that in some countries represented here the present convention limits conform to the typical standards of compensation. But in the United States the difference between Warsaw and non-Warsaw compensation for accidents is very dramatic indeed.

In aviation accidents covered by the Warsaw Convention during the period 1950–1964 the average passenger fatality settlement was relatively constant and averaged about \$6,500, slightly below the Warsaw limits. In contrast, in accidents not covered by the Warsaw Convention, i.e., accidents in domestic transportation, the average recovery in each year was substantially higher than the Warsaw limit. For the years 1958 through 1964, that average comes to approximately \$52,500, and for the 15-year period the average was approximately \$38,500.

But in seeking the proper level for a limit, it is not average recoveries that we are primarily concerned with. We are concerned

here with the percentage of persons who, at any given ceiling, would be deprived of their just due. If the limit were set exactly at the average, then approximately one-half of the persons affected would be adversely affected. Let me stress that again, as it is really at the heart of our position. A limit set at or very close to the average would have the result that approximately one-half of the persons affected by the limit would be deprived of the compensation that their legal system considers them entitled to in order to make them whole for their injury or loss.

With this in mind, let us examine the experience of aviation accident claims in the United States settled at various levels where the convention was not applicable. The following table shows the distribution of settlements of the 813 aviation accident death claims paid over the 7 years 1958-1964 on behalf of the 13 major United States international and domestic trunkline carriers where the Warsaw Convention was not applicable:

<i>Amount of payment *</i>	<i>Number of claims</i>	<i>Percent of claims</i>
0	53	6.5
\$ 1-\$ 8,292	194	23.9
8,293- 16,583	159	19.5
16,584- 33,000	115	14.1
33,001- 50,000	54	6.6
50,001- 75,000	47	5.8
75,001- 100,000	45	5.6
100,001- 200,000	110	13.5
200,001 and up	36	4.4
	813	100.0

* In a few cases, these figures include claims subject to State limits on wrongful death actions.

NOTE: Condensed from the full table made available at the conference. (The tables were prepared by the staff of the CAB on the basis of questionnaires answered by the carriers.)

Thus 29.3 percent of all the settlements were in excess of \$50,000 per person. To put it another way, nearly one-third of all these aviation accident victims would have been deprived of some portion of what in fact was received had a \$50,000 limit been in force. 23.5 percent, or nearly one-quarter, would have been deprived by a \$75,000 limit. 17.9 percent, or nearly one in five, would have been deprived by a limitation at the \$100,000

level. Of course, the lower the limit, the greater is not only the number of persons deprived of their due but also the extent of their denial.

This is why we consider the \$100,000 figure proposed by the United States to be not at all excessive. We consider this figure would be a realistic and effective limit. We are prepared to accept and ask our Congress to accept the proposition that persons whose loss would be in excess of \$100,000 should make some other provision for their families for the loss over that amount.

Before leaving these figures relating to aviation accident recoveries, one other point should be made. We have no reason to believe that a limit set at \$100,000 per passenger would tend to become the average recovery in the United States or anywhere else. Even where no limit has been applicable—as in the great majority of our non-Warsaw cases—the United States experience has been that recoveries are spread through the entire range. As I have stated, the average recovery in aviation death cases—which of course is what determines insurance costs—has been \$38,500 per passenger for the 15-year period 1950-1964, and \$52,500 for the last 7 years for which figures are complete—1958-1964. These figures, in the absence of any limit, are of course nowhere near the limit the United States proposes.

Economic Cost of Increased Limits

First, I think it is fair to assume that everyone here agrees that when we talk about increased economic costs we are talking about insurance costs. No one expects any one airline or group of airlines to bear the cost of any given accident. We are talking about the cost of distribution or allocation of risks.

What then would these increased insurance costs be? It is rather difficult to get insurance estimates with precision. But on the basis of the figures of present insurance costs of United States trunkline and international carriers, and on the basis of estimates furnished by one of the two groups of

aviation underwriters, we have been able to construct certain estimates:

<i>Amount of limit</i>	<i>Percentage of increase in insurance cost over present costs</i>
\$ 25,000	9
50,000	25
75,000	38
100,000	48

Thus, acceptance of the United States proposal would, in our estimate, result in an increase in insurance cost to United States airlines by about one-half of the present cost.

Assuming the rough accuracy of these estimates, what would be the effect on airline operating costs of an increase in limits of liability such as is proposed by the United States? What relation, in other words, does the figure of insurance cost bear to overall cost, revenue, or fares? What we have done to arrive at an estimate is to take the insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile for the major United States airlines, domestic and international, for the last year for which figures are complete—1964. That cost—average insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile—is 64 cents per 1,000 passenger-miles.³ To the base figure of 64 cents we have added the increases estimated above. The result is shown in the following table:

<i>Amount of limit</i>	<i>Cost per 1,000 revenue-passenger-miles</i>
\$ 25,000	\$ 0.71
50,000	0.81
75,000	0.90
100,000	0.96

It is worth noting in considering the proposal of the United States, what is the difference in cost between the United States proposal and other proposals that have been made. The difference in insurance cost between a \$50,000 limit per passenger and a \$100,000 limit is only 15 cents per 1,000 revenue-passenger-miles. Between \$75,000 and \$100,000, the difference is only 6 cents per 1,000 revenue-passenger-miles.

To translate these figures into a typical

international flight, the additional cost of insurance resulting from a move to a \$100,000 limit from the present Warsaw limit would amount to an additional 32 cents per 1,000 passenger-miles or roughly \$1 per passenger in a one-way trip between New York and London. This is in relation to a current standard economy fare of approximately \$250 one way.

In short, we have before us not a parade of horrors, not a prospect of economic disaster for the airline industry or heavy burdens for airline passengers. Whether it is the airlines who would bear the increased cost of insurance, or whether in time this cost would be passed on to the passengers, or whether perhaps there would be some apportionment between carriers and passengers, what we would have if the United States plan were adopted would by no means cause a great disturbance or be a great economic burden.

Conclusion

We do not wish to overstate the emphasis on figures. The United States position rests on a moral and social judgment as much as on an economic one. But we think that the figures, estimates, and analysis presented here justify our twin conclusions:

1. The Warsaw Convention is harsh and unfair and represents a burden that we, the Government of the United States, cannot continue to ask our citizens to bear;

2. The cost of meeting the figure that we have suggested is altogether reasonable and would be no great burden either to the airlines of the world or to the traveling public.

Let me, in closing, repeat my call to you at the opening session. Permit us to remain with you in the Warsaw/Hague system by agreeing to our proposed revision of the convention to \$100,000 per passenger, inclusive of costs and attorneys' fees. How we achieve this result, whether under Hague, under Warsaw, or under some other method that has been suggested or perhaps may be suggested, I hope we can discuss in the days ahead.

³ This figure, incidentally, is considerably higher than the insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile for our two largest international carriers. [Author's footnote.]

CLOSING STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 14

It is with considerable sadness that I have asked for the floor at this time. The United States delegation thought that it had come to Montreal well prepared with facts and with arguments in support of our position. We thought we had made a persuasive presentation for the proposition that the Warsaw Convention needed to be updated, and updated substantially. We believed, and still believe, that the United States proposal, or something close to it, would have been in the public interest. It would have secured justice for many persons, and at very little cost.

We thought that this conference would recognize that commercial aviation is no longer an infant industry entitled to special shelter, but that it should be treated like other persons or businesses dealing with the public. In other words, we thought this conference would recognize the principle that persons or firms engaged in international commercial aviation—whether airline, manufacturer, or ground control—should, on the whole, be held responsible for injuries done to others. We believed that if this principle were accepted, it would be possible to maintain the considerable uniformity of law and practice achieved by the Warsaw/Hague system. We believed that it would be possible to build on the experience gained over the past 30-35 years to fashion new and imaginative solutions to the legal, economic, and practical problems involved in the relations between airlines and travelers through many lands. We hoped that it would be possible to develop a consensus and to initiate action here at this conference.

Our hopes, it is now clear, were not justified. Despite active and stimulating discussion, and despite several valiant efforts to develop acceptable compromises, no proposal was found that clearly expressed a consensus of the countries represented. Indeed, it was the will of the conference not even to express a preference among those proposals that did have substantial support. We hoped

until today that it might yet be possible to lay a firm foundation here for a successful diplomatic conference and to work out an interim arrangement along the lines of this conference's recommendations. If this had come about, our delegation had hoped to recommend to our Government that it withdraw the United States notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention. It was not to be, and we are sorry.

But we should not, Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, feel too sad. From the point of view of the traveling public, there can be no doubt that this conference has had a wholesome effect. All the countries represented here, and doubtless many others that will hear and read of the work of this conference, have come to think hard about the question of the obligation of airlines toward their passengers. Nearly all countries have agreed, as every one of our exploratory votes proved, that the Warsaw Convention limits are obsolete and unfair. Whatever the timing, whatever the procedure followed, we may be sure that the convention will be brought up to date or will gradually fade away. In the long run, the aviation industry, which has always been proud of its position in the forefront of human advance, will not—indeed cannot—stand still on the simple and morally clear-cut issue of protection of its customers.

As for international cooperation, the spirit is so widespread, the habit so deeply ingrained, that it cannot be said to depend on any single convention. So far as the United States is concerned, Mr. Chairman, let me state again that, while we are disappointed that this meeting could not have reached a more clear-cut result, our impatience on the issue of compensation for accident victims is due only to our concern for the traveling public. It signifies in no way any lessening in our devotion to ICAO or to the traditions of cooperation in international aviation which the United States has done so much to promote.

A few words may be in order, Mr. Chairman, about the consequences for the airlines

of the world of the withdrawal by the United States from the Warsaw Convention.

First, we hope and expect that the uniform practices established in the light of the Warsaw Convention will be maintained—all, that is, except for the famous small print purporting to give notice of the applicability of the convention and of the limits of liability contained therein. We do not, in other words, expect that the practice of interline ticketing, of remittance through the clearinghouse, and the like, will be affected.

Second, we expect that nearly all airlines will be amenable to suit in the United States brought on behalf of passengers residing in or citizens of the United States. So far as residents of other countries are concerned, we expect that, in general, only United States flag airlines will be subject to suit in the United States. Thus there is not likely to be much successful "forum shopping."

Third, we expect that courts in the United States—and, accordingly, out-of-court settlements—will treat persons involved in air accidents like persons involved in any other accidents. Thus compensation will be based on the passenger's earning capacity, his life expectancy at the time of accident, and the degree of dependence of the survivors. There will be some high settlements and some low ones, and there may well be some judgments in favor of the carriers.

Limitations on liability, whether statutory at the place of accident or by contract in the ticket, will almost certainly be disregarded on the ground that they are contrary to public policy. But you may be sure that foreign carriers will receive full justice in the United States. Further, where foreign residents bring suit in the United States, it will be the passenger's earning capacity, his life expectancy, and the status of his survivors in his own country, as well as that country's concepts of proper compensation for accident victims that will generally govern the result in the United States.

Fourth and finally, we believe the cost in terms of increased insurance premiums for carriers flying to and from the United

States or carrying large numbers of United States passengers will be small—on the order of one-half of 1 percent of operating costs. For local and regional carriers, including some of those that may still be classified as "infant industries," the increase in insurance cost as the result of United States withdrawal from the convention will be hardly noticeable.

In closing, let me say again, Mr. Chairman, what I said at the opening of the conference. The United States notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention was given not in any spirit of defiance of this organization or of our treaty partners.

We are grateful to ICAO for holding this conference, and we are grateful to all of the delegations for the courteous and attentive hearing we have had and for the resourcefulness and energy devoted by so many delegates to the effort to reach a compromise solution. We remain committed to cooperation in international law and in international aviation.

If it has not been possible to reach agreement here, we hope at least to have demonstrated to all of you that our decision has been a thoughtful and reasonable one, taken only after trying all other possible alternatives, and motivated solely by our desire to do the right thing for our citizens and for the traveling public the world over.

U.S. Informs U.N. Security Council of Action on Rhodesian Agent

Following is the text of a letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Akira Matsui, President of the Security Council.

U.S./U.N. press release 4813 dated February 28

FEBRUARY 28, 1966

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit hereunder the text of the letter delivered by my Government to Mr. Henry J. C. Hooper, the registered agent for

the so-called Rhodesian Information Office in Washington.

DEAR MR. HOOPER: The Department of State notes that you entered the United States on September 17, 1965, as a nonimmigrant, bearing an A-1 visa in connection with your assignment at that time as a diplomatic agent attached to the British Embassy. The Embassy informed the Department on November 11, 1965 that you had ceased to be a representative of Her Majesty's Government and were no longer a member of the Embassy staff.

The Department of State has been advised by the Department of Justice that you have filed, on behalf of a so-called "Rhodesian Information Office", a registration statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. That statement lists your foreign principal as "Department of External Services, Ministry of Information, Government of Rhodesia."

As you are aware the United States Government considers Southern Rhodesia to be a territory over which the United Kingdom has full and exclusive authority. As Secretary Rusk announced on November 11, 1965,¹ this Government in no way recognizes the rebel regime which declared unilaterally the independence from the United Kingdom and purported to establish a new state of "Rhodesia".

A diplomatic agent whose official capacity has terminated has, of course, a reasonable time within which to wind up his affairs and leave this country. More than three months have now elapsed since the termination of your diplomatic assignment with the British Embassy. Since you are no longer a representative of Her Majesty's Government and since the United States does not recognize any independent state of "Rhodesia", I am obligated to inform you that you have no official capacity in this country. The Government of the United States is, therefore, not prepared to accord to you a continuing residence on the basis of a purported official capacity. If you should wish to remain in the United States as a private citizen, the law permits you to make application to the Department of Justice for an adjustment of your status under Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS C. MANN

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

I shall be pleased if this letter might be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 894.

GATT Contracting Parties Meet at Geneva

The Department of State announced on March 21 (press release 60) that Henry P. Brodie, Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Mission, Geneva, would head the U.S. delegation to the 23d session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, from March 24 to April 6. The agenda will contain a number of topics important to United States commercial and economic policy interests, including several items on various aspects of the expansion of trade of less developed countries.

The GATT is the principal international forum where the world's trading nations deal with trade policy problems. Its members carry on over 80 percent of world trade. It is a multilateral trade agreement which replaced the pre-World War II bilateral trading system. The Kennedy Round of negotiations for lowering trade barriers is also taking place within the GATT framework, and during the 23d session the Director General will report to the Contracting Parties on progress in these negotiations.

In recent years the Contracting Parties have turned increasingly to trading problems of particular interest to the less developed countries. On February 8, 1965, they signed a new part (part IV) of the General Agreement, designed to provide an institutional and legal framework for dealing with these problems.¹

In a parallel step, GATT established a new Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) to watch over implementation of the new provisions. The Committee's first year in operation will be reviewed during the 23d session. This will entail a discussion of the accomplishments of a number of special working parties and expert groups assigned to study in detail various facets of the special trade problems of less developed

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1964, p. 922; for a U.S. statement of Feb. 8, 1965, see *ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1965, p. 355.

countries. In addition, the work of the CTD during the coming year will be mapped out by the Contracting Parties.

A number of agenda items will deal with the continuing efforts in the GATT to reduce and remove import restrictions. These efforts have enjoyed considerable success in recent years, and the reduction of the remaining restrictions continues to be an important aspect of U.S. commercial policy.

Regional arrangements will also receive intensive attention at the session. GATT will examine recently announced plans for free trade areas between Australia and New Zealand and between the United Kingdom and Ireland. It will also continue its examination of the association arrangement between the European Economic Community and a number of African nations. The 23d session will also review annual reports submitted by a number of older economic integration bodies, including the EEC, the European Free Trade Area, the Central American Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and the Central African Economic and Customs Union.

Sixty-seven countries are now full contracting parties to the General Agreement. In addition, a number of other countries maintain varying degrees of association with the GATT, and several others have indicated their intentions to seek full membership during the coming year.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Reports by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Dominican Republic. S/7032/Add. 9-14. January 20-February 14, 1966. 12 pp.

Letter dated January 20 from the representative of India concerning the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. S/7095. January 20, 1966. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 22 from the representative of Thailand rejecting Cambodian charges of Thai aggression. S/7097. January 27, 1966. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 24 from the representative of Thailand charging that Cambodian soldiers had fired rifles and machineguns across the border into Thai territory. S/7098. January 24, 1966. 1 p.

Report of the Secretary-General on the observance of the India-Pakistan cease-fire. S/6710/Add. 17. January 28, 1966. 5 pp.

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of the United States requesting that "an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Viet-Nam." S/7105. January 31, 1966. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 28 from the Secretary-General to various governments containing a further appeal for voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. S/7107. February 1, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of the United Kingdom informing the President of the Security Council of his Government's imposition of a total ban on exports to Rhodesia and extension of the ban on imports to include all imports from Rhodesia. S/7108. February 1, 1966. 1 p.

Letters from representatives of various countries concerning actions taken in compliance with the Security Council resolution on Southern Rhodesia: Argentina, S/7094; Australia, S/7104; Austria, S/7115; Brazil, S/7122; Bulgaria, S/7121; Burundi, S/7113; China, S/7130; Colombia, S/7112; Cyprus, S/7099; Haiti, S/7119; India, S/7092; Japan, S/7114; Jordan, S/7120; Liberia, S/7124; New Zealand, S/7093; Nicaragua, S/7139; Pakistan, S/7127; Rwanda, S/7135; Ukrainian S.S.R., S/7110; Yemen Arab Republic, S/7118. 30 pp.

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. concerning his Government's compliance with the Security Council resolution on Portuguese territories. S/7111. February 1, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated February 3 from the representative of Ghana transmitting a message from President Nkrumah concerning the call for Security Council debate on Viet-Nam. S/7116. February 7, 1966. 1 p.

Letter dated February 7 from representatives of 18 Latin American countries concerning "the so-called First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America," held at Havana on January 3. S/7123. February 8, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated February 8 from the representative of Turkey concerning a violation of Turkish airspace by a Greek aircraft. S/7125. February 9, 1966. 1 p.

Letter dated February 7 from the representative of Cambodia replying to the letter of the Thai representative (S/7098) and transmitting a communique of the Cambodian Ministry of Information concerning border incidents. S/7126. February 9, 1966. 4 pp.

Letter dated February 8 from the representative of Turkey concerning a recent communique issued after consultations between the Government of Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration on the question of Cyprus. S/7128. February 9, 1966. 2 pp.

Letters dated February 8 and 14 from the representative of Greece concerning violations of Greek airspace by Turkish aircraft. S/7129, February 9, 1966, and S/7137, February 14, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated February 11 from the representative of Greece transmitting the text of the communique referred to in the letter from the representative of Turkey (S/7128) and pointing out that this text "reflects once more the attachment and dedication of the Greek Government to peace. . . ." S/7136. February 11, 1966. 2 pp.

General Assembly

Letter dated January 20 from the representative of Spain concerning his Government's desire to reach a solution of the problem of Gibraltar. A/6242. January 25, 1966. 3 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Report of the Working Group of the Whole. A/AC.105/30. January 26, 1966, 3 pp.

Information furnished on objects launched into orbit or beyond: Letter dated January 24 from the representative of the United States giving data for period of November 16-30, 1965, A/AC.105/INF.123, January 28, 1966, 2 pp.; letter dated February 8 from the representative of the U.S.S.R. giving data for period December 10, 1965-January 25, 1966, A/AC.105/INF.124, February 10, 1966. 4 pp.

Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the second part of its 17th session, Monaco, January 3-28, 1966. A/CN.4/184. January 28, 1966. 16 pp.

Trusteeship Council

Report of the World Health Organization on its Investigation of the Complaints Contained in a Petition Concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1647. January 14, 1966. 42 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Africa. Report of the sub-regional meeting on economic cooperation in East Africa. E/CN.14/346. December 10, 1965. 89 pp.

Organization and Procedural Arrangements for the Implementation of Conventions and Recommendations in the Field of Human Rights:

Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. E/4133. December 16, 1965. 8 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General. E/4143. January 19, 1966. 41 pp.

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Utilization of United States Agricultural Surpluses in the Republic of Korea—Procedures and Problems. Study prepared by the ECAFE/FAO Agriculture Division. E/CN.11/L.144. Bangkok, 1965. 55 pp.

Development of Non-Agricultural Resources. Report by the Secretary-General. E/4132. January 18, 1966. 46 pp.

Fourth Biennial Report on Water Resources Development. E/4138 (Summary). January 31, 1966. 4 pp.

Inflation and Economic Development. Report of the Secretary-General. E/4152. January 31, 1966. 49 pp.

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Commission on Human Rights:

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/452. January 18, 1966. 13 pp.

Draft Declaration and Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/900. January 27, 1966. 30 pp.

Membership of the Sub-Commission on Prevention

of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/901. February 3, 1966. 14 pp.

Report of the 18th session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. E/CN.4/903. February 4, 1966. 66 pp.

Commission on the Status of Women:

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/896 (E/CN.6/452). January 18, 1966. 13 pp.

United Nations Assistance for the Advancement of Women. Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/450. January 26, 1966. 6 pp.

Economic Rights and Opportunities for Women—Facilities for Assisting Employed Mothers in Child-Care. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/455. January 28, 1966. 21 pp.

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. Evaluation of the Fellowship Program. Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/897 (E/CN.6/453). February 8, 1966. 25 pp.

Social Commission. Proposed Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare. Analysis of comments by governments and proposals for further action. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/401. February 10, 1966. 6 pp.

Committee for Industrial Development:

Industrial Technology. Textile Industries in Developing Countries. Note by the Secretary-General. E/C.5/101. January 27, 1966. 151 pp.

Industrial Technology. Promotion of Standardization in Developing Countries. Note by the Secretary-General. E/C.5/103. January 28, 1966. 53 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.

Extension to: Hong Kong, February 14, 1966.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 1966.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 1966.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 1966.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 18, 1966.

Entered into force: March 20, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, December 23, 1965; France, December 21, 1965.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Pakistan (with a declaration), February 24, 1966.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 1965.¹

Acceptances: Cuba,² December 28, 1965; Switzerland, January 14, 1966.

Ratification deposited: Madagascar, January 11, 1966.

BILATERAL

Ceylon

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Colombo March 12, 1966. Entered into force March 12, 1966.

Malta

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of January 15, 1966 (TIAS 5956), relating to the deployment of United States naval repair vessels to Malta. Effected by exchange of notes at Val-

letta February 25 and March 4, 1966. Entered into force March 4, 1966.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields in 1966-67. Signed at Washington March 19, 1966. Entered into force March 19, 1966.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

U.S. Consulate Established in Bechuanaland

The Department of State announced on March 23 (press release 65) that a U.S. consulate is being established in the British protectorate of Bechuanaland. Charles H. Pletcher, who has been appointed the first U.S. consul to be stationed in that country, is scheduled to arrive at Gaberones, the capital, during the first half of April to assume responsibilities for U.S.-Bechuanaland relations. Bechuanaland on September 30 will become the independent republic of Botswana.

From July 1964 to date, U.S. interests in Bechuanaland have been handled by the U.S. consulate at Mbabane, Swaziland, which has had responsibility for U.S. interests in all three of the former U.K. High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland.

Confirmations

The Senate on March 17 confirmed the nomination of Dixon Donnelley to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 62 dated March 22.)

Appointments

James Wadsworth Symington as Chief of Protocol, effective March 22. (For biographic details, see

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to reservations.

Department of State press release 63 dated March 22.)

Robert J. McCloskey to be Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective March 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 68 dated March 25.)

Designations

Philip B. Heymann as Acting Administrator for the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective March 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 54 dated March 16.)

PUBLICATIONS

Department Releases 1966 Edition of "Treaties in Force"

Press release 53 dated March 15

The Department of State on March 15 released for publication *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1966*.

This is a collection showing the bilateral relations of the United States with 139 states or entities and the multilateral rights and obligations of the contracting parties with respect to more than 380 treaties and agreements on 74 subjects. The 1966 edition includes some 300 new treaties and agreements, including the king crab fishery agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the claims agreement with Yugoslavia, the agreement concerning automotive products with Canada, and the desalination agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mexico, and the United States. Also included in this edition are the new cultural exchanges agreements with France, the United Kingdom, Peru, and Uruguay.

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are arranged by country or other political entity, and the multilateral treaties and other agreements are arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

The publication provides information concerning treaty relations with numerous newly independent states, indicating wherever possible the provisions of their constitutions and independence arrangements regarding assumption of treaty obligations.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

The 1966 edition of *Treaties in Force* (322 pp.; Department of State publication 8042) is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$1.50.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States. Booklet for the information of men and women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the Foreign Service of the United States to serve with the Department of State or the U.S. Information Agency. Pub. 7924. Department and Foreign Service Series 132. 32 pp., illus.

Challenges and Choices in U.S. Trade Policy. These two addresses by Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, are reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin of November 8 and 15. In his addresses Mr. Solomon describes the challenges facing U.S. trade policy and the choices that must be made in the immediate years ahead to meet them. Pub. 8002. General Foreign Policy Series 809. 15 pp. 10¢.

Foreign Affairs. Excerpt from President Johnson's state of the Union message of January 12, 1966. Pub. 8011. General Foreign Policy Series 211. 17 pp. 15¢.

The Battle Act Report, 1965. Eighteenth report to Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act). Pub. 8019. General Foreign Policy Series 210. 124 pp. 40¢.

Universal Postal Union. Constitution, convention, and related documents, with Other Governments, revising the Universal Postal Convention of October 3, 1957. Signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Date of entry into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 325 pp. \$1.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of November 28, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade August 19 and November 3, 1965. Entered into force November 3, 1965. TIAS 5903. 2 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa November 17, 1965. Entered into force November 17, 1965. TIAS 5904. 2 pp. 5¢.

Air Service—Lease of Equipment. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, extending the agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn

July 30 and August 25, 1965. Entered into force August 25, 1965. Operative August 2, 1965. TIAS 5905. 4 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Continental Air Defense. Establishment of Back-Up Interceptor Control System (BUIC). Agreement with Canada, supplementing and amending the agreement of September 27, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa November 24, 1965. Entered into force November 24, 1965. TIAS 5907. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia, amending the agreement of February 17, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tunis November 29, 1965. Entered into force November 29, 1965. TIAS 5908. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington April 2, 1965. Entered into force May 13, 1965. TIAS 5909. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade November 22, 1965. Entered into force November 22, 1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5910. 7 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Ground-to-Air Communications Facilities in Northern Canada. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa December 1, 1965. Entered into force December 1, 1965. TIAS 5911. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi December 10, 1965. Entered into force December 10, 1965. TIAS 5913. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—Austria Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with Austria and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna June 15 and July 28, 1964. Entered into force December 13, 1965. TIAS 5914. 10 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—Portugal Cooperation

Agreement. Agreement with Portugal and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna February 24, 1965. Entered into force December 15, 1965. TIAS 5915. 20 pp. 15¢.

Extradition—Continued Application to Kenya of the United States—United Kingdom Treaty of December 22, 1931. Agreement with Kenya. Exchange of notes—Dated at Nairobi May 14 and August 19, 1965. Entered into force August 19, 1965. TIAS 5916. 2 pp. 5¢.

Trade—Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics From Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy, amending the agreement of July 6, 1962. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington November 16, 1965. Entered into force November 16, 1965. TIAS 5917. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of December 7, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nairobi December 1, 1965. Entered into force December 1, 1965. TIAS 5919. 2 pp. 5¢.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income. Protocol with the Federal Republic of Germany, modifying the convention of July 22, 1954. Signed at Bonn September 17, 1965. Entered into force December 27, 1965. With memorandum of understanding signed at Bonn October 19, 1965. TIAS 5920. 34 pp. 15¢.

Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with the Philippines, amending the agreement of April 12 and June 7, 1948. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 2 and 20, 1965. Entered into force December 20, 1965. TIAS 5921. 3 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Support for German Armed Forces in the United States in Emergencies. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn October 21, 1965, and at Washington December 18, 1965. Entered into force December 18, 1965. TIAS 5922. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of October 22, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens October 22 and 23, 1965. Entered into force October 23, 1965. Operative October 22, 1965. TIAS 5923. 2 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1398 PUBLICATION 8063 APRIL 11, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 21-27**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 21 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 53 of March 15 and 55 of March 18.

No.	Date	Subject
60	3/21	GATT Contracting Parties meet at Geneva (rewrite).
61	3/21	Rusk: "Face the Nation."
*62	3/22	Donnelley sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
*63	3/22	Symington sworn in as Chief of Protocol (biographic details).
*64	3/22	Supplementary protocol with United Kingdom for avoidance of double taxation (text).
65	3/23	Stationing of consul in Bechuanaland (rewrite).
*66	3/22	Meeting of voluntary agencies on refugees and immigration.
*67	3/23	Program for visit of Prime Minister of India.
*68	3/25	McCloskey appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
†69	3/25	U.S. reply to French aide memoire on NATO relations.
70	3/25	National foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters (rewrite).
71	3/25	Rusk: news conference of March 25.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free

In an address made at New York City on February 23 upon receiving the National Freedom Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country about the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that address. "Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1399



April 18, 1966

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER GANDHI OF INDIA
CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON

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President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi of India Confer at Washington

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India made an official visit to the United States March 27–April 1. She met with President Johnson and other top Government officials at Washington March 28–29. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi on March 28, an exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and the text of a joint communique released on March 29, together with the text of President Johnson's message to the Congress on March 30 outlining actions to be taken to alleviate India's food crisis.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated March 28; as-delivered texts

President Johnson

Madam Prime Minister, we are very glad that you are here. I feel very privileged to welcome you as the leader of our sister democracy. I have even greater pleasure in welcoming you as a good and gracious friend.

Someone has said that all pleasure is edged with sadness. Only 2 months ago we looked forward to receiving your gallant predecessor here in our Capital in Washington. We shared your grief in his sudden and untimely death.¹

We are reminded that three American Presidents—Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—were similarly stricken while engaged in that

most demanding of all public tasks, the task of working the hard passage from conflict back to peace. It is good to know that this task which Prime Minister Shastri had so ably begun is now in your strong and sympathetic hands.

Our thoughts also go back to the visits of another great Indian leader, those in 1949, 1956, and 1961 of your great father. Few have ever held a larger place in the hearts of the American people, and few ever will. We like to think, Mrs. Gandhi, that he belonged to us, too.

My countrymen and yours will be asking what we shall talk about during these next few days. Perhaps, with your permission, I may say just a word about that now.

I think they can be reasonably sure that we will not be wasting any of our time. Our concern will be with very practical questions. I look forward to getting your thoughts, Madam Prime Minister, on how peace can be obtained or made more secure, in Asia and throughout the world. I shall seek your counsel on the problems of Southeast Asia, where India, under the Geneva accords, has for so long played such a special role.

I will speak of my deep desire, which I know you share, for the continued improvement in relations between India and her great sister nation, Pakistan. The United States values deeply the friendship of both India and Pakistan. Nothing, we know, is more painful or more costly to all concerned than a falling out between one's friends.

I shall look forward, Mrs. Gandhi, to getting a better understanding of the urgent

¹ For statement by President Johnson on the death of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, see BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1966, p. 156.

economic and social problems with which your Government is now concerned. I will welcome that frankness and candor and detail that always marks conversations between good friends.

Economic stability and political tranquillity depend on how well we accomplish commonplace tasks: the production of food, its transportation, the supply of fertilizer, family planning, electricity for farm and village, the realization of economic growth and opportunity.

We shall be concerned with these essentials. The solution of these problems lies, we know, with the Indian Government, but the United States believes in backing the efforts of those who are determined to solve their own problems. We know, Madam Prime Minister, that India under your leadership will have such determination.

We want to learn how we can best help you and how our help can be used to the very best effect. Your people and ours share the conviction that however difficult the problems there are none that a strong and a vigorous democracy cannot solve.

You have long been aware, Madam Prime Minister, of the fascination that Indian culture holds for Americans. This extends from the Hindu Epics to the modern Indian novelists, and from the painters of the Ajanta Cave and the Akbar Court to your brilliant film producers of the present day. I venture to think that there is much about the United States that your students find equally interesting. Before our conversations end, I hope to be able to announce an imaginative new step to encourage and to facilitate these common interests.

Well, so much for our work in the days ahead. I hope there will be time for something more, for Mrs. Johnson and our daughters and I look forward to renewing an old friendship, to matching, if possible, in warmth and spirit your own hospitality in the years past.

Let me say once more how much we appreciate your making this long journey at this busy time to visit us here in the United States. I think I speak for every

American when I say that we are very proud and very honored to have you today as our guest in this country.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I thank you, Mr. President, for your warm words of welcome and for this gracious reception to me. I have had the privilege and the great pleasure of visiting America many times. Each visit has been an education, an enlarging of the circle of friends, and a deepening of understanding.

I come today as a friend, and I bring with me the greetings and good will of the Indian people.

Mr. President, you have visited India with Mrs. Johnson. We have very pleasant and happy memories of that occasion. You are known in India not only as a great President of a distant country but as a man of high idealism and a warmhearted friend who has come to our help in a time of need.

You have mentioned your interest in peace, Mr. President. We in India are greatly interested and concerned about peace, for to us it is not only a question of an ideal but one of very practical necessity to give us time and opportunity to deal with those other problems and questions which you have mentioned; that is, to be able to develop our country, to give opportunity to our own people to stand on their feet, to deal with the many obstacles and difficulties which a longstanding poverty has imposed on us.

I am grateful to you for your kind invitation. As I meet you again, I recall your moving words on the theme of poverty. Declaring unconditional war on the pockets of poverty in your own country, you have said: ²

. . . we want to give people more opportunity.
. . . They want education and training. They want a job and a wage. . . . They want their chil-

² For text of the President's remarks at Cumberland, Md., May 7, 1964, see *Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, vol. I, p. 626.

dren to escape the poverty which has afflicted them.

May I say, Mr. President, that important as these words are for the American people, they cannot mean as much to them as they do to us in India who have so long been denied the very basic decencies of life. We know that in our own war on poverty we have a noble friend, one who believes that the distant sufferer is his own brother.

India and the United States cannot and should not take each other for granted or allow their relations to drift. As friends committed to common ideals, they can together make this world of ours a better place in which to live.

Mr. President, may I express my gratitude not only for the welcome you have given me but for the kind words which you have said for my father and our late Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri. I know how greatly Mr. Shastri was looking forward to his visit here. I hope that I shall be able to fulfill what he had in mind and what he had hoped to do.

Mr. President, may I greet you and the American people on behalf of the people of India.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated March 28; as-delivered texts

President Johnson

Madam Prime Minister: I have heard—and do in part believe—that Queen Victoria, speaking in a different age and under different circumstances, once gave the following estimate of two of her prime ministers:

“Mr. Gladstone,” said she, “talks to me as if I were a public meeting—but Mr. Disraeli speaks to me as if I were a woman.”

Tonight I am very pleased to tell our friends who have assembled here that we have spoken to our gracious visitor not only as a woman with an understanding heart but also as a leader with a sense of vision and a builder with a valued view of faith.

India is a vast and varied land. The roots of freedom and justice run deep in the

Indian past. Its culture was full and strong centuries before the dawn of the Christian era.

The world has listened to the wisdom of India spoken through the voice of an eloquent leader. Once, many years ago, he said:

Democracy demands discipline, tolerance and mutual regard. Freedom demands respect for the freedom of others. In a democracy changes are made by mutual discussion and persuasion and not by violent means.

These were the words of Prime Minister Nehru. This was the belief of Prime Minister Shastri. Their fidelity to freedom's cause created, with Mahatma Gandhi, a new nation—conceived in struggle, grown strong in sacrifice.

Now, tonight, Prime Minister Gandhi comes to this house and to this table, the custodian of her nation's hope and the steward of her nation's dreams.

Today we here in the White House talked about the work and the sacrifice that is needed to make those dreams a modern reality. Together we discussed the practical ways that India and the United States can help to build a world where life is hopeful and where life is happier for all peoples, as well as the peoples of all lands.

Prime Minister Gandhi's goal is to weld the Indian nation into a land where the words of its founding fathers come true and their views of its future are real.

There is much that binds India and the United States together. Both our nations have the deep-felt obligation to the basic dignity of man—and the conviction that people can solve their problems by free choice far better than they can by any arrangement of force. There is in India and this country the strong tradition of freedom that just will never die.

I remember very clearly tonight my visit to India in 1961.

I remember what I saw and what I felt and what I heard throughout that great land. The thousands of students along the roads and in the cities, each of them quite impatient to know and to learn. I saw the

teachers and the scholars—the public servants—and the people, searching, yearning, discovering, hoping. And I think of our young people here and what we have done in the last year to achieve a new revolution in education—beyond the wildest dreams of just a decade ago.

Now, how can we bring into closer union the spirit and the courage of both our countries?

I have given a good deal of thought to that in the last few months, and tonight I would propose that we mark this historic visit of Prime Minister Gandhi with a lasting endowment for the benefit of inquiring young minds in the Indian nation.

So may we, Madam Prime Minister, with the permission of your Government and the American Congress, launch a new and imaginative venture? We shall call it an Indo-American Foundation. I would propose that this foundation be established in India, and that it be endowed with \$300 million in Indian currency owned by the United States. Other foundations all over the world will cooperate, I am sure, with an enterprise of this kind.

I would suggest that this foundation be organized as an independent institution, with the distinguished citizens of both our countries on its board of directors. I would propose that the new foundation be given a broad charter to promote progress in all fields of learning: to advance science, to encourage research, to develop new teaching techniques on the farms and in the factories, to stimulate, if you please, new ways to meet old problems.

The journey to our future is over a very long and a very winding road. Every mile will be challenged by doubt. But together, Madam Prime Minister, we must avoid the detours that intrude on our safe journey toward a time when, as your father promised, life will be better for all of our people.

So, ladies and gentlemen, let us honor those who are so welcome here tonight. Let us ask you to join in honoring the Chief of State whose wise and gifted Prime Minister we have enjoyed so much today and that

we welcome so warmly this evening. I should like to ask those of you who are assembled here to join me now in raising your glass in a toast to the great President of India.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Your words, Mr. President, were exceedingly moving. You have spoken of India and her wide variety. We who live there are naturally deeply conscious of it, while at the same time we are fully aware of the underlying and the basic unity which binds together all our people.

You have quoted some words of my father. I should like to quote something which you yourself have said. You said, Mr. President: "Reality rarely matches dreams, but only dreams give nobility to purpose."³

In the United States you have matched your dreams in many ways. Yet you still seek, and rightly, to offer the American people a better and a more purposeful life. You have called this idea the "Great Society." In India we also have our dreams, which may seem trite to you who sit here because they appear so simple—food barely sufficient to keep one from hunger, shelter to keep out the wind and the rain, medicine and education by which to restore the faith and the hope of our nearly 500 million people.

But everything in life is relative. There is an old proverb in my country. A person says, "I complained that I had no shoes until I met a man who had no feet."

Mahatma Gandhi said once, and it is something which my father often repeated, that we in India had to work to wipe the tear from every eye. That, of course, is a big task, and I doubt if it can be done in any country. And yet we have been trying to do that for 18 long years. Two centuries of subjugation cannot be washed away so

³ For text of the President's remarks at Detroit, Mich., Sept. 7, 1964, see *Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, vol. II, p. 1049.

easily. It takes time. It takes work. It takes courage.

India is changing, as no doubt your advisers who have been to India have told you, Mr. President. Nowhere in the world can the contrast be so striking. We have not only different levels of development between the different states but even within each state. We have often several centuries existing side by side. We have some of the greatest irrigation works in the world, and yet, in parts of our State of Rajasthan, desert families store precious water under lock and key. During a tour of some of these border areas a couple of months or so ago, I myself experienced the great hardship of doing without water and measuring the miles from well to well.

Some 12 million or more bullock carts still churn the dust of our village roads. Yet in other parts of India, we are building three nuclear powerplants.

Average agricultural yields are low, and at the same time there are areas where we obtain sugar cane yields that compare favorably with those in Hawaii or in Java.

A third of the illiterate people in the world are in India. Yet we are steadily conquering illiteracy.

In our State of Maharashtra, village after village vies to achieve total literacy. Parents learn from their children so that the honor of the village is upheld. In Madras people have banded together to improve their schools. They have given 100 million rupees beyond what the Government spends on their schools.

In the Punjab, little workshops make lathes and pumps that have revolutionized the countryside.

The seeming inconsistencies and conflicts of India are legion. The setbacks, and we have had many, are heartbreaking. Yet the signs of change are clear and constantly growing.

Sometimes critics point to an example of success and say, "This proves nothing. This is a mere drop in the ocean of Indian poverty." How wrong this is, for every

success reinforces the prospect of further success. It shows that success is possible. The example and the confidence it generates radiates outward.

This, Mr. President, is really our major problem. Years ago when we visited the villages to persuade people to try for a better life, they turned to us and said, "There can be no better life. God wills it this way. This is our lot and we have to suffer it." Today not a single voice will be heard like this. There is only one demand: that we do want a better life. We want better schools and more schools. We want bigger hospitals and more hospitals and all the other signs of progress and signs of raising the standards of living.

This I think is a very big achievement.

You talked, sir, of democracy. May I tell you one more story which I shared with the Vice President a short while ago. It happened during our first elections. I had gone to speak in a village where just the day before the leader of an opposition party had spoken. When my speech was ended, an elderly gentleman got up from the audience and said, "We have listened very carefully to what you have said, but just the day before somebody came"—so-and-so came—"and he said the exact opposite. Now, which of you was telling the truth?"

Now, this you can understand is an extremely tricky question to ask a public speaker. I said, "Well, I think that what I said was the truth, but I have no doubt that the gentleman thought that what he said was the truth. The whole point of democracy is that everybody should say whatever he thinks is the truth, and you, the people, have to really judge which is the correct version and which is the right version or the right thing for you."

Well, this was rather a difficult explanation for them, and they said, "Now, you tell us, do you belong to the Congress Party?" I said, "I do." "Is your party in power? Is it forming the government?" I said, "Yes, it is." "Then what business have you to send somebody here who tells us incorrect

things. It is your business to keep them away."

This was one of the stops where I was supposed to stay only 10 minutes, but I stayed for 2 hours trying to argue out the whole point about elections, freedom of expression, and so on. I can't say that I got any further at the end of 2 hours.

But now, years later, we find that we have got further. Nobody today in India would put such a question. They know that the different parties have their points of view, and these points of view are put before the people, and the people judge, not always rightly, but I think they try to judge rightly. Certainly, from election to election they have shown a great maturity.

India very definitely is on the move. Mr. President, the United States has given India valuable assistance in our struggle against poverty, against hunger, against ignorance, and against disease. We are grateful for this act of friendship. But we also know that our own "Great Society" must and can only rest securely on the quality and the extent of our own effort.

This effort we are determined to make. We owe it to our friends, and even more so we owe it to ourselves.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is of the greatest importance, to use your own words, to bring into closer union the spirit and courage of both our countries. I welcome your intention to set up an Indo-American Foundation, which will give tangible shape and form to this union.

The present-day world offers the possibility of bringing together one people with another. The young men and women of your Peace Corps are well known and well loved in our country. Every endeavor to sustain and enlarge this people-to-people partnership is a good effort and is welcome.

Friendship with America is not a new thing for us. Those of us in India who have been involved with the struggle for freedom have known from our earliest days your own struggle here. We have been taught the words of your leaders, of your past great

Presidents, and, above all, we were linked in friendship because of the friendship which President Roosevelt showed us and the understanding which he showed during some of the most difficult days of our independence struggle. I have no doubt it was also this understanding and friendly advice given to the British Government which facilitated and accelerated our own freedom.

But there again, the major effort had to be on our own, and this is what we want today: that we should bear our burden, as indeed we are doing, but that a little bit of help should come from friends who consider it worthwhile to lighten the burden.

Because, Mr. President, India's problems today are her own, but they are also the world's problems. India has a position in Asia which is an explosive position. India, if it is stable, united, democratic, I think can serve a great purpose. If India is not stable, or if there is chaos, if India fails, I think it is a failure of the whole democratic system. It is a failure of many of the values which you and I both hold dear.

That is why, Mr. President, I welcome your words and I welcome this meeting with you, which has been most valuable to me.

I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join with me in drinking a toast to the President and Mrs. Johnson, our friends, the American people, and the Great Society, not just for America but for all who dream of it, for all who struggle to transform those dreams into reality.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated March 29

At the invitation of President Johnson, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, has been on an official visit to the United States of America. During her visit, Prime Minister Gandhi met the President and members of the United States Government.

The President and the Prime Minister dis-

cussed India's efforts for the improved well-being of its people. Prime Minister Gandhi emphasized the high priority which India attaches to economic development. President Johnson assured Prime Minister Gandhi of the deep interest of the Government and the people of the United States in participating in international efforts, particularly those under the leadership of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to assist India in its own massive efforts to raise the living standards of its people within the framework of a parliamentary democracy.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's emergency food grain requirements resulting from last year's unprecedented drought. They agreed that the problem should be viewed not in isolation but in the context of an incipient worldwide food deficit, a challenge to humanity as a whole that merits the sustained and serious attention of all nations.

The Prime Minister described measures which the Government of India is taking to achieve self-sufficiency in the nation's food production. The President assured her that, Congress willing, the United States will continue to participate generously in the international effort to alleviate India's immediate food deficit problem. The President told Mrs. Gandhi that he intended to send a special message to Congress shortly to seek its endorsement of such U.S. assistance. Both of them agreed that further participation of other countries in meeting India's emergency food needs is also highly desirable.

Prime Minister Gandhi welcomed the President's proposal for the establishment of an Indo-U.S. Foundation to promote progress in all fields of learning. The President and the Prime Minister look to this cooperative endeavour to develop new teaching techniques in farm and factory, to advance science and to increase research.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi agreed that following the Tashkent Declaration there had already been con-

siderable progress toward reestablishing the conditions of peace in the subcontinent and that it is necessary that this process continue in order that the peoples of both countries may concentrate their energies once again on the urgent tasks of national development. They also agreed on the importance of continuing to give full support to the United Nations objectives of refraining from the use of force and of resolving conflicts between nations through peaceful means.

During their discussions, President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi reviewed recent developments in south and southeast Asia in the context of the universal desire of men and women everywhere to achieve peace that respects liberty, dignity, and the pursuit of a better way of life. In this connection the President explained the policies the United States is pursuing to help the people of the Republic of Vietnam to defend their freedom and to reconstruct their war-torn society. The Prime Minister explained the continuing interest and efforts of her country in bringing about a just and peaceful solution of this problem.

Prime Minister Gandhi affirmed the determination of her nation to defend the freedom and territorial integrity of India and explained the challenge presented to it by the aggressive policies of the People's Republic of China. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that such aggressive policies pose a threat to peace, particularly in Asia.

The President and the Prime Minister consider that the visit has reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship between the United States and India, based upon a shared commitment to constitutional democracy and a common revolutionary heritage. Their highly informative, frank, and friendly discussions have contributed to a valuable personal understanding between their two countries and their two peoples.

Prime Minister Gandhi extended a warm invitation to President Johnson to visit India. The President expressed his grati-

tude for the invitation and his hope that he could visit India again.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

White House press release dated March 30

To the Congress of the United States:

In recent months I have been watching with deep concern the emerging problem of world food supply. And I have been especially concerned with the prospect for India. During this past week I have discussed the Indian food problem with the Prime Minister of India, who has been our welcome and distinguished guest here in Washington. I am persuaded that we may stand at this moment on the threshold of a great tragedy. The facts are simple; their implications are grave. India faces an unprecedented drought. Unless the world responds, India faces famine.

Strong efforts by the Indian government, and our help, have so far averted famine. But in the absence of cooperative and energetic action by the United States, by other nations and by India herself, some millions of people will suffer needlessly before the next crop is harvested. This, in our day and age, must not happen. Can we let it be said that man, who can travel into space and explore the stars, cannot feed his own?

Because widespread famine must not and cannot be allowed to happen, I am today placing the facts fully before the Congress. I am asking the endorsement of the Congress for a program that is small neither in magnitude nor concept. I am asking the Congress, and the American people, to join with me in an appeal to the conscience of all nations that can render help.

I invite any information that the Congress can supply. Our people will welcome any judgments the Congress can provide. The executive branch, this nation and the world will take appropriate note and give proper attention to any contributions in counsel and advice that Congressional debate may produce.

If we all rally to this task, the suffering can be limited. A sister democracy will not suffer the terrible strains which famine imposes on free government.

Nor is this all. The Indians are a proud and self-respecting people. So are their leaders. The natural disaster which they now face is not of their making. They have not asked our help needlessly; they deeply prefer to help themselves. The Indian government has sound plans for strengthening its agricultural economy and its economic system. These steps will help India help herself. They will prevent a recurrence of this disaster. I also propose action through the World Bank and the Agency for International Development to support this strong initiative by the Government of India.

The Crisis

Since independence India has done much to increase her output of agricultural products. Her agriculture has not been neglected. From 1950 to 1965 she increased food production 75 percent. This is a creditable achievement. But India has had to contend with a continuing and relentless increase in population. Her people have also consumed more from a higher income. Accordingly, she has remained heavily dependent on our help. Last year we provided, under Public Law 480, more than 6 million tons of wheat, equal to more than two-fifths of our own consumption. To keep this supply moving, the equivalent of two fully loaded liberty ships had to put in at an Indian port every day of the year.

Now India has been the victim of merciless natural disaster. Nothing is so important for the Indian farmer as the annual season of heavy rain—the monsoon. Last year, over large parts of India, the rains did not come. Crops could not be planted, or the young plants withered and died in the fields. Agricultural output, which needed to increase, was drastically reduced. Not since our own dustbowl years of the nineteen-thirties has there been a greater agricultural disaster.

Indian leaders have rightly turned to the world for help. Pope Paul VI has endorsed their plea. So has the World Council of Churches. So has the Secretary General of the United Nations. So has the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization. And so, in this message, does the President of the United States.

I have said that effective action will not be cheap. India's need is for at least 11 to 12 million tons of imported grain from January to December 1966.

Food in this world is no longer easy to find.

But find it we must.

Here is what I propose.

The Program

Last fiscal year we supplied six million tons of food grain to India. So far in this fiscal year, I have allotted 6.5 million tons of grain for shipment to India—more than the total of six million tons which we had planned to provide as a continuation of past arrangements. It is even more necessary in this emergency to keep the pipelines full and flowing and to insure that there is no congestion of rail or sea transport. India, furthermore, estimates an additional six to seven million tons of food grain will be necessary through next December beyond what has already been committed or expected.

I propose that the United States provide three and one-half million tons of that requirement, with the remaining three and a half million tons coming from those nations which have either the food to offer or the means to buy food. I invite those nations to match the amount which we will supply. For example, I am delighted to be informed that Canada is prepared to provide a million tons of wheat and flour to India.

Every agriculturally advanced country can, by close scrutiny of its available supplies, make a substantial contribution. I ask that every government seek to supply the maximum it can spare—and then a little more. I ask those industrial countries which cannot send food to supply a generous equivalent

in fertilizer, or in shipping, or in funds for the purchase of these requisites. All know the Indian balance of payments is badly overburdened. Food and other materials should be supplied against payment in rupees, which is our practice, or as a gift.

It is not our nature to drive a hard mathematical bargain where hunger is involved. Children will not know that they suffered hunger because American assistance was not matched. We will expect and press for the most energetic and compassionate action by all countries of all political faiths. But if their response is insufficient, and if we must provide more, before we stand by and watch children starve, we will do so. I, therefore, ask your endorsement for this emergency action.

I have spoken mostly of bread-grains. The Prime Minister of India spoke also of other commodities which can meet part of the requirements or replace part of the need. In response to her needs, I propose that we allot up to 200,000 tons of corn, up to 150 million pounds of vegetable oils, and up to 125 million pounds of milk powder to India. The vegetable oil and milk powder are especially needed for supplementing the diets of Indian children.

In addition, India's own exchange resources can be released for food and fertilizer purchases if we make substantial shipments of cotton and tobacco. I am suggesting the allotment for this purpose of 325-700,000 bales of cotton and 2-4 million pounds of tobacco. Both of these commodities we have in relative abundance.

I request prompt Congressional endorsement of this action.

I urge, also, the strong and warmhearted and generous support of this program by the American people.

And I urge the strong and generous response of governments and people the world around.

India is a good and deserving friend. Let it never be said that "bread should be so dear, and flesh and blood so cheap" that we turned in indifference from her bitter need.

Further Action

The Indian people want to be self-supporting in their food supply.

Their government has adopted a far-reaching program to increase fertilizer production, improve water and soil management, provide rural credit, improve plant protection and control food loss. These essentials must be accompanied by a strong training and education program.

I have directed the Secretary of Agriculture, in cooperation with AID, to consult with the Indian government to ascertain if there are ways and means by which we can strengthen this effort. We have long experience with short courses, extension training and similar programs. If they can be used, I feel certain that American agricultural experts would respond to an appeal to serve in India as a part of an Agricultural Training Corps or through an expanded Peace Corps. Many of our younger men and women would especially welcome the opportunity.

I am determined that in our assistance to the Indian government we not be narrowly limited by what has been done in the past. Let us not be afraid of our own enthusiasm. Let us be willing to experiment.

The Indian government believes that there can be no effective solution of the Indian food problem that does not include population control. The choice is now between a comprehensive and humane program for limiting births and the brutal curb that is imposed by famine. As Mrs. Gandhi told me, the Indian government is making vigorous efforts on this front.

Following long and careful planning and after discussions in recent days with Prime Minister Gandhi, I have proposed the establishment of the Indo-U.S. Foundation. This Foundation will be financed by rupees, surplus to our need, now on deposit in India.

It will be governed by distinguished citizens of both countries. It will be a vigorous and imaginative enterprise designed to give new stimulus to education and scientific research in India. There is no field where, I hope, this stimulus will be greater than in the field of agriculture and agricultural development.

Finally, in these last days, the Prime Minister and I have talked about the prospects for the Indian economy. The threat of war with China and the unhappy conflict with Pakistan seriously interrupted India's economic progress. Steps had to be taken to protect dwindling exchange resources. These also had a strangling effect on the economy. Indian leaders are determined now to put their economy again on the upward path. Extensive discussions have been held with the World Bank, which heads the consortium of aid-giving countries.

The United States interferes neither in the internal politics nor the internal economic structure of other countries. The record of the last fifteen years is a sufficient proof that we ask only for results. We are naturally concerned with results—with insuring that our aid be used in the context of strong and energetic policies calculated to produce the most rapid possible economic development.

We believe Indian plans now under discussion show high promise. We are impressed by the vigor and determination of the Indian economic leadership. As their plans are implemented, we look forward to providing economic assistance on a scale that is related to the great needs of our sister democracy.

An India free from want and deprivation will, as Mahatma Gandhi himself once predicted, "be a mighty force for the good of mankind."

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 30, 1966.

"If the fears and agonies of the war in Viet-Nam can lead us another step toward collectivizing the international police responsibility and closer to a wider realism about the impossibility of all wars, even its tragedy may be redeemed. It can be the prelude, if not to a golden age, at least to a world freed of the obsessive risks of annihilation."

The Quest for Peace

by Arthur J. Goldberg
*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The tradition for vigorous and healthy discussion in our country is an old one—with its roots in the history of our own Revolution, if not in the history of Western civilization itself. Justice Brandeis, speaking of those who won our independence, once said:

They believe that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American Government.

Those of you who have studied the classics will find a striking similarity, a deliberate one, between the words of Justice Brandeis and those attributed to Pericles when he said: "... we Athenians . . . instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all."

It is in this spirit that Americans today—on the campus, in our newspapers, on television, in various citizen forums, and in the Congress—should debate the vital aspirations of American foreign policy—the aspirations directly related to our quest for peace.

It is in this spirit that today I wish to discuss with you our search for the just resolution of the problems of Viet-Nam and Communist China, upon which the success of our quest so intimately depends.

I speak, too—and trust that all will listen—in the spirit of Cromwell's admonition: "My brethren . . . I beseech you, bethink you that you may be mistaken."

The Alternatives to War

It is now a cliché to say that in the age of nuclear destruction the world can no longer afford or accept war as a means of settling its inevitable disputes. We have not stopped dead at the cliché but have committed both urgency of thought and national purpose to working out the alternatives to war.

We know, or should know, some of the methods of dealing with disputes which do not work. The big war, the holy war, the

¹ Address made at Charter Day ceremonies at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 25 (U.S./U.N. press release 4825 dated Mar. 24).

ideological war, the war of unconditional surrender—all these are simply wars of extermination—but extermination for everybody.

On the other hand, retreat before violence only encourages more violence. Even the more sophisticated forms of “retreat”—for instance, spheres of influence that amount to spheres of domination—hardly work better over the long run since they are based on an assumption that has been repeatedly proved false in the 20th century: that peace can come if only small nations do what large neighbors tell them.

In the modern world they feel they have their own rights. Besides, most small nations have more than one big neighbor. Suppose, as in the prewar Balkans of 1914, the signals get crossed? In any case, everyone is a neighbor on a planet the astronauts and cosmonauts can encircle in 90 minutes.

What are the alternatives to war? We know them from our domestic community. They are practiced every day in societies which are wide enough to span continents. We abandon the right of private redressing of wrongs; instead, we hand over our disputes and conflicts to the impartial action and scrutiny of the law.

We set up all the needed instruments of mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and adjudication. We seek agreement or acquiescence by compromise, adjustment, and impartial decision. We do not permit settlement by force, and we employ an independent police power both to check violence and to guarantee the peaceful resolution of disputed issues.

To say that men do not know how to be rid of armed conflict is to deny generations of development in domestic legality. Our trouble lies not in ignorance of the tools but in the habit and pride of national sovereignty which prevent us from adapting and using the tools in an international society. Just so did men long resist abandoning the “right” to fight duels or vendettas.

Such principles are all very well. But between the idea and the reality falls the shadow—the shadow of Viet-Nam. Can this

war be fitted into any wider concept of the search for better methods of peacekeeping? I think it can. No thinking American would support it if it could not. Let me begin by saying what this war is not.

It is not emphatically a war to establish an American “imperialism” or an American “sphere of influence” in Asia. What exclusive interests have we there? Investment? trade? settlement? None.

It is not a war to threaten or frustrate the legitimate interests of the Chinese people—though it seeks to discourage violence and aggression and play some part in persuading them that the imperialist world, once known to the Central Kingdom, is dead and will not be resurrected.

It is in part, if you like, to persuade them that the fact that large parts of Asia—including all Southeast Asia and the hill states of the Himalayas—once, supposedly, paid the emperors tribute is no reason why they should revert to the status of vassal states in the 20th century.

Again, this war is *not* a holy war against communism as an ideology. It does *not* seek unconditional surrender—from North Viet-Nam or anyone else. It does *not* seek to deny any segment of South Vietnamese opinion its part in peacefully establishing a stable regime.

It does, however, preclude retreat before two things—first, the program of the Viet Cong, strongly controlled by the North, to impose its will by violence; and second, its claim to be the “sole genuine representative” of a people, the vast majority of whom have rejected this claim.

This, I believe, is the background against which to consider in positive terms what this war is about. It is, I suggest, another step in a limited operation of a policing type—an operation designed to check violence as a means to settle international disputes.

The violence is no less total because it has been largely organized as a guerrilla operation. Guerrilla warfare—entering villages by stealth, killing the head man, kidnaping

the young men, breaking up the families—is, in a real sense, the most total of wars, short of nuclear destruction.

Our Aims in Viet-Nam

To attempt to check it, to establish the principle that this kind of violence, fanned and fed from outside, is as impermissible a means for settling international disputes as any other form of violence, is the first and indeed chief aim of American military action.

The second, once violence stops, is equally compatible with what I would call the legal and peaceful alternative to international violence. It is to grant the people of South Viet-Nam the time, the security, and the opportunity to express their own preferences as free as is humanly possible from coercion of any form.

In the period after World War II we have witnessed—indeed, we can take pride in having helped to bring about—the remarkable phenomenon of a genuinely free expression of will among the vanquished peoples of Japan and Germany while they were still subject to military occupation by the victors. We have also seen Western colonialism—notably the British and the French—end again and again by the advent to power of the anticolonialists in truly free elections.

What has been done before can be done again. And if, given the opportunity to express their preferences free of coercion, the South Vietnamese people vote for the Viet Cong, or for a coalition, or for any other particular outcome, we must be and will be prepared to accept their judgment. I say frankly that we do not expect that these people will make such a choice, but that is their business.

But if you ask me whether in view of Asia's colonial past, in view of the far-reaching differences between America and mainland China, in view of the fact that America is vast, powerful, Western, capitalist, and wealthy—if you ask me whether ideally America is the most suitable, the

most acceptable policeman, I can only say probably not, and we do not wish to be.

Indeed, it is probably true that they would prefer that a regional organization of Asian countries themselves or the entire world community play the policeman's role. My own profound dedication to the United Nations and my deep interest in its growth spring from the belief that it is the motive center of an international society wherein law and order are not based upon power alone, where the police function is a collective responsibility.

Role of the International Community

In the case of Viet-Nam, nothing would be more heartening and welcome than to have the international community—acting through the United Nations—accept the responsibility for the most immediate of our aims—that of checking the resort to violence against South Viet-Nam.

Similarly, we would welcome it if the international community were to accept the responsibility for creating in Viet-Nam the peaceful alternative to violence—the responsibility of policing reaffirmed and revitalized provisions of the Geneva agreements, of insuring by means of effective patrol and supervision that the people of South Viet-Nam are given the security and freedom necessary to make their own choices concerning their government and their future.

But it would be unrealistic not to recognize that the membership of the United Nations is not yet prepared to accept the first responsibility. And one should recall that the only occasion on which the membership accepted an equivalent responsibility was in Korea in 1950, when the Soviet Union was temporarily absent from the Security Council and when the membership did not yet include a host of newly independent countries who—for reasons we, as one of the earliest nonaligned countries in modern history, cannot fail to understand—hesitate to take sides in issues where the great powers strongly disagree.

Indeed, our recent experience in the Se-

curity Council showed that the members of the Council found it impossible, in the face of the intransigence of a few of the members, to accept the much more modest responsibility of formally calling upon the parties involved in Viet-Nam to reach a settlement through negotiations, rather than fighting, in a forum of their own choosing.

But to say that the membership of the United Nations is not yet prepared to accept the responsibility for checking the use of force against South Viet-Nam is not to say that the responsibility can be shirked or ignored by those committed to the rule of law—and we do not intend to do so.

It seems clear that, for the immediate future, only a few members of the international community are willing to join in the onerous and costly task of again demonstrating with arms that the use of force is not a tolerable method to settle international grievances or satisfy national ambitions.

This is a responsibility that we and others cannot escape if we are to build an enduring peace. It is a responsibility well described over a century ago by John Stuart Mill:

The doctrine of non-intervention (he wrote), to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free states. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right side must not help the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent. Though it be a mistake to give freedom to a people who do not value the boon, it cannot but be right to insist that if they do value it, they shall not be hindered from the pursuit of it by foreign coercion.

But we must not forget—and I assure you we have not—that our interest will be served by encouraging the international community as a whole to accept some, if not all, the responsibility for seeing to it that, once this intolerable use of force is abandoned, the people of South Viet-Nam are,

through impartial and effective policing and supervision, guaranteed the physical security necessary to permit a free choice concerning their own government and their own future.

Acceptance of such responsibilities by the international community would hasten the withdrawal of American and other foreign forces from Viet-Nam. For then the withdrawal would be the prelude not to the condoning of violence and the spread of anarchy but part of a new attempt to insure that political decisions in our inescapably international society are based upon law, order, and consent—not upon force supplied and directed from outside.

This is where all the nations and all the governments have their part to play. Whatever their devotion to national sovereignty—as in France; however their sovereignty is wrapped up in ideology—as in the Soviet Union; however deep their dedication to independent nonalignment—as in most emerging nations; all have to face a profounder, antecedent condition to sovereignty and independence, and that is survival itself.

If the fears and agonies of the war in Viet-Nam can lead us another step toward collectivizing the international police responsibility and closer to a wider realism about the impossibility of all wars, even its tragedy may be redeemed. It can be the prelude, if not to a golden age, at least to a world freed of the obsessive risk of annihilation.

The Question of Communist China

I turn now to the second issue which looms large in our international horizon—the question of Communist China. It is not unrelated to the question of Viet-Nam. Indeed, part of the difficulty in any review of our Chinese policy is the role being played by Peking in support of violence and terror and war—all in the guise of so-called “wars of national liberation”—not only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, and in some parts of the Americas.

The doctrine is one of war, to be sure, but "national liberation" in the lexicon of Communist China is a spurious label to cover up subversion and aggression.

The recent setbacks Communist China has experienced in virtually every area of the globe, however, show that most nations are aware of the threats that current Communist Chinese policy poses to their national existence and to world peace.

But not even these setbacks seem to be swaying Mao Tse-tung and his fellow leaders, and I strongly question if any diplomatic action open to the United States would have more effect in convincing the present regime to mend its ways and change its belief about remaking Asia in their image.

What about some of the proposals concerning Communist China that are now being discussed?

The Communist Chinese leaders have set a price for entering the U.N. And what a price it is! It includes not only the expulsion from the U.N. of the Republic of China and other unnamed "imperialist lackeys" of the United States but the complete reorganization of the U.N., the withdrawal of a General Assembly resolution condemning Peking as an aggressor in the Korean conflict, and the branding of the United States as an aggressor there.

This is a price that, in my opinion, even most nations who support Red China's membership will not pay.

The unreality reflected in Peking's attitude toward U.N. membership is repeated in its attitude toward diplomatic recognition.

The evidence can be found in the bitter experiences of those nations that have turned to recognition of Peking and have had to turn embarrassed backs on Taiwan and suffer continuing rebuffs and humiliation at the hands of Communist China.

What the current discussion ultimately must face up to is that it is not so much a matter of whether we should recognize Communist China or support its admission to the U.N. Rather it is a question of

whether the United States is prepared to agree that the 12 million people of Taiwan are to be handed over to Peking against their will.

I do not agree and, I am convinced, most Americans do not agree.

It is true, of course, that the figure of 12 million is not very imposing when stacked up against the three-quarters of a billion people of mainland China. But morality in international relations cannot be decided by figures. Principle must remain our guide.

If the United States and Communist China are to normalize relations, it can only be done through a common commitment to a rule of law which adjures international violence.

When the time comes—as we all hope it will—when the leaders of Communist China are ready to subscribe to this principle in full measure and to end the isolation that now cuts them off from the rest of the world, the United States will not be backward in welcoming and applauding the change.

World Rule of Law

For we stand ready to live in peace with any and all countries regardless of ideology. All we ask is that they join in seeking common understandings, common undertakings, and the peaceful resolution of all differences. That is the overall policy that guides our relations with Communist and non-Communist nations alike. I do not believe it requires reappraisal.

It merits consideration by all men and nations who seek to live in peace.

Our commitment to the still-distant goal of a world rule of law makes it all the more imperative that we redouble our creative energies to the use of the United Nations as an effective instrument to build and to keep the peace.

We realize that it cannot yet provide the final answer, nor can it yet guarantee the peace in full. But that is more the fault of its members than of the U.N. I am optimistic, however, that it will in time realize in full the grand dream of Franklin Delano

Roosevelt of a world free from want and free from fear. For, regardless of our differences, I do not believe mankind will let its noblest work be extinguished in a puff of time.

Though the days before us are dark still and the threats many, I refer you to yet another somber time and the words spoken then by Winston Churchill, whose statue is to be unveiled in Washington next month:

These are not dark days, these are great days . . . (he said) and we must all thank God we have been allowed, each of us according to our stations, to play a part in making these days memorable in the history of our race.

In our one world today the history of the human race can only be memorable if mankind succeeds in achieving the ancient and precious goal of a universal and lasting peace. In this quest we cannot—we dare not—fail.

Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on Viet-Nam and NATO

Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary Ball at Paris on March 30 by André Fontaine of Le Monde, which was published in that paper on March 31.

Press release 73 dated March 31, revised

Q. Mr. Secretary, the initial reason for your visit to Paris was to make a statement before the NATO Council on the war in Viet-Nam. Are there any new developments that need to be brought to the attention of the Council?

A. We decided last year to have meetings at regular intervals in order to review current problems. We had one of those meetings this morning.

Q. Did you appeal for increased Allied assistance?

A. No, but several countries informed us through their representatives at this meeting that they intended to allocate funds for hospitals or relief missions.

Q. How do you explain the small amount of such participation especially if you compare it with what happened during the Korean war?

A. Actually, this assistance is not as small as is believed. If the plans now under discussion are effectively carried out, there will be, between Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, a total of considerably more than 50,000 foreign troops at our side in Viet-Nam. As for the attitude of the Europeans, obviously we regret it, but it is definitely a very different situation from the one that occurred in Korea, when we were acting under the United Nations flag.

Q. What are your principal objections to the policy of the French Government?

A. I am not absolutely sure that I understand very well what that policy is. This is a matter that I discussed a year and a half ago with General de Gaulle and, at that time, he proposed a neutralization of South Viet-Nam. Insofar as that concerns the United States, we have never asked anything other than a neutral Viet-Nam, which means a country whose people would be free to decide for themselves as they see fit and not be compelled to accept a regime imposed by force. If by neutrality you mean simply a country that does not enter into any alliance, we have no objection to that.

Q. In case you should win, what kind of Viet-Nam do you visualize?

A. A country in which the government and society would be strong enough to carry out their task in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.

Q. Do you really believe that that is possible?

A. The Vietnamese have already demonstrated a strong determination to be independent.

Q. How long do you think that will take?

A. I do not expect a prompt decision. We are pursuing limited objectives, and we are seeking to attain them, while limiting mili-

tary operations as much as possible. This cannot be done in 24 hours.

Q. Aren't you afraid that the public will one day have enough of this war?

A. The largely predominant feeling is that we are facing a situation with which we must grapple as long as that is necessary. The opposition to the war is noisy but rather limited. In my opinion, the support of our cause is stronger than it was before.

Q. Do you not recall that following the Korean war, the American leaders were determined to avoid any land war in Asia and that President Eisenhower was elected largely on his promise to put an end to the impasse?

A. Times have changed, and President Eisenhower has given his full support to President Johnson's policy.

France and NATO

Q. To come now to NATO, do you accept France's position that our country could remain in the alliance after leaving its military structures?

A. The organization of the North Atlantic Treaty and its integrated commands are the means that make it possible for the alliance to operate. If France applies the policy it has just announced, the deterrent effort exercised by the alliance will be diminished. Moreover, if the defense of France is to depend on arrangements that provide for a more or less loose liaison between the separate military commands, it is the very security of France that will be diminished.

Q. Do you see any chance that France will really resume its place in NATO?

A. Certainly, and we shall always remain ready to welcome it, as President Johnson has said.¹ The decisions that France has just taken sadden and worry the United States deeply.

Q. Do you really think that there is any possibility of cooperation between two

armies when one is based on the idea of the flexible response and the other on the doctrine of massive reprisals?

A. There are two different problems here. The problem of the strategic theory to be applied must be debated among generals, and it is the practical arrangements for close cooperation that will most effectively permit a solution. The other problem concerns what you call "a cooperation between armies without an integrated command"; this cooperation has never been effectively assured by mere liaison between the armies. During the War of 1914-1918 it took 4 years to create a combined command under the orders of Marshal Foch. Only then was considerable progress made. In 1939 and 1940 the general-staff liaison between the Allies was tragically inadequate—and the French have good reason to know this better than anyone. It was only when the Allies succeeded in establishing an integrated command, placed under the orders of General Eisenhower, that the war was won.

Q. Do you think that the influence of Germany in the alliance will be increased by France's withdrawal from NATO?

A. No one wants any country—including the United States—to occupy a dominant position. What we are seeking is collective action. It would be very regrettable if the present crisis were to lead to a strengthening of national positions.

Q. Do you think that Germany will be admitted to the Standing Group?

A. I would not venture to make any forecast regarding that point.

Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities

Q. Do you think that the time has come for a new examination of the problem of the nuclear responsibilities of the multilateral force?

A. The sharing of nuclear responsibilities is a very big problem that has not yet been resolved. The creation of the multilateral force is not its only possible solution. The British have proposed establishing an At-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 554.

lantic nuclear force, which is now being studied by the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other member countries of NATO.

Q. Hasn't President Johnson himself decided to set aside the plan for a multinuclear force?

A. At the beginning of 1965 the political situation was such in Germany and elsewhere that it would have been useless to act too quickly. Besides, the United States was not attempting to impose its ideas, but rather to fill a European need. However, the preparation of a collective plan that would permit the nations not in possession of nuclear weapons to participate in the decisions on nuclear power has not yet been finished, and that is a task which still is very important. The question is under study in the so-called McNamara committee. I do not wish to say any more, but I am certain that we must find a means of enabling the nations without atomic weapons to participate in the decisions on nuclear power.

Q. What do you make of the Soviet objections?

A. The Soviets object to the Atlantic pact itself and, consequently, to anything that may strengthen or consolidate it.

Q. Are you in favor of maintaining French troops in Germany?

A. That is a problem that should first be examined by Germany itself. It is of particular concern to Great Britain also and the United States, since these two countries also maintain troops in Germany; and, of course, it concerns all the members of the alliance. In my opinion, the fundamental question is what agreements will be made regarding the command. The United States will not take a position on this problem until after holding more extensive consultations.

Q. Among the reasons for the French decision, mention has often been made of the desire not to let our country be drawn into a war which it did not want, and in this connection the matter of sending para-

chutists to the Congo from the base in Evreux has been cited.

A. In the event of war, the French forces would be assigned to an integrated command only if the French Government decided to do so under article V of the Atlantic Pact. The French decision actually represents a step backward toward the restoration of the old system of national rivalries. As for the Congo affair, I can tell you that the French Government had been notified and raised no objection. I can tell you categorically that before the takeoff of the American planes charged with dropping those parachutists, my Government asked the French Government whether it had any objection, and the Quai d'Orsay gave us its full assurance that it had no objection.

In this connection I should like to make some remarks that I consider very important.

What "Integration" Means

I am astounded to hear certain persons here suggest that France's participation in the integrated command could involve that country in a war against its will. It would be very useful if you would explain to your readers what integration actually means, for it seems to me that there is a great deal of confusion about it on this side of the ocean.

In NATO there is no integration of the operational command in peacetime except with regard to certain air-defense units which, owing to the nature of things, must be capable of instantly retaliating against an attack. With this one exception, no French soldier can be given an order to make the slightest move by anyone but the French command. Even in case of war, troops would be placed under the operational command of SHAPE only if the French Government "deemed it necessary," under article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Consequently, for the NATO command to be able to dispose of French forces, a national decision, made by the French Government, would be necessary.

Without any doubt, if France is still bound by the North Atlantic Treaty, as the French Government states that it wishes to be, France would be under the obligation of remaining at the side of its allies in the event that one of the members of NATO should be the victim of armed aggression. This obligation results from the treaty itself and not from France's remaining in NATO or from its participation in the integrated command. The two things have nothing in common.

U.S. Position Defined

Permit me to define our position clearly. What causes us the most concern about the measure that France proposes to take is that it seems to constitute a step backward toward a disastrous past. Since the war, we have constantly tried to contribute toward creating a state of affairs that would make it possible to eliminate the causes of conflict—and the principal cause of past wars has been the effort made by each European nation to insure its supremacy over the others. Hence, we are reminded of 1914 when we witness acts that seem to have been inspired by the old feelings of national rivalry, the old, outmoded concepts of sovereignty.

As two Presidents of the United States have said, what we desire is a partnership between equals, from one shore of the Atlantic to the other. We have been ready for a long time to create a state of affairs in which the political decisions and responsibilities are completely shared on an equal basis, and we are anxious to attain it.

We wish to create a true association based on equality of treatment, and we have a feeling that we will not be able to obtain it fully if Europe does not take the course of unity.

We can, to be sure, practice equality of treatment in our negotiations with the European countries, but there is an aspect of equality that does not depend either on the will or the acts of the United States—namely, equality of dimensions and resources. Now, this difficulty itself would be

surmounted by the establishment of a united Europe. With resources that would be very nearly the same as those of the United States, a unified Europe would be, in every respect, our equal. But this equality will never be achieved by the fragmentation of Europe, which would thus see its power and importance reduced.

The unity of Europe is, of course, an affair that concerns the Europeans and not the Americans, but we see in it the means of realizing a true association between equal countries. I wish to repeat once again that domination is the thing that is farthest from our minds. It is association that we want.

Permit me to make another point very clear. We believe in consultations, and I am always surprised to hear that we do not wish to consult anyone.

When we tried, in the past, to hold consultation in the NATO Council, the French Government now in power stated that it did not consider the Council an appropriate forum for consultations concerning the problems arising outside the area with which the treaty is concerned.

Permit me to make another remark. We regret that the French Government considered itself justified in acting unilaterally and has not presented its views on the reform of NATO to all the members of the organization, with a view to a common discussion. During the last 3 years we have repeatedly stated to the French Government that we would welcome any proposals that it might make to us. We have stated that we did not consider NATO to be a perfect or unalterable organization and that the times and conditions had changed, which fact could make changes in the form or structure of the organization necessary.

We have been told repeatedly that proposals would be communicated to us later, and we have stated very clearly that the other members of NATO and we ourselves would, together, give them most careful study. But the French Government has apparently chosen to act unilaterally.

United States and France Exchange Views on Atlantic Alliance

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 25

Press release 69 dated March 25

The United States Government acknowledges receipt of the aide memoire of the French Government, dated March 11, 1966,¹ regarding French views as to the military relations of France with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular with the United States.

The aide memoire appears to be an indication by the French Government of a proposed general course of future action by the French Government, rather than an invitation to discuss specific requests. The statement is not precise with regard to the measures that the French Government contemplates, nor does it indicate when and how it expects any such proposals to be given effect. The United States Government will also await clarification of the position of the French Government with regard to the bilateral agreements between France and the United States, having in mind the terms of those agreements as they relate to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Since the bilateral agreements provide for military facilities utilized by the United States in fulfillment of its NATO commitments, the United States Government will, of course, also consult with the other NATO Allies on this subject.

FRENCH AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 10

Official translation

For years, the French Government has noted on numerous occasions, both publicly and in talks with the Allied Governments, that it considered that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization no longer corresponded, insofar as it is concerned, to the conditions prevailing in the world at present and which are fundamentally different from those of 1949 and the following years.

¹ The French aide memoire, which is dated Mar. 10, was delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Paris on Mar. 11.

Indeed, the threats hanging over the Western World, in particular in Europe, which had motivated the conclusion of the treaty, have changed in nature. They no longer have the immediate and menacing character they formerly had. Moreover, the countries of Europe have re-established their economy and therefore have regained resources. In particular, France has equipped itself with an atomic armament whose very nature excludes its being integrated. In the third place, the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, replacing the monopoly held by the United States, has changed the general conditions of defense of the West. Lastly, it is a fact that Europe is no longer the center of international crises. The center has shifted elsewhere, especially to Asia, where the countries of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole are obviously not involved.

This evolution does not by any means lead the French Government to call into question the treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. In other words, barring events in the coming years that might come to alter fundamentally the relations between the East and the West, it does not intend to avail itself, in 1969, of the provisions of Article 13 of the treaty and considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it appears necessary.

This being unequivocally affirmed, the problem of the organization arises, that is to say, of all the agreements, arrangements, and decisions made after the signature of the treaty, whether multilateral or bilateral in form. The French Government considers that this organization no longer meets what it considers to be the essential requirements.

Undoubtedly, the possibility of undertaking negotiations to modify by common accord the arrangements in force could have been entertained. The French Government would have been happy to propose this if it had had reason to think that such negotiations could lead to the result that it itself has in view. Unfortunately, everything indicates that such an undertaking would be doomed to failure, inasmuch as France's partners appear to be, or declare that they are, all in favor of maintaining the *status quo*, if not of strengthening everything that, from the French viewpoint, seems to be now and henceforth unacceptable.

Therefore, France is led to draw, insofar as it is concerned, the necessary conclusions, that is to say, to take in its own behalf the measures which seem to it to be essential and which are, in its view, in no way incompatible with its participation in the Alliance or with its participation, should the occasion arise, in military operations at the side of its allies.

Already in the past, the French Government has taken measures of this nature with respect to its naval forces assigned to NATO, either in the Mediterranean or in the Atlantic. It is now a question of its ground and air forces stationed in Germany,

which are assigned to the Allied Command in Europe. France intends to put an end to such assignment. This decision will involve its simultaneous withdrawal from the two integrated commands to which these forces are attached, and in which it participates within the framework of NATO, that is to say, the Supreme Allied Command Europe and the Central Europe Command, and, hence, the transfer outside of French territory of the headquarters of these two commands.

The application of all of these measures naturally raises a number of problems which the French Government is ready, as of now, to discuss with its allies and, in particular, with the United States. It will be advisable to examine the liaisons that should be established between the French Command and the NATO Commands, as well as to determine the conditions under which the French forces, particularly in Germany, would participate in time of war, if Article 5 of the Washington treaty were to be invoked, in joint military actions, both with respect to the command and to the operations themselves. This is based on the assumption in particular that the French ground and air forces now stationed in Germany will be maintained there under the conventions of October 23, 1954, which the French Government is, for its part, disposed to do.

It will be advisable, furthermore, to consider the problems that may arise for France regarding the Military Committee and the Standing Group, including the problem of liaisons to be established, if necessary, between those bodies and the French Command.

These are, in broad outline, the measures the Government of France envisages, insofar as it is concerned, in order to adapt to the new conditions the terms of its participation in the Atlantic Alliance. It is ready to enter into discussions on the practical terms of application of these measures and hopes that adequate arrangements can be made by common accord among all the allies.

The multilateral problems are not, however, the only ones facing the United States and France. The two countries have indeed concluded in the past a series of bilateral agreements which are still in force and which are the following:

Depots of Deols—La Martinerie.

Making available to the American forces certain airfields and installations in France.

Supply lines.

American headquarters at Saint-Germain.

Pipeline.

The French Government considers that these agreements as a whole no longer correspond to present conditions, which lead it to resume in French territory the complete exercise of its sovereignty, in other words, no longer to agree to foreign units, installations, or bases in France being under the

control in any respect of authorities other than French authorities. It is ready to study and, if possible, to settle with the Government of the United States the practical problems resulting therefrom.

The French Government is prepared, furthermore, to enter into talks on the military facilities that could be made available to the Government of the United States in French territory in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance. Such facilities could be the subject of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments.

World Meteorological Day

Statement by President Johnson, March 23

White House press release dated March 23

On June 10, 1964, at Holy Cross College, I pledged that this Nation would move ahead with plans for a worldwide weather system, in collaboration with other nations, toward a goal beneficial to all mankind.¹ On the occasion of World Meteorological Day, I now reaffirm that pledge.

Today, we recognize the efforts of scientists and technicians everywhere—working as individuals and working as a single scientific community—to improve our understanding and prediction of the weather.

This day symbolizes for us, and for all mankind, a new dawn of hope for a better, safer, and more meaningful life.

In a world grown tired of wars, it commits all nations to work together in joint programs of peace.

It looks to the time when all our science and technology, and all the wonders of the space age, will give us the power of which man has always dreamed—not the power of one nation over another but the power of the human race over the forces of nature.

We know now that our environment is global and indivisible. Knowing this, it follows that the only way to achieve significant improvement of weather services and prediction is by vigorous international cooperation and by worldwide dissemination of weather data.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1964, p. 990.

The instrument of this program is the World Meteorological Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations with a membership of 127 countries. Through the World Meteorological Organization the concept of a World Weather Watch is now taking shape. On this occasion, I am proud to say that the United States strongly supports international cooperation in this vital field.

Much must be accomplished to transform hope into reality. Scientifically, we must move toward a better understanding of our environment. Technologically, we must move toward developing improved systems. But there are no insuperable obstacles—and the opportunities are too great for us to ignore.

Our own nation's efforts in this worldwide project will continue to be coordinated by the Environmental Science Services Administration under the leadership of Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor.

An Interagency Committee for International Meteorological Programs has already developed a series of proposals to carry us well into the decade of the seventies. I have asked the Secretary of Commerce; Dr. Donald Hornig, my Science Adviser; and Charles Schultze, the Director of the Budget, to study these proposals and to recommend to me a plan of action for America's role in this important international program.

National Maritime Day, 1966

A PROCLAMATION¹

Today the American Merchant Marine continues a long tradition of essential service to the American economy and defense. Throughout our history, American ships have contributed to the development of our modern economy, as well as to the strength and unity of the country. As this Nation's

economy continues to expand, we will continue to need ships—fast, modern descendants of the famous "Clippers"—to carry our products to the far corners of the earth and return with the raw materials essential to our national prosperity.

Our merchant marine is also vital to our friends all over the world. The transportation of surplus commodities to many of the underdeveloped countries is an important part of our foreign aid program.

As long as the United States may be called upon to defend the Free World's interests anywhere on the globe, our ships are necessary to insure continuous supply of the military material that helps to prevent or defeat aggression by any country.

The complex task of creating and maintaining a merchant marine adequate to our needs for peacetime commerce, and sufficient for defense purposes, requires the efforts of government, management and labor and the support of all Americans.


To remind the American people of the important role of the American Merchant Marine in the life of this Nation, the Congress in 1933 designated May 22 of each year as National Maritime Day and requested the President to issue a proclamation annually in observance of that day. May 22, 1819, is the day the *SS Savannah*, the first steamship to cross the Atlantic, set forth on its historic journey into the future.

Since May 22 falls on Sunday this year, it is appropriate that the day be observed on the following Monday.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby urge the people of the United States to honor our American Merchant Marine on Monday, May 23, 1966, by displaying the flag of the United States at their homes and other suitable places, and I request that all ships sailing under the American flag dress ship on that day in tribute to the American Merchant Marine.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 22nd day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3708; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 4945.

The United States and Brazil: Partners in Progress

by Lincoln Gordon

Ambassador to Brazil¹

Almost 4½ years ago, on October 31, 1961, I gave my first public talk as United States Ambassador to Brazil as a guest of the American Society and the American Chamber of Commerce. Now I am once again your guest here, this time to say a few words of farewell. Many farewells imply a sharp break in the continuity of one's life and associations. This one, happily, does not.

My new duties in Washington are two-fold: (a) to guide the relationships of our Government with those of our Latin American sister nations and (b) to serve as United States Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. Since Brazil represents 35 percent of the population, area, and economy of Latin America, it will naturally continue to occupy a great deal of my attention. And since the Alliance for Progress has been the central focus of my work here, as foreshadowed in that talk in October 1961, there, too, there will be continuity.

But perhaps more important, these 4 years have made Mrs. Gordon and me *meio-brasileiros*. We both leave a large part of our hearts here as we carry home with us the many lessons we have learned from living among the spirited, tolerant, friendly, good-humored, and intensely human people who make up this great nation.

Nor were we at all anxious to leave. Until a presidential telephone call on January 17, exactly 1 month ago, we fully expected to stay here for at least another year. We were happy in this prospect because we were still learning new lessons every day and week. We had only begun to experience the full variety and vitality of Brazil, and there was still much to be done in the never-ending task of exploring new paths for cooperation between our Governments and peoples. To these tasks I hope to contribute from my new vantage point, with the help of my as yet unnamed successor in this Embassy.

Any man's life is divided into more or less sharply defined periods. My own working life has had many such divisions, in great variety. As Dean Acheson notes in his delightful recent book of memoirs *Morning and Noon*, the principal factor governing the succession of these periods is luck—chance—happenstance. So far, I have indeed been lucky, and I do not regret any of these experiences. But two stand out as especially challenging and therefore especially rewarding: participation in the success of the Marshall Plan and the creative period of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from 1947 to 1952, and these last 4 years in charge of the American Embassy in Rio.

This has not been exactly the most tranquil period in Brazil's political and economic life or in Brazilian-American relations. Sometimes, in looking at the row of photographs of my predecessors in the corridor outside my office, I have thought with envy

¹ Address made to the American Society and American Chamber of Commerce at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on Feb. 17. Mr. Gordon, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil since Sept. 18, 1961, was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on Mar. 9.

of the era in which Ambassador [Edwin V.] Morgan served for no less than 21 years. I daresay that Brazil has changed at least as much since 1961 as in the whole span of Morgan's tenure. If I ever find time to write some memoirs, their central theme will deal with these processes of change.

This is not to underrate the importance of certain dramatic events, which can make profound shifts in the course of history. Surely the Cuban missile-base crisis of October 1962 and the Brazilian revolution of March 1964 were both such events. But we should also not underestimate the elements of continuity or the forces of political, economic, and social evolution which shape the way of life of a nation and its role in the constantly more interdependent society of nations on this globe.

I am a strong disbeliever in the idea of historical determinism. Neither the gospel according to Hegel and Marx, nor Spengler, nor Toynbee, nor others among the ancient or modern fatalists provide adequate tools for really understanding the past or for predicting the future. Of course there are historical and social and political and economic forces and factors. At any given time these set institutional and psychological and material limits to the achievement of individual or collective aspirations and to the translation of policy objectives into realities. But the task of policymakers and of political leadership is to influence and guide these forces, to expand the limits, and to assert man's capacity to reshape human institutions into patterns which conform more closely to his own evolving aspirations. In the field of economic and social progress in this hemisphere, this has been the philosophical premise of the Alliance for Progress.

Vigor of Alliance for Progress

When I spoke to you 41½ years ago, the Alliance was a new and daring innovation in the relations among the American Republics, still in that phase of parental hopes and expectations which accompany the birth of a new infant. Would it survive at all? Would

it grow into vigorous and meaningful life or become just another international alphabetical nonentity? Would it really enlist "the full energies of the peoples and governments of the American republics in a great cooperative effort"—in the brave words agreed to at Punta del Este?² I well remember the many doubts and disillusionments expressed in 1962 and the all-too-ready conclusion of some observers that, if not already moribund, the Alliance had certainly died with the tragic assassination of President Kennedy in November of 1963.

Now, however, as we approach the half-way mark of the original 10-year period envisaged at Punta del Este, I believe we can say with confidence that the Alliance for Progress is indeed a vigorous creature, that its goals do in fact reflect the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of our peoples, and that its methods were well conceived and are constantly improving in the daily process of practical application. That is why the conference in Rio de Janeiro last November³ determined to incorporate into the OAS Charter itself the principles of the Alliance for Progress as the basis for long-term economic and social cooperation in this hemisphere.

But this is not merely a matter of words and juridical principles. It is a matter of visible results already achieved and in progress, of new institutions created and functioning, and of new attitudes.

The discussions last November reflected a whole new climate of thought about the nature of economic and social development, how to accelerate it, and how to reinforce national efforts through international support, mutual aid, and regional economic integration. Instead of dialectical debate in terms of mystical categories, there was a sober appreciation of the need to mobilize resources, to guide their fruitful application in priority areas of public and private investment, to build and modernize institu-

² For background and texts of documents establishing the Alliance for Progress, see *BULLETIN* of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

tions, to train personnel, to create incentives, and to enlist active participation and support from all sectors of society.

Sloughing Off of Old Myths

Not only in Brazil but all over the continent there has been a sloughing off of intellectual myths which stood in the way of progress in freedom. The extreme case is the Fidelista myth, so fulsomely expounded by Ché Guevara at Punta del Este 5 years ago. Where is he now, I wonder? What happened to that earthly paradise he promised to create?

But there are many other less extreme cases. There was the inflationist myth that rapid development and structural reform in Latin America made galloping inflation inevitable. Today there is an overwhelming consensus that inflation not only creates glaring social injustice but also undermines any possibility of sustained and healthy development.

There was the populist myth that certain goods and services could be subsidized on a grand scale at no cost to anyone. Today it is commonly accepted that subsidies are costly to the community, distort the balance of needed development, and divert fiscal resources which are indispensable to high-priority public investment.

There was the Socialist myth that the public and private sectors must be at war with one another. Today it is increasingly understood that their roles are more complementary than competitive and that the institution-building and incentive-creating functions of government are more efficient contributors to development than the placing of operational responsibility for productive enterprises in bureaucratic hands.

And there was the technocratic myth that an elaborate mathematical model, beautiful in its internal logic and well printed on thick white paper, could justify the title of "National Development Plan," even though its numbers had no foundation in reality and there was no administrative machinery to convert its conclusions into real investment,

production, and consumption. Today the planners have learned to work with the operators, to get their hands dirty at the project sites, to build their essential foundations of statistical and institutional facts, and to take greater satisfaction in modest operational results than in mathematical elegance for its own sake.

Progress Too Slow in Many Areas

Judged by general economic measures, moreover, this continent is moving forward at a substantial pace, even though it can and should be even more rapid. Overall growth in the last 2 years has exceeded the minimum targets laid down at Punta del Este, and there is every prospect that 1966 will see a still higher rate. But this is no reason for complacency or relaxation. There are too many areas of vital concern in which progress is far too slow.

At Punta del Este, and before that at the Bogotá conference of 1960,⁴ special emphasis was placed on education, health, housing, and improved rural living conditions. In all these fields the Alliance has made only a modest beginning. We must not deceive ourselves by the hope that somehow or other general economic growth will trickle down into adequate social investment and agricultural modernization. These areas require deliberate thought and resolute action.

I attribute the lag in these fields not so much to political resistances, although these exist, especially in the case of agriculture. But the fact is that it is much easier to build roads and dams and industrial plants than it is to build an adequate educational system, a public health service, or a modernized rural economy. They are all essential, but the first among these equals is education.

If the Latin American societies wish to fulfill the expressed desires of their peoples to become full members of modern industrialized democracies, with genuine equality of opportunity, then their schools and uni-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 533.

versities must produce men and women with the skills necessary to achieve that goal. This means a long-term dedication on the part of each country to educational planning, the mobilization of resources for education, the training of teachers and researchers, the preparation of educational materials, and above all a basic reform of teaching methods and specialties to meet the needs of tomorrow.

Educational expansion and reform is of course primarily a national responsibility. To the extent that international cooperation can assist—and I believe that it can assist on a very substantial scale—President Johnson has made it crystal clear in his new proposals⁵ to our Congress that the United States is ready and willing to provide such assistance. To do so effectively, we have to improve our own resources of qualified manpower, and an important element of the President's new program looks to that objective.

Educational improvement is not merely a governmental responsibility. Private business can make a vast contribution to it, through in-house and in-factory training programs, through the systematic upgrading of manpower at all levels, through the support of intermediate and advanced training courses for manual and clerical and managerial employees, and through the broadening of opportunities for all individuals to make full use of their talents. The foreign business community has a clear responsibility to set an example in this matter because of its access to the technology, management methods, and educational systems of the more highly industrialized nations. Many of the American enterprises represented here today have already begun to do so, and I urge you all to redouble your efforts.

Another front of supreme importance for the success of the Alliance for Progress is more rapid advance in the economic integration of Latin America and in the development of the vast open regions in the center

of South America through multinational investment projects. This is the largest area on earth which is readily habitable by man and yet still largely uninhabited. With the application of modern technology, with cooperation among the nations directly involved, and with strong international financial and technical support, there is every reason to foresee a transformation of this area into one of the great world centers of productive economic activity.

A World of Growing Interdependence

I concluded my talk here in 1961 by answering the question, why the United States is interested in the Alliance for Progress. I said that the answer "lies in the conviction that a prosperous, free, and self-reliant Latin America is essential to the kind of world in which we of the northern part of the hemisphere can also pursue our own aspirations for a life in freedom and dignity." I can tell you today that there has been no weakening of that conviction, which President Johnson holds just as deeply as President Kennedy did and which is shared by the overwhelming majority of our Congress and our public at large.

At home, we are strenuously engaged in the manifold tasks of creating what President Johnson has called a Great Society. True equality of opportunity, regardless of race or family wealth, the rebuilding of cities, the cleansing of rivers, the humanizing of urban life, and the constantly closer integration of industry with agriculture and of city with countryside—all these are demonstrations that we too are still a nation very much in the course of development. We do not seek to impose our patterns on other nations or to compel cooperation on reluctant partners. We are proud of our own nationalism and expect other people to be proud of theirs. But we have learned that constructive nationalism is not to be confused with xenophobia or isolationism.

We foresee a world of growing interdependence in which the special values of each nationality will enrich the lives of other

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 329.

peoples. Within that world we foresee a special intimacy and cordiality of relationships in this hemisphere because we know the dedication of all its peoples to the humane values of respect for the individual, the democratic way of life, and progress in freedom. Mrs. Gordon and I have learned in these years how deeply devoted Brazil and the Brazilian people are to these values. That is why we can depart with regret but also with renewed confidence in the future of this country, of this continent, and of our continued collaboration in the great common enterprises which lie before us all.

Further Steps Taken To Remove Restrictions on U.S. Exports

Press release 51 dated March 14

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The governments of many countries have taken further steps toward eliminating or easing quantitative restrictions on United States exports. The United States has pressed its case for this trade liberalization through official government consultations during the last year in the major capitals of Western Europe, in Japan, and in Canada, as well as in Geneva under the terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

After World War II many countries adopted selective controls as a means of conserving their small volume of dollar holdings. Quantitative restrictions on imports are permitted on these grounds under GATT rules. The critical lack of foreign exchange in many countries continued through the immediate postwar period and even into the fifties. The Department of State and other United States Government agencies have continually worked to have these restrictions removed since that time.

Since 1963 most important European countries have dismantled virtually all quantitative restrictions on industrial items of sig-

nificant export interest to the United States. An important exception is coal, which still remains restricted in several major European countries.

However, many Western European nations, for protective reasons, continue to restrict a number of agricultural items. To get at this difficult problem, the United States has continued to utilize the complaint procedures under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Following our GATT consultations with Germany in the last 2 years, we achieved in 1965 more or less automatic renewal of tenders for United States exporters for sales of fresh apples, pears, canned cherries; Germany established sizable quotas for dried alfalfa, ice cream mix, and applesauce. Germany also removed certain import licensing arrangements which discriminated against United States bourbon. Austria eased certain technical import requirements for fresh apples and pears in 1965. The French have progressively increased import quotas on various items of fresh and canned fruits following our GATT consultations with them which began in 1962.

In addition to actions following more formal procedures of consultation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Denmark and France liberalized certain vegetables; New Zealand liberalized dried fruits; Japan liberalized a variety of vegetables and animal feed; Finland liberalized nuts and certain oils; Chile liberalized frozen chicken, peas, and potatoes; Norway increased import quotas for fresh apples and a few other agricultural commodities.

In the industrial area Japan removed import restrictions on automobiles and imitation jewelry; Spain liberalized over 100 categories of goods and enlarged the global quotas on a number of other items. Finland freed imports from licensing requirements on a large number of items; and Denmark removed the remaining restrictions on industrial items of export interest to the United States, particularly refrigerators, washing machines, gas meters, and parts of gas meters.

IMPORT LIBERALIZATIONS

Denmark

Meat and edible offals of rabbits, fresh, chilled, or frozen, salted, in brine, dried or smoked.

The following vegetables, fresh or chilled: artichokes, beans, and other leguminous vegetables, *except* peas; champignons and other edible mushrooms; dill, pumpkins, cress and watercress, chervil, parsnips, parsley, parsley-root, chives, rhubarb, radishes, and other edible roots, *except* carrots, celeriac, beetroot, and horseradish. The following vegetables (whether or not cooked) preserved by freezing: gherkins, cucumbers, champignons, and carrots. The following vegetables, provisionally preserved in brine, in sulphur water, or in other preservative solutions but not especially prepared for immediate consumption: artichokes, beans, and other leguminous vegetables, *except* peas; champignons and other edible mushrooms; dill, pumpkins, cress and watercress, chervil, parsnips, parsley, parsley-root, chives, rhubarb, radishes, and other edible roots, *except* carrots, celeriac, beetroot, and horseradish; Jerusalem artichokes, fresh or dried, whole or sliced.

Fresh blackberries and gooseberries; certain fodder root products; licorice confectionery.

Granite; transmission, conveyor, or elevator belts or belting, of vulcanized rubber, rubber tires and tubes for bicycles without motor and for bicycles with an auxiliary motor; wallpaper; refrigerators with a volume of not more than 200 liters and parts thereof; washing machines, for domestic use or for laundries, and parts thereof; gas meters and parts thereof.

Finland

Fats and oils of fish and marine mammals, whether or not refined; prepared or preserved fish; herring in containers of less than 25 liters, and other fish products.

Calcium carbide; adhesive plasters; wadding and gauze; medical bandages, excluding plaster bandages; perfumery, cosmetics, and toilet preparations; household soap; polishes and creams.

Furskins, tanned and dressed; twine, cordage, and rope.

Glass beads, imitations of pearls, precious and semiprecious stones; pearls, precious and semiprecious stones, synthetic stones; articles of jewelry; goldsmith's and silversmith's wares of precious metals; articles consisting of, or incorporating, pearls; imitation jewelry.

Railway rails and accessories; tubes and pipes of cast iron; tube and pipe fittings of cast iron; structures of iron or steel; stoves.

Ranges, cookers, grates, fires, and other similar heating equipment; central heating boilers; radi-

ators; air heaters; other articles of iron or steel, sack and other binders of iron wire, thimbles and sewing rings, tube adjusters, joining pieces, and cup springs.

Electrical signaling apparatus; circuit breakers, switches, circuit dividers, fuses, electric metal filament lamps for general use; discharge lamps.

Insulators, conduit tubing.

Arms, ammunition, and parts.

Brooms and brushes; squeegees of materials other than rubber or plastic.

Spain

Cattle under 2 years of age; broilers; inulin; denatured sucrose; vegetable produce of a kind used for animal food.

Hexane, heptane; paraffin; bitumen, pitch, and petroleum asphalt; bitumen and asphalt; bituminous mixtures based on natural asphalt, on natural bitumen, on petroleum bitumen, on mineral tar, or on mineral tar pitch.

Boric oxide and acid; aluminum sulphate; sodium cyanide; borax hydrate; borax anhydrous; methanol; methanal; acetaldehyde; lactic acid of a strength of more than 50 percent, its salts and esters; urea containing in the dry state more than 45 percent by weight of nitrogen; hexamethyl-enetetramine; antisera, etc., put up for retail sale, *except* sera of immunized persons or animals and microbial vaccines; antisera, etc., in bulk form, *except* sera of immunized persons or animals and microbial vaccines; medicaments made from plants, put up for retail sale; urea containing not more than 45 percent of nitrogen; concentrated superphosphates (double or triple); certain phosphatic fertilizers; ammonium phosphates containing not less than 6 milligrams of arsenic per kg., composite and complex fertilizers; lozenges or similar prepared forms or in packings of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg.; other fertilizers.

Synthetic tanning substances; ordinary household soap; prepared glues, products suitable for use as glues, put up for sale by retail.

Solid or semisolid fuels; colloidal graphite; wood tar; wood tar oils (other than the composite solvents and thinners); wood creosote; wood naphtha; acetone oil; polyurethanes; polyamides; polyhaloethylenes; polyvinyl acetate; polyvinylidene chloride in the form of liquid, flakes, chips, powder, and paste; polyvinyl butyral and polyvinyl formal; polyacrylates, polymethacrylates, and their derivatives; hardened proteins (for example, hardened casein and hardened gelatine); natural resins modified by fusion and artificial resins obtained by esterification of natural resins or of resinic acids; chemical derivatives of natural rubber; certain high polymers, artificial resins and artificial plastic materials, including alginic acid, its salts and esters; linnoxyn.

Silkworm cocoons; yarn of viscose rayon and of

cuprammonium rayon (cupra), not put up for retail sale; yarn of acetate rayon and of other continuous artificial fibers, not put up for retail sale; monofil of viscose rayon and of cuprammonium rayon (cupra); monofil of acetate rayon and of other continuous artificial fibers; yarn of viscose rayon and of cupra, put up for retail sale; yarn of acetate rayon and of other continuous artificial fibers, put up for retail sale; woven fabrics of viscose and acetate rayon and of cupra, and of other continuous artificial fibers; flax, raw or processed but not spun; flax tow and waste (including pulled or garnetted rags); ramie, raw or processed but not spun; ramie noils and waste (including pulled or garnetted rags); flax or ramie yarn; woven fabrics of flax or of ramie; discontinuous artificial fibers; continuous filament tow for the manufacture of artificial fibers; waste of artificial fibers (continuous or discontinuous); artificial fibers (discontinuous or waste), carded, combed, or otherwise prepared for spinning; yarn of artificial fibers (discontinuous or waste), not put up for retail sale; yarn of artificial fibers (discontinuous or waste), put up for retail sale; woven fabrics of discontinuous artificial fibers; jute, raw or retted, *except* cuttings; builders' carpentry and joinery, etc.; yarn of vegetable textile fibers, manila hemp, pita, etc.; yarn of vegetable textile fibers, of other fibers; woven fabrics of other vegetable textile fibers; woven pile fabrics, etc., of other textile fibers; narrow fabrics of artificial fibers; chenille yarn, gimped yarn, etc.; nets and other textiles articles; elastic fabrics (other than knitted or crocheted); wicks of woven, plaited, or knitted textile materials; textile hose-piping and similar tubing; knitted or crocheted fabric, not elastic or rubberized.

Understockings and other articles; undergarments, knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rubberized, of other textile materials; other garments and other articles, knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rubberized, of other textile materials; men's and boys' outer-garments; women's, girls', and infants' outer-garments of wool; women's, girls', and infants' outer-garments, of artificial fibers; men's and boys' undergarments, of artificial fibers; women's, girls', and infants' undergarments; shawls, scarves, mufflers, mantillas, veils, and the like; collars, tuckers, fallals, bodice fronts, jabots, cuffs, etc.; gloves, mittens, mitts, stockings, socks, and sockettes, not being knitted or crocheted goods; makeup accessories for articles of apparel (for example, dress shields, shoulder and other pads, belts, muffs, sleeve protectors, pockets); traveling rugs and blankets, electrically heated; traveling rugs and blankets of other textile fibers.

Bed linen, curtains, and other furnishing articles; tarpaulins, sails, and camping goods.

Tableware and other articles of a kind commonly used for domestic or toilet purposes of porcelain or

china (including biscuit porcelain and parian), plain; tableware and other articles of a kind commonly used for domestic or toilet purposes of other kinds of pottery, plain; glassware for household use with a low coefficient of expansion; glassware for household use of toughened glass.

Synthetic or reconstructed precious or semiprecious stones, cut or otherwise worked but not mounted, set or strung.

Tubes and pipes and blanks, other than seamless, of iron (other than cast iron) or steel, excluding hydroelectric conduits; high-pressure hydroelectric conduits of steel; metal structures; hermetically sealed silos with metal walls, glazed continuous feed and discharge type for the preservation and transformation of agricultural produce intended for feeding cattle; reservoirs, tanks, vats, and similar containers, of iron or steel, of a capacity exceeding 300 liters; boxes and other containers of sheet steel used for commercial packaging, finished for direct use and not folded (with a capacity of $\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 liters inclusive); compressed gas cylinders and similar pressure containers, iron or steel; stranded wire, cables, cordage, etc., unprocessed, made of round wire of a diameter of 1 mm. or more, combined with textile or other fibers less than 1 mm.; combined with textile or other fibers; other, combined with textile or other fibers; barbed iron or steel wire; twisted hoop or single flat wire, barbed or not, and loosely twisted double wire, of kinds used for fencing, of iron or steel; gauze cloth, grill, netting, fencing, reinforcing fabric, and similar materials, of iron or steel wire; expanded metal, of iron or steel, roller and precision chain; chain and parts thereof, of iron or steel; anchors and grapnels and parts thereof, of iron or steel.

Needles for hand sewing, etc., with a diameter of not more than 1 mm.; pins, hairpins, etc.

Central heating boilers, radiators, etc.; bathtubs, showers, etc., of cast iron; bathtubs, showers, etc., of enameled steel sheet; iron or steel wool; duplex or twin wire for healds; cooking and heating apparatus of copper, not electrically operated; accessories for electric wiring; pins other than ornamental, needles, safety pins, and the like.

Niobium, unwrought, of nuclear quality; zirconium, unwrought, of nuclear quality; shovels, picks, spades, etc.; and tool-tips and plates, etc., of sintered metal carbides.

Sewing machine needles; postage-franking machines; certain calculating machines; electric accumulators.

Articles of carbon or graphite, *except* carbon parts for cinematograph projection.

Tracklaying tractors, with a cylinder capacity of 6,000 cc. or less.

Automatic record players actuated directly or indirectly by counters or coins; recording apparatus for flexible records; gramophone records, etc., pre-

pared but not recorded (wax recordings, discs, tapes, wires, etc.); gramophone records, etc., recorded (wax recordings, discs, matrices, and other intermediate forms).

Brooms and brushes, of materials (other than artificial plastic materials) merely bound together, with or without handle; other brooms and brushes (including brushes of a kind used as parts of machines), paint rollers, etc., *except* those made of artificial plastic materials; prepared knots and tufts for broom or brush making, *except* those made of artificial plastic materials; feather dusters, *except* those made of artificial plastic materials; powder puffs, etc., *except* those made of artificial plastic materials.

Hand sieves and hand riddles, *except* those made of artificial plastic materials; press fasteners, including blanks, molds, and parts; slate pencils, etc.; scent and similar sprays of a kind used for toilet purposes, and mounts and heads therefor; vacuum flasks and other vacuum vessels, complete with cases; parts thereof, other than glass inners; tailors' dummies and other lay figures; automata and other animated displays of a kind used for shop window dressing.

Board of Foreign Scholarships Members Sworn In

Press release 58 dated March 18

Six new members and four reappointments to the 12-man Presidentially appointed Board of Foreign Scholarships were sworn in on March 17 in the presence of the Secretary of State, who characterized the Board as "part of a great human enterprise . . . which has the deepest importance for the daily concerns of men and, in the days of nuclear weapons, even for the survival of man."

The Board of Foreign Scholarships sets the policies for the Department of State's educational exchange program, supervises them, and makes the final selection of its academic grantees. These include more than 5,000 students, teachers, research scholars, and university lecturers annually, both in this country and abroad. Under the chairmanship of historian Oscar Handlin of Harvard University, it this year celebrates 20 years of establishment. Its members are

distinguished private citizens drawn from academic and public life.

In informal remarks following the swearing-in, Secretary Rusk said:

I know of no activity more central than the work of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the educational exchanges in which your Board will be taking the leadership.

We have foreign students and scholars in this country by the many tens of thousands. We are sending our own young people and our own teachers into many lands in the other direction. I have no doubt that this creates a network of understanding that is important for the maintenance of peace—understanding that derives not from just a sense of amiability but understanding that comes from knowledge of other people.

Following are the names of the members of the Board:

New Members

William G. Craig, head master, John Burroughs School, St. Louis, Mo.

W. J. Driver, Administrator, Veterans Administration

Brooks Hays, Arthur Vanderbilt Professor of Political Affairs, Rutgers University

Teruo Ihara, associate professor of education, University of Hawaii

Frederick B. Pike, professor of Latin American history, University of Pennsylvania

James R. Roach, professor of government, University of Texas

Reappointments

John Hope Franklin, professor of American history, University of Chicago

Francis Keppel, Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

John M. Stalnaker, president, National Merit Scholarship Corp.

George E. Taylor, director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington

Commissioner General Confirmed for U.S. Exhibit at Canadian Fair

The Senate on March 17 confirmed President Johnson's nomination of Stanley R. Tupper to be Commissioner General for U.S. participation in the Canadian Universal and International Exhibition. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated March 4.)

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

Thank you very much for the opportunity of appearing before you in support of the President's economic and military assistance programs.

The Foreign Assistance Act and the Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966 will provide the basic authority to carry forward a foreign aid program which, in the words of President Johnson, will "help give the people of the less developed world the food, the health, the skills, and education—and the strength—to lead their nations to self-sufficient lives of plenty and freedom."²

The legislation and programs before this committee are the result of a sober and searching review conducted last fall at the direction of the President. That review was a response to concerns expressed by the Congress and this committee and a response to the call for action in the conference committee report on last year's authorization bill.

I was an active participant in this review, and I am convinced that the proposals now before you are based on a full understanding of the lessons of the past as well as creative thinking about the future.

For fiscal year 1967 the President is requesting new appropriations of \$2,469 million for economic assistance programs and \$917 million for programs of military as-

sistance. These are minimum estimates, based on conservative appraisals of needs for the coming year. If this request should prove insufficient, the President will not hesitate to request additional funds.

I strongly support these proposals and urge the approval of H.R. 12449 and H.R. 12450 by this committee.

Foreign Aid Basic to U.S. Security

Foreign aid is basic to U.S. security.

Without it, many countries undoubtedly would have been subverted or overrun in the past two decades.

Without it, the frontiers of freedom would have shrunk and Americans would be living in a less stable and more threatening world.

Too often, I think, we let immediate crises and headlines obscure the very real progress that is being made in so many parts of the world. This is often called the "quiet battle," and it is a battle of which all Americans can be proud. As the President said in his foreign aid message, "We will never know how many crises have been averted, how much violence avoided, or how many minds have been won to the cause of freedom in these years."

But much remains to be done, and that is why we ask the Congress to provide the authority and funds to mount a renewed attack on the root causes of misery and unrest on which aggression and subversion feed.

The economic assistance program we are

¹ Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 17 (press release 56).

² For text of President Johnson's message on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

proposing is based on two fundamental facts:

—First, that the basis for successful foreign aid is self-help. No amount of U.S. assistance can do the job unless the recipient nation itself invests the resources, makes the reforms, and adopts the policies which will lead to lasting progress.

U.S. aid will not be provided unless nations are willing to do their part in the crucial task of development; it will not be provided where nations engage in wasteful foreign adventures. The President has made this clear in his messages to the Congress; he has made this clear to recipient nations in his actions.

—Second, that the major concern of a successful foreign aid program must be people. Our aid cannot be concerned simply with dollars or plans or facilities.

That is why we are proposing a renewed attack in the fields of education, health, and agriculture.

Our own experience in America demonstrates that the vital ingredient of progress is people who are educated and healthy, people who have enough of the right food to eat, people who look to the future with hope. This is no vision or dream. It is realism rooted in experience.

Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency for International Development] has given you some of the details of these new initiatives in health, education, and agriculture. But I should like to say that my belief in this approach is based on my own experience and the contrast between the life I knew as a boy and the life of present-day America.

For I do not believe that the situation in many parts of the world now is so different from what it was not too many years ago in many parts of our own country.

I believe that the rapid growth of our own nation and the transformation of backward areas into active participants in progress are the direct results of better education, improved health, and more efficient agriculture. You can chart the course of our own progress in school attendance statistics,

health records, and agricultural productivity figures.

Our foreign aid program is designed to help others follow the same path of progress.

Two Important Features

The President's foreign aid proposals have two important features of particular interest to this committee—a split of military and economic assistance and a 5-year authorization for the entire aid program.

The separation of the two parts of the foreign assistance program is designed to clarify the purposes and functions of each and to give the public a greater understanding of what we are doing in our overseas programs. Congressional examination and review of the relations of the two programs and of their effectiveness in carrying out our foreign policy goals is being maintained by reference of the two bills to this committee and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In addition, the President is requesting that the Secretary of State be given continued responsibility to exercise supervision and general direction of the military assistance program [MAP]. Careful review will be maintained by AID and the Department of State to assure that MAP expenditures and sales are consistent with our foreign policy objectives.

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara will discuss this program with you in detail in the near future. But I should like to add my strong support for the requests which he will be presenting.

Military assistance helps to strengthen our own security by building the security of others. It helps those nations which are working with us to secure peace by deterring aggression. MAP helps to build the shield behind which economic growth can take place.

But the program does more. It also contributes to the economic progress of the recipients by stressing civic action programs through which local troops build schools and roads and other essential facilities. In

addition, we help train foreign military personnel at schools in the United States and abroad, and through these courses, impart a new understanding of the role of the military in a democratic society.

We are requesting extension of the multi-year principle to all authorizations for economic and military assistance.

Other witnesses will deal with the specific requests. I should only like to underscore a key aspect.

Full review will be maintained by this committee. The executive branch is prepared to make an annual presentation of the program in whatever form you may request. But the long-term authorization will free this committee from the burden of an annual legislative cycle and enable you to examine the entire aid program or selected parts of it in whatever depth that you feel is necessary. In this way the informed judgment of this committee can be brought to bear in areas of particular concern; and I can assure you of the desire of the executive branch to make such examinations as fruitful and constructive as possible.

The Economic Assistance Program

I should like to take a few minutes to discuss four particular aspects of the fiscal year 1967 economic assistance program.

First, we are continuing to focus our aid in those nations and on those programs where self-help and performance are the strongest and where U.S. security interests are most directly served.

As a result, in fiscal year 1967:

—92 percent of the total country programs is concentrated in 20 countries;

—84 percent of development loans is for 8 countries;

—93 percent of supporting assistance is for 5 countries, with 72 percent in Viet-Nam alone.

Second, we have been continuing our successful efforts to reduce the adverse impact of the aid program on our balance of payments. With relatively small and necessary exceptions, all the funds now being ap-

propriated for the AID program will be spent in the United States. As you know, AID is in the business of exporting U.S. goods and services, not U.S. dollars.

AID offshore expenditures declined from nearly \$1 billion in fiscal year 1960 to \$515 million in fiscal year 1964 and will be further reduced to about \$400 million in fiscal year 1967. Taking into account repayments on past aid of \$186 million, the net impact on the U.S. balance of payments of AID offshore expenditures in fiscal year 1967 is estimated to be only \$214 million.

In the long run, foreign aid will be a substantial help to our balance of payments. As countries which we now assist grow stronger, they will provide new and growing markets for U.S. businesses. And an increasing flow of dollars to the United States will result from development loan repayments.

Third, we are increasing our efforts to stimulate the private sector in the developing countries and increase the role of U.S. private enterprise in our assistance programs.

This is a basic aspect of our aid program. For until the energies of all the citizens of a developing nation are involved in the job of building a better life and until all can share in that life, there is no true progress. Their own and foreign private enterprise can play a vital role in stimulating and releasing these energies. In recent years there has been a growing understanding in the developing nations of this fact. And there has been a corresponding growth in AID support for efforts to build the private sector. This is being accomplished through modification of policies by developing countries themselves, as well as through creation of institutions under the aid program.

The U.S. Government itself can only do a small part of the job. It must rely increasingly on our business and labor leaders, our teachers and lawyers, our farmers and bankers, who have great reservoirs of knowledge and experience important to the attack on the problems of the developing nations.

As part of our renewed efforts we will

make greater use of the unique contributions which U.S. private citizens can make. We will continue our support for the International Executive Service Corps and are encouraged by the spirit of service which has moved so many qualified business executives to participate in its work.

As President Johnson indicated, we expect to carry on a frank and constructive review with recipient countries of obstacles to domestic and foreign private investment. We will continue to support liberalization of overcontrolled economies; to furnish assistance to the formation of cooperatives and the training of labor and business leaders; and to support institutions offering improved credit facilities and advisory services for small- and medium-sized farms and businesses.

We are continuing our policy of encouraging U.S. private investment in the developing countries. In support of this policy we are requesting that this committee double the authority of the investment guaranty programs.

Last August the Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, composed of distinguished citizens and chaired by Arthur K. Watson, reported its recommendations for strengthening the participation of private enterprise in our foreign aid programs. A number of these recommendations have been adopted; others are being carefully studied and are providing the basis for new initiatives in important parts of the aid program.

Fourth, we are placing increasing efforts on programs to combat subversion and the despair and frustration on which such subversion grows. This is a crucial aspect of our aid, for as we have seen in many parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where insurgents are active, the energies of a people are diverted from the long-range job of peaceful development to the short-run task of survival.

These programs focus in four major areas:

—*public safety*, which helps to build basic local security;

—*civic action*, sponsored and supported by both the military assistance program and AID through which local military units participate in nation-building projects;

—*rural and community development*, which helps to build local government units and increase local participation in economic and social improvement projects;

—*labor and youth*, which are, of course, essential parts of the foundation for a society of progress and freedom.

Aid to Areas of Concern to U.S. Security

I should like to discuss with you some of the areas of particular concern to our own security where the foreign assistance program plays an important role.

Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia

A major portion of the funds in the fiscal year 1967 foreign economic aid program—\$550 million—is for Viet-Nam.

The crucial battle to determine the kind of life which the peoples of Southeast Asia will live continues. The battle is not simply a matter of guns and troops and planes. It also involves hard, basic work being done in villages to improve agricultural productivity, increase health services, and establish educational systems. It is this work which points the way to the kind of life which the people of Viet-Nam can live when the guns are still.

I think it is important that these works of peace continue even while the military struggle continues. That is why we and the leaders of South Viet-Nam reaffirmed our commitment to improve the life of the Vietnamese people in the Declaration of Honolulu.³ For we all recognize that, while we could win the victory on the battlefield, we could still lose the more important fight for the future well-being and progress of the people.

As part of similar efforts elsewhere in Southeast Asia, we are stepping up our assistance to Thailand and Laos.

There are also encouraging signs of a de-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305.

veloping regionalism in Asia. The countries of the area are beginning to look beyond their own borders for ways in which they can cooperate in the common problems of economic development. For some years, the Mekong Coordinating Committee, which includes representatives of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam, has been conducting studies and preinvestment surveys for the long-range development of the Mekong Basin. Two smaller projects in Thailand are, in fact, nearly completed, and engineering work for the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos will shortly get underway.⁴

We do not stand alone in our efforts to spur development of this river basin. Six other outside donors—Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand—have joined with the United States with pledges totaling over \$23 million for the Nam Ngum project, which will be administered by the World Bank.

Another important development is the founding of the Asian Development Bank, which has been in the planning stage since 1963 and is expected to begin operations later this year.⁵ Thirty-one countries have joined in providing funds for the Bank. The initial capitalization of the Bank is \$1 billion—\$650 million from regional members and \$350 million from nonregional members. Subscriptions to date are only \$3 million short of this goal. Japan has subscribed \$200 million, the same amount as the United States.

The need for closer regional cooperation is particularly great in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the legislation before this committee contains a new title for multilateral and regional programs in Southeast Asia. This new title is evidence of U.S. willingness to respond to new Asian initiatives which will accelerate social and economic progress and development and strengthen cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia.

The proposed Southeast Asia title is a fur-

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.

⁵ *Ibid.*

ther step toward the realization of the President's goal, spelled out in his speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965:⁶ a broadly based international cooperative effort for the accelerated development of Southeast Asia—an effort which will offer the peoples of the area an alternative to violence and which would replace “despair with hope and terror with progress.”

Dominican Republic

This past year has been one of crisis and turmoil in the Dominican Republic, but since last September there have been signs of progress. The Provisional Government, with the help of the Inter-American Peace Force, has retained control of the divided country. We are working with the peoples of the Dominican Republic to assure the peaceful transition to power of a freely elected democratic government. We are also working with the people and providing economic assistance which will help to direct the energies and the policies of the country toward peaceful reform and a better life.

India and Pakistan

As you know, we have just announced our willingness to negotiate certain economic development loans with India and Pakistan. We are prepared to continue to help if these two countries demonstrate their willingness to take necessary self-help measures in the fields of agriculture and other priority areas and find a way to live at peace with each other.

We are heartened by the progress of reconciliation shown at the United Nations and at Tashkent, and in the announcement of troop pullbacks. We look forward to the day when the full energies of these two great peoples can, with our assistance, be devoted to the task of building for the future. That job, as we all know, will be a staggering one, as the current food shortages in India so starkly remind us. But it must be successful, and we are prepared to do our part.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

Korea

One of the most encouraging signs of the past year has been the continuing economic progress in Korea. For example, Korean exports in 1965 were 50 percent larger than in 1964 and five times greater than in 1960. Industrial production rose by 16 percent last year. Korea's gross national product increased by 9 percent in both 1963 and 1964.

This progress has been a demonstration of what can happen to a country after the smoke of battle has cleared and the energies of the people are turned to the great task of peaceful development. Our AID program was once largely in the form of grants to support the Korean economy. The grant economic aid program has been declining steadily while our development lending has increased, including loans to private projects, reflecting the ability of the country to make positive use of capital goods. Korea has provided an excellent example of what can be done when self-help is accompanied by strong United States support.

Africa

In Africa in recent months there has been some further movement toward regional cooperation. More and more of Africa's leaders are recognizing that peace and economic growth receive great impetus from a cooperative approach to development. We would be glad to see the achievement of certain steps being taken to further subregional cooperation and institutions such as in the proposed Economic Community of Eastern Africa. We look forward to cooperating with the new African Development Bank and other regional institutions which can play a vital role in drawing together the countries of this great continent. As the means for cooperation develop, the U.S. intends to make greater use of regional institutions and arrangements as channels for our assistance.

Latin America—Alliance for Progress

Last November I took part in the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro,⁷ where I had the valuable assistance

of Congressman [Armistead I.] Selden and Congressman [William S.] Mailliard. I conveyed to the Conference the intention of the United States to extend its commitment to the great joint effort to promote peaceful change through the Alliance for Progress. In a personal message to the Conference, President Johnson said:

Recognizing that fulfillment of our goals will require the continuation of the joint effort beyond 1971, I wish to inform the conference—and through you, your respective governments—that the United States will be prepared to extend mutual commitment beyond the time period foreseen in the charter of Punta del Este. In determining the scope of the United States effort, we will want to examine carefully with you at that time the requirements of the hemisphere, in the light of progress made through self-help measures and the contributions which by then some of your countries will be able to make to one another to further the common effort.

The leaders of the hemisphere demonstrated their commitment to progress by adopting the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro last November.⁸ This act added an important new element to the Alliance: a commitment by all members of the Alliance to help one another and to provide assistance to achieve economic and social objectives set forth in the act. Although many members of the committee may have read it, I would like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, the text of the act.

The Alliance is moving ahead. Brazil, as a result of farseeing and courageous decisions involving difficult measures for stabilization, development, and reform, has greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored its credit, encouraged private investment, set its economy moving forward, and pressed forward the modernization of its economic institutions. Chile is making important strides, and Colombia and Peru are taking the self-help steps which are expected to result in more rapid progress and therefore would justify greater support from the United States.

We will continue our strong support for

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 998.

successful regional integration in Central America and are hopeful that the movement toward greater cooperation of all the economies of Latin America will gain momentum in the years ahead. In addition, we will continue to work with the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and the Inter-American Development Bank to increase regional cooperation.

Arrangements for Coordination of Aid

There is a growing awareness among aid-giving and aid-receiving countries of the advantages of cooperation and mutual assistance. I have indicated the increasing spirit of cooperation among developing countries. Donor nations are also moving toward closer relationships in their aid-giving efforts. Particularly encouraging is the growing number of arrangements for coordination of aid among donors.

We are continuing our efforts to strengthen bilateral coordination. For example, the United States recently agreed to engage in regular consultations at the Cabinet level with Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Formal coordination arrangements have been established for a number of aid-recipient countries. Aid to India and Pakistan is provided through World Bank consortia which include Western European countries, Japan, Canada, and the United States. Aid to Turkey is provided through a consortium of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

The World Bank also sponsors less formal coordinating mechanisms called consultative groups. There are now World Bank consultative groups for six countries, including Colombia, Thailand, and Tunisia.

These arrangements—consortia and consultative groups—bring together donor countries and international financial institutions. They provide an effective forum for reviewing the requirements of a recipient country, for evaluating self-help performance, and providing aid on a more orderly basis.

Foreign Aid and World Progress

The foreign aid program, which this committee is now considering, is essential to U.S. security and national interest in both their short- and long-range aspects.

For the short range, the program provides direct support to Viet-Nam, assists self-defense and internal security efforts in other countries, and helps to build the stability essential to a peaceful future.

For the long range also, we need our foreign aid program, because as the President said, “. . . we are concerned with the kind of world our children will live in.”⁹

We seek a world of progress and of peace, where each nation lives in independence. This is no dream; it is a necessity. For in this age of rapid communication, rockets, and nuclear power, what happens half a world away is of vital concern to us and our security.

Only as others grow in freedom, progress, and security can we here in the United States be truly free and secure to enjoy the blessings of a better life.

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of Peace Corps to Congress

White House press release dated March 14

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith from the Secretary of State the Fourth Annual Report of the Peace Corps.¹

This is a report of service to our neighbors throughout the world. It is the story of new opportunities for growth and learning among our own people.

The expansion of the Peace Corps has been as dramatic as its promise.

Five years ago today the Peace Corps was eleven days old. By mid-summer, 1961, 120

⁹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

¹ Single copies of the report are available upon request from the Peace Corps, Washington, D.C., 20525.

Volunteers were serving in 3 countries. At the close of fiscal year 1965 there were 8,624 Volunteers serving in 46 countries. Africa received 3,278 Volunteers—Latin America received 3,214—the Near East and South Asia, 1,285, and the Far East, 847.

There are many examples of Peace Corps impact. One is Afghanistan. Nine Volunteers went there in 1962 to begin the Peace Corps' work. As of June 30, 1965, there were 136 Volunteers in Afghanistan, located in 19 different towns and villages. Peace Corps teachers reach nearly 40 per cent of all Afghan students at the secondary and university levels.

There are other measures of progress. I am pleased to note that as the number of Volunteers has risen, the cost per Volunteer has declined. During fiscal year 1963, for example, the annual cost per Volunteer was \$9,074. For 1965 the cost was reduced to \$8,028. The estimate for fiscal year 1966 is \$7,832.

The Peace Corps is the largest producer and consumer of language materials in the world. Since 1961, 20,000 trainees have received instruction in one or more of about 60 languages in the Peace Corps training curricula. Twenty additional languages are under consideration for inclusion in future training programs.

Since its inception, 150,000 Americans have volunteered for Peace Corps service. Some 15,000 have served abroad in 49 nations.

As of June 30, 1965, 4,545 Volunteers had completed service and returned to the United States. Thirty-seven per cent of all returned Volunteers are continuing their education. Government service is attracting 17.8 per cent, while another 16.4 per cent are teaching. The remaining 28.5 per cent are engaged in private business, non-profit organizations and miscellaneous activities.

It is fair to say that the lives of virtually all Volunteers have been changed by their service in the Corps. They have become aware—in a unique and profound way—of the bond of suffering and hope that unites

men and women on every continent. And they are returning home with a new understanding of their nation and the world.

No more valuable experience can be gained by any man.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 14, 1966.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee on S.693 and H.R. 290, bills to amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. July 28-August 2, 1965. 140 pp.

89th Congress, 2d Session

Report of Wayne L. Hays, Chairman of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on a Special Study Mission to the Far East Combined With a Report of Observations on Viet-Nam and a Report on the 11th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held at Wellington, N.Z., November 30-December 8, 1965. H. Rept. 1225. January 25, 1966. 12 pp.

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part I. January 25-February 3, 1966. 224 pp.

Fifth Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. H. Doc. 382. February 15, 1966. 32 pp.

Asian Development Bank Act. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 12563, to provide for the participation of the United States in the Asian Development Bank. February 16, 1966. 138 pp.

Supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization, Fiscal Year 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 12169. H. Rept. 1295. February 22, 1966. 11 pp.

Asian Development Bank. Report to accompany H.R. 12563. S.Rept. 1008. February 24, 1966. 11 pp.

Report on Activities and Accomplishments Under the Communications Satellite Act. H. Doc. 400. March 3, 1966. 10 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of 1948. S. Rept. 1051. March 4, 1966. 5 pp.

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization. S. Rept. 1052. March 4, 1966. 7 pp.

The United Nations and Human Rights

*Statement by Morris Abram*¹

We welcome the discussion of violations of human rights in all countries. We are particularly pleased with the inclusiveness and breadth of the item.

We also realize that it is impossible to discuss this item without referring to matters of internal life within states—whether for justified praise or deserved criticism. This item demonstrates that domestic human rights issues must be discussed in international bodies if human rights are to be discussed in a meaningful way. Human rights are either exercised or deprived in respect to a location, and all locations on this planet (except possibly Antarctica) are subject to the jurisdiction of some state. Therefore, if we are to discuss human rights at all, we must discuss the practice of states or of people and groups within states. At this stage in international organization, most improvements in human rights practice will have to come from discussion—from the desire of states for justified praise or the fear of deserved criticism—for international human rights enforcement machinery is either quite embryonic or nonexistent.

My delegation has no reluctance to discuss the state of human rights in the United States.

We have much to be proud of. Speech,

¹ Made in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on Mar. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 4823). Mr. Abram is U.S. representative to the Commission.

press, and religion are as free here as anywhere in the world. Last night I canvassed the whole catalog of rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration to evaluate how closely American practice accords with those principles. Of course, many of the most fundamental of these rights are explicitly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and have been vigilantly guarded by a truly independent judiciary. I could not help but compare American practice with certain others which have been the subject of recent comment in the world press.

First, in accordance with article 13 of the Declaration, everyone in the United States has and freely enjoys the right to freedom of movement and the right to leave this country, including the right to renounce his citizenship. Such is not the case everywhere in the world.

Second, as provided in article 19 of the Universal Declaration, everyone in the United States has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. No man is restricted to the ideas which are generated in the United States, for we keep our ears and eyes open to the receipt of ideas and information from abroad. No matter how repugnant such ideas are to the government of the day, or to the majority of my fellow countrymen, these ideas pass into our country without hindrance. Moreover, it would be unthinkable for my country to charge a man with a

crime for sending his ideas abroad, however critical these are with regard to American society or its institutions. We listen to outside criticism and frequently learn and improve our conduct as a result.

Third, our Federal Government is today consciously striving in every area to make the promise of equality to all races and creeds a fact, as well as an ideal. Segregation in all its forms is opposed by Federal law and policy. I believe it is fair to say that beginning in 1938 and up to the present day the United States Supreme Court has invariably granted relief to every proved claim of violation of rights because of race.

However, we are not content with our record in race relations, and this dissatisfaction is not likely to be more pointedly stated than has been done on repeated occasions by the President of the United States. There is prejudice, discrimination, and also segregation in the United States. But who can doubt the determination of the Government to eradicate all these evils and its really Herculean efforts calculated to end these evils.

Moreover, we have been determined to reach *all* the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without sacrificing *any* of them. For example, we are confident we shall eradicate discrimination against Negroes without depriving Negroes and other races of freedom of speech. We are not prepared to destroy freedom or to live with discrimination. This is the reason we place such a heavy emphasis on education as a weapon against prejudice and discrimination.

Influence of Knowledge and Ideas

I know that many believe that laws and regulations are the complete and only answer to intolerance and discrimination. We believe these are necessary because laws not only restrain antisocial conduct but perform an educational function as well.

We recognize that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to lead people to respect the rights of others by education in the face of

laws which forbade them to accord such respect. Thus it was necessary for segregation laws to be nullified before men could really deal with one another as equals. Nevertheless, there is work to be done beyond legalization and law enforcement if we are to have a truly just society.

In the United States we have seen the good effects of massive studies in the cause and possible cures of prejudice. We don't know nearly as much as we should in this field, but we are learning. Beginning in the 1940's an American rights organization, along with university scholars, began work on the monumental five-volume work known as *Studies in Prejudice*.

These scholarly works have become the foundation for many popular renditions by which the basic ideas of this scholarship have been filtered down to the general literate public. And these ideas *have* influenced conduct, as for example:

We now know that prejudice is not caused by the supposed inadequacies of the victims of prejudice but is a product and responsibility of the prejudiced person. In other words, for a man to say he is prejudiced tells more unfavorable things of him than it does of the class or group which he despises.

Next, we have learned that prejudice is frequently a form of self-hate, externalized to a victim, but essentially an expression of the bigot's dissatisfaction with himself.

Then, we have come to know the violently prejudiced person as "the authoritarian personality," a form of emotional illness.

Now, this new knowledge is not without its power. Since no one wishes to be known as mentally or emotionally ill or to be regarded as unstable, many people have made great efforts to reexamine their deepest prejudices and to restrain their antisocial expressions.

I can personally recall the times, before this new learning was widely understood, when prejudice enjoyed a certain snob value. Today, even, most segregationists, especially those in public life, begin their

rationalizations by such comments as, "I'm not prejudiced, but . . ." I am not saying that we have conquered individual prejudice by scholarship and knowledge, but I do say we are making progress in this field through these means.

On the other hand, there is a very important area in which we have almost no knowledge—an area which should be of the greatest and most fundamental concern to this Commission.

I was on the American Prosecution Staff at Nuremburg. I became convinced there that the Nazi had by some diabolical psychological process prepared the way for genocide by convincing masses of people that other masses were not human. The Nazi, in fact, indoctrinated a form of collective psychopathology which made it possible for apparently normal humans to commit the most heinous crimes on other humans without the normal feelings of guilt.

However, the phenomenon is not new. The Caesars and the Roman populace were quite capable of treating Christians or slaves or war prisoners as less than human, as subjects fit for evisceration in the Colosseum. In my own country the slaveholders and their allies dehumanized the Negro and treated slaves as property. In my own time this collective psychopathology lingers on in diminishing manifestations which impede progress and the full realization of the promise of our American Constitution.

Already there are private stirrings for investigation of this whole area of psychology which has permitted and encouraged man's inhumanity to man. David Astor, editor of the *London Observer*, and Dr. Norman Cohn, of the University of Sussex in England, have been leaders in the promotion of research into this dark area to learn the why and the how of this collective dehumanization process. Surely we have responsibility to know of this work, and to learn from it.

Believe me, such studies are of more than academic interest and may even furnish the

key to the prevention of some possible future wars.

Denials of the Equality of Man

I should now like to say a word about the particular reference in this agenda item to racial discrimination, segregation, colonialism, and *apartheid*.

I need not tell you that my delegation deplores these evils. These practices, whether private or governmental policies, are of course denials of the equality of man, cruel to the victim, and impoverishing to the practitioner.

However, not all the human rights violations in this world are embraced within these classifications—not nearly all of them.

Last Monday, March 14, the ILO [International Labor Organization] brought to our attention the alleged situation in Burundi. Here color discrimination was *not* involved. Men were said to be oppressing other men of the same color. The documentation presented to this Commission included such references as these:

Mr. Rifant (from the United Arab Republic): "The case disclosed a complete disregard for all human values, with no redeeming feature whatever." Mr. ben Ezzedine (from Tunisia), speaking of "another case involving the murder of a trade union official" stated: "A government which committed such acts, or allowed them to be committed, must bear its share of responsibility for them." Mr. Abid Ali (of India) observed that "the Burundi Government, by its contemptuous refusal to furnish an explanation after repeated solicitations from the ILO, had admitted by implication that the brutal acts alleged in the complaint were true."

Such serious charges by a responsible body should cause us deep concern. And we are obliged to reflect on the fact that as alleged they are manifestations of the inhumanity of men of the same color and nation to one another.

These circumstances also show us concretely that national independence does not

solve all problems of human rights, and that beyond independence lies the necessity of establishing a rule of law which alone can protect human rights.

We have all seen in the press statements, to my knowledge, unchallenged, that in recent months 100,000 people have been executed in a country, without trial, following an attempted coup. Neither segregation, racial discrimination, nor *apartheid* were involved, but quite possibly a tenth of a million were slaughtered. I do not know all the facts.

But this I do know: No government on earth has the right to slaughter its people. Executions, except by due process of law, are nothing less than murder. I believe this fully without regard to the political convictions of the alleged victims.

Recently, in another very advanced and powerful state, a trial was held and the defendants were given long prison terms, for either expressing opinion or imparting ideas across the state's frontiers. Whatever the exact specifications of the alleged crime, I should have thought the acts were of the character declared a human right, not a crime—by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Now, lest any should feel that these statements are invidious, let me hasten to say the following.

There are grave injustices committed in the United States each day. Even when our legal system is working in accordance with its highest standards, because we are human, there may be miscarriages of justice. However, and this is my point, self-criticism, which our society permits and encourages, is the best possible check against the extension of and perpetuation of mistakes.

Colonialism, segregation, racial discrimination, and *apartheid* were and are violations of human rights. Some day these shall be overcome, but the conquest of these evils will not of itself produce a millennium. I am firmly convinced that in the long run the effective protection of human rights depends on the full implementation of *all* guarantees.

My distinguished colleagues of the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, and Poland seem to assume that *apartheid* is subsumed under the issue of colonialism. I would respectfully point out the most vivid example of *apartheid* occurs in a state of undoubted independence.

We must not blur issues. Experience shows that if we rid ourselves of one wrong, we do not cure all others.

It is not enough to get rid of slavery; we must also get rid of inequality.

It is not enough to abolish colonialism; we must also establish effective democracy.

It is not enough to get rid of *apartheid*; we must also eradicate feelings of superiority.

It is not enough to adopt constitutions and laws; we must also put them into practice.

It is not enough to rely on the self-examination of governments; we must be willing to hear and heed outside critiques from disinterested persons and groups.

Human Rights an International Concern

Finally, human rights either are an international concern or they are not. If they are, then all human rights are of such concern, and the conduct of every state is of interest and justified concern to every other. My delegation believes human rights are inseparable one from the other and that the human family is one.

From these beliefs it follows that we should be prepared to examine and discuss the violations of all human rights, whenever they occur. This is the only effective and honest way to promote the principles of human rights as promised in the charter.

Further, only by such open and effective discussion can we discharge the responsibility of this Commission to advance the fundamental and essential objective of the United Nations—to establish world peace.

The premise of the United Nations Charter that human rights issues have a direct impact on peace and international security has been confirmed by the events of the past

20 years. This experience has shown that many international crises today involve human rights issues, whether those crises arise from religious, ethnic, or racial disputes or whether they arise from attempts by one country, or one group within a country, to impose its will or economic and social system by force on another country or group within a country. In each case, widespread denials of human rights may ensue. In some cases, economic and social rights are denied. In others, fundamental political rights are abused, and often both are in jeopardy. It would not be difficult to accumulate a list of instances in which either the deprivation of human rights or the fear of such deprivation has contributed to conflicts in which the United Nations has become involved. For example, many of the disputes in the Middle East have their roots in religious differences; in Rhodesia the issues are racial; and all of us can think of other instances which could be cited.

Further, it seems to be a fact that many conflicts are, in part, difficult to end because the contending parties believe that the rights of their supporters will not be protected if the other group prevails. If there were adequate and generally accepted international machinery to guarantee human rights in practice, many a people now otherwise preoccupied could turn its efforts to constructive tasks—and there are certainly a sufficient number of tasks ahead. What I am talking about is the problem of establishing a climate in which men who have been foes can feel confident that they will not be risking incarceration or execution because they fought for what they believed was right.

The establishment of a stable peace in some areas of the world may require some accompanying guarantees of human rights. In certain cases a United Nations presence of some kind or the presence of a human rights commission to which individuals have free access under the auspices of an appropriate regional or other organization could be helpful. The services performed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in

the Dominican Republic are illustrative of the possibilities here.

The distinguished representative of the Ukraine suggested this morning that regional commissions already established to deal with human rights might be of assistance in halting violations within their areas. We agree. We believe further that the experience developed by these groups can be a resource for this Commission, and that the presence of observers from such commissions in our meetings would further exchange of information. Mr. Chairman, my delegation is working on a resolution we hope to cosponsor for this purpose.

East German Bid for U.N. Status Rejected by France, U.K., U.S.

Following are texts of a tripartite communique issued at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on March 3 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States and a letter of March 16 addressed to the President of the U.N. Security Council from the representatives of the three countries.

TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE

U.S./U.N. press release 4816 dated March 3

The Delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, in response to the announcement of an application of the so-called German Democratic Republic for admission to the United Nations, reiterate that only the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is entitled to speak on behalf of Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. Since it is not a state, the so-called German Democratic Republic has no right whatever to be admitted to the United Nations Organization.

TRIPARTITE LETTER

U.S./U.N. press release 4821 dated March 16

YOUR EXCELLENCY: With reference to the letters addressed to Your Excellency and to the Secretary General concerning the so-called German Democratic Republic, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States wish to state the following:

As already stated in the tripartite communique of 3 March 1966, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only government entitled to speak on behalf of the German people in international affairs. It is, furthermore, the only authority in Germany resulting from free elections.

The great majority of the world community has refused recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic. No specialized agency of the United Nations has admitted it to any form of active participation whatever. It cannot be eligible for membership in the United Nations which, according to Article 4 of the Charter, is open only to States.

In conformity with the agreements concluded at the end of the second world war, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and of the United States share with the Government of the Soviet Union responsibility for the settlement of the German question and for the reunification of Germany.

In this regard, it should be recalled that at the Geneva Conference, on July 23, 1955, the Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR declared:¹

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

For their part, the Governments of

France, the United Kingdom and the United States have always striven to promote a solution of this question by implementation of the principle of self-determination. They will continue their efforts to achieve this aim. Attempts to establish the so-called German Democratic Republic as a separate state can only frustrate this objective and thus make more difficult a peaceful settlement in Europe.

We shall be grateful if Your Excellency will have this letter circulated as an official document.

LORD CARADON

*Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations*

JAMES ROOSEVELT

*Acting Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations*

JACQUES TINE

*Acting Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations*

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Ratification deposited: Mauritania, January 11, 1966.

Signatures: China, January 13, 1966; Federal Republic of Germany, January 27, 1966; Greece, March 16, 1966; Togo, January 24, 1966.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946, as amended. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.

Acceptance deposited: Singapore, February 21, 1966.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

¹ Not in force.

Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 5643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹
Acceptances deposited: Burma, March 8, 1966; Tunisia, March 9, 1966.

Judicial Cooperation

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Open for signature at The Hague November 15, 1965.¹

Signature: United Arab Republic, March 1, 1966 (with a declaration).

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.¹

Acceptances deposited: Ghana, November 5, 1965; United Kingdom, February 24, 1966.

Accession deposited: Zambia, December 14, 1965.

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.¹

Acceptance received: Singapore, February 14, 1966.

North Atlantic Treaty

Protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters. Signed at Paris August 28, 1952. Entered into force April 10, 1954. TIAS 2978.

Notification of denunciation: France, March 30, 1966, effective March 31, 1967.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

¹ Not in force.

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, January 12, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Notification of denunciation received: Pakistan, February 24, 1966, effective May 24, 1967.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: India, February 28, 1966.

BILATERAL

Algeria

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Algiers February 23, 1966. Entered into force February 23, 1966.

Colombia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Bogotá March 10, 1966. Entered into force March 10, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Saigon March 21, 1966. Entered into force March 21, 1966.

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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†75	4/1	Sisco: "A Fresh Look at the U.N."

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Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free

In an address made at New York City on February 23 upon receiving the National Free Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country at the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that address. "Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."

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THE
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BULLETIN

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"It is the spirit and vision of the charter to which we must be dedicated if we are to carry out what President Johnson called the 'assignment of the century'—the pursuit of peace."

A Fresh Look at the United Nations

by Joseph J. Sisco

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

It is a privilege to be here in Atlanta. The aim of these regional foreign policy conferences is an excellent one, embodying a basic democratic idea—a direct discussion of public policy between interested citizens and those charged with formulating it.

A generation or two ago most of the major problems of government could be understood by almost every citizen. Today even many well-informed people do not feel fully competent to judge many public issues. Too many persons simply shy away from their consideration altogether. Let the expert, the man with specialized knowledge, decide them. Yet these decisions, the complex no less than the simple, determine the future of our nation.

The need for an informed, educated citizenry is therefore greater than ever. And as the issues grow more intricate, our obligation to explain and discuss them becomes correspondingly more important.

The institution I want to talk with you about today—the United Nations—is as complex as any around, as complex, in fact, as the 117 widely varied nations comprising it.

We Americans are pragmatic in our approach to most institutions. We pride our-

selves on our flexibility and lack of dogmatism. Yet for some reason our view of the United Nations has often been somewhat simplistic. We have tended to forget that the United Nations must inevitably reflect the great diversity of views, interests, and goals of the members represented in the world body. We sometimes forget when we do not always get our way that the United States is not the only country developing the scenario in world affairs today. We have at times asked too much of the U.N. and on other occasions have expected too little.

Polls show that the American people strongly support the U.N.: 80 percent believe the U.N. important and want the U.S. Government to "use it more." Of course, the U.N. is an important instrument of foreign policy, one way among others for advancing our causes and for cooperating with other countries in the myriad tasks of political conciliation, social progress, economic development, and technical cooperation.

But we must avoid extravagant expectations about the U.N. Those who start out by seeing the U.N. as a panacea for all our ills often end in disillusionment. And they sometimes go to the opposite extreme of pessimism—regarding the U.N. merely as a decorative feature on the international landscape. For example, a distinguished correspondent, concerned over some irresponsible

¹ Address made before a regional foreign policy conference at Atlanta, Ga., on Apr. 2 (press release 75 dated Apr. 1).

actions by some members of the General Assembly, recently advised his readers that "the only way to preserve the organization so that in some distant future it may play the role for which it was created is to spare it as much as possible." A few weeks later, another distinguished correspondent for a great U.S. newspaper entitled an article "The U.N. Tries Hard, But . . ."

Now, I have been engaged in wrestling with the sometimes exhilarating and sometimes frustrating problems that have faced us in the U.N. for the past 15 years. I try not to overexaggerate, but—to quote a friend of mine—I try not to underexaggerate either. I believe the beginning of wisdom lies in being neither a pessimist nor an optimist—but in being a "possibilist." I am a possibilist. In fact, I would venture to say that all practitioners of foreign policy must be possibilists—for politics, whether in our own Legislature or in an international forum, is the art of the possible.

How does a possibilist approach foreign policy problems, and more specifically, how does he operate in the U.N.?

First, he keeps in mind the real options that are open to him. He is problem-oriented and does not grasp for utopian solutions. In the words of Winston Churchill: "Do not let spacious plans for a new world divert your energies from saving what is left of the old."

He knows, in the words of President Franklin Roosevelt, that the structure of world peace "cannot be a peace of large nations or of small nations, (but) . . . a peace which rests on the cooperative efforts of the whole world."

He knows he must deal with factional disputes in Cyprus and disorder in the Congo and the effect of the price of cocoa on Ghana's future—and not with some amorphous scheme for world order.

He knows that, when weighing the question of Red China's admission to the U.N. or recognition, not only is our view relevant but also the adversaries' continued insistence that the Republic of China be eliminated or cast aside.

He is concerned with how to recruit observers for Kashmir, as well as how to achieve a more fundamental and lasting political solution.

Second, he adapts to changing circumstances. One of the cliches about practitioners of foreign policy is that we are unaware that the world is changing. We are either asleep like Rip van Winkle or are romantically playing the old familiar tunes from our boyhood. I assure you that if you sat at my desk in Washington for one day you would soon be disabused of this cliché.

In dealing with U.N. affairs we are constantly aware that we cannot escape the dramatic changes of the 20 years since the charter was signed, and especially the changes in the composition and pressures in the U.N. during the decade of the sixties. It is a commonplace that change is taking place at a revolutionary and ever-accelerating pace. The tough assignment is to know how to design and adapt machinery to provide for peaceful change while preserving the underlying values—justice, economic and social advancement, human rights—for which the U.N. was created and to which our foreign policy is devoted.

Third, a possibilist does not start out with extravagant expectations. He is not disillusioned when he encounters setbacks. He seeks limited goals. He is patient. He keeps probing for possibilities. The history of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem illustrates this dramatically.

World Changes Reflected in U.N.

The task of the United Nations has been encumbered almost from the start by great-power conflicts. Its efforts to promote social progress have been hampered by discord and strife. It has been called upon to keep peace where there has been no peace in the hearts of men. It has been buffeted by the winds of racism and nationalism as the peoples of colonial lands have moved to rule themselves in freedom and to assert their right to speak and vote as equals in the forum of the nations.

But through it all the U.N. has survived and continues to serve the cause of peace. That the United Nations has come this far is a tribute to the vision of those who drew the founding plans, a testimonial to the resiliency and relevance of the charter itself. The measure of the importance which President Johnson attaches to the U.N. is demonstrated by the fact that for the first time in our history a Supreme Court Justice was asked to leave the bench to lead us in the U.N. forum. Justice Arthur Goldberg has done this brilliantly.

One question being asked is, "Where is the U.N. going?" This issue concerns us not only because of the present financial and constitutional difficulties the U.N. faces. In deeper perspective, we are grappling with the question of how to make sure that the U.N. structure keeps up with the times. For in the words of Lord Halifax at the concluding session of the San Francisco conference:

We cannot claim that our work is perfect or that we have created an unbreakable guaranty of peace. For ours is no enchanted palace to "spring into sight at once" by magic touch or hidden power. But we have, I am convinced, forged an instrument by which, if men are serious in wanting peace and are ready to make sacrifices for it, they may find means to win it.

Changes in the world are inevitably reflected in changes in the U.N. To be sure, the U.N. must continue to be representative of the new membership, as it has tried to be by enlarging the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

The U.N. is based on the one-nation, one-vote principle. Of the present 117 members, nearly half did not exist as independent states when the U.N. was formed. Of the 67 new members to enter the organization since 1945, 34 are African states, most small and with limited resources. A significant shift in relative voting strength to small members has occurred in most important U.N. organs.

If the U.N. is to be vital and viable, it must reflect not only the "sovereign equality" of states but the realities of power and responsibility as they exist in the real world today. For if it does not do so, the

U.N. will speak but no one will listen, and its findings will lose their value.

The 20th General Assembly witnessed several examples of excesses by the majority, in some cases overriding the charter provision for a two-thirds vote on an important question on issues affecting peace and security. As Ambassador Goldberg stated at the close of the 20th Assembly: Where action is taken by the Assembly in derogation of the charter requirement for a two-thirds vote on important questions, "that action is a complete nullity. It is null and void." The discrepancies between voting power and real power will not be solved by formal abandonment of the one-nation, one-vote system. The charter on this subject is unlikely to be changed, and an agreement on a formula for weighting votes is unlikely. Rather, informal influence, mutual adjustment procedures, composition of subgroups, and the weight of political and financial contributions should help redress the balance. Above all, patience and understanding will be required, particularly by the advanced countries with greater experience in international affairs. It is our hope that all members will see that in the long run orderly procedures will serve their interests and help move all of us toward a more stable world order in which the rule of law prevails.

A Hard Look at U.N. Programs and Budgets

We have also been taking a hard look at programs and budgets throughout the entire U.N. system. We supported the establishment of a General Assembly committee to review budgetary problems in the U.N. system. The United States has been the main supporter of these programs in the past, and we can expect to do our full share in the future. We have supported U.N. programs because they help the developing countries to help themselves; because they sometimes avoid some of the political difficulties which are involved in bilateral aid, they help share the burden, and they provide a worldwide pool of technical help which is not available to any single country. But our support can

not and must not be taken for granted.

We realize the needs are great, and the developing countries understandably want to better their lot today, not in the distant future. But we are convinced that more of the needs can be met by assuring that the U.N. and its family of agencies are operating at maximum efficiency, that sound and systematic budgetary procedures are followed, that program priorities are clearly established, marginal and duplicative activities eliminated, that undue increases in staff are avoided, and that reasonable and not excessive budget target levels are established.

We are working hard to this end. As President Johnson stated in a memorandum of March 15 to the Secretary of State directing him to undertake certain measures to improve our participation in international organizations:²

No nation has been a greater supporter of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations than the United States. . . . The United States shall continue to meet its fair share of the financial requirements of these organizations. If we are to be a constructive influence in helping to strengthen the international agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we must apply to them the same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that we do to our own Federal programs.

Ambassador Goldberg and I have just returned from Geneva, where we met with the other major contributors to the U.N. in an effort to give reality to this directive.

Peacekeeping

We consider U.N. peacekeeping an important security option in U.S. foreign policy. The U.N. has undertaken some dozen peacekeeping operations—all of which have served the national interests of the United States and the cause of peace. We would like to see the U.N. capacity to keep the peace strengthened. A U.N. Committee of 33 is examining various facets of this problem—including whether new arrangements are needed regarding authorization of peacekeeping and

their management, and how these should be financed in the most equitable and reliable manner.

However, as long as there are fundamental differences between the U.S.S.R. and the United States about the role of the U.N. in the peacekeeping field, it will be difficult to make real progress toward a more reliable system of financing or authorizing future peacekeeping operations.

The Soviets still want to subject all future peacekeeping operations to their total veto. We favor the Security Council playing the primary role provided in the charter. But subjecting peacekeeping operations entirely to the Soviet veto is a prescription for future total paralysis.

For our part, we will support desirable future peacekeeping operations. We recognize that where a major power has fundamental objections, those who favor a particular peacekeeping operation may have to carry a heavier financial burden. We recognize that the unwillingness of the General Assembly to apply the loss-of-vote sanction against those who refused to pay their peacekeeping assessments has weakened the principle of collective financing. But we will continue our efforts to preserve this concept wherever possible. We favor the broadest possible sharing of the burden by those who support U.N. peacekeeping.

A system based essentially on a voluntary means of financing is not as reliable as we would like. But this need not be fatal if the preponderant majority of like-minded states who support a peacekeeping operation band together and make reasonable contributions.

This *ad hoc* improvised system is working today. Blue-bereted U.N. soldiers or observers are helping to keep the peace in Cyprus, in Kashmir, in the Middle East—and you and I, as a result, can sleep more restfully tonight. This is the U.N. at its best.

Let me close with this thought.

The key to successful U.S. policy in the U.N. arena, as in other arenas of our foreign policy, lies in joining with other nations in common institutions. We are com-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 577.

ing to see that the capacity to act through the U.N. and to fulfill the purposes of the charter means building the joint executive machinery for that end.

Yet in the last analysis, Macaulay was right: "It is the spirit we are of, not the machinery we employ, which binds us to others."

It is the spirit and vision of the charter to which we must be dedicated if we are to carry out what President Johnson called the "assignment of the century"—the pursuit of peace.³

A great American poet said that America is promises. We are dedicated in our domestic society to narrowing the gap between promise and performance in American life. This is now equally true for the societies beyond our shores. The Charter of the U.N. is promises, too. It is the promise of collective measures for peace; it is the promise of constant search for friendly relations among nations based on respect for equal rights and self-determination; it is the promise of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, and cultural character; and it is the promise of encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

It is no longer our national community alone but a whole generation of mankind for whom these promises must be kept.

They must be kept if we are to preserve this planet—this fragile spaceship we share—from the ever-brooding threat of annihilation.

They must be kept if our kind of world—the world of free choice, of diversity, and of the truths in the Declaration of Independence—is to have a chance to prosper.

Let us stretch the possibilities in the charter. The U.N. can achieve the vision in the charter, but only with our help. The U.N. needs American commitment and participation and leadership if it is to fulfill the great promises of the charter.

NATO: An Instrument of Peace

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated April 4

Seventeen years ago today, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Western nations drew together in an historic undertaking to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples.

For the United States this meant rounding the last corner on the long road from self-imposed isolation to full acceptance of our responsibilities in the world. For our allies the North Atlantic Treaty signified a departure, no less historic, from traditional pursuit of national interests narrowly construed. In the treaty we together acknowledged a common destiny and the duty to pursue it together.

We decided that if we didn't hang together, we would hang separately. Nearly two decades of time have demonstrated the wisdom of those who read the lesson for the future in two world catastrophes out of the past.

The Atlantic alliance deterred the threatened aggression which brought it into being. Behind the military bulwark it raised from the Black Sea to the North Cape an era of unprecedented growth and well-being began. Within the framework of security it provided, the vision of a united Europe became a practical undertaking, now far advanced.

The Atlantic alliance has succeeded perhaps better than its founders dared hope. Yet we must never forget why it has prospered.

The unique quality of the alliance for peace lies in the joining of sovereign nations in an integrated system of collective defense. We and our partners, in painstaking effort, created the peacetime planning agencies and integrated military commands called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These institutions afford practical assurance that aggression would be met by allies acting at once and as one. They have

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

insured the peoples of the Atlantic community 17 years of peace.

NATO was created as an instrument of peace. Its objectives are to remove temptation to aggression and to provide the foundation for seeking a settlement in Central Europe, based on the principle of self-determination, providing increased security for East and West alike. Every lesson of our common experience argues that these objectives should be pursued in closest concert.

Together with 13 other allied nations, we

have declared our resolve to carry on, to strengthen and perfect our NATO system in this constructive spirit.¹ We shall not abandon an institution which has proved itself in the hour of peril.

We look forward to the day when unity of action in the Western family is fully reestablished and our common interests and aspirations are again expressed through institutions which command universal support among us.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

How the Secretary of State Apportions His Time

Following is a study prepared in the Bureau of Public Affairs in response to an academic request¹ for information on how the Secretary of State spends his official time, together with a portion of an interview with Secretary Rusk on April 3 on the nationally syndicated television program "Open End," in which the Secretary discussed his working day.

SECRETARY'S PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES

An examination of how a Secretary of State spends his official time suggests that his activities are directed toward five major categories:

1. Advising the President on foreign affairs;
2. Managing the Department of which he is head;
3. Consulting with the Congress;
4. Dealing directly with foreign officials, both here and abroad; and
5. Making American policy views known to the public, both domestic and foreign.

For illustrative purposes, a study recently was made of Secretary Rusk's activities in a single month, January 1965, which was selected arbitrarily. His activities are described below for this 1 month, under the five headings cited.

Advising the President

In addition to the heavy flow of official papers and telephone conversations between the White House and the Department of State, on 11 separate occasions during the month, the Secretary went to the White House to meet with the President and, on occasion, fellow members of the Cabinet or other top White House advisers. These White House meetings absorbed 17 hours during the month, a figure which does not include the time necessary for preparation before the meetings, or for subsequent implementation of policy decisions taken.

¹ From Dr. Gerard J. Mangone, associate dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, in connection with his forthcoming book entitled *Foreign Policy and American Government*.

Managing the Department

The Secretary must deal directly with his principal assistants so that immediate and urgent problems are met, without impairing the need for coherent, longer range planning. Morning staff meetings help set the stage; a dozen of these were held during the month. Most problems of administration and policy are presented in writing; this task is performed mainly by the bureaus, with the assistance of the Executive Secretariat and the Secretary's immediate staff. Yet *individual* discussions are integral to the Secretary's management function, keeping him attuned to developments, and providing a rapid channel for exchanging views. During the month under consideration, over a hundred individual discussions were held.

During the month, the Secretary met on 19 occasions with U.S. ambassadors in Washington for consultations. These meetings provide an important opportunity for coordination which has obvious advantages over exchanges of telegrams. As an incentive to younger officers, the Secretary met once with members of the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club.

Consulting With the Congress

President Johnson has urged Cabinet members to make themselves available for discussions with Members of the Congress. During the month, the Secretary made 11 separate trips to the Capitol for meetings with individual Members of Congress and congressional committees. Twenty-two hours were spent in these meetings. It should be noted that since the month under study was January, at the beginning of a new presidential term, the Congress did not meet until midmonth. Also, substantial time spent in preparation for congressional briefings, meetings, and appearances must be added to the figure given.

Dealing With Foreign Officials

During the month, the Secretary had individual appointments with 21 foreign ambassadors and 1 foreign minister. It was

chiefly in connection with this aspect of his work that the Secretary was host at 13 receptions, luncheons, or dinners in the Department of State, and guest at 19 dinners or other functions outside the Department. One day was spent on a trip to President Johnson's ranch in Texas, where the President was conferring with the Prime Minister of Canada. At the end of the month, upon the death of Sir Winston Churchill, the Secretary flew to London for 3 days of events honoring the late British leader.

Informing the Public

During the month the Secretary held six "background" conferences with news reporters. Unlike formal, on-the-record news conferences, the background conferences permit exploration in depth of developments. The Secretary also appeared on three radio-television interviews and gave seven interviews to authors of magazine articles or books.

This schedule of activity is based on a 7-day working week and covers both daytime and evening hours. Of the 31 days in January 1965, the Secretary had 1 day only (a Sunday) without scheduled appointments. He was away from Washington a total of 4 days (Texas and London), and, in addition, spent half a day at a ship-commissioning ceremony in Virginia. Of the 25½ working days in Washington, about a third of the Secretary's time was spent outside the Department of State building (at the White House, Capitol, and elsewhere).

EXCERPT FROM "OPEN END" INTERVIEW

David Susskind, Moderator: Mr. Secretary, how many hours a day do you work customarily?

Secretary Rusk: It varies a little from day to day, but I get into the office around quarter to 9, or 9 o'clock, and I'm usually ready for bed about midnight. This frequently means diplomatic dinners and things of that sort in the evening, but if I'm not at those I'm usually in the office. So it's usually a 14- or 15-hour day.

Mr. Susskind: You work 6 days, 7 days?

Secretary Rusk: I usually come in for part of the time on Sundays—hour or two—look at the cables and see what's going on. Saturday is almost an ordinary working day.

Mr. Susskind: When did you last have a vacation?

Secretary Rusk: Well, when I went over to Mr. Churchill's funeral, I got the flu, so that I spent a week or 10 days in Florida getting—getting over the flu. Otherwise, I've snatched a little time, 2 or 3 days at a time, here and there. I hope to get a little longer time at some stage.

The theory is that the Secretary of State gets a vacation after Congress adjourns and before the United Nations convenes, but they've been overlapping for 5 years so that it hasn't been easy to get away.

Mr. Susskind: Do you feel the need to get away from it all, to refresh yourself, recharge your battery?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that we would all be a little more efficient if we got away perhaps more frequently than we do. But it isn't easy to get rest if responsibility goes along with you. And any of the senior officials in Government find it almost impossible to go away and forget what is going on and forget the job. Fortunately, I have no insomnia; when my head hits the pillow, I'm asleep, and that has been a considerable resource.

Mr. Susskind: Are you woken much in the middle of the night?

Secretary Rusk: I get a number of calls in the middle of the night from time to time. The world is round and that means that when it's 3 o'clock in the morning in Washington it's 3 o'clock in the afternoon somewhere else. So you do get the night calls from time to time but not as much as perhaps you would suppose.

Mr. Susskind: But you're able to go right back to bed?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, yes, that's a gift.

Mr. Susskind: Do you ever have moments when the responsibility and complexity of your office is almost overwhelming? Do you ever feel that it's just too much?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it's a sobering—

it's a sobering responsibility. The world is extremely complicated. We're dealing with 120 different nations. The rate of change is very fast. During this calendar year we'll have 50 elections and changes in government somewhere in the world. Most of those are of importance to the United States. And one needs all the help that one can get.

Of course, the great preoccupation is to know best how to serve the President, because his is the awesome and the lonely task. And that's what all of us are always trying to learn how to do better.

But we do have a competent diplomatic service, a competent Department. We have good working relationships with the other departments. We have good working relationships with the other departments of Government, so that the burdens are tolerable. What we need is wisdom. I've sometimes said when I've seen some pickets that we need your prayers and not your impressions.

Mr. Susskind: Mr. Secretary, in 1968 you will have served two 4-year terms as Secretary of State. If President Johnson was re-elected and asked you to serve again in that office, would you be inclined to do so?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to anticipate even the year 1968. The Secretary of State serves at the pleasure of the President, and the matter is, in the first instance, for the President to decide. I must say it's been a great privilege for me to serve first under President Kennedy and then under President Johnson. And I've had to leave to both of them the question as to my qualifications or how long they've wanted me to serve. I felt it an obligation to do so and a privilege to do so, so long as I was qualified to do it.

Mr. Susskind: Do you have any theory on how long an official should serve in such a demanding, challenging job?

Secretary Rusk: It would be hard to generalize. No, I just think I—that's a matter that the President would have to decide.

Mr. Susskind: How does the family of the Secretary of State withstand the pressures of the job? You're absent a good deal of the

time, traveling much of the time, in the office 16 hours a day.

Secretary Rusk: Well, my wife has a schedule that is comparable to my own, because she undertakes a good many things in my place. For example, every embassy in Washington has a national-day party once a year, a reception of some sort. Mrs. Rusk represents me at all of those. And she does a good many other things of that sort that are highly relevant to the job that both of us have. So she has a rather full schedule.

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking" German Note of March 25

Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

U.S. NOTE OF APRIL 2¹

Press release 76 dated April 6

The Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of the note of the Federal Republic of Germany of March 25 concerning the reunification of Germany, disarmament, and other matters relating to the peace and security of Europe. The United States Government welcomes the German note as a forward-looking communication containing many constructive suggestions.

The United States Government notes with satisfaction the reaffirmation expressed in the note of the desire of the Federal Republic of Germany to live on good terms with all of Germany's neighbors, including the nations of Eastern Europe, and it hopes that further progress will be made toward this goal. It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that all nations interested in the peace and security

¹ Delivered by the American Embassy at Bonn to the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany on Apr. 2.

of the world will carefully study the March 25 note and that they will find, as the Government of the United States has found, that the note gives positive expression to the desire of the German people to live in peace and freedom and to their willingness to make sacrifices to achieve German reunification. The United States Government supports the efforts of the German Government outlined in the note intended to contribute to European peace and security, disarmament, and the related goal of the improvement of relations between Germany and all of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. These efforts are complementary to those of other governments which are also concerned with these problems.

The Government of the United States wishes to assure the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that it will give most careful consideration to the ideas and suggestions in the German note regarding disarmament and the safeguarding of the peace. The United States shares with the German Government and other governments whose goal is a more peaceful and secure world, the hope that the day may soon arrive when Germany will be reunified in a peaceful and equitable manner which will assure to the German people the right freely to determine their own way of life and destiny and will permit a united Germany to contribute fully to a peaceful and stable international community.

GERMAN NOTE OF MARCH 25²

Official translation

I

The German people wish to live in peace and freedom. They consider it their greatest national task to remove the partition of Germany under which they have suffered for many years. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has repeatedly stated that the German people would be prepared also to make sacrifices for the sake of their reunification. They are determined to solve this problem by peaceful means only.

² Delivered by the German Embassy at Washington to the Department of State on Mar. 25.

The thought of another war, which would destroy whole countries and nations, even continents, is unbearable to them. They want to help ensure that such a catastrophe can never happen, and in this wish they know that they are at one with all reasonable people. For many years now governments have been endeavouring to solve the political problems which lie at the root of tension between world powers, and to ward off the dangers that arise as a result of the arms race, especially the increase in weapons of mass destruction. What there is to show for these efforts is disappointing. The crucial problems remain unresolved and the will even to discuss them seriously is not equally strong among the nuclear powers.

As in the past, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany still holds the view that a world-wide, general and controlled disarmament must be the objective. Nor will this objective be changed by monotonous propaganda which seeks to question and misrepresent the standpoint of the Federal Government on problems of disarmament and security.

Moved by concern about further developments, it therefore has the honour to present to the United States Government particularly in its capacity as a member of the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in this note a survey of its policy for peace and to put forward some proposals on disarmament, armaments control and European security.

II

The Federal Government considers that, given good will and honest intentions on all sides, even the most difficult problems between nations can be resolved in a peaceful and equitable manner. Thus, on this basis it has reached agreement with Germany's neighbours in the West on all problems that were still open after the war.

The German people desire to live on good terms with all, including their East European neighbours. Hence the Federal Government has been trying in various ways to improve relations with the states and peoples of Eastern Europe. If we consider that there are many who look upon this policy with unfounded mistrust and even make every effort to frustrate it, the results are, on the whole, nevertheless satisfactory. They are an encouragement to the Federal Government to continue on its present course.

Despite the fact that the Federal Government has made particular efforts to cultivate relations with Poland, the country which suffered most of all among the East European nations in the Second World War, it has made but little progress in this direction. Although the Polish Government is obviously interested in more lively trade between Germany and Poland, it has hitherto not given any indication that it is interested in achieving a conciliation between the two nations. Rather does it

hamper the cultural contacts we seek, stands for the continued division of Germany and at the same time calls upon the Federal Government to recognize the Oder-Neisse-Line, though it is generally known that, under the allied agreements of 1945, the settlement of frontier questions has been postponed until the conclusion of a peace treaty with the whole of Germany and that, according to International Law, Germany continues to exist within its frontiers of 31 December 1937 until such time as a freely elected all-German government recognizes other frontiers.

If, when the occasion arises, the Poles and the Germans enter into negotiations on frontier questions in the same spirit that led to the conciliation between Germany and her Western neighbours, then Poles and Germans will also find their way to agreement. For in this question neither emotions nor alone the power of the victor, but rather reason, must prevail.

In recent years the Federal Government has established official relations with Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. It is also endeavouring to create such relations with Czechoslovakia as well, and would welcome a renewal of more friendly relations between the people of that state and the German people.

In the opinion of the Federal Government the Munich Agreement of 1938 was torn asunder by Hitler and no longer has any territorial significance. The Federal Government, therefore, as it has often declared, does not assert any territorial claims against Czechoslovakia; it stresses that this is the official statement of German policy.

The policy pursued by the Federal Government is neither revanchist nor restorative. It is looking forward, not backwards, and its aim is an equitable European order on the basis of peaceful agreements, an order in which all nations can live together freely and as good neighbours. After all, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe belong to Europe as well.

Already by its co-operation in the reshaping of Western Europe, the Federal Government has shown that its vision goes beyond the situation of pre-war Europe. It is seeking new forms in international co-operation because it is convinced that the old order of nation states as we have known them in our continent is no longer adequate to cope with the enormous political, economic and technical tasks of this age. We can only master these tasks if we combine our efforts.

The Federal Government has therefore participated in all plans for European unification. Nowhere has the idea of European integration found such a response as in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose Basic Law (Constitution) even provides for the cession of sovereign rights to supranational organizations. A policy, therefore, which is aimed at achieving international co-opera-

tion and association, serves the cause of peace; it needs peace if it is to accomplish its aims.

III

But this peace is not secure.

The Government of the USSR has announced time and again that it does not want war. The Federal Government presumes that the Soviet Union really means this, but the value of Soviet assurances is diminished by quite unambiguous and massive threats like those frequently made against the Federal Republic, as, for instance, in the note communicated by the Soviet Government on 5 February 1963 which states:

"It is not hard to imagine that in the event of a thermo-nuclear war the mighty and concentrated blows of rockets and nuclear weapons will inevitably come down over West Germany and that that country would not survive a third world war."

And on 16 January 1963 the then Soviet Prime Minister said in East Berlin that the Federal Republic of Germany "if a war breaks out, will burn out like a candle in the very first hour."

Only last month Soviet marshals asserted they could "wipe any enemy from the face of the earth in no time at all"; they declared that the arrogance of the West German revanchists forced them to keep their powder dry but that "never mind, the means are there of cooling down the hotheads." Such language reveals a mentality which the Federal Government can only view with concern, and it has all the more reason as the Soviet Union does in fact possess the strongest ground forces in Europe and, furthermore, has at its disposal a very large arsenal of nuclear and hydrogen bombs, rockets as well as a fleet of nuclear bombers and guided-missile submarines. It has concentrated both its conventional and its nuclear forces in the Western part of the area under its rule.

IV

The Federal Republic of Germany did not have any troops of its own until 1955. Its security depended entirely on the protection afforded by its Western allies. It did not join NATO until May 1955, when it began to build up the Federal Armed Forces. Today the Federal Republic of Germany has a defensive force but does not possess nuclear weapons nor has it such weapons at its disposal.

Already in the Paris agreements of 1954, the Federal Government renounced the production of weapons of mass destruction especially nuclear weapons, and to that extent subjected itself to international control by the Western European Union.

The Federal Government is determined in accord with its allies to defend itself against any attack on its freedom. However, it is not equipped for a war of aggression. Nor would it be capable of waging such a war since it has assigned all its

combat units to NATO, an alliance concentrated only on defense. Within the framework of this alliance it advocates, together with other allies, that all parties to it should share in the responsibility for nuclear defense. It does not, however, as it has repeatedly declared, seek national possession of nuclear weapons.

Its policy is aimed at increasing security in Europe and at creating a situation in which threats, pressures, ultimatums, and use of force, in any form, are impossible. Its aim is to eliminate the sources of political tension. It therefore advocates both a solution of the German problem and a consistent disarmament policy that will contribute towards safeguarding the peace.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, wants to do more than just make these general points. It therefore has the honour to submit to the United States Government the following ideas and suggestions regarding disarmament and the safeguarding of peace.

V

1. The Federal Government is aware of the dangers involved in a proliferation of nuclear weapons. If it proves too difficult to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the non-proliferation problem, the Federal Government would consider a step by step approach advisable. There are obviously only two ways for a state to come into possession of nuclear weapons, i.e., either by producing these weapons itself or by obtaining them from a nuclear power. Both these possibilities should be eliminated.

As regards the first possibility, the Federal Republic of Germany, as has already been mentioned, renounced the production of nuclear weapons as early as 1954 and to that extent submitted to international control. In the light of this the Federal Government appeals to all non-nuclear states who are members of military alliances in East or West to express the same renunciation and submit to a similar international control. This should be followed by further steps concerning the non-aligned states.

To eliminate also the second possibility of spreading nuclear weapons, the Federal Government suggests that the nuclear powers come to an agreement not to transfer any nuclear weapons to the national control of other countries.

2. Nobody will be able to claim that the nuclear armaments race increases security in Europe and throughout the world. The Federal Government therefore declares that it is prepared to consent to any agreement in which the countries concerned pledge themselves not to increase the number of nuclear weapons in Europe but to reduce them in stages. Such an agreement, however, would have to extend to the whole of Europe, preserve the overall balance of power, provide for effective control, and

be linked with essential progress in the solution of political problems in Central Europe.

3. As a receiving country for fissionable material the Federal Republic of Germany has submitted to international controls which ensure that such material is not used for the production of nuclear weapons. As a supplying country the Federal Republic of Germany, in its supply agreements with receiving countries outside the EURATOM area, is prepared in general to demand similar controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its attitude is based on the assumption that other supplying countries impose the same condition.

4. The Federal Republic of Germany and its Western allies have already exchanged declarations renouncing the use of force. As the governments of the Soviet Union and some other East European countries have repeatedly expressed their anxiety, unfounded as it is, over a possible German attack, the Federal Government proposes that formal declarations be exchanged also with the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and any other East European state, in which either side gives an undertaking to the other people not to use force to settle international disputes.

5. To dispel the mistrust with regard to alleged German aggressive intentions, the Federal Government also proposes bilateral agreements with the

Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian governments concerning the exchange of military observers to attend manoeuvres of armed forces.

6. Finally, the Federal Government is prepared to participate and to co-operate in a constructive spirit in a world disarmament conference, or in any other disarmament conference, promising success.

VI

The Federal Government considers that these suggestions and proposals stand the best chance, at the present stage, of being carried into effect. It realizes, however, that more far-reaching proposals are required if the world is to be given security in every respect and if it is to be guarded against the risk of nuclear war. It is prepared to co-operate also in such more comprehensive plans; it believes, however, that all efforts to achieve security, disarmament and armaments control will fail to bring decisive and lasting success unless there is a simultaneous step-by-step removal of the causes of tension in the world. Looking at Europe, that means, above all, solving the German problem in an equitable manner by granting to the entire German nation the right freely to determine its political way of life and its destiny.

WASHINGTON, 25 March 1966.

The United States and Germany: Our Mutual Responsibilities and Our Mutual Dependence

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany¹

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you today on the subject of German-American relations. You are a community of scholars—many mature experts in your chosen discipline, others in the making. Your minds have been trained to review today's events not just in terms of their present interest but also according to their significance in the longer perspective of history.

¹ Address made at the University of Erlangen at Erlangen, Germany, on Feb. 18.

Since my arrival in Germany nearly 3 years ago, I have often referred, on occasions like this, to the strong bonds of culture and kinship between the German and American people. Our common values and interests have provided a natural and easy basis for my discussions with your leading men of affairs. Rather than trace for you tonight, however, the separate strands of the web that history has woven between us, I would like to remind you of the significance of our situation as kindred nations in the world of today. I would like to consider with you

where the realities of this association can lead us.

The fact that the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are both members of the North Atlantic alliance is a prime element in the present international power relationship. The essential aspect of our association within this alliance is that it has been instrumental in developing the military strength and unity of Europe and the North Atlantic area for the benefit of the entire free world.

To the credit of our cooperation under the Marshall Plan there stand the magnificent achievements here in Germany since 1945 of the restoration to productive vitality of a society which had been crushed by defeat. Ahead there lies the opportunity for Germany to apply your new strength to the task of aiding others. We Americans hope also to be able to work together with Germany in such an endeavor.

The decision announced by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946,² to help bring Germany back to a place of honor among the free nations was not intended as a simple act of charity. Behind this decision to free the Germans from quarantine and to help them revive their productive capacity there was the implicit recognition of interdependence between the fate of Germany and our own future.

The policy of Secretary Byrnes was founded upon the obvious fact—obvious, that is, to those not dedicated to the aim of dominating others—that the recovery of Germany was essential to the effective restoration of peace in Europe. But this policy was founded also upon a broader principle—namely, that peace is indivisible and must be consolidated and defended whether the arena is a single country, a continent, or the world.

That this should be cardinal principle of American policy attests to the great distance that the United States itself has come in its abandonment of isolation. And here you Germans—most especially you of the younger generation—have something funda-

mental in common with us. For we have both come a long way. It took a reluctant involvement in two world wars to convince the American public that the United States could not put off its emergence on the world stage.

That our growing strength could not be consistent with a merely passive world role took even longer to stir the conscience of the American people. Today, I believe, awareness of our international responsibilities does rule that conscience. The proof of this has come again and again since that day at Stuttgart in September 1946—in Berlin, in Greece, in Korea, and in Viet-Nam—wherever the challenge arose to stand and be counted in the cause of peace.

In the view of my Government, these international responsibilities extend not just to those areas where we have specific alliance commitments. They are worldwide. We do not expect them to be construed as limiting our worldwide interest in keeping the peace. As Vice President Humphrey told the conference of NATO parliamentarians last October, "The Atlantic nations cannot survive as an island of stability in a world of chaos."³ Our fundamental task, as he said, is to concert our power for the purpose of building a world order capable of forestalling the outbreak of crises.

Germany's Sense of National Purpose

The German people have arrived at this juncture in history by another route. For a long time, the sense of national identity in Germany was stunted by internal divisions. These were expressed in a bewildering variety of local, regional, or other parochial loyalties. Political unity was achieved relatively late, and partly as a consequence of this, the awakening to national consciousness and national pride came with an upsetting suddenness.

The newly emergent sense of national purpose in Germany expressed itself most markedly in the form of policies aimed frankly at the aggrandizement of German power. Yet there were undercurrents pres-

² See BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1946, p. 496.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 650.

ent that flowed in the direction of commitment to the more wholesome attributes of the modern nation-state. There were, for example, early efforts toward political democracy and representative government; the flourishing of the cosmopolitan arts—music, painting, and literature; a deepening sense of civic and social responsibility which the famous Iron Chancellor, Prince von Bismarck himself, applied in his welfare legislation, a model of its type for the Western World.

These constructive impulses were brutally thrust aside. But now, the German people have found themselves again. We see in being a German Government able to take a leading part in the advancement of human welfare. I have emphasized on another occasion that we, the American people, think it high time that the world take adequate account of Germany's postwar record of political as well as material achievement. Germany has proved its capacity for democracy—as well as European and world citizenship.

It is also time to take seriously Germany's expressed willingness to commit its national resources in assisting others. If the Germans are to have any degree of conviction that their effort will be worth while, they must be conceded a fair chance to prove the sincerity of their purposes. The United States, for one, is ready to accept the stated intentions of the German leaders at their face value.

NATO

The most important of Germany's international engagements is the incorporation of nearly half a million German soldiers, sailors, and airmen into NATO commands. These forces are deployed not only in the direct defense of their country but also of the alliance as a whole. Alongside them are the forces of other countries—men and weapons whose presence serves as the clearest possible illustration of the practical interdependence of the partners in the NATO enterprise. Germany's role in this enterprise is central. The territory of the Federal Re-

public represents the front line of the free-world position in Europe. West Germany is, however, no mere outpost. It is, indeed, a firm bastion of the alliance structure.

For us Americans, Germany has a special importance as an ally. We recognize that Germany's welfare is an essential component of the European stability and growth that we set out in 1945 to reestablish. Without it, the Continent could hardly be considered defensible at all. So long as the Europeans continue to desire our help in preserving their freedom, we shall remain prepared to give that help. This we shall do, not only to honor our treaty commitments but in simple self-interest. For to anyone examining the situation of the United States as a world power in the nuclear age, it must be clear that our fate is linked inseparably with that of free Europe. Our heavy investment of American men, material, and technology in the Federal Republic—and Berlin—exists in order to defend not just Germany or Europe but the United States as well.

I cannot take seriously the notion spread by some that the United States does not feel genuinely committed to the defense of Germany and Europe. We adhere to that commitment; we have no thought of departing from it. Let me read to you what Under Secretary of State George Ball told his friends in this country on the occasion of the fourth German-American Conference, November 1964:⁴

We have not stationed our troops in Europe to let them be overrun by a hostile power. We have not built our massive strategic nuclear force and targeted a considerable part of it against weapons whose only target is Europe with any thought that the force would not be used if Europe were attacked.

European Unity

There are other German commitments which involve broader and longer range objectives, for example, the German commitment to the goal of European unity. The German Government has, at every juncture in the evolution of the European communi-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1964, p. 773.

ties, demonstrated its readiness to place the common welfare of the group of nations ahead of its own advantage—a demonstration above all of your conviction that the goal is indeed attainable.

Your leaders are not blind to the difficulties that remain in the way of achieving European unity. They have combined patience with persistence. They have been guided throughout by the belief that what unites the people of Western Europe is far stronger than their remaining differences. If the German link to the United States through NATO arose in the first place as a matter of unavoidable necessity, the German commitment to Europe is a matter of free as well as enlightened choice.

German statesmen have not permitted incidental obstacles to deter them from moving with all practical speed toward the objective of a united Europe. From the first, they have recognized the importance of creating a sound basis for this new Europe through reconciliation with France. German and French policy has wisely been directed not only toward eliminating old rivalries but toward organizing effective consultation and cooperation where the two countries have a common interest. We welcome a Franco-German association which seeks to further, in proper phasing, the twin enterprises of European unity and Atlantic partnership.

Let me say here that this aim is in no sense contradictory to the U.S. interest. Apart from the obvious importance of Franco-German friendship to the health and stability of the Western alliance as a whole, we regard the effective cooperation of these two great peoples as indispensable if there is to be any durable association among Europeans. This is true whether limited to the economic field—or extending to political forms. Only in this way can Europe's future be assured.

I might remind you that the movement toward an integrated Europe, to which German national policy has dedicated itself, owes a great deal to the original stimulant of the Marshall Plan. The program of Marshall Plan aid was put into effect, you

may recall, because the United States Government felt it had a heavy stake in Europe's recovery. This meant not just the recovery of Germany alone, or of France alone, but of all of Europe together. We still have a heavy stake in the security and welfare of Europe. We continue to feel that European unity would serve our own interest—as well as Europe's.

Reunification and Eastern Policy

Uppermost in most Germans' minds is the great unresolved problem of German reunification. Since there are, unfortunately, virtually no signs of progress, patience—along with persistence—must still be exercised. I can assure you, however, that we have no intention of resigning ourselves to the Soviet refusal to permit Germany to be reunified in freedom.

Although we, as you, have forsworn the use of force in its solution, our conscience rejects the arbitrary restraints that prevent people of the same nation and culture, members of the same families even, from living and working together in peace. We agree with your leaders when they emphasize that this is not exclusively a question of Germany's partition but also a result of the partition—let us rather say the disruption—of Europe as a whole.

My Government is equally convinced that German unity is the key to peace in Europe. Along with you, we will persist in the effort to persuade the Soviet leaders to discard the long-outmoded concept of power politics, which holds that territory once occupied should not be relinquished while force suffices to hold it. We will seek to convince the Soviets that their interests would be far better served, in the long run, if they allowed the barrier that cuts through the heart of Europe to fall away.

When that happens, the energies of the Eastern European nations will be released for more constructive purposes. They will be able not only to deal more flexibly and effectively with their own domestic needs but also, through the free exchange of goods and ideas with their Western neighbors, to

comprehend today's trend toward the concept of a common European citizenship. Thus they could regain a sense of identity with the European cultural and intellectual heritage.

I am confident that, if the Soviet leaders would only be willing to try to understand your Government's effort to revive a relationship of trust with the peoples of Eastern Europe, they would find less reason for willfully misinterpreting your motives. They would cease crying their tired slogan of "Beware of German revanchism." We know what difficulties burden your effort to clear a pathway toward the unity of Eastern and Western Europe as a whole. We wish you well in this effort.

International Trade

Of great importance, not only to both countries but to the world, are the efforts we and Germany, as well as many others, are making to liberalize and expand world trade and to deal with some of the pressing specific trading problems. The United States and Germany, as the two leading world trading countries, have obvious and important roles to play in the trade field. We both attach the highest importance to GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and to a successful Kennedy Round of tariff reductions. Both countries are committed in the Kennedy Round to make a special effort to reduce barriers on trade items of interest to the developing countries, without asking full reciprocity for them.

Moving from joint German-U.S. interest in the Kennedy Round, our interdependence is most pronounced in our direct trade. Total trade between our two countries is now in the neighborhood of \$3.2 billion, or over 2 percent of total world trade! From the end of World War II until 1963 the United States was the major foreign trade partner of the Federal Republic. As a result of the sharp expansion of trade among the EEC [European Economic Community] countries, France has now advanced to first place among Germany's foreign trade partners, with the United States in second posi-

tion. The United States still retains, however, its long-held position as the leading supplier to Germany.

Total German imports from the United States, including defense items, amounted to approximately \$2 billion, both in 1963 and 1964. Commercial imports have continued to expand, climbing an additional 11 percent during the first 9 months in 1965 to a level of about \$1.3 billion. German exports to the United States (Germany's fourth largest customer) reached a record high in 1964 of \$1.2 billion, a 14-percent increase over the preceding year. German exports continued to expand in 1965, increasing 18 percent over the previous year. The largest single group was, of course, motor vehicles, accounting for over one-third of total German exports.

The outlook for a further expansion of U.S.-German trade in 1966 is favorable. U.S. deliveries of consumer goods to West Germany are expected to grow further as a result of the continuing upward trend of personal incomes and the greater competitiveness of U.S. products. West German agricultural imports (which account for about 30 percent of U.S. deliveries) will probably continue the upward trend in evidence for some years; in particular, grain imports are expected to grow further.

In the capital goods sector, prospects are less favorable because investment by German industry in plant and equipment is beginning to level off. Nevertheless, demand for automation and electronic equipment of the types supplied by the United States may very well increase.

Although West Germany is a major producer of agricultural products, whose value of production amounts to about DM25 billion annually, or almost 5 percent of the gross national product, it is also among the world's largest importers of agricultural products. The United States has the good fortune to be able to supply approximately 13 percent of Germany's total agricultural imports. Our major exports complement German requirements, especially in the raw materials, such as soybeans, food grains,

cotton, tobacco, oil meal, vegetable oils, and hides and skins. In turn, although our imports from Germany are largely industrial, the United States benefits from imports of German wines, beers, hops, leather, and specially processed meat products. On balance, each country has something agricultural to contribute to the increased well-being of its fellow world citizens.

Assistance to Developing Areas

In all the major aspects of policy that we have so far reviewed—NATO, European unity, the problem of reconstructing a divided Europe—Germany is playing a key and a constructive role. The German concept of its own national interest has followed the fruitful patterns of cooperative bilateral and multilateral association. At the same time, your domestic institutions have become firmly established. They have become adjusted to the pressures of a complex industrial society. The Federal Republic of Germany has become a mature power, fully capable of making its own independent contribution to the solution of our international problems.

If we consider the responsibilities which both the United States and Germany recognize in the economic field, one of the most important relates to the developing countries. The hallmark of today's world is the inescapable interdependence of the nations. The measure of a nation's true worth—its proper rank in the company of great powers—lies in its readiness to marshal its resources to help other nations who are less fortunate. It is a clear objective of our own national policy to do just that. This is what President Johnson aims at when he speaks of internationalizing his conception of the Great Society. It is not only impossible, but self-defeating, to deny progress to the less developed nations of the world.

The exercise of international responsibility is not just to play the policeman's role, however unavoidable that may sometimes be. Both we and the Germans have been ready to assist directly through our bilateral

aid programs and in concert with other countries through various international institutions such as the World Bank. We have both contributed extensively through these international agencies to improve living standards in the developing world. Our own program has been a large one.

Today the United States Government provides economic and technical assistance of significant proportions to 80 nations, comprising nearly half of the world's population. Three-fourths of these nations did not exist in their present state before World War II. Over 20 years, beginning with the Marshall Plan, we have spent more than \$100 billion on aid grants and loans. Our surplus agriculture food grants and sales for local currency alone have totaled over \$12 billion. In the current year we shall spend in the neighborhood of \$4½ billion and will have aid programs in about 90 countries.

We must help these countries not only to prevent social disorder and unrest which could lead to their disaffection or loss to the free world. We need to help them in organizing and developing their own human and material resources in the interest—ours as well as theirs—of building a stable free-world community. The resistance of the underdeveloped countries to the political diseases of our time will be effective only if they can develop a firm material basis for their political institutions.

The Federal Republic has for some years been active in this field. Germany's development aid program began in 1960. It is the largest after our own in terms of numbers of countries assisted—more than 65. Official statistics reveal that more than DM26 billion has already been expended on development aid, including DM10 billion by organizations of private citizens. The program includes, as does our own, technical assistance grants in addition to development loans. Currently Germany is providing technical assistance to over 90 countries. I note appreciatively that South Viet-Nam is one such country where extensive German economic aid has been given and where more

aid of a humanitarian nature is promised. In addition, the German Peace Corps now has over 500 volunteers operating in 12 countries.

But there is more to be done. Not least, there is the challenge to learn from each other's experience—at home and abroad.

We see substantial possibilities, for example, in cooperative efforts between our two countries—and also on a Europe-wide basis—to overcome our most persistent environmental problems. And what we can do for ourselves, we can help others do. Next month our distinguished Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Udall, will be visiting the Federal Republic.⁵ He will be consulting with governmental and business leaders here on problems ranging from the reduction of air pollution to efficient management of natural resources. The systematic exchange of information and joint study of our most pressing problems will be organized on a large scale. Through these and other investigations, we can not only make progress in removing the imperfections in our own society but in assisting others to do the same.

The Federal Republic of Germany has resources to dedicate, on behalf of all the German people, to the realization of the ideals of justice and human progress. This is not a task for cynics. Above and beyond the possession of material resources, it will require the determination to persist for the sake of an ideal. For young people like yourselves, who can bring a fresh imagination to your encounters with the issues and problems of the contemporary world, this appeal should have special meaning. The fulfillment of this ideal will be *your* task—a task which you will share with the young generations of my own country and of the other Western democracies. As a community of free nations we can together help the world to achieve a level of development which earlier generations could not even imagine.

⁵ For a White House announcement of Feb. 26, see *ibid.*, Mar. 21, 1966, p. 463.

U.S. Comments on Sales of Aircraft to Jordan

*Department Statement*¹

The U.S. Government has, over the years, provided Jordan with limited amounts of arms to meet its defense requirements. We can confirm that an agreement has recently been reached between the United States and Jordan providing for Jordanian purchase of a limited number of military jet aircraft for its air defense system to replace older models.

Just as we will continue to refrain from becoming a principal supplier of arms to the Near East, so does it remain our policy not to discuss the specifics of arms transactions as they occur. Therefore, we are not in a position to go into the details of the equipment sold in this case.

Our sale to Jordan was made both in the light of Jordan's defense requirements and in accordance with our policy of preventing instability from developing the Near East. It is consistent with our due regard for area security and our general restraint as to the equipment supplied. We do not believe that this sale will be a destabilizing factor or contribute to imbalance in the area. In this connection, we continue to regret the massive Soviet sales of arms to certain countries of the Near East which have intensified the arms race in that area, and we will continue to strive for agreed limitations on arms buildup there.

Letters of Credence

Laos

The newly appointed Ambassador of Laos, Khamking Souvanlasy, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated April 6.

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Apr. 2.

The United States and Japan: Different Paths to Common Goals

by Robert W. Barnett

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

Distinguished authorities have already talked to you about social and political developments in Japan, Japan's industrial capabilities, Japan's role in world commerce, Japan's potential for contributing to the growth of developing countries in Asia, and operational problems that arise when Americans do business with Japanese.

My task is to discuss United States foreign policy and Japan.

I will speak briefly about the scale of activity, the common appreciation of environment, and the vital links which give firm foundation for the partnership which has been established between our two countries and how it is that we can respond differently to challenges in the Pacific basin and still contribute to a common purpose.

What makes countries big or little? Ordinary maps show Communist China to be 27 times the size of Japan: 3.7 million square miles as compared with 142,000 square miles. Adjust that map to show Communist China and Japan in terms of population, and Communist China will be seven times as large as Japan: 763 million compared with 98 million. Adjust it to compare Communist China's gross national product with Japan's, and Japan will be larger than Communist China. A map showing volume of world trade will show Japan over five times as large as

Communist China: \$16 billion of annual exports and imports for Japan compared with just over \$3 billion for Communist China.

A most precious social asset is density of trained brains. Crosshatch a map to reflect this resource in Japan and in Communist China, and for Japan the map will be eight times as dark as for China: school enrollment of youths 18-24 amounts to some 3 percent of that age in China, 25 percent in Japan.

Communist China is justifiably seen as a major presence in world power relations today. So is Japan—in the region of which China is a central part and throughout the world.

Problems of Common Concern

War in Viet-Nam lies close to the heart of all foreign policy calculations in the Pacific basin. Differing involvement in the day-to-day military confrontation itself must not be permitted, however, to obscure the fact that Japan and the United States share a vital and continuing interest in the uneasy environment of which Viet-Nam and Communist China are troubled parts. In that total environment are characteristics which existed before the violence of today and will persist after the violence has been stopped.

What are some of them?

The area does not enjoy a tradition of community such as has grown over the past two centuries on both sides of the Atlantic. Among themselves few Asian societies

¹ Address made at Palm Springs, Calif., on Mar. 3 before a conference on "Doing Business With Japan," sponsored by the University of California at Los Angeles.

have yet come to feel deeply interdependent.

Throughout the area, almost all of the countries are in the process of fashioning each for itself a sense of valid national identity and purpose. Three of the countries suffer the trauma of being divided.

The area is experiencing, thanks largely to the beneficence of medical science and increasingly effective public health administration, extremely high rates of population growth and growing awareness of shortage of investment capital needed for sustained growth of productive capabilities. Investment capital generated from the local savings and brought in from outside is inadequate.

Much of the area bears heavy—in Vietnam, massive—military burdens, and most of the area knows the crippling effects, psychologically, of uncertainties brought by fear of foreign aggression.

Sensitive people in government, in universities, amongst newspapermen and the general public, crave the reassurance of faith in system.

I have had the privilege of participating in three of the last four annual meetings of the United States–Japan Joint Cabinet sessions on economic problems.² There has been in this short period of time a striking progression by our Cabinet members from focus on bilateral economic links and problems toward focus on basic problems of common concern, some of which I have tried just now to identify. Most of the time we think and talk alike about them.

Differences can and do trouble the partnership of the United States and Japan. At a 3-day meeting of the American Assembly last fall, we tried to sort out reasons why. We bear wider world responsibilities than does Japan. There is a disparity in our size, wealth, and power: Japan accounts for one-twelfth of United States foreign trade, whereas the United States accounts for al-

most one-third of Japan's foreign trade. We often talk about problems from different starting points: Japan's attitudes toward China and Taiwan have a different history from ours. We look upon most economic problems in business terms, while Japan often believes they involve matters of national prestige. Many Japanese and many Americans have been approaching problems of security and military power differently: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits wars as an instrument of national policy, and many Japanese want to disregard, or regard as not their business, use of military force as a factor in national power. Our two languages are profoundly different and difficult to master. There are, I am told, 27 ways to say the single word "I" in Japanese.

We have learned to make allowances for these differences and in fact turn them to mutual advantage. We respect and trust the creative potentiality of diversity among self-determining societies and applaud the growing polycentrism we see among Communist states. From different starting points our two countries work together with astonishing harmony of purpose in the United Nations, in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], in the Development Assistance Committee, in the IMF [International Monetary Fund], in the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and in the "Group of Ten." We are entering into the great adventure of launching the Asian Development Bank on the same footing.³ We will each subscribe 20 percent of the Bank's loan capital.

We rely upon each other's imagination and initiatives in developing new thoughts for development possibilities in Southeast Asia. We applaud normalization of relations between Japan and Korea and look to the benefits this collaboration can make for the

² For text of a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the 1965 meeting, see BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1965, p. 247.

³ For remarks made by President Johnson upon signing the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.

growth processes of a Korea to which we have long been offering help in both the economic and defense fields.

Japan shares our friendly feelings toward the people of Taiwan.

I will add nothing to what others have said about the dynamism and diversity of United States-Japanese economic interdependence. Today this relation suffers few real friction points.

Wonderfully rich exchanges are taking place between architects, scientists, doctors, artists of our two countries. Tourism delights and enriches understanding of thousands of Japanese and Americans every year.

But the United States-Japanese relationship is not trouble free.

Today, the Government in Japan supports President Johnson's stand against aggression in Viet-Nam, but it confronts a press and public opinion which often condemns the United States for this involvement, in part because they disapprove of our policies toward Communist China and they fear escalation of hostilities. The Japanese Government does not conduct itself as we must in the Far East, and we do not insist that it do so. For it to assess reality, make independent decisions, and commit resources to serve its basic national self-interest will, we believe, serve common ultimate goals even though we may move along different paths.

Japan's Economic and Social Development

A great contribution Japan can make to our common hope for a restoration of peace and a resumption of effective growth processes in the Pacific area is just to live up to its own potentialities for effective national performance. Its past accomplishments have been spectacular. Japan's record of economic development since 1952 surpasses that of any country in the world. From the years 1951-53 to 1963-64 its real national income almost tripled. Its rate of annual gain was 12 percent in 1960-62 and almost 10 percent in 1963-64. In 1965 there was a temporary slowdown, but in 1966 its growth is expected to be about 7½ percent. Japan can-

not be a simple model for all countries to slavishly imitate, but there are components for Japan's success that merit close study.

I will mention only the following components: education, frugality, a low rate of population growth, mutual respect between government and business, readiness to compete, modest military spending, and a democratic political process.

Compulsory education in Japan has been in effect many years and is accompanied by a high rate of attendance. Ninety-five percent of the population is literate. There is one teacher per 120 persons. And 25 percent of the total population is in school, and institutions of higher learning carry the scientist and the scholar to the limits of their ability.

Frugality is the midwife of wealth. Of Japan's total gross national product, it saved 28.6 percent in 1951-53, increasing it to 38 percent in 1963-64. A predominant part of this saving went into productive capacity. In short, saving went into wealth-producing purposes.

In 1948 a eugenics law was passed which legalized all techniques for effective family planning. A legal framework thus existed for bringing the Japanese population growth rate below 1 percent a year compared to an average of over 2 percent for the Far East as a whole, with percentages like 3.5 in Taiwan, 2.8 in South Korea, 3.4 in South Viet-Nam, 3.2 in the Philippines, and 3.2 in Malaysia. Japan's achievement goes far toward explaining why Japan was able to invest in industry instead of such economically less productive purposes as schools, hospitals, housing, et cetera. In other countries with lower incomes to begin with and higher rates of population growth, heavy investment has been necessary merely to prevent decline in per capita national welfare.

A tradition for mutual respect between government and business goes back for many decades. An illuminating discussion of how each helps the other is contained in William W. Lockwood's contribution to the American Assembly's *The United States and Japan*. Suffice it to say here that the Government

is conscious of requirements of the national economy as a whole, but great scope is allowed the private enterpriser to compete, innovate, and organize resources for effective economic performance—both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. It will surprise many to be reminded that though Japan is foreign-trade minded, 90 percent of Japan's economic life involves operations wholly within Japan. Japan has created a national market.

Japan is a member of the OECD and GATT. It subscribes to the belief that maximum benefit for all will come with movement toward a worldwide multilateral non-discriminatory competitive trading community. Most of its leaders accept, in principle, the conclusions of the U.S. Committee for Economic Development and Japan's own CED (*Keizai Doyukai*) that Japan has reached a point where it does not need to protect itself commercially against others and should be treated by others on the same footing as the other major industrial societies of the world. Japan is ready to compete. It also has shown by its membership in the Development Assistance Committee in Paris, and the fact that it is the fifth largest aid-giving country in the world, that it recognizes a difference between what rules should apply among the advanced countries and what obligations should be borne by advanced countries with respect to the needs of countries in earlier stages of economic development.

Since 1945 only a very modest part of Japan's national resources has been devoted to military use. In 1965 only 1.3 percent of Japan's GNP went into its military budget. Relief from this burden has contributed in a fundamental way to Japan's capability for economic and social growth.

Side by side with economic achievement has been the accomplishment of Japan in relying upon the operation of vigorous interplay between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government, under scrutiny of an energetic press, as the method of evolving national decisions.

A degree of national consensus on domes-

tic questions is being achieved so that it is in the field of foreign rather than domestic policy that parties of the right and of the left enter dispute.

There is much from the Japanese experience and system that others can learn, both in the Pacific area and elsewhere, both the developing countries and those which regard themselves as well advanced.

U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam

A different system, and less effective, has been developing since 1949 on the China mainland, now deeply committed to support of aggression in Southeast Asia. For Japan, no less than for other Asian countries, this alarming commitment is a fact of fundamental importance, the main obstacle for that expansion of contacts and enlargement of trade and friendly relations in an environment of national safety which the Japanese people greatly crave.

The people of Japan, I think, should applaud President Johnson's formulation on February 23⁴ of what the United States involvement in Viet-Nam does and does not imply for today and the future.

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression.

Our measured use of force must be continued. But this is prudent firmness under control. There is not, and there will not be, a mindless escalation.

General Westmoreland's needs will be met.

We are in Viet-Nam with five allies giving vital support, each with his own strength and in his own way, to the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia.

We have threatened no one—and we will not. We seek the end of no regime—and we will not.

The pledge of Honolulu⁵ will be kept, and the pledge of Baltimore⁶ stands open—to help the men of the North when they have the wisdom to be ready.

We Americans must understand how fun-

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

damental is the meaning of this second war—the war on want.

We stand for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor their result.

Our undiscouraged efforts for peace will continue.

There is no computer that can tell the hour and day of peace, but we do know that it will come only to the steadfast, never to the weak in heart.

We keep more than a specific treaty

promise in Viet-Nam. We keep the faith for freedom.

In a Far East—and a world—torn by conflict and burdened with anxiety, Japan and the United States strive together along different paths and using differing resources to construct a world order in which the unprofitability of aggression is clearly demonstrated and the possibilities for welfare, freedom, and self-respect by individuals and societies are a valid hope.

THE CONGRESS

Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign Aid in the Near East and South Asia

Statement by Raymond A. Hare

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs*¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the proposals for the 1967 foreign economic assistance programs. It so happens that I have had a certain amount of firsthand experience in these matters—most recently as Ambassador in Turkey—and out of that experience has come a conviction that our assistance programs are an important and effective element for the achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

In compliance with the desires of the Congress and the President we have carefully

reexamined our requirements in the area and the extent to which the individual nations are making genuine efforts on their behalf. The program proposals have been modified to meet new circumstances, to emphasize and accelerate self-help, and to focus attention on agriculture, health, and education. As they now stand, they are designed as the minimum consistent with the achievement of our objectives in the Near East and South Asia.

There has been no basic change during the past year in the great significance of the area to us or in the nature of the problems with which we must grapple. Most of the states of the area are underdeveloped, subject to internal stresses and strains, threatened by domestic disruptive forces

¹ Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 22. For a statement on the Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 made before the committee by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 17, see BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1966, p. 628.

and, in some cases, by external power. They very much want for themselves true national independence and the modernization that will meet the reasonable expectations of their people. Their basic objectives are generally, but not necessarily always, consistent with ours.

The question of the bearing of recent events on the achievement of these objectives can be best introduced through a summary review of the three subregions of the area. I turn first to South Asia, since there have been significant and dramatic developments in that region and since a large part of our assistance expenditures are made there.

South Asia

South Asia is the heartland of non-Communist mainland Asia. The will and determination of the peoples of this region to withstand the pressures from Communist China will, in the long run, bear decisively on the question of whether Communist China can be contained and brought to respect the dictates of international law and society. We should not let this view of the importance of the region be obscured.

The war last fall between India and Pakistan was a tragic experience for us as well as for the belligerents, but, like many tragedies, this one has been followed by constructive action. The participants seem now to have a new and sober appreciation of the fact that peace on the subcontinent is essential if their universally felt aspirations for national security and a better life are to be achieved. Even the Soviet Union has found it has served its interests to play a role of moderation through the initiative which it took at Tashkent.

On our side we, too, have felt the necessity of carefully reviewing our policy with respect to the subcontinent. In so doing we have concluded that future aid to India and Pakistan must be related rather directly to progress toward securing the peace between them, since without peace economic development is not possible, and without economic development stability is uncertain. We have

made this quite clear to both India and Pakistan. As you know, we suspended all military aid and sales deliveries to both countries when the fighting broke out last fall. Although we have recently relaxed our policies slightly on sales of limited and selected nonlethal military items, our embargo is otherwise still in effect.

Our recently indicated willingness to negotiate commodity loans of \$50 million for Pakistan and \$100 million for India reflects satisfaction with the progress made at the Tashkent conference and thereafter. We trust that a continuing process of reconciliation will permit the flow of free-world aid resources to build up once again to the level required to provide the critical margin between stagnation and progress.

Our future economic aid to the subcontinent, as to other recipients, will continue to be clearly contingent on the readiness of the recipients to undertake those measures of self-help which experience has shown are necessary if our assistance is to achieve its agreed objectives. We have had encouraging signs that a large measure of underlying agreement has developed amongst us as to what these measures should include. The new-found determination of India's Government to overcome its food deficit problem and its dependence on U.S. P.L. 480 wheat shipments is an outstanding case in point. While drought and war set back the economy in 1965-66, the Indian Government appears determined to do the necessary trimming and to make the necessary policy adjustments to attract more foreign private capital and improve its general economic performance. With our help, coupled with that of others, India should be able to make substantial economic progress and maintain an influential stake for free-world interests in the Asian struggle against Chinese communism.

Pakistan's good economic performance is a matter of record. In the 5-year plan which ended last year, sound planning and increasing reliance on private initiative and market forces helped the economy to achieve impressive progress in all key sectors, and

the GNP growth rate exceeded 5 percent. Like India, unfortunately, Pakistan has suffered the effects of drought and war during the past year.

India and Pakistan have many essential assets, but they do not have the necessary capital. We would hope that our help, friendship, and encouragement may serve to assist them in promoting their objectives of economic self-sufficiency and internal and external stability. We would hope that this would also contribute to a more stable power balance in Asia. That is our objective. I believe it is attainable. And I believe it is easily important enough, in terms of our interests in the seventies and eighties as we see them now, to justify a substantial commitment of U.S. resources in support of the self-help efforts of India and Pakistan themselves.

Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Cyprus

Greece, Turkey, and Iran, associated with the West in the NATO and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] alliances, continue to provide a stable political and military corridor that is significant for the entire area. With U.S. assistance and with increasing efforts on their part, each of these countries has stood firm against Communist attempts at direct or indirect penetration, and each is making renewed efforts to strengthen its political, social, and economic structure.

In Iran the Shah and his Government continue their wide-ranging efforts to reform landholding, increase literacy, improve local government, and otherwise strengthen and modernize the social fabric. In addition, with increasing American private investment, the country is intensifying its efforts to modernize its economy and make it more productive.

In Greece a lengthy political crisis accelerated the economic decline that had become evident early in 1965; thanks, however, to courageous self-help measures by the Government and to external assistance, especially food and feed grains from the

United States, the downward economic trend has been arrested.

Free national elections in Turkey have brought a pragmatic, development-minded government into power with a substantial majority. Despite the many problems facing it, we are confident that Turkey should be able to continue its progress toward economic and social modernization in accord with its development plan and within a democratic framework.

Although the Cyprus problem has had unfortunate repercussions in Turkey's relations with Greece and also given rise to discussion of broader foreign policy implications, Turkey remains solidly within NATO and our own working relationship remains close and firm.

The Cyprus situation itself is fortunately more quiet, but the basic problem remains unresolved. We continue to support efforts by the United Nations and by the parties themselves to work their way toward a lasting solution to this serious problem.

Near East

Most states of the Near East have continued to make economic and social progress despite the political tensions that surround and often embroil them. It is a restless area, sensitive to the stirrings of Arab nationalism and still caught up politically, economically, and emotionally in the persistent Arab-Israel dispute. This tangled matter continues to defy settlement. The past year witnessed no serious increases in tension or outbreaks of violence between the parties, however, and most states of the area are increasingly preoccupied with developmental and other internal problems. At the same time much attention remains focused on the Yemen situation. While there has been no fighting there in recent months, the agreement of last summer between King Faisal [Saudi Arabia] and President Nasser [United Arab Republic] to settle the problem has yet to be implemented. Another source of concern to which we continue to devote considerable attention is

the arms rivalry throughout the Near East.

It remains our policy to support the independence and integrity of all states in the area. We continue to work with them in helping bring about the conditions of stability in which an enduring Middle East peace can be achieved and in aiding them to recognize Communist blandishments for what they are. Most of these nations have shown the will and the ability to resist Communist penetration. By supplying selective economic assistance we are making it possible for many Near Eastern countries to register real economic growth and thereby meet the aspirations of their people for greater opportunities and a higher standard of living.

U.S. Aid a Crucial Element

The news headlines of the year have impressed upon us the fact that in some countries the search for modernization, national strength, and international peace has been thwarted or diverted by continuing political instability, as in Yemen or Syria; by violent international antagonisms, as in the Indian subcontinent; or by food shortages, as in India and the U.A.R. Press and political leaders in some countries have been critical of the United States, and several have taken steps to "normalize" their relations with the Communist world.

In charting our future course in the Near East and South Asia, we should view these manifestations—irritating, burdensome, sometimes tragic—in conjunction with other underlying circumstances. The threat of direct Communist aggression has tended to recede somewhat; this, seen short term, is reassuring. What is not reassuring, however, is that nothing has occurred to

give reason to believe that there has been any real change in Communist objectives.

The tragic India-Pakistan conflict brought the populous South Asian area to the edge of holocaust, but both countries drew back, and they now appear to be committed to a peaceful search for solutions to their differences. India, faced with a food crisis, is taking radical remedial steps.

Though the headlines out of the area have emphasized war, coups, disorder, and poverty, it is significant that many of the states, embracing most of the region's population and resources, have recently effected peaceful transfers of political power. Throughout the area the long slow process of education and institution building goes on. The experiences of the year may have brought a new sense of realism: a disillusionment with simple solutions arrived at through war or ideological "movements," a new awareness of the need to respect facts, to exercise patience and restraint; a new willingness to turn inward to the hard tasks of self-help in development; and a new realization of the constancy of American purpose.

When there is violence and instability in the Middle East and South Asia, the threat extends to ourselves as well as to our friends in the area; and our resources—as well as theirs—are diverted. With peace and increasing stability they, with our assistance, can concentrate upon the building of independent, self-sustaining, democratic societies. At this juncture our assistance—though only a fraction of the total country investment—is frequently the crucial element in the maintenance of order, the building of infrastructure for production, or the development of basic human resources.

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolutions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic Nations

*Statement by John M. Leddy
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

I am happy to be able to present the views of the Department of State on Senate Resolution 128 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 64, on which your subcommittee is holding hearings. I believe that your hearings can contribute to a better understanding of these important questions.

The Department of State has previously informed the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of its views on these two resolutions by letter, and I believe that you have these letters from Assistant Secretary MacArthur on record.²

Let me begin by assuring you that the Department of State shares the goals implied in the two resolutions of attaining an increasingly closer relationship among the Atlantic nations. The reservations which we have about the resolutions under consideration are not reservations regarding their general philosophy. Rather, our reservations center upon how best to attain the objectives of the resolutions and on the scope of the specific goal envisaged, especially in Senate Concurrent Resolution 64.

The simple, but decisive, fact is that our Atlantic allies do not now wish to move

toward any type of federal political relationship with the United States, even as an objective. Until there is an interest on the part of the other states concerned, we cannot do a great deal.

The fundamental reason why there is little European interest in federal union with us at this time is, I think, evident. It is that Europe fears that it would be swallowed by a more powerful United States. One very friendly European statesman has said that Europe did not wish to be dissolved in the American cup of tea. He expressed a view shared by many of our friends.

European Unification a First Requirement

If Europe is hesitant about federation with us because of the inequality between a United States and a divided Europe, we can hope that Europe would be more confident in its relations with us once it had attained something approaching equality of real power. This hope has been one of the most compelling reasons for our support for European unification. We believe that this is a virtual requirement before political ties with North America of an organic sort can be seriously considered.

The best prospect today for European unification is the European Communities, that is, the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Community]. These unique institutions form, so to speak, the

¹ Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 24, during hearings on S. Res. 128, a Resolution Establishing a Commission for a Stronger Atlantic Union, and S. Con. Res. 64, a Concurrent Resolution To establish an Atlantic Union delegation.

² Not printed here.

economic constitution for a politically united Europe. And we have done all we could properly do to encourage their development and to favor their success.

The results so far are at once both sobering and reassuring. They are sobering because, after almost two decades of movement toward a united Europe, there are still only six states committed to the limited goals of the European Communities. Great Britain, in particular, remains outside. Moreover, the Six themselves are deeply divided upon the political aspects of their relationship. I think that this very tangible European reality shows all too vividly the distance that separates the possible in Atlantic relations from the desirable.

Yet the European Community experience is also reassuring. In recent months the Common Market has undergone the most divisive crisis of its 8-year existence. But it has surmounted that crisis without breaking apart and without important weakening. I think that is significant.

That experience had some instructive lessons for us. It showed that there were five European states deeply, firmly committed to the political goals inherent in the European Communities. When put to a very severe test, these governments, public opinion, and parliaments showed the importance they attached to unity by their refusal to weaken the Community institutions.

Consequently, I think we can have some confidence in the commitment of the core of Europe to unity. We are at the same time forced to recognize that there is an enormous gap between this commitment and any larger unity with the United States.

We shall continue to collaborate with the European Communities to the full extent of their willingness and of their capability. We shall continue to work within the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to strengthen our ties with our allies and to accomplish specific economic tasks that require close coordination. And we shall continue to support NATO and its political implications.

Our NATO Relationship With Europe

The present state of our NATO relationship with Europe is among the foremost of our concerns. We have always seen it as an institution both demanding and permitting growing bonds among its members. Called into being by the Soviet threat and fashioned to provide maximum security for the Atlantic area, it has seen the greatest degree of union yet attained with our allies even though limited to the defense of the Atlantic countries.

Again, I believe that our current experiences with NATO are instructive and both sobering and reassuring.

We have seen the firm opposition of one member state to continue a relationship which it feels impairs its freedom of action even in a single, although important, aspect of national policy. This determination to achieve greater freedom of national action at whatever cost is not encouraging. It serves to undermine our common security and to divide us. It tells us a great deal about the chances that a broader system of political, economic, or security unity embracing the United States would have.

Yet there is reason for reassurance, too. The threat to NATO unity has brought home to us all the real value of the institution. The unanimity of strong support for NATO and for its fundamental concepts among the 14 is persuasive evidence that this powerful Atlantic bond still holds.³

Thus, as far as our Atlantic relations alone are concerned, we can see some reasonable hope of closer ties. They will enable us to cope with increasing success with our common concerns in other areas of the world.

As this suggests, we cannot lose sight of the other facets of American foreign relations. While Europe does constitute the most powerful grouping of states with which we share common objectives, it is not the only one. Our relations with Latin America, Africa, and Asia are of very great impor-

³ For text of a 14-nation declaration, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

tance. Our relations with them must also draw closer at the same time that we develop our relationship with Europe.

Atlantic Union Not Now Practical

In the light of these considerations and this experience, we believe that the action proposed in the two resolutions is not likely to be productive. In fact, at the present time, an attempt on our part to move to some form of Atlantic union with our Atlantic allies could only diminish the prospects for eventual attainment of such an objective.

We are now engaged in attempting to minimize the harm likely to be done to existing institutions by the recent French action regarding NATO.⁴ In responding to this new reality in the alliance, we are also considering what might be done in the process to strengthen Atlantic unity and the unity of Europe. The challenge to our common defense system has, in itself, brought the rest of the alliance more tightly together. Despite the obvious weakening of our unity inherent in a French decision to seek a separate course, we hope, and expect, that we will maintain our successful NATO structure and find ways to improve our unity in the process.

Therefore, to conclude, the Department of State respects the high motives of those supporting Senate Concurrent Resolution 64 and Senate Resolution 128 and fully supports closer ties between the United States and its allies. However, the disparity in power between the United States and European countries which have not yet achieved their own unity makes proposals for seeking far-reaching political action with our allies to achieve these ends impractical. Only after Europe has attained sufficient unity to consider itself a *de facto* peer of the United States would such an undertaking have hope of

⁴For an exchange of aide memoire between the United States and France, see *ibid.*, Apr. 18, 1966, p. 617.

success. We are working to promote that unity and, despite serious obstacles, believe that Europe has a will to unite which will eventually prevail.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to present these views of the Department of State to your subcommittee.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

- Report of the Special Study Mission to the Far East, Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan comprising members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1345. March 28, 1966. 89 pp.
- The American Research Hospital for Children in Krakow, Poland. H. Rept. 1346. March 28, 1966. 8 pp.
- Duty-Free Treatment for Certain Corkboard Insulation. Report to accompany H.R. 8376. H. Rept. 1353. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic Acid. Report to accompany H.R. 10998. H. Rept. 1354. March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
- Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Natural Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 11653. H. Rept. 1355. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Tanning Extracts. Report to accompany H.R. 12328. H. Rept. 1357. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Istle. Report to accompany H.R. 12461. H. Rept. 1358. March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 12262. H. Rept. 1356. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Crude Chicory and Reduction in Duty on Ground Chicory. Report to accompany H.R. 12463. H. Rept. 1359. March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R. 12657. H. Rept. 1360. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Electrodes Imported for Use in Producing Aluminum. Report to accompany H.R. 12997. H. Rept. 1362. March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
- Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 12617. H. Rept. 1406. March 31, 1966. 29 pp.
- Emergency Assistance to India. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 997. H. Rept. 1408. March 31, 1966. 6 pp.
- Tariff Treatment of Certain Woven Fabrics. Report to accompany H.R. 11029. S. Rept. 1092. April 1, 1966. 3 pp.
- Emergency Food Relief for India. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 149. S. Rept. 1101. April 5, 1966. 6 pp.

U.S. Presents Amendments to Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Committee

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Adrian S. Fisher before the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on March 22, together with the text of amendments to the U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

U.S./U.N. release 4830 dated April 1

STATEMENT BY MR. FISHER

The delegation of the United States welcomes the resumption of our discussion on nonproliferation. We are resuming this discussion today as a result of action taken by this Committee at its meeting on March 1 of this year on the recommendation of the cochairmen that we do so.

General Assembly Resolution 2028 adopted last autumn calls upon this Conference to give urgent consideration to the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with a view to negotiating a treaty to prevent such proliferation.¹ As we resume our deliberations on this subject today, I am sure we all feel the sense of urgency expressed in this resolution and a sense of obligation to negotiate the treaty for which it calls.

When we last discussed the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, many delegations expressed the view that when we returned to the discussion of this subject it would be appropriate to examine, article by article, the two draft treaties that lie on the table. The representative of the Soviet

Union, in his intervention on March 3, stated that he had no objection to this method of proceeding.

The delegation of the United States believes that it might be helpful to compare the articles of the two draft treaties. But it feels that, as this process begins, the Conference should have on the table for consideration and study certain important amendments which we are now introducing to the United States draft treaty.²

These amendments have been developed by the United States in large part as a result of the deliberations of this Conference. We are offering them because we believe that they will advance the negotiation of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. By so doing, we are making it clear that our position in negotiating an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is not inflexible. The United States delegation hopes that other delegations will be equally flexible.

It is for the purpose of presenting these amendments that the United States has asked for the privilege of speaking first today. The amendments are before the Committee in Document ENDC/152/Add. 1 dated March 21, 1966.

The United States draft amendments deal directly with the principal threat of our time—the threat that the danger of nuclear war can be increased by an increase in the number of power centers that can start such a war. The U.S. draft strikes at the heart of

¹ For background and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.

² For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.

this threat by prohibiting any increase, even by one, in the number of power centers that have the right or ability to fire a nuclear weapon.

Definition of "Control"

What we must do if we are to achieve the basic objective of our nonproliferation negotiations is to limit the number of powers that will be in a position to unleash nuclear weapons. There are two ways by which a non-nuclear-weapon state could obtain this power. One would be by obtaining from an existing nuclear-weapon state the right or ability to use these weapons. Under the U.S. amendments this route is barred by the precise definition of control which I am about to describe. The other way in which a non-nuclear-weapon state could obtain this power would be by manufacturing nuclear weapons itself. This route we have also barred, as I shall indicate later, by paragraph 2 of article I and by paragraphs 1 and 2 of article II of the amendments.

One of the key elements in the U.S. amendments is the definition of control of nuclear weapons in terms of the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. "Control" was not defined explicitly in the original U.S. draft, although its meaning was clearly implied by the prohibition of any action to increase the number of entities with independent power to use nuclear weapons.

The discussions in this Conference, and further deliberation on the question, led the United States to the conclusion that the definition of "control" is too central to the problem of nonproliferation to be left to implication. We have therefore given it an exact definition. Before quoting article IV(c) of the U.S. amendments, I should like to say this: It may seem illogical in describing amendments to begin with the last article of those amendments. However, as representatives will see, the last article consists of definitions. This first appearance of lack of logic will therefore, I think, give way to a recognition that it is best first to define the terms one is talking about and then to indicate how those terms are used in

the substantive amendments. Article IV(c) reads: "'Control' means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State."

I should emphasize that the decision of the nuclear-weapon state would have to be explicit; it would have to be concurrent in time with the event; it could not be in the form of a general approval given in advance. Moreover, it is essential to keep in mind that under this definition control relates not merely to the right but also to the ability to fire nuclear weapons.

In considering the significance of this definition of control this Conference should also have in mind the intentions of the United States with respect to possible common nuclear defense arrangements within alliance structures. I have already read, at the meeting on March 3, testimony from the Secretary of State of the United States before our Congress dealing with possible NATO nuclear arrangements.³ I would like to add here that, while he was testifying, he was asked whether any plans being discussed in NATO contemplated that the United States would give up its veto over the use of U.S. weapons. Here is his reply:

We would have to insist . . . that the United States be a necessary party to a decision to use nuclear weapons. Because the vast arsenals of the United States are so heavily involved in that decision, we must be present for that decision and must ourselves agree to the decision taken.

Our Secretary of Defense was asked the same question. He was equally explicit. Here is his reply:

We have no plan to dilute our veto in any way and our allies are not asking us for a dilution of that veto.

These clear statements of U.S. intentions and the clear definition of "control" in the U.S. draft indicate that the U.S. draft would not permit a non-nuclear-weapon state to have any relationship to nuclear weapons which would give it the right or ability to

³ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Feb. 23, see *ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1966, p. 406.

fire such weapons on its own. Furthermore, under provisions of the U.S. amendments that I will be discussing later, a nuclear-weapon state is prohibited from allowing a non-nuclear-weapon state to have a relationship to nuclear weapons which would permit the non-nuclear-weapon state to obtain manufacturing or design information.

With these clear prohibitions of the U.S. draft in mind, we do the cause of nonproliferation a disservice if we permit ourselves to be diverted into theoretical discussions about what is meant by "access" to nuclear weapons. Here we should note in passing that U.N. Resolution 2028 does not entangle itself in this vague concept of "access."

We do the cause of nonproliferation even less service if we let ourselves be drawn into a debate on whether certain collective defense arrangements might increase the influence within an alliance of a non-nuclear-weapon state. This would indeed be a fruitless expenditure of our efforts, particularly when those attacking these collective defense arrangements concede that they do not involve the acquisition of any independent ability to fire nuclear weapons.

We have a difficult enough task ahead of us in negotiating a nonproliferation agreement if we concentrate—as we should and must—on the central issues. We should therefore reject diversions which may render a difficult task impossible.

If we but concentrate on our main task, we shall, despite the difficulties which now face us, be able to accomplish our objective: the negotiation of an agreement which insures that the number of power centers which have the right or ability to start a nuclear war will not be increased—not even by one.

I hope I have made clear the views of the United States on the importance of the definition of "control." With this in mind, I should like to explain the other portions of our new amendments.

First, as representatives may have already gathered from my remarks, we have adopted in our amendments the concept of "nuclear-weapon State" and "non-nuclear-weapon

State." This is a concept which I believe was first mentioned by the distinguished representative of India [V. C. Trivedi] during our last session. These terms nuclear-weapon state and non-nuclear-weapon state are formally noted in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article IV. This is the article dealing with definitions, but these terms, as they are defined, appear throughout articles I and II of the amendments.

As Ambassador Trivedi has pointed out, there are states with important programs for peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have wisely chosen to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Our original draft was therefore not accurate in defining such states as "non-nuclear." We believe that our amendments, by making the distinction between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, better describe the actual problem with which we are dealing—the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am happy to note that some recent speakers in the Committee already seem to have adopted this concept, following the lead which the representative of India gave us at the last session.

The adoption of this terminology may help stop the talk of a "nuclear club." This phrase has often been used loosely in discussing the proliferation problem. I submit that it is a phrase which, with its implications of a high table or superior coterie, is quite inconsistent with the objectives of our work here.

Obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States

Let me now draw attention to our new article I and the obligations it establishes for nuclear-weapon states. Under the first paragraph of this new article, the nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty undertake: "Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States."

The first portion of this new language maintains the prohibition in our prior draft against transfer of nuclear weapons into the

national control of any non-nuclear-weapon state. The second portion forbids also the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon states.

A close analysis of the language in article I of the original U.S. draft treaty dated August 17, 1965, showed that it might have been interpreted as permitting the creation of a new nuclear entity composed entirely of non-nuclear-weapon states, in the event that a preexisting nuclear-weapon state had previously unilaterally disarmed itself of nuclear weapons. This result was not intended, but to remove any doubt the amendment makes explicit the intent not to transfer control of nuclear weapons, either to a single non-nuclear-weapon state or to several such states acting together.

Paragraph 2 of our new article I would oblige the nuclear-weapon states:

Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State or association of such States:

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.

As representatives will realize, in subparagraph (a) of this new formulation we have adopted to some extent provisions contained in the Soviet articles I and II concerning preparations for manufacture and concerning testing of nuclear weapons. Here we have also sought to take into account the wise observation of the distinguished representative of Sweden at our meeting of February 24, when she pointed out that there was not one but a chain of decisions leading up to the final action of "manufacture" of nuclear weapons.

In paragraph 2 (b) of our new article I, we have adopted the concept of a prohibition against encouraging or inducing a non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own weapons. This idea of a prohibition against encouragement or inducement adopts a concept that had its origin in article I, paragraph 2, of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-

phere, in outer space and under water. This concept would be equally suitable in the treaty we are now considering.

I have already indicated to this Conference why I think that the concept of access is not productive of progress in our work here. But at this stage I should also point out that any legitimate concerns in this regard should be taken care of by the amendment that I am now discussing and the comparable provisions of article II. The obligations of nuclear-weapon states and the corresponding obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states in these two amendments—articles I and II—are, so to speak, mirror images of one another. The amendments to article I make it perfectly clear that the nuclear-weapon states cannot do anything that would assist the non-nuclear-weapon states in manufacturing nuclear weapons, in preparing for their manufacture, or in testing them. They go even further and commit the nuclear-weapon states not to do anything which will encourage or induce the non-nuclear-weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire their own nuclear weapons.

This commitment must be evaluated in the light of the corresponding commitment in article II, under which, in paragraph 1, the non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons and, in paragraph 2, not to accept assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparation for such manufacture, or in testing nuclear weapons, or even to accept encouragement or inducement to acquire nuclear weapons otherwise. As I shall make clear in my discussion of paragraph 4 of articles I and II, respectively, these solemn commitments apply to units or personnel of a non-nuclear-weapon state which are under the command of a military alliance.

I should now like to call your attention to paragraph 3 of our new article I, which, in addition to previous prohibitions, obliges nuclear-weapon states: "Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons."

This provision, together with the definition of control, which I described earlier, completes the embodiment in treaty language of our Government's position that there should be no increase—not even by one—in the centers of nuclear power which have the right or ability to start a nuclear war.

This provision would bar any transfer of control of nuclear weapons to any association of states—that is, it would prohibit the granting to any such association of the right or ability to fire a nuclear weapon without the explicit concurrent decision of a nuclear-weapon state—unless one of the members of the association was a nuclear-weapon state and that member gave up its entire nuclear arsenal to the association. Since this would not involve any increase in the number of nuclear-weapon powers, no proliferation would result.

This section of the U.S. amendments is also related to discussions about possible common nuclear defense arrangements within alliance structures. This is a subject on which there has been a great deal of misunderstanding and some misstatements. It is for that reason that I should like to develop the implications of this section somewhat further.

I should like to do so by pointing out that where a nuclear-weapon state retains a veto over any use of nuclear weapons, there is no problem of transfer of control. That is because no additional state and no association of states gains the right or ability to take, on its own, a decision to use nuclear weapons. Neither would have the ability to start a nuclear war. That terrible decision remains in the hands of the existing nuclear-weapon states, and no question of transfer of control even arises.

In this connection, the testimony of the Secretaries of State and Defense of the United States concerning the intentions of the U.S. with respect to proposed nuclear arrangements within NATO should make it quite clear that no one in NATO has been talking about any arrangements which would involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Indirect Action Prohibited

Paragraph 4 of our new article I also constitutes an important addition to our draft. It commits the nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty: "Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance."

Both the original U.S. draft and the Soviet draft reflected a concern with preventing the possibility of a state doing indirectly, in conjunction with one or several other states, what it could not do directly. Our new article I, paragraph 4, represents a refinement of our previous formulation and, in addition, borrows from the formulations in all three paragraphs of the Soviet article I. We believe this new paragraph 4 to be more concise and more comprehensive than either our own previous formulation or the Soviet draft.

I shall not go further today in describing our new article II, which sets forth the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states. The important point about article II is that it corresponds in reciprocal fashion or, as I said earlier, it is a mirror image of the obligations required of the nuclear-weapon states in article I. Nor do I intend today to discuss the language of other articles of the treaty to which we have not proposed amendments. We shall deal with these other articles later as our discussion progresses.

I have already dealt with three subparagraphs of our new article IV. In particular, I have already noted the precise definition of "control" contained in subparagraph (c) of that article. I would emphasize once again our strong belief that this definition, taken in conjunction with our new articles I and II, represents the most precise prohibitions yet formulated against proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It remains for me to indicate the last element in our new amendments, an element which, in our view, is of considerable im-

portance. I refer to the bracketed portion in our new article IV (d) which indicates that a definition of "nuclear weapon" is to be supplied at that point. We are convinced of the need for such a definition but believe that it is not essential at this point in our negotiations and can be formulated at an appropriate technical level at the appropriate time. We do think it advisable at this time to call the Committee's attention to this question.

Path to Agreement Now Open

Mr. Chairman, we believe that these new U.S. amendments reflect better than our previous draft—and, with all due respect, better than the present Soviet draft—the requirements for a just, precise, and effective treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We submit these amendments as evidence of our deep desire to reach agreement on this all-important question. We seek to move our negotiations forward. We hope the Soviet response will be in the same spirit so that we may look forward to a constructive period of deliberations.

I shall not try to anticipate here and now the reaction of the Soviet Government to these amendments. If the Soviet Government is truly concerned about preventing proliferation, direct or indirect, and is not more interested in seeking to interfere with justifiable and proper defense arrangements among allies, then it should recognize that we have provided in this new language the basis for a foolproof nonproliferation treaty that can be negotiated and implemented before it is too late.

We believe that we have today taken a further step toward agreement. Certainly that is our intention. We believe that the Soviet Government should recognize this intention and in our further discussions should respond to this effort in a constructive way. The path to agreement may not be wide or smooth, but it is now open if men of common cause and of good will are prepared to make use of it.

AMENDMENTS TO U.S. DRAFT TREATY

AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. DRAFT TREATY TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ENDC/152, August 17, 1965)

Article I

Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes:

1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State or association of such States—

- (a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

- (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.

3. Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons.

4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

Article II

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes:

1. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and not to seek or to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into its national control or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States of which it is a member.

2. Not to seek or receive, and not to provide, whether alone or in any association of non-nuclear-weapon States:

- (a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

- (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.

3. Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons.

4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of its armed forces or its military personnel, even if

such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

Article IV

In this treaty

(a) "Nuclear-weapon State" means a State controlling nuclear weapons as of . . . (date).

(b) "Non-nuclear-weapon State" means any State which is not a "nuclear-weapon State".

(c) "Control" means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State.

(d) "Nuclear weapon" means (definition to be supplied).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 1 confirmed the nomination of Joseph Palmer 2d to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 78 dated April 11.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. *Notification that it considers itself bound:* Malta, January 3, 1966.¹

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, January 3, 1966.¹

Aviation

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (TS 876). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.¹

Ratification deposited: Liechtenstein, January 3, 1966.

Accession deposited: Spain, December 6, 1965.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.³

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, March 3, 1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force March 20, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: March 31, 1966.

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands,⁴ February 18, 1966.

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands,⁴ February 18, 1966.

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands,⁴ February 18, 1966.

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.²

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 18, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.³

Acceptance received: Yugoslavia, March 4, 1966.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality, concluded at The Hague April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937.

Accession deposited: Mauritania, March 2, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), relating to measures of control;

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), re-

¹ On February 28, 1966, Malta informed the U.N. Secretary-General that it does not intend to maintain the reservations made on its behalf by the United Kingdom in respect of the convention at the time of its extension to Malta on August 7, 1957.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Not in force.

⁴ With a declaration.

lating to entry into force of proposals adopted by the Commission.

Done at Washington November 29, 1965. Open for signature at Washington November 29 through December 12, 1965.³

Ratification deposited: Canada, April 1, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at Washington June 4, 1965.⁴

Signature: Monaco, April 7, 1966.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8, 1965.

Ratification deposited: Finland, December 14, 1965.

Acceptances: Iceland, December 16, 1965; Sweden, December 17, 1965.

Transit Trade of Land-Locked States

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states. Adopted by the United Nations Conference on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries at New York July 8, 1965. Open for signature until December 31, 1965.

Signatures: Afghanistan, July 8, 1965; Argentina, December 29, 1965; Belgium, December 30, 1965;⁵ Bolivia, December 29, 1965;⁴ Brazil, August 4, 1965; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, December 28, 1965;⁶ Cameroon, August 10, 1965; Central African Republic, December 30, 1965; Chile, December 20, 1965;⁷ Czechoslovakia, December 10, 1965;⁶ Federal Republic of Germany, December 20, 1965;⁶ Holy See, December 30, 1965;

Hungary, December 30, 1965; Italy, December 31, 1965;⁴ Luxembourg, December 28, 1965⁴; Nepal, July 9, 1965; Netherlands, December 30, 1965; Paraguay, December 23, 1965; Rwanda, July 23, 1965; San Marino, July 23, 1965; Sudan, August 11, 1965;⁴ Switzerland, December 10, 1965; Uganda, December 21, 1965; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, December 31, 1965;⁶ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 28, 1965;⁶ United States, December 30, 1965; Yugoslavia, July 8, 1965; Zambia, December 23, 1965.

BILATERAL

Paraguay

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción March 18, 1966. Entered into force March 18, 1966.

United Kingdom

Interim agreement relating to the renegotiation of schedule XX (United States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Signed at Washington April 5, 1966. Entered into force April 5, 1966.

³ Not in force.

⁴ With a declaration.

⁵ With reservations and a declaration.

⁶ With a reservation and a declaration.

⁷ With a reservation.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free

In an address made at New York City on February 23 upon receiving the National Freedom Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country about the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that address. "Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1401



May 2, 1966

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United States Policy Toward Communist China

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

Mr. Chairman, during the last month and a half this distinguished committee and its corresponding members in the other House have heard testimony on Communist China from a number of prominent scholars and distinguished experts on Asia.

I welcome these hearings. For Communist China's policies and intentions, in all their aspects, need to be examined—and reexamined continually.

China Specialists in Government

The Department of State and other agencies of the Government do collect, study, and analyze continually with the greatest care all the information obtainable on Communist China in order to make—and, when the facts warrant, revise—judgments of Peiping's intentions and objectives. Highly trained Chinese-language officers here in Washington and overseas—men who specialize in Chinese history and communism—are working full time analyzing and appraising Peiping's moves. Numerous private scholars, some of whom have appeared before this committee in recent weeks, are consulted by the Department of State. And there are, of course, many specialists on Communist China in other agencies of the Government. These capable individuals—in and out of Government—systematically interchange and cross-check their analyses

and estimates to provide what I believe is the most complete and most accurate picture of Communist China, its leaders, and its policies, available to any non-Communist government in the world.

Three Caveats

Before going further, I would like to enter three caveats:

First, the experts do not always agree, especially in their estimates of Chinese Communist intentions.

Second, the leaders we are discussing are both Chinese and Communist. Some of their words and acts can perhaps be best understood in terms of Chinese background—Chinese traits or historic Chinese ambitions. Others can perhaps be better understood in terms of their beliefs and ambitions as Communists. They are deeply committed to a body of Communist doctrine developed by Mao Tse-tung. Still other words and acts may be consistent with both the Chinese and doctrinaire Communist factors.

We have faced a similar problem over the years with respect to the Soviet leadership. Some of their words and acts could be explained chiefly in terms of historic Russian imperial ambitions or Russian traits or practices. Others have been clearly attributable to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, or to interpretations of that doctrine by Stalin and more recent leaders. Some sovietologists put more emphasis on the traditional nationalist or imperial factors, others put

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 16.

more on the Marxist-Leninist factors. There is no way to determine the exact weight which ought to be given to each of these two influences.

Likewise, with regard to the Chinese Communists, there has been considerable disagreement over the respective dimensions of the two streams of influence: Chinese and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. Over the years some of the experts on China may not have appreciated adequately Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. Likewise, some of the experts on Chinese Communist doctrine may tend to underestimate the Chinese factors in the behavior and intentions of the Peiping regime.

The third caveat is this: Predicting what the Chinese Communists will do next may be even more hazardous than usual at this juncture. They themselves appear to be taking stock. We know that some high-level talks have been going on and that they have called some of their ambassadors back for consultation.

Chinese Communist Setbacks

We know—the whole world knows—that the Chinese Communists have suffered some severe setbacks internationally during the past 14 months. They were unable to persuade the Afro-Asians to accept their substantive views on the Second Bandung Conference. They have found themselves in difficulty in several African countries. Their diplomatic missions have been expelled from Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic. Their technicians have been expelled from Ghana. The Governments of Kenya and Tunisia have warned them against promoting revolution in Africa.

During the fighting between India and Pakistan, the Chinese Communists marched up hill and down again. They have been disappointed by the Tashkent agreement and the steps taken in accord with it. They were strongly opposed to the agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which was ratified by both countries. They have suffered a major setback in Indonesia

—the Indonesian Communist Party has been decimated.

Generally, in their struggle with Moscow for leadership of the world Communist movement, the Chinese Communists appear to have lost ground. Even their relations with Castro's Cuba have sunk to the level of mudslinging.

And, probably most important of all, Peiping sees the power of the United States committed in Southeast Asia to repel an aggression supported—and actively promoted—by Peiping.

Will the Chinese Communist reaction to all these setbacks be a wild lashing out? Or will it be a sober decision to draw back and even to move toward peaceful coexistence?

We, of course, hope it will be the latter. But we cannot be sure what Peiping intends to do. We do not expect the worst but we must be prepared for it.

Our Relations With Peiping

I will not try here today to review in detail the record of our relations with the Peiping regime. In the months after the Chinese Communist takeover in 1949 we watched to see whether the initial demonstration of intense hostility toward the United States and toward Americans who were still resident in China was momentary, or reflected a basic Peiping policy. Then came the aggression against the Republic of Korea, to which, at a second stage, the Chinese Communists committed large forces, thus coming into direct conflict with the United Nations and the United States.

We have searched year after year for some sign that Communist China was ready to renounce the use of force to resolve disputes. We have also searched for some indication that it was ready to abandon its premise that the United States is its prime enemy.

The Chinese Communist attitudes and actions have been hostile and rigid. But a democracy, such as ours, does not accept rigidity. It seeks solutions to problems, however intractable they may seem.

Sino-United States Ambassadorial Talks

We have discussed various problems with the Chinese Communists at international conferences such as the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1962.

In 1955 we began with them a series of bilateral conversations at the level of ambassadors, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw. It was our hope that by direct, systematic communication we might be able to reduce the sharpness of the conflict between us. There now have been 129 of these meetings, the latest of which took place in Warsaw today.

These exchanges have ranged widely, covering many subjects affecting our two countries. At first there was a little progress in dealing with small specific issues, such as the release of Americans being held in Communist China. Although an understanding was reached in this limited area, Peiping refused to fulfill its commitment to release all the Americans.

I think it is accurate to say that no other non-Communist nation has had such extensive conversations with the Peiping regime as we have had. The problem is not lack of contact between Peiping and Washington. It is what, with contact, the Peiping regime itself says and does.

Although they have produced almost no tangible results, these conversations have served and still serve useful purposes. They permit us to clarify the numerous points of difference between us. They enable us to communicate in private during periods of crisis. They provide an opening through which, hopefully, light might one day penetrate. But the talks have, so far, given no evidence of a shift or easing in Peiping's hostility toward the United States and its bellicose doctrines of world revolution. Indeed, the Chinese Communists have consistently demanded, privately as well as publicly, that we let them have Taiwan. And when we say that we will not abandon the 12 or 13 million people on Taiwan, against their will, they say that, until we

change our minds about that, no improvement in relations is possible.

Today we and Peiping are as far apart on matters of fundamental policy as we were 17 years ago.

The Basic Issues

In assessing Peiping's policies and actions, and the problems they present to American foreign policy and to the free peoples of the world, we must ask ourselves certain key questions:

What does Peiping want, and how does it pursue its objectives?

How successful has it been, and how successful is it likely to be in the future?

Is it on a collision course with the United States?

What are the prospects for change in its policies?

What policies should the United States adopt, or work toward, in dealing with Communist China?

What Does Peiping Want?

First, the Chinese Communist leaders seek to bring China on the world stage as a great power. They hold that China's history, size, and geographic position entitle it to great-power status. They seek to overcome the humiliation of 150 years of economic, cultural, and political domination by outside powers.

Our concern is with the way they are pursuing their quest for power and influence in the world. And it is not only our concern but that of many other countries, including in recent years the Soviet Union.

Peiping is aware that it still lacks many of the attributes of great-power status, and it chafes bitterly under this realization.

Arming To Become a "Great Power"

The Chinese Communists are determined to rectify this situation. They already have one of the largest armies in the world. They are now developing nuclear weapons and

missile delivery systems. They are pouring a disproportionately large proportion of their industrial and scientific effort into military and military-related fields.

What is all this military power for? Some believe it to be for defensive purposes alone:

To erect a token "deterrent" nuclear capability against the United States or the U.S.S.R.;

To demonstrate symbolically that "China must be reckoned with";

To react to an imaginary, almost pathological, notion that the United States and other countries around its borders are seeking an opportunity to invade mainland China and destroy the Peiping regime.

But such weapons need not serve a defensive role. They can be used directly by Peiping to try to intimidate its neighbors, or in efforts to blackmail Asian countries into breaking defense alliances with the United States, or in an attempt to create a nuclear "balance" in Asia in which Peiping's potentially almost unlimited conventional forces might be used with increased effect.

These weapons can ultimately be employed to attack Peiping's Asian neighbors and, in time, even the United States or the Soviet Union. This would be mad and suicidal, as Peiping must know, despite cavalier statements that mainland China can survive nuclear war. Nevertheless, a potential nuclear capability, on top of enormous conventional forces, represents a new factor in the equilibrium of power in Asia that this country and its friends and allies cannot ignore.

Peiping's use of power is closely related to what I believe are its second and third objectives: dominance within Asia and leadership of the Communist world revolution, employing Maoist tactics. Peiping is striving to restore traditional Chinese influence or dominance in South, Southeast, and East Asia. Its concept of influence is exclusive. Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi reportedly told

Prince Sihanouk recently that his country's "friendship" with Cambodia would be incompatible with Cambodian ties with the United States. Peiping has tried to alienate North Viet-Nam and North Korea from the Soviet Union. It has had uneven success in such maneuvers. But it has not abandoned this objective. Where Peiping is present, it seeks to exclude all others. And this is not only true in its relations with its neighbors but in the Communist world as well.

Direct Aggression

Peiping has not refrained from the use of force to pursue its objectives. Following Korea, there were Tibet and the attacks on the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits. There have been the attacks on India. It is true that, since Korea, Peiping has moved only against weaker foes and has carefully avoided situations which might bring it face to face with the United States. It has probed for weaknesses around its frontier but drawn back when the possibility of a wider conflict loomed.

While the massive and direct use of Chinese Communist troops in overt aggression cannot be ruled out, Peiping's behavior up to now suggests it would approach any such decision with caution.

If the costs and risks of a greater use of force were reduced by, for example, our unilateral withdrawal from the region, Peiping might well feel freer to use its power to intimidate or overwhelm a recalcitrant opponent or to aid directly insurgent forces.

Mao's Doctrine of World Revolution

As I have said, the Chinese Communist leaders are dedicated to a fanatical and bellicose Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of world revolution. Last fall, Lin Piao, the Chinese Communist Minister of Defense, recapitulated in a long article Peiping's strategy of violence for achieving Communist domination of the world. This strategy involves the mobilization of the underdeveloped areas of the world—which

the Chinese Communists compare to the "rural areas"—against the industrialized or "urban" areas. It involves the relentless prosecution of what they call "people's wars." The final stage of all this violence is to be what they frankly describe as "wars of annihilation."

It is true that this doctrine calls for revolution by the natives of each country. In that sense it may be considered a "do-it-yourself kit." But Peiping is prepared to train and indoctrinate the leaders of these revolutions and to support them with funds, arms, and propaganda, as well as politically. It is even prepared to manufacture these revolutionary movements out of whole cloth.

Peiping has encouraged and assisted—with arms and other means—the aggressions of the North Vietnamese Communists in Laos and against South Viet-Nam. It has publicly declared its support for so-called national liberation forces in Thailand, and there are already terrorist attacks in the remote rural areas of northeast Thailand. There is talk in Peiping that Malaysia is next on the list. The basic tactics of these "wars of liberation" have been set forth by Mao and his disciples, including General Giap, the North Vietnamese Communist Minister of Defense. They progress from the undermining of independent governments and the economic and social fabrics of society by terror and assassination, through guerrilla warfare, to large-scale military action.

Peiping has sought to promote Communist coups and "wars of liberation" against independent governments in Africa and Latin America as well as in Asia.

Words Versus Actions

Some say we should ignore what the Chinese Communist leaders say and judge them only by what they do. It is true that they have been more cautious in action than in words—more cautious in what they do themselves than in what they have urged the Soviet Union to do. Undoubtedly, they recognize that their power is limited. They

have shown, in many ways, that they have a healthy respect for the power of the United States.

But it does not follow that we should disregard the intentions and plans for the future which they have proclaimed. To do so would be to repeat the catastrophic miscalculation that so many people made about the ambitions of Hitler—and that many have made at various times in appraising the intentions of the Soviet leaders.

I have noted criticism of the so-called analogy between Hitler and Mao Tse-tung. I am perfectly aware of the important differences between these two and the countries in which they have exercised power. The seizure of Manchuria by Japanese militarists, of Ethiopia by Mussolini, and of the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia by Hitler, were laboratory experiments in the anatomy and physiology of aggression. How to deal with the phenomenon of aggression was the principal problem faced in drafting the United Nations Charter, and the answer was: collective action. We do ourselves no service by insisting that each source of aggression or each instance of aggression is unique. My own view is that we have learned a good deal about this phenomenon and its potentiality for leading into catastrophe if the problem is not met in a timely fashion.

The bellicosity of the Chinese Communists has created problems within the Communist world as well as between Peiping and the non-Communist world.

Recently a leading official of a Communist state said to me that the most serious problem in the world today is how to get Peiping to move to a policy of "peaceful coexistence."

Chinese Communist Fear of Attack

At times the Communist Chinese leaders seem to be obsessed with the notion that they are being threatened and encircled. We have told them both publicly and privately, and I believe have demonstrated in

our actions in times of crisis and even under grave provocation, that we want no war with Communist China. The President restated this only last month in New York.² We do not seek the overthrow by force of the Peiping regime; we do object to its attempt to overthrow other regimes by force.

How much Peiping's "fear" of the United States is genuine and how much it is artificially induced for domestic political purposes only the Chinese Communist leaders themselves know. I am convinced, however, that their desire to expel our influence and activity from the western Pacific and Southeast Asia is not motivated by fears that we are threatening them.

I wish I could believe that Communist China seeks merely a guarantee of friendly states around its borders, as some commentators have suggested. If it was as simple as this, they would have only to abandon their policies which cause their neighbors to seek help from the United States.

The trouble is that Peiping's leaders want neighboring countries to accept subordination to Chinese power. They want them to become political and economic dependencies of Peiping. If the United States can be driven from Asia, this goal will be in their grasp. The "influence," therefore, that Peiping's present leaders seek in Asia is indeed far reaching.

Dominance in the Communist Movement

I had the privilege almost exactly a year ago of commenting at some length before this committee on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The essential nature of this conflict has not changed in this year. It has, if anything, intensified and widened. Its Russo-Chinese national aspects have become more conspicuous. Both sides have clearly given increased thought to the implications of a wider war in Southeast Asia for their mutual treaty obligations. I don't know what the Soviets would actually do with respect to

their treaty with Communist China, but Peiping does not seem to be counting on Soviet support.

Peiping's Desire To Maintain Sharp Communist-U.S. Polarity

One of Peiping's most fundamental differences with Moscow centers on its desire to maintain the sharpest possible polarization between the Communist world and the United States. Peiping argues that we are the "enemy of all the people in the world." Its national interests in Asia are served by maximizing Communist (and world) pressure on us and by attempting to "isolate" us. For this reason alone the Chinese would probably have opposed any Soviet attempts to reach understandings with us. In addition there are ideological and psychological reasons for Sino-Soviet rivalry:

The intense and deadly antagonisms that have always characterized schisms in the Marxist world;

Mao's belief that after Stalin's death the mantle of world Communist leadership should rightfully have passed to him and the Chinese Communist party;

Peiping's obsession, also held or professed by the leaders of the Soviet Union during the 30 years after the Bolshevik revolution, with a fear of being threatened and encircled;

The mixture of the psychology of the veterans of the long march and Chinese traditional attitudes which has led Peiping's leaders to believe that through a combination of patience, struggle, and "right thinking" all obstacles can be conquered; and

Peiping's professed belief that the Soviets are joining with the United States in keeping China in a position of inferiority and subordination.

All these have merged to give the Sino-Soviet dispute a flavor and an intensity which rival even the current Chinese Communist antagonism for the United States itself.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

How Successful Has Peiping Been?

We can see that the Communist Chinese have set vast goals for themselves, both internally and externally. The disastrous results of the so-called great leap forward have forced them to acknowledge that it will take them generations to achieve their goals.

They have wrought considerable changes on the mainland of China. Perhaps their greatest feat has been to establish their complete political authority throughout the country. They have made some progress in industrialization, education, and public health—although at the expense of human freedom, originality, and creativity. But their efforts to improve agriculture and to mold the Chinese people into a uniform Marxist pattern have been far less successful.

The economic, political, and social problems still confronting the Chinese Communist leaders today are staggering.

Economic Problems

Peiping's economic power will almost certainly increase over the coming years. But even with relatively effective birth control programs the population of mainland China may reach 1 billion by 1985.

Where is the food to come from? Where are the resources for investment to come from? Can the rapidly increasing military and economic costs of great-power status be carried by Chinese society at the same time that other economic tasks vital to China's economic survival are carried out? I do not denigrate in the slightest native Chinese ingenuity and capacity for incredibly hard work when I suggest that the solutions to these problems are in the gravest doubt.

Internal Political Problems

Even more important to Peiping's leaders than these economic problems, however, are the will and morale of their own people. The current leaders—Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and others—are an intensely committed group of men whose entire lives

symbolize their willingness to postpone the satisfactions of the present for the promised glory of the future.

Every generation is suspicious that the youth of today is not what it was in the good old days. But this has become another obsession of Peiping's old men. Their domestic propaganda and their comments to visitors, as well as the reports of refugees, have all emphasized their distrust of the youth of the country. They fear that their grand designs and goals—both domestic and foreign—will not be pursued with zeal by the next generation.

I believe their concern may be both genuine and warranted. How pleased can young college graduates be to be sent off to rural China for years for ideological hardening? How attractive is it to the Chinese peasant and worker to be called on for years of sacrifice to bring revolution to Africa or Latin America? Will Chinese scientists accept the dogma that scientific truth can be found only in the pages of Mao Tse-tung's writings? How can professional Chinese Communist army officers and soldiers be persuaded that the words of Mao represent a "spiritual atomic bomb" more powerful than any material weapon?

I am unaware of any new revolution brewing on the Chinese mainland. I have no evidence that the current regime does not, in practical terms, control effectively all of mainland China. But there is evidence of a growing psychological weariness that in years to come could produce a significant shift in the policies of a new generation of leaders.

The dramatic succession of foreign policy failures during the last year, both in the Communist and non-Communist world, must be having some effect on the confidence of the people in the wisdom of their leaders and even on the leaders themselves.

I do not predict any quick changes in China. Nor are there simple solutions. Peiping's present state of mind is a combination of aggressive arrogance and obsessions of its own making. There are doubtless many reasons, cultural, historical, political,

for this state of mind. Psychologists have struggled for years in an effort to characterize what is a normal personality. The definition of what a normal state personality might be is beyond my abilities. I would be inclined, however, to advance the view that a country whose behavior is as violent, irascible, unyielding, and hostile as that of Communist China is led by leaders whose view of the world and of life itself is unreal. It is said that we have isolated them. But to me they have isolated themselves—both in the non-Communist and Communist world.

We have little hope of changing the outlook of these leaders. They are products of their entire lives. They seem to be immune to agreement or persuasion by anyone, including their own allies.

It is of no help in formulating policy to describe Peiping's behavior as neurotic. Its present policies pose grave and immediate problems for the United States and other countries. These must be dealt with now. The weapons and advisers that Peiping exports to promote and assist insurrections in other countries cannot be met by psychoanalysis. At the present time there is a need for a counterweight of real power to Chinese Communist pressures. This has had to be supplied primarily by the United States and our allies.

We should be under no illusion that by yielding to Peiping's bellicose demands today we would in some way ease the path toward peace in Asia. If Peiping reaps success from its current policies, not only its present leaders but those who follow will be emboldened to continue them. This is the path to increased tension and even greater dangers to world peace in the years ahead.

China as a Great Power

We expect China to become some day a great world power. Communist China is a major Asian power today. In the ordinary course of events, a peaceful China would be expected to have close relations—political, cultural, and economic—with the countries around its borders and with the United States.

It is no part of the policy of the United States to block the peaceful attainment of these objectives.

More than any other Western people, we have had close and warm ties with the Chinese people. We opposed the staking out of spheres of influence in China. We used our share of the Boxer indemnity to establish scholarships for Chinese students in the United States. We welcomed the revolution of Sun Yat Sen. We took the lead in relinquishing Western extraterritorial privileges in China. We refused to recognize the puppet regime established by Japan in Manchuria. And it was our refusal to accept or endorse, even by implication, Japan's imperial conquests and further designs in China that made it impossible for us to achieve a *modus vivendi* with Japan in 1940-41.

We look forward hopefully—and confidently—to a time in the future when the government of mainland China will permit the restoration of the historic ties of friendship between the people of mainland China and ourselves.

Elements of Future Policy

What should be the main elements in our policy toward Communist China?

We must take care to do nothing which encourages Peiping—or anyone else—to believe that it can reap gains from its aggressive actions and designs. It is just as essential to "contain" Communist aggression in Asia as it was, and is, to "contain" Communist aggression in Europe.

At the same time, we must continue to make it plain that, if Peiping abandons its belief that force is the best way to resolve disputes and gives up its violent strategy of world revolution, we would welcome an era of good relations.

More specifically, I believe, there should be 10 elements in our policy.

First, we must remain firm in our determination to help those Allied nations which seek our help to resist the direct or indirect use or threat of force against their territory by Peiping.

Second, we must continue to assist the countries of Asia in building broadly based effective governments, devoted to progressive economic and social policies, which can better withstand Asian Communist pressures and maintain the security of their people.

Third, we must honor our commitments to the Republic of China and to the people on Taiwan, who do not want to live under communism. We will continue to assist in their defense and to try to persuade the Chinese Communists to join with us in renouncing the use of force in the area of Taiwan.

Fourth, we will continue our efforts to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations or its agencies. So long as Peiping follows its present course it is extremely difficult for us to see how it can be held to fulfill the requirements set forth in the charter for membership, and the United States opposes its membership. It is worth recalling that the Chinese Communists have set forth some interesting conditions which must be fulfilled before they are even willing to consider membership:

The United Nations resolution of 1950 condemning Chinese Communist aggression in Korea must be rescinded;

There must be a new United Nations resolution condemning U.S. "aggression";

The United Nations must be reorganized;

The Republic of China must be expelled;

All other "imperialist puppets" must be expelled. One can only ask whether the Chinese Communists seriously want membership, or whether they mean to destroy the United Nations. We believe the United Nations must approach this issue with the utmost caution and deliberation.

Fifth, we should continue our efforts to reassure Peiping that the United States does not intend to attack mainland China. There are, of course, risks of war with China. This was true in 1950. It was true in the Taiwan Straits crises of 1955 and 1958. It was true in the Chinese Communist drive into Indian territory in 1962.

It is true today in Viet-Nam. But we do not want war. We do not intend to provoke war. There is no fatal inevitability of war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists have, as I have already said, acted with caution when they foresaw a collision with the United States. We have acted with restraint and care in the past and we are doing so today. I hope that they will realize this and guide their actions accordingly.

Sixth, we must keep firmly in our minds that there is nothing eternal about the policies and attitudes of Communist China. We must avoid assuming the existence of an unending and inevitable state of hostility between ourselves and the rulers of mainland China.

Seventh, when it can be done without jeopardizing other U.S. interests, we should continue to enlarge the possibilities for unofficial contacts between Communist China and ourselves—contacts which may gradually assist in altering Peiping's picture of the United States.

In this connection, we have gradually expanded the categories of American citizens who may travel to Communist China. American libraries may freely purchase Chinese Communist publications. American citizens may send and receive mail from the mainland. We have in the past indicated that if the Chinese themselves were interested in purchasing grain we would consider such sales. We have indicated our willingness to allow Chinese Communist newspapermen to come to the United States. We are prepared to permit American universities to invite Chinese Communist scientists to visit their institutions.

We do not expect that for the time being the Chinese Communists will seize upon these avenues of contact or exchange. All the evidence suggests Peiping wishes to remain isolated from the United States. But we believe it is in our interests that such channels be opened and kept open. We believe contact and communication are not incompatible with a firm policy of containment.

Eighth, we should keep open our direct

diplomatic contacts with Peiping in Warsaw. While these meetings frequently provide merely an opportunity for a reiteration of known positions, they play a role in enabling each side to communicate information and attitudes in times of crisis. It is our hope that they might at some time become the channel for a more fruitful dialog.

Ninth, we are prepared to sit down with Peiping and other countries to discuss the critical problems of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Peiping has rejected all suggestions and invitations to join in such talks. It has attacked the test ban treaty. It has advocated the further spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries. It is an urgent task of all countries to persuade Peiping to change its stand.

Tenth, we must continue to explore and analyze all available information on Communist China and keep our own policies up to date. We hope that Peiping's policies may one day take account of the desire of the people of Asia and her own people for peace and security. We have said, in successive administrations, that when Peiping abandons the aggressive use of force and shows that it is not irrevocably hostile to the United States, then expanded contacts and improved relations may become possible. This continues to be our position.

These, I believe, are the essential ingredients of a sound policy in regard to Communist China.

I believe that they serve the interests not only of the United States and of the free world as a whole—but of the Chinese people. We have always known of the pragmatic genius of the Chinese people, and we can see evidence of it even today. The practices and doctrines of the present Peiping regime are yielding poor returns to the Chinese people. I believe that the Chinese people, no less their neighbors and the American people, crave the opportunity to move toward the enduring goals of mankind: a better life, safety, freedom, human dignity, and peace.

Secretary Rusk Answers Questions on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam

Following is the text of an interview with Secretary Rusk by Paris-Match for publication in the April 16 issue of that magazine.

Press release 79 dated April 12

Q. Do you sincerely believe that the French Government's new NATO proposals are made simply to spite the United States?

A. No.

Q. Do you think, like so many people in this country [United States], that General de Gaulle carries on a quarrel with the United States which dates back to World War II?

A. There are too many American soldiers buried on French soil for us to think in terms of quarrels. There are too many fundamental common interests between the United States and France to describe differences on particular questions as quarrels. Relations among great nations are not and should not be determined on the basis of personal feelings.

Q. Do you consider that all or part of the French proposals for a NATO reform are totally negative or incompatible with the American viewpoint? If so, which ones?

A. The premise of your question is incorrect. France has made no proposals to reform NATO. From time to time over the past 3 years, the French Government has indicated that it intended to put forward proposals, and her allies in NATO have made it clear that they looked forward to those proposals and would give them most careful consideration. But instead of offering proposals for the reform of NATO, the French Government has chosen to announce its decisions without consulting its allies in any serious way.

Q. How can you say there have been no proposals for NATO reform? What about General de Gaulle's 1958 letters to the U.S. and the U.K.?

A. The 1958 proposal had nothing to do

with NATO. It suggested a three-power organization for tripartite consultations on world policy. In the United States reply it was pointed out that such an arrangement would be objectionable to our other allies, whose interests would have to be considered. The United States was not prepared to nominate itself as a member of such a triumvirate. We accept an obligation to consult with many other nations, large and small, where their and our vital interests are involved.

Q. Do you see a link between the French NATO proposals today and General de Gaulle's forthcoming trip to Russia?

A. We have not been informed as to what General de Gaulle intends to discuss in Russia. The question should be addressed to the French Government.

Q. Does not the American Government prefer having a strong independent ally to a weak dependent one?

A. The question confuses the real issue. Of course we welcome a strong France, but what nation is wholly independent in the world today? The United States is linked to its allies all over the world by treaties which are the law of our land. Each of these alliances restricts our independence by the commitments we have undertaken. I know of few nations that have less freedom of action than the United States, because our freedom of action is limited by our responsibilities. We want no satellites. What we prefer most as partners are strong nations which are at once dependable, independent, but interdependent allies. What we have long sought is an equal partnership with a Europe moving toward unity.

Q. Do you agree that the Russian threat of a conventional or nuclear attack on Europe has diminished in the past 17 years? Is NATO adequate in the light of this new situation?

A. If the threat against Western Europe has diminished in the last 17 years, it has diminished because NATO has stood as a firm barrier to Soviet ambitions. We should

not forget that as late as 1961-1962 we were in the midst of a major crisis over Berlin that threatened war. The fact that a dam has contained the flood waters over the years is no reason for dismantling it.

Nature of the Alliance

Q. Do you make a distinction between NATO and the Atlantic alliance?

A. NATO is an organization which combines three significant elements—an integrated military staff ready to assume operational command of NATO-assigned forces the moment aggression occurs, common planning through the integrated staff, and military forces in being. NATO, in other words, is the collective security system which gives reality to the mutual defense commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty. We have learned through experience of two world wars that such a collective system is essential if aggression is not only to be defeated but deterred. It took nearly 4 years in the First World War to bring about the creation of a combined command under Marshal Foch, and the delay cost heavily. In the Second World War the lack of a combined command and the inadequacy of arrangements between the allies contributed to the catastrophes of 1940. By not making these mistakes again we have created the greatest possible deterrent to war.

Q. What is your opinion of General de Gaulle's thesis that the military agreements between France and the U.S. need no longer be applicable because they no longer meet present conditions?

A. Most of those military agreements by their terms continue for the life of the North Atlantic Treaty, to which France says it intends to continue to adhere. This thesis strikes at the very heart of the sanctity of international agreements. If one party to an agreement is no longer bound because that party believes that the agreement does not meet present conditions, then the agreement has no validity of any sort. Proposals for changes can be considered through the normal processes of consultation and nego-

tiation. The United States has more than 4,000 agreements with other nations. We are concerned about actions which would weaken the growing fabric of international law.

Q. France was the first Western country to side with the United States during the 1962 Cuban crisis. Still, Cuba was outside the NATO area. How do you account for this attitude?

A. We very much appreciated the prompt and forthright response of the French Government during the Cuban missile crisis. The unanimity of NATO and the unanimity of the Western Hemisphere were major contributions to the peaceful settlement of a situation that menaced the entire free world.

Q. Would the American Government accept French NATO bases and military installations on American soil under French nominal or operational command?

A. I am sure we would if French forces were needed in the United States in defense of the NATO area.

Q. Would you wish to keep American bases or military installations in France if they were under the same command arrangements as in England?

A. The fact is that American bases in England and France are today under the same kind of command and control arrangements. The British flag flies side by side with the American flag over the bases in England, just as the Tricolor flies side by side with the American flag over American installations in France.

Q. Why do you refuse landing and transit rights in the United States to French military aircraft on their way to Tahiti?

A. We have been granting landing and transit rights for French military aircraft going to Tahiti on the understanding that they carry no nuclear weapons, material, or components for use in a weapons test. The United States is signatory to the nuclear test ban treaty, along with 105 other countries. By our treaty commitments we are obliged not to assist any country in nuclear testing

in the atmosphere, in the sea, or in outer space. We do not think we should be asked to violate that treaty.

NATO Without France

Q. Could the Allied military organization in Europe really function without France?

A. Of course. Fourteen nations, comprising 450 million people and possessing massive military power, will not be paralyzed by the attitude of France.

Q. Is it the American intention to give West Germany the command of the "center Europe" sector if France leaves NATO?

A. It is not for the United States to "give" any command to any NATO member. The command arrangements of NATO are for all the NATO members to consider and decide among themselves, not just one or a few.

Q. What reforms of NATO would you envisage after the French withdrawal?

A. This will be for the NATO governments to decide on the basis of consultations now in process.

Q. There is serious concern in France that participation in an integrated command and the maintenance of American airbases in France may drag France into a war it does not want. Don't you agree that this is a real problem, particularly in view of the fact that America's involvement in Vietnam could lead to a collision between the United States and the Soviet Union?

A. The concern in France on this point is based on a misapprehension of facts. The NATO integrated command is essentially a combined planning staff ready to assume operational command if armed attack occurs against a NATO nation in the North Atlantic area, as that term is used in the North Atlantic Treaty. But in peacetime the integrated staff does not have operational command over any force except certain air-defense units which must be maintained on a constant alert basis in Europe. Consequently, France's participation in an inte-

grated command does not place her troops in peacetime under the command of any foreign officer or staff. If war should break out, it would be for the French Government to decide that her forces should then be released to the integrated command. Under these circumstances, I cannot see how participation in the integrated command could involve France in a war.

What might involve France in a war would be her continued allegiance to the North Atlantic Treaty, since it is required by that treaty to come to the defense of any signatory power subjected to armed attack in Europe or North America. But France, as I understand it, wishes to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Nor do I see any reason why France might be drawn into war through the maintenance of American airbases on French soil. American planes in France do not take off except under regulations worked out with the French military authorities. When, for example, our airplanes were used to airlift paratroopers to Stanleyville, this matter was first discussed with your Foreign Office, and the United States was given assurances that the Foreign Office would have no objection to the planes' taking off from Evreux for that purpose.

Q. Well, after all, won't you agree that France has played and is playing a constructive role in trying to alleviate the division of Europe?

A. No one is more interested than the United States in a genuine solution of East-West problems. After all, the United States has been required to spend more than \$850 billion in defense budgets since 1947; we can think of much better uses for such resources. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union could find more desirable ways of using comparable resources on their side. But East-West issues affect all the members of the alliance and can be solved only on the basis of the common interests of the peoples of the West and the peoples of Eastern Europe. We believe that a solution can best be found through the collective efforts of the Western nations and would welcome

active French participation in a concerted search for these solutions, including the reunification of Germany, disarmament, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the normalization of trade and cultural relations between Eastern and Western Europe. But it does not appear that France agrees with this view. France elected not to participate in the protracted discussions that led to an easing of the Berlin crisis of 1961-62, and France is not participating in the current disarmament talks at Geneva. Certainly fragmentation within the West will only impede an ultimate East-West settlement.

U.S. Position on Viet-Nam

Q. Now, about Viet-Nam, the United States was extremely critical of France during the Indochinese and the Algerian wars. Are you not today in the same position we were in a few years ago?

A. The question is much more complicated than you have suggested. Following the seizure of mainland China by the Communists, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed that the security of Southeast Asia was of vital importance to the free world. The United States provided large-scale economic and military assistance to France during its struggle in Indochina. Unhappily, the free world was not able to reach a fully adequate solution in 1953 and 1954. But that is past history. The United States is not in the same position as was France a few years ago. We have just as vital a stake in peace in the Pacific Ocean as we have in peace in the Atlantic Ocean. We agreed, during World War II, with our European allies that the war against Hitler should be given first priority. But in the second-priority theater in the Pacific, Japanese militarism was defeated without major redeployments from the European theater. France has elected to reduce its responsibilities in the Pacific. The United States has major commitments there.

Q. Would you remain in South Viet-Nam if a civilian government asked you to leave?

A. This is a very hypothetical question

because I do not contemplate the contingencies you describe. The treaty commitments of the United States turn upon the requests of South Viet-Nam for assistance. If that situation should change, there would result a new situation. Since I do not expect it to happen, I do not wish to speculate.

Q. Would the United States be ready to suspend once more its air raids over North Viet-Nam?

A. We have said over and over again that we would be prepared to suspend the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace. There was no bombing of North Viet-Nam from the beginning of increased North Vietnamese infiltration into South Viet-Nam in 1960 until February 1965. It is not merely a debater's point to call this a 4-year pause because many efforts were made during that period to bring about a peaceful settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia. There was a brief pause in May of 1965, during which categorical and negative answers were received from all Communist capitals directly involved. There was a 37-day pause beginning last Christmas. During that time many governments, including our own, diligently explored the possibility of a peaceful settlement. The replies from the other side were simple, harsh, and negative. We have had no hint or suggestion that the suspension of bombing would lead to a suspension of the infiltration of men and arms from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. The bombing of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam continues even though the bombs are not carried by airplanes. The United States wants peace in Southeast Asia. If Hanoi would decide to abandon its attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force, peace could come very quickly. The problem is one of appetite. I repeat that the United States would be ready to suspend its bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace.

Q. Couldn't a direct dialog with China promote the cause of peace?

A. I am surprised by this question. The United States has perhaps had more discus-

sions on serious matters with Peiping than any government having diplomatic relations with Peiping, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union. We have had a direct dialog with Peiping for more than 10 years, involving 129 discussions between our and their Ambassadors in Geneva and Warsaw. The problem is not one of contact. The problem is that with contact we have not been able to find a basis for improved relationships. Peiping has made it very clear, according to their public declarations, that there is no possibility of improving relations with the United States unless we are prepared to abandon Formosa and the 12 million people living on that island. That we will not do. We hope to continue the dialog with Peiping, but those who expect some magical formula must face squarely the issue of the surrender of 12 million people on Formosa.

U.S. Ready To Consult With France and NATO on French Demands

Following are the texts of aide memoire exchanged between the United States and France.¹

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF APRIL 12²

Press release 80 dated April 12

The Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of an aide-memoire from the Government of the French Republic on March 29, 1966. The United States Government has been and will continue to be in consultation with its other Allies in NATO on the questions to which the actions of the Government of the French Republic give rise, and which affect the security of all members of NATO.

¹ For an earlier exchange of aide memoire, see BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1966, p. 617.

² Delivered by the U.S. Embassy at Paris to the French Foreign Office on Apr. 12.

The United States Government takes note of the view expressed by the French Government that the measures it proposes to take are made necessary "because of the impossibility of amending, by mutual agreement and under satisfactory conditions, the provisions in force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The United States Government calls the attention of the French Government to the fact that the drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty recognized that changes might occur in the factors "affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area."³ They, therefore, provided, in Article 12 that, after ten years of the operation of the Treaty, any Party should have the right to request a consultation of the Parties "for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty."

The United States Government recalls to the French Government that, having in mind Article 12, it has, like many other NATO Governments, over the past several years invited the French Government to submit any proposals it might have for the revision of the Treaty or the Treaty Organization. Moreover, it has assured the French Government that such suggestions would be given the most careful consideration. The United States Government cannot, therefore, understand the basis upon which the French Government has concluded, without consulting the other Parties to the Treaty, that it is impossible to amend the NATO arrangements and that it must act unilaterally. The United States Government calls attention to the fact that the Declaration of Fourteen of the member countries dated March 18, 1966,⁴ was issued only after the French Government had given notice of its intentions to act unilaterally and without advance consultation.

The United States Government takes note of the intention of the Government of the French Republic to terminate the assignment to the Allied Command in Europe of

the French ground and air forces stationed in Germany on July 1, 1966. In doing so, the United States recalls that all forces stationed in the area of Allied Command Europe were, by agreement, to be placed under the authority of SACEUR, in conformity with the 1954 London Final Act⁵ and the subsequent NATO Council resolution⁶ to implement Section IV of the London Final Act. Furthermore, the Government of the United States wishes to inform the Government of the French Republic that upon the termination of such assignment the Agreement dated September 6, 1960, between the United States and France regarding the NATO Atomic Stockpile of Weapons in Germany for Support of and Utilization by French Forces Assigned to NATO would, by its own terms, cease to have application.

The United States Government further notes the intention of the Government of France to withdraw French personnel assigned to NATO commands, also to take effect July 1, 1966, and from the NATO Defense College after July 23, 1966.

The aide-memoire states that "the withdrawal of the French elements assigned to the Allied commands and to the NATO College entails the transfer of the headquarters of these bodies outside of French territory;" and that the French Government believes that the transfers "might be completed by April 1, 1967." On this alleged basis, the French Government has denounced the Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters of August 28, 1952, to take effect on April 1, 1967. It is not clear to the United States Government why the intended withdrawals of French personnel should entail the removal of NATO headquarters from France by April 1, 1967.

This entire subject is now under study among the other North Atlantic Treaty Allies. Accordingly, it has not been determined when withdrawal of Allied Headquarters would be accomplished. Consulta-

³ For text of the North Atlantic Treaty, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 339.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 720.

tions on this subject will be necessary and it is the hope of the United States Government that all Governments will approach further discussions of this matter in the spirit of Allies seeking to reach agreement with minimum adverse effect upon the security of the North Atlantic area and with as little mutual inconvenience as possible.

The aide-memoire further states the desire of the Government of France to terminate United States military activities under certain bilateral agreements freely entered into between France and the United States. These agreements provide that they shall remain in force for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty unless the two Governments by mutual consent decide beforehand to terminate them. They include the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951; the Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952; the United States Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953; and the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953.

The United States Government cannot agree with the suggestion of the French Government that April 1, 1967 "would be appropriate for completing the necessary operations" with regard to the transfer of personnel and installations involved in these agreements, but, on the contrary, believes that such precipitate action could jeopardize the security interests of all members of the Alliance. It notes, moreover, that the System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958, between the United States and France, provides that, if one party should wish to modify its terms, the parties will consult, and that, if they are unable to come to agreement within one year, that agreement may be terminated effective after a period of one additional year. The United States Government expresses the view that since this method of adjusting the position of the parties was considered to be desirable when the System of Communications Agreement was concluded on December 8, 1958, it remains so today and might appropriately be availed of in consideration of the bilateral agreements con-

cluded earlier, which by their terms continue for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Accordingly, while the United States intends to remove its facilities from France as promptly as possible in view of the attitude of the French Government, the United States Government would be prepared to give its consent to the termination of the agreements referred to above only on the condition that there be applied to all such agreements the provisions of consultation and termination set forth in the System of Communications Agreement. The United States Government is prepared to explore with the French Government the question of future United States military activities in France, together with arrangement for the use of essential facilities, and mutually agreed conditions for the orderly withdrawal of those facilities that are not to remain in France. In this connection, the United States Government notes the willingness of the French Government to make special provision for activities authorized by the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951 and the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953.

United States activities under these Agreements between France and the United States have been and continue to be in support of the North Atlantic Treaty. Accordingly, it will be necessary in this case as well for the United States Government to seek the views of its other Allies with regard to this aspect of consultations with the Government of France.

The Government of the United States notes that the French Government is prepared to begin conversations regarding mutual facilities which might be made available in the event of an armed attack within the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Finally, the attention of the French Government is called to the fact that its actions in withdrawing from, abrogating or repudiating existing agreements will entail financial problems and responsibilities that must be taken into account in any discussion of these actions.

FRENCH AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 29⁷

Official translation.

In its aide-memoire of March 11, 1966, the French Government notified the Government of the United States of America of the measures that it had decided to take, as far as it was concerned, because of the impossibility of amending, by mutual agreement and under satisfactory conditions, the provisions in force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This impossibility has just been confirmed by the declaration of fourteen of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, including the United States itself, dated March 18.

In an aide-memoire dated the following March 25, the Government of the United States requested specific information on the measures envisaged by France and the position of the French Government concerning the bilateral agreements between the two countries.

The French Government has the honor to submit below the information thus requested:

1. The French Government announced that it proposed to terminate the assignment to the allied command in Europe of the French ground and air forces stationed in Germany.

It has the honor to inform the Government of the United States that this assignment will end on July 1, 1966.

2. The re-establishment of a single national command of the French forces will require the withdrawal, on the same date, of the French personnel assigned to the integrated allied commands.

It is a question of the supreme command of the allied forces in Europe, the Central Europe command, the Southern Europe command, and the commands subordinate to them, as well as the Defense College of NATO.

The French higher-echelon personnel and

the French auditors of the NATO College will be withdrawn after the present study session, which will end on July 23, 1966.

The French Government thinks that it would be advisable, after the termination of the French participation, to establish liaison missions with the staffs concerned. French officers would thus be on the spot, in particular to assist the allied staffs in the operations for transferring out of French territory. The establishment of these liaisons with the allied commands would also facilitate the study of the conditions under which the French forces, particularly in Germany, if they continue to be stationed in the territory of the Federal Republic, might participate in time of war in joint military actions, both with respect to command and to the operations properly so-called. It is specified in this connection that, in the event contemplated, French forces would be stationed in Germany by virtue of the convention of October 23, 1954 on the presence of alien forces in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. The withdrawal of the French elements assigned to the allied commands (supreme command and Central Europe) and to the NATO College entails the transfer of the headquarters of these bodies outside French territory. It appears that a period of one year would permit taking the necessary measures for this purpose and that the entire operation might be completed by April 1, 1967. Consequently, the French Government, by virtue of Article 16 of the Protocol of August 28, 1952, on the status of general headquarters, is going to notify to the United States Government the denunciation of that Protocol, which will cease to be in force on March 31, 1967.

4. Naturally, the foregoing particulars by no means exhaust the list of problems that will have to be resolved with regard to NATO. The French Government is prepared to discuss these other problems in either a bilateral or multilateral framework, whichever is appropriate.

⁷ Delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Paris on Mar. 29.

5. In its previous communication, the French Government informed the United States Government that it thought that certain bilateral agreements between France and the United States no longer met present conditions, which conditions prompt it to resume the full exercise of its sovereignty in French territory. Furthermore, those agreements, as a whole, would no longer be applicable as regards the essential factor, in view of the decisions made by the French Government regarding its participation in the Atlantic Organization.

It appears that, in general, the same date, April 1, 1967, would be appropriate for completing the necessary operations, such as the transfer of the headquarters of the American forces in Europe (Camp des Loges) and of the various United States Army and Air Force installations. Longer time limits could be considered for settling certain complex problems, such as those caused, in particular, by the existence of the depots at Deols-La Martinerie. Special provisions could also be contemplated, if the Government of the United States expresses the desire for them, with respect to the conditions under which the pipeline that is the subject of the agreement of June 30, 1953 could continue to operate.

The French Government is prepared to begin talks at once with the Government of the United States regarding the practical measures that should be adopted with respect to these various points concerning the bilateral agreements.

Lastly, if the Government of the United States so desires, the French Government is also prepared to begin conversations to define the military facilities referred to in the

aide-memoire of March 11 on which the two governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Little Rock

The Department of State announced on April 12 (press release 81) that it will hold a regional foreign policy conference in Little Rock, Ark., on May 5, sponsored by Little Rock University. About 30 community organizations are cooperating in the conference.

Invitations have been extended to business and community leaders, representatives of national nongovernmental organizations, and members of the press, radio, and television from Arkansas, Oklahoma, southern Missouri, and western Tennessee. The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials scheduled to participate in the conference include: Under Secretary George W. Ball; Richard Reuter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Food for Peace Program); J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; David H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; Mrs. Charlotte Moton Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; and Robert H. Miller, Director, Viet-Nam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

Continuity of Refugee and Migration Policies

by William J. Crockett
*Deputy Under Secretary for Administration*¹

I am most pleased to have this opportunity to meet with the representatives of the voluntary agencies which are concerned with solving migration and refugee problems around the world and to discuss the activities which are the mutual concern of you and the Department.

I should like to begin by saying that the proposed elimination of the superstructure of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs will have no policy or organizational effects on the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs. It will not change in any way the great humanitarian policies on refugees and displaced persons as first enunciated by President Truman in 1948 and which are today fully embraced by President Johnson and his administration.

Policy in this government of ours is not the property of one man. Policy in this government of ours is not dependent for its continuation and fulfillment upon the personality of any one of us. We are but the instruments of the President in the fulfillment of his administration's policies.

And I repeat, the great humanitarian policies laid down by President Johnson at the foot of the Statue of Liberty will not be changed by any of us.²

¹ Address made before a meeting of representatives of American voluntary agencies engaged in refugee and migration activities at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 22. For background, see Department of State press release 66 dated Mar. 22.

² For remarks made by President Johnson at Liberty Island, N.Y., on Oct. 3, 1965, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

Over the past several years, the Department has planned and put into effect several organizational changes designed to reduce the layers of supervision between the people who operate the programs and do the actual work and the top-level policy and executive positions in the Department. One such change was that which eliminated the Bureau of Administration, headed by an Assistant Secretary for Administration. This change was accomplished smoothly and the individual programs involved have continued to work as effectively as under the old arrangement, or more so. Similar changes, which we believe will result in a much stronger and harder hitting conduct of our foreign affairs, are being made in our regional bureaus, which are the heart of the work of the Department.

We have every reason to feel that the changes proposed for the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, by removing one level of supervision, will place the offices comprising the Bureau in closer contact with top-level officials of the Department, thereby elevating them and making them more effective. I want to give you the Department's assurances that the changes envisaged will in no way mean any modification of or deviation from our humane policies concerning joint interests which the United States Government and the voluntary agencies share in our mutual efforts to help the unfortunate through the refugee and migration programs. Further, I want to assure you of our continued determination to implement our immigration laws in complete conformity with

the President's policy and his own stated objectives.

The Department is fully aware of and has the greatest admiration for the devoted and inspiring work which the American voluntary agencies have carried out over so many years in providing care and assistance to refugees and helping them to become reestablished as independent, self-sufficient persons. Through all these years you have worked closely with the Department and other agencies of our Government which are concerned with refugee matters. You have given President Johnson warm and enthusiastic support in obtaining the enactment of his immigration legislative program. For these reasons you have an understandable concern in what happens in the Government which might affect the refugee programs.

We plan, of course, to continue the present Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs along with its experienced personnel. Under our general plan of reorganization, the office will be considered fully responsible for carrying out its own programs and functions and will be given my personal attention and sympathetic support, along with that of other senior officers in the Department.

You and your associates are more aware than other Americans that we in the Department do not take and never have taken the significance of refugee situations around the world lightly. It may surprise even you to know that since the end of World War II the U. S. Government has spent almost \$2 billion on migration and refugee activities. This is more than the United States has contributed to the United Nations and its constituent organizations for all nonrefugee purposes.

At this tense period in world affairs, I can assure you that we are not about to relax our interest in refugee matters. We are continuing our full support for the programs which are the functional responsibilities of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs and tomorrow will begin hearings before the Congress on our requested appro-

President Congratulates Agencies on Work With Refugees

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett, which was read by Mr. Crockett to the voluntary agency representatives at a meeting on March 22.

MARCH 22, 1966

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad to learn that you are meeting today with the leaders of the voluntary agencies who have done and are doing so much for refugees and migrants. I want you to extend to them my personal best wishes and my congratulations for the remarkable job they have done over the years to alleviate the suffering of the world's stateless and homeless peoples. Without their dedicated support of our governmental programs to help these victims of war and more recently of Communist aggression, thousands who now enjoy the blessings of freedom would have perished.

I want you to assure them that we shall accept every effort to see that the friendly and humane policies related to migration and refugee matters initiated by our beloved President Truman will continue in the same full force as they have been during my Administration.

I look forward to an era of renewed government cooperation and full partnership with these great humanitarian organizations.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

priations for fiscal year 1967. These will include our contributions to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as for the work of the United States Escapee Program in Europe, the Far East Refugee Program in Hong Kong and Macao, assistance to Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal, and the movement of refugees from Cuba to the United States.

You have been kept currently informed as to the basis for the State Department's having steadily reduced its appropriation requests for these programs over the past 5 years, and we have done so again in 1967.

These reductions do not reflect any lessening interest in the refugee programs. Rather they show, first, there have been reductions in the size of refugee problems through the successful solution of the cases of many refugees, which is a great tribute to the work of your voluntary agencies; secondly, most countries of asylum are becoming increasingly prosperous and it is no longer necessary to provide the same measure of assistance to individual refugees; thirdly, the United States has worked consistently to increase the contributions of other governments to refugee problems, particularly by their support of international organizations; and finally, we are always on the alert to find better and cheaper ways of carrying out our operations. This latter point is important in view of the necessity for reducing the cost of all government operations wherever possible in order to finance our commitments in Viet-Nam and to improve the level of our society at home.

Our appropriation request of \$6 million for migration and refugee assistance should be viewed in the context of the comments I have just made and of the very large contributions which the United States is making toward refugees through other appropriations. As you know, over \$40 million is being spent annually for Cuban refugees in the United States, the refugee program in South Viet-Nam is currently at a level of \$20 million, and we are still contributing approximately \$23 million toward the Palestine refugee problem each year. In addition to all this, large amounts of P.L. 480 surplus food are being distributed to refugees; this and other AID assistance is our main contribution to the numerous African refugee situations. It is therefore clear that the United States is not reducing its interest in refugee and migration problems but rather is devoting the necessary resources to these problems on a priority basis.

We are also prepared to meet new refugee emergencies as they may occur. As you know, the Migration and Refugee Assistance

Act of 1966 provides authority for the President, when he deems it necessary in the interest of the United States, to utilize up to \$10 million of AID funds to meet unexpected refugee needs. The President will not hesitate to use this authority, as is indicated by his prompt approval of the funds for the movement of Cubans to the United States which began a few months ago. At the time he outlined his proposed plan for aiding Cubans at the signing of the immigration bill at Liberty Island, the President made clear in his statement "that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here." The President set forth the additional policy that, "Those who can contribute most to this country—to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit—will be the first that are admitted to this land."

In this connection, we in the Department of State shall continue our efforts to insure continuation of the President's sympathetic and humane policy for the admission of refugees into the United States. We realize that there is still much to be done to achieve all that is required in the application of the new law, but we are steadily working to improve the situation.

I want the remainder of time to provide an opportunity for me to hear your views and questions. At this particular meeting I should think it would be more productive for all of us if we could address ourselves to the broad area of refugee and migration policies and programs and their place within the Department of State and leave detailed technical questions to a later working meeting when our technical experts can wrestle with them. I want to tell you again how much we appreciate and admire the accomplishments of the voluntary agencies in the refugee field. I want you to know we will do everything we can to continue and strengthen our long cooperative relationship and to seek your advice and guidance on problems of mutual interest in this field.

Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees and Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba

Statement by Robert M. Sayre

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

I am grateful for this opportunity to review with you the latest developments with regard to the movement of Cuban refugees to the United States and to comment on other aspects of the Cuban scene which I believe will be of interest.

The present movement of refugees by U.S. Government-chartered aircraft from Varadero, Cuba, to the Miami International Airport, which began on December 1, 1965, is in response to President Johnson's declaration included in his remarks at the Statue of Liberty on October 3, 1965, on the occasion of the signing of the new immigration bill, in which he said in part:²

But those who . . . come will come because of what they are . . . not because of the land from which they sprung.

. . . it is in that spirit that I declare . . . to the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here . . . will find it. The dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for the oppressed is going to be upheld.

I have directed the Departments of State and Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare to . . . make all necessary arrangements to permit those in Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United States. . . .

Our first concern will be with those Cubans who have been separated from their children and their parents and their husbands and their wives that are now in this country. Our next concern is with those who are imprisoned for political reasons.

A few days earlier on September 28 and again on September 30 the Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro, had declared that Cuban citizens who might desire to join their families in the United States or others who simply wished to live in the United States would be permitted to leave Cuba.

On October 4, 1965, the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which represents United States interests in Cuba, was requested to inform the Cuban Government officially of the U.S. position as stated by the President. On October 5, 1965, the Cuban Government in a diplomatic note addressed to the Swiss Embassy indicated its willingness to discuss arrangements which would permit an orderly movement to the United States.

On October 8 a detailed proposal was made to the Cuban Government in which the principal suggestions were a system of priority categories, a movement of between 3,000 and 4,000 persons per month, transportation to be provided by the United States Government, and the inclusion of persons imprisoned in Cuba for offenses of a political nature. The Cuban Government replied on October 12, 1965, indicating a willingness to move toward an official understanding along the lines proposed by the United States, with the exception of political prisoners and with the added exception that free departure would not be granted to young Cubans between the ages of 15 and 26 "who under Cuban law are subject to the first call for compulsory military service."

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Mar. 23.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

Negotiations continued, in the course of which the Swiss Ambassador in Havana, Mr. Emil Stadelhofer, traveled to Washington on October 23 for a brief meeting with representatives of the Departments of State, Health, Education, and Welfare, and Justice. The successful culmination of this effort was the memorandum of understanding³ made effective on November 6, 1965, by an exchange of notes in Havana between the Embassy of Switzerland in its capacity as representative of the interests of the United States in Cuba and the Cuban Government.

Movement of Refugees to U.S.

While arrangements for chartering aircraft were being made by the transportation office of the Department of State working through the Military Air Transport Service, arrangements were also made to charter vessels to bring to the United States from the small Cuban port of Camarioca those persons who were gathered there on the date the memorandum became effective. This Camarioca movement resulted from Prime Minister Castro's offer to let Cubans in the United States come by small boat to this port and pick up their relatives and families—despite U.S. objections because of the danger which this presented for the Cubans and those who came to get them. As a result, in the period roughly from September 30 to November 30, some 159 small craft of every description succeeded in making this dangerous crossing and returning to the United States with some 2,866 persons. Had it not been for an extraordinary and all-out effort of the U.S. Coast Guard in patrolling the Florida Straits and in shepherding these vessels, many lives would have been lost. On several occasions the Coast Guard cutters rescued people already in the water and from craft on the verge of foundering. As a humanitarian gesture, and considering that the Cuban Government had closed the port of Camarioca to new departures, the U.S. Government picked up and transported to

Key West the remaining 1,970 persons.

Both the sea movement from Camarioca and the airlift which began on December 1 were financed in accordance with a Presidential Determination issued on November 10, 1965, authorizing \$750,000 to be utilized for this purpose in fiscal year 1966. This authorization was pursuant to section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

Various U.S. airlines were interested in participating in the airlift and seven companies have done so. The flight schedule calls for two flights per day Monday through Friday. The airline companies have performed admirably and efficiently. On only one day, due to engine trouble, were the flights cancelled. Extra flights were added on each of the two following days to keep the movement on schedule.

At the beginning of the movement there were a few delays and difficulties of an administrative nature, but we think it fair to say that for many weeks now it has been a smoothly functioning operation. The Embassy of Switzerland on the Cuban end has made a fine contribution to this success and merits great credit for its very hard work and dedication. I understand that representatives from the Departments of Justice and HEW will also testify before this committee and will, I am sure, describe the handling procedures and processing of the refugees.

In the month of December 3,351 persons arrived on these flights; in January, 3,464; in February, 4,031; and in March, to the 11th, 1,594. The movement continues to be of persons in the first-priority category, that is, "immediate relatives" of persons now living in the United States, and appears likely to remain so for several more months. At the time it becomes possible to consider the movement of persons other than the first-priority category in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the memorandum of understanding, it is our hope that it will be possible to give first consideration to relatives of American citizens in accordance with the system of preferences which has

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1965, p. 850.

been more or less traditional in our immigration laws.

With regard to the possibility that some Cuban refugees might be received by other countries in this hemisphere, we have made known to the Council of the Organization of American States on two occasions our interest in this subject. On February 12, 1966, the first response came when 106 refugees, destined to join relatives in Costa Rica, were brought to Miami by an extra flight of the regular airlift plane. The arrangements for their onward transportation to San José, including the cost, were made in Costa Rica. In arranging this movement the good offices of the Swiss Ambassador were an essential factor. At the moment, similar movements to two other countries are in the planning stage and we are optimistic that they will ultimately be realized.

Internal Situation in Cuba

It is our expectation that the refugee movement will continue for the foreseeable future. The number of Cubans who wish to leave is clearly in the hundreds of thousands. In view of the gray, bleak situation inside Cuba, it is not surprising that Cubans from all walks of life have left the island since the airlift began. As problems press from all sides and as life in Cuba becomes more closed and unattractive, frustrations and apathy increase.

Thus, Castro's charismatic appeal has diminished sharply and the enthusiasms of the revolution's early days are steadily giving way in many cases to weariness or, on the part of some officials, simply a grim determination to see things through. This growing disenchantment with the revolution mainly results from several factors: from the failure of the economy to provide the Cuban people with the better life they were promised; from Cuba's high degree of isolation from the world community, especially the nations of Latin America; and, somewhat paradoxically, from greater control and organization of Cuban society, control and organization that are, in part at least, in-

tended to reinstill revolutionary zeal and drive.

There is ample evidence that the regime is now in the process of moving toward an even more totalitarian state, with, of course, Castro exercising nearly absolute power. Last October, for example, the name of Cuba's single party was changed from that of the United Party of the Cuban Revolution to the Communist Party, and the party was reorganized along more tightly structured orthodox Communist lines. To insure that the party would maintain his authority Castro made certain that persons known for their loyalty to him were appointed to key positions on the Central Committee. Shortly before this move, Castro stated in a public address that people appointed to technical and management positions within the government have to be good revolutionaries and that if it were a question of choosing between revolutionary zeal and competence, the former quality must be decisive.

Other manifestations of the closed society include purges at Cuban schools and close surveillance of Cuban life on an individual basis by a well-trained, well-organized security apparatus. Neither activity is, of course, new to the Castro regime, but both have been reemphasized during the past year. Students and faculty members have been dismissed from universities and even high schools because of their attitudes, and the activities of informers and police agents have become even more extensive. The recent showcase trial of the former president of the FEU (the University of Havana student organization), the arrest of the Vice Minister of the Armed Forces for "crimes against revolutionary morals," and Castro's statements against officials who lead *la dolce vita* at home and abroad are additional indications of the regime's close check on the private lives of its subjects and its desire to remove from positions of responsibility those who may be "unreliable" and, hence, dangerous.

As already noted, much of the apathy and dissatisfaction among the Cuban people stems from the failure of the economy. Al-

though there have been swings in both directions, the economy has remained essentially stagnant since Castro came to power. Shortages of common items, rationing of clothing and basic foodstuffs, a lack of spares for capital equipment that is still U.S.-oriented, and an inadequate transport and distribution system are some of the economy's most salient features.

There probably was some improvement in 1964-65, largely as a result of increased sugar production, which reached 6 million tons last year. (Rather ironically, the Cuban Government considered it necessary to follow capitalist practice by establishing incentive programs for sugar workers.) The 6-million-ton level was mainly achieved, however, at the expense of cutbacks in other sectors of the economy, notably in the cultivation of rice, corn, and other agricultural products whose lands were put into sugar cane. Further, sugar production is likely to decrease this year, owing to both a severe drought and the generally poor performance of the economy. Compounding Cuba's difficulties is the low world sugar price, which has dropped from about 12 cents a pound in early 1964 to a little more than 2 cents a pound today. The falling sugar price is reflected in Cuba's imports from the free world: about \$350 million in 1964, an estimated \$190 million in 1965, and a probable further drop in 1966.

"Tricontinent Conference"

Despite the failure at home, the Castro regime continues its efforts to play a role on the stage of international communism and to portray itself as the model revolution for this hemisphere.

The most recent, and very important, manifestation of its subversive intent was the conference held in Havana from January 3 to January 15, at which delegations from some 86 countries met together as the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Conference—usually referred to as the "Tricontinent Conference." This conference was sponsored by the AAPSO [Afro-Asian

Peoples Solidarity Organization], a Cairo-based, Communist-dominated organization.

The delegations attending were technically not official representatives of their governments, but in the case of the Communist countries, as well as several others, official approval cannot be doubted. From this hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba, none of the delegations had any official tie or approval. They represented a variety of Communist, pro-Castro, Communist-front, and other groups, whose most evident common denominator was opposition to the United States and to the duly established governments of Latin America.

The tone of the Tricontinent Conference became increasingly strident and resulted in an outpouring of speeches and resolutions which denounced the United States both in general and specifically in every conceivable trouble spot in the world. Even more striking than the militant cast of the proceedings was the constant extolling of armed violence as the principal tactic in achieving revolutionary victory throughout the world.

In his opening speech of January 2, Fidel Castro gave an indication of the tone the conference was to take when he asserted that "any revolutionary movement anywhere in the world can count on Cuba's unconditional support." He struck an even more aggressive posture in his closing speech of January 15 in which he urged "revolutionary armed battle . . . in all or almost all Latin American countries," mentioning specifically and repeatedly Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.

Certainly one of the most important delegations at the conference was that from the U.S.S.R., headed by Sharif Rashidov, an alternate member of the Soviet Presidium and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Rashidov stated in his address to the conference that his delegation was present "with the aim of giving all-round assistance to the unification of the anti-imperialist forces of the three continents in order to provide greater

impetus to our common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism—led by the U.S. capitalists.” Referring to Latin America he stated,

We express our fraternal solidarity with the armed struggle being waged by the Venezuelan, Peruvian, Colombian, and Guatemalan patriots for freedom against the stooges of imperialism. . . . We are in solidarity with the struggle being waged by the peoples of British, French, and Dutch Guiana and the Antilles against the colonial regimes, and also with the struggle waged by the people of Puerto Rico.

The speeches of most other delegates echoed the bellicose tone of the Cuban and Soviet speeches. The speeches of the Latin American delegates, for example, stressed the need to step up the struggle in this hemisphere against “imperialism,” and its “native tools, such as the Organization of American States.” Chief delegates of the Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Guatemalan Communist organizations, among others, stressed armed violence against the established governments as the only solution to Latin America’s problems.

Among the principal resolutions adopted by the conference were the political resolution and the resolution on economic problems. The first-named consists of a long review of the world situation as seen through the Communists’ distorted vision, in which all alleged wrongs are ascribed to U.S.-led “imperialistic forces.” The following extract will provide something of its flavor:

There is particular importance in developing effective American peoples who are under arms against the native oligarchies, servants of the United States, as in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala, or who suffer the repression of military tyrannies, as in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and other countries. Latin America is the rear guard of the most powerful and brutal imperialism, which is the chief prop of colonialism and neo-colonialism throughout the world. Every blow struck by the Latin American peoples at their Yankee and native oppressors has a decisive influence in weakening U.S. imperialism.

The economic resolution is an appeal for “economic emancipation” but contains, also, the following exhortation:

The resolution calls upon all the participants in the conference to redouble their efforts in rendering economic, financial, and other assistance, including arms and ammunition, to countries engaged in armed struggle for liberation.

Moreover, there were special resolutions on certain countries. In our area these were Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, British Guiana, Peru, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, and Nicaragua.

In addition to the speeches and resolutions, the conference also took several practical steps toward implementing the decisions which had been reached. Following protracted behind-the-scenes debate and infighting between the Chinese and Soviet factions represented in Havana, the conference’s organization committee established a Tricontinent Conference Solidarity Organization with provisional headquarters in Havana and a Cuban as temporary Secretary General. It appears that the new organization backed by Moscow and Havana parallels and in many ways duplicates the older Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, over which Peking hoped to win control.

The conference also established, as a subordinate body to the Tricontinent Solidarity Organization, a liberation committee with the expressed purpose of encouraging and giving all the necessary aid to national liberation movements, “particularly those in arms against imperialism.” The 27 Latin American Communist delegates to the conference remained in Havana following the formal conclusion of the Tricontinent Conference and unanimously agreed on the establishment of a Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) with objectives similar to those of the liberation committee mentioned above.

From even these brief extracts it is clear that the conference constituted, among other things, a gross intervention into the internal affairs of this hemisphere. Those countries singled out as special targets were, understandably, particularly outraged and took the initiative in the OAS [Organization of American States], which resulted in the COAS resolution of February 2 condemning the Tricontinent Conference for its aggres-

sive and interventionist acts and resolutions.⁴

Subsequently, the Latin American representatives in the United Nations, as well as several Latin American governments on an individual basis, have condemned the conference on the same grounds. Castro may well believe that the results of the conference were favorable to him. We believe to the contrary: that his brazen, arrogant call for subversion and violent revolution has driven home to the free peoples of the hemisphere as never before the true nature of the Castro-Communist goals.

It may be argued that much of the conference's stress on armed struggle and the violent overthrow of duly established governments was due to Soviet-Chinese Communist competition within the conference forum—in other words, that the deeds of the Soviets and of the Cubans will not match their words. This may be, though certainly not from any lack of desire on their part to achieve the goals outlined in Havana. But, from a foreign policy viewpoint, we believe it must be assumed that there is some substance behind their words. The OAS countries are alert and prepared to counter any increased subversive efforts.

U.S. and OAS Policy Toward Cuba

At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS countries, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962,⁵ the ministers resolved that the Government of Cuba, by virtue of its adherence to Marxism-Leninism and its alinement with the Communist bloc, had made itself incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system and should therefore be excluded from participation in that system.

At the Ninth Meeting in July 1964 in Washington,⁶ the Foreign Ministers decided that the attempt by the Castro government

against the democratic reform government of Venezuela was "aggression" within the meaning of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. They therefore resolved that the governments of the American states should not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba; should suspend all of their trade, direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment sent for humanitarian reasons; and should suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba except that necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature. Moreover, the foreign ministers urged the other nations of the free world to examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution. This step was related, of course, to the exertion of a policy of economic denial against the Castro regime so as to limit its potential for external trouble-making.

The most recent COAS resolution regarding the Tricontinent Conference and the letter⁷ addressed to the President of the U.N. Security Council by the Latin American representatives are firm indications that the free countries of this hemisphere remain alert and determined to maintain this policy.

For our part we continue to regard the Communist regime in Cuba as temporary, and our goal remains a truly free and independent Cuba which, under a government democratically chosen by the people, will live in peace with its neighbors. As far as the U.S. Government is concerned, two aspects of the present Cuban Government's posture are not negotiable: the Cuban regime's political and military ties of dependence with an extracontinental Communist power and its campaign of subversion in the hemisphere.

We do not consider the present government in Cuba a direct military threat to the United States or to Latin America under present circumstances—nor shall we permit it to become such a threat, as OAS actions in October 1962 and July 1964 demonstrated.

⁴ For a U.S. statement made in the OAS Council on Jan. 24, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1966, p. 383.

⁵ For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

⁶ For background and text of Final Act, see *ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

⁷ U.N. doc. S/7123.

We and the other members of the OAS do regard that regime as a focus of subversion in the hemisphere.

In establishing our policies in the light of this threat of subversion, we do not contemplate the use of military force in the context of existing circumstances. We have been pursuing and we intend to pursue—within the framework of the inter-American system to the greatest extent possible—courses of action designed, on the one hand, to reduce the will and ability of the present government in Cuba to advance the Communist cause in Latin America through sabotage and terrorism; and, on the other hand, to assist the nations of this hemi-

sphere in strengthening their ability to resist subversion. Related to the latter course of action are the long-range objectives of the Alliance for Progress, which seeks, through social and economic development of hemispheric countries, to eliminate the conditions which furnish a fertile field for subversion and revolution.

The strategy which we and the other members of the OAS are following requires patience, tenacity, flexibility, and a high degree of responsibility. We intend to continue on this course in the conviction that it is the most effective means, under present circumstances, of attaining our objective of a free Cuba.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in the Security Council on April 9, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4832

Mr. President [Moussa L. Keita of Mali], I wish to join my colleagues who have preceded me in welcoming you to your first meeting in the Security Council. Having also been President of the Council myself in the first meeting which I attended, when I was charged with convening a meeting of the Council too promptly, I am aware of the complexity of the task before you as a servant of the Council, with such long and established traditions of contribution in the

interests of peace. I welcome you as a colleague and as a President of the Council and extend to you the best wishes of my delegation and offer you full cooperation in what is always a very onerous task.

I also associate myself, Mr. President, with the views you have expressed on behalf of all of the members of the Council concerning our distinguished colleague, Ambassador El-Farra [Muhammad El-Farra of Jordan, President of the Security Council during March], for his great and continuing contribution to the work of the Security Council.

You are doubly welcome, Mr. President, by me since you are also the distinguished Ambassador of your country to our country in Washington and because we enjoy friendly relations with your country.

Several members of the Council have al-

ready adverted to the important constitutional and procedural issues which have been raised with regard to the manner in which this meeting of the Council has been set. This is not the appropriate time for us to debate this issue. We have a matter of urgency before us upon which we should act and act promptly. But I believe it will be necessary for the Council to consider the matter more fully in some form in the future, and we on that occasion, when time permits, will communicate our detailed views on this very important subject later.

This Council is called urgently by the United Kingdom to address itself to an immediate and pressing problem: the possibility that oil may at any time be delivered to Southern Rhodesia from tankers calling at the Portuguese port of Beira.

The general views of my Government on the settlement of the Southern Rhodesia question have been expressed several times before the General Assembly and this Council, and they are too well known to require a detailed statement from me at this time. I content myself to say that in Southern Rhodesia, as elsewhere, my Government is committed to the objectives of democratic government and self-determination, self-determination by and for all the people of Southern Rhodesia, not by and for the few.

It is a matter of concern, I am sure, to all of us in the Council that the steps which we agreed on last November in pursuit of this common goal have not as yet had their full effect; and we meet again this morning to consider a further urgent measure which will contribute to the achievement of this goal.¹

From the outset I wish to make it clear that my Government shares the view, which I do not find any disagreement about in this Council, that the problem of Southern Rhodesia is a responsibility of the British Government—not that this Council and the world organization do not have an appro-

priate role to play in dealing with this problem. The world has quite properly looked to Britain, the constitutional authority, to resolve this very difficult crisis. Britain has never hesitated to acknowledge its responsibility publicly and to the members of this Council—and for coming here when it did originally and when it does so today, it seems to me, as a believer in this world organization, that Great Britain should be congratulated and not condemned for manifesting its recognition of its obligations under the charter and its respect for the decent opinions of mankind. The good faith of Britain is doubted in some circles. I can only say for myself and my Government that we believe that Britain is entirely committed to bringing an end to the Smith regime, and we are convinced that this is a firm policy of Prime Minister Wilson and his government.

Gravity of the Proposal

It is fitting that Britain should expect and obtain from all of us the fullest co-operation in support of its efforts. It was, in fact, in a search for such support that the United Kingdom brought the problem of the Southern Rhodesian rebellion to the attention of the Security Council last November. Now Britain has returned to this Council to receive additional backing for new and very firm steps.

I should like to say to this Council that what Britain is asking for in terms of substance is not by any means inconsequential. On the contrary, it is one of the gravest and most far-reaching proposals that has been made to this Council. What is involved is not the question of two tankers, if I may say so with all due regard to all who have spoken. If we look at paragraph 5 of the resolution, this resolution tendered by the United Kingdom calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force, if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia.

The question of intercepting vessels on the high seas, the question of arresting and

¹ For U.S. statements in the General Assembly and the Security Council and texts of resolutions adopted in the two bodies, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 908.

detaining them, is a matter that has a long history in the field of international law. Indeed, if we refer to history, my own country once went to war with Great Britain on the question of arresting and detaining vessels on the high seas. And we are asked in the Security Council—and it should be a matter of deep consideration and concern for all of us—to put our sanction upon what will be a rule of international law when this Council acts: Vessels on the high seas can be arrested and detained in the interest of international law which we will be making here today if we adopt the resolution tendered by Great Britain, as I hope we will do.

Actions Taken by the United States

It is not an easy decision for any government to put its support to a resolution of this character, both in light of our history and traditions and in light of all of the far-reaching implications that such a step as we are asked to take may envision. Indeed, for a major trading country such as the United States to put teeth into a program of denial such as the one called for by the Security Council last November involved an impressive array of steps on our part, which called into play very important decisions on our part. When I last spoke to the Council on this subject,² I mentioned some of the measures which we had taken and I said the United States would consider urgently what else remained to be done in order to apply an effective across-the-board program of trade sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. I am sure the members of the Council will be interested in hearing what this involved from the standpoint of the United States in terms of taking such action.

First, we refused recognition of the Smith regime.

Second, we immediately instituted a comprehensive embargo on the shipment of all arms and military equipment to Southern Rhodesia.

Third, we suspended action on applica-

U.S. Views on Delay in Calling Security Council Meeting

Following is a statement issued at Washington and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York on April 8.

The attitude of the Council President is unprecedented. Article 28 of the charter provides that: "The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously."

The Council's own rules of procedure provide that: "The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council."

The President has no discretion as to whether to call a meeting. His responsibility is to fix the time for the meeting. In fixing the time, the President does not exercise an arbitrary or unfettered discretion. The fixing of the time must be related to the urgency of the request. The meeting of the Council he must call at the request of a member cannot by the nature of the charter and the rules be unduly delayed or obstructed even by a majority of the members, much less by a mere minority.

Failure to comply with the procedures and established practices of the Security Council will have serious implications for its effectiveness in this and future cases, and is a cause of great concern to the United States Government.

tions for United States Government loans and credit guarantees and are issuing no further investment guarantees to Southern Rhodesia.

Fourth, we took action in support of the financial measures instituted by the British Government, including recognition of the authority of the newly appointed Board of Directors in London over the official deposits of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in the United States.

Fifth, we announced that at the request of our Government the United States importers of asbestos and lithium from Southern Rhodesia had agreed to find other sources.

Sixth, we informed United States companies that we recognized the legal authority of the British Government to take actions banning the trade in Southern

² *Ibid.*, pp. 912 and 920.

Rhodesian chrome and tobacco, and we recommended in the strongest terms to the United States companies that they comply with the British Orders-in-Council passed for this purpose.

Seventh, despite our great tradition and in part our constitutional commitment to freedom of private travel, we took measures to discourage private travel by Americans to Southern Rhodesia by announcing that the United States Government could no longer assure normal protective services to Americans planning to travel through or in Southern Rhodesia. And we also said that American travelers intending to go to Southern Rhodesia must have British visas, not Southern Rhodesian visas, for travel to that country.

Eighth, we instituted procedures which have cut off virtually all American exports of consequence. The exceptions are largely humanitarian items and not essential to the Southern Rhodesian economy.

Ninth, we suspended the United States sugar quota for Southern Rhodesia for the years 1965 and 1966. In fact, part of that quota was on the high seas for delivery to the United States when we took that action, and we have subjected ourselves, obviously, to legal action for the act we took with respect to a shipment on the high seas before the Security Council acted.

Tenth, we instituted a total embargo on shipments of all United States petroleum and petroleum products into Southern Rhodesia. And we also advised United States citizens and enterprises to comply in full with the British Government's Order-in-Council prohibiting import of such products into Southern Rhodesia.

In addition to these direct measures, we have joined the United Kingdom and other countries in establishing an airlift of petroleum products to Zambia in order to aid that landlocked nation in maintaining its economy, a consideration which must never escape the minds of this Council. United States aircraft are being used in this operation delivering vital cargo to Elisabethville at

a total rate of 1 million gallons per month.

Mr. President, these measures cannot be taken overnight. We took them urgently and as quickly as we could. And the measures we have instituted against Southern Rhodesia will mean a trade loss to the United States of many millions of dollars. In addition, since the middle of January, the United States has allocated more than \$4 million for the Zambian airlift and for planned emergency maintenance of the Great North Road from Tanzania to Zambia. It is interesting, Mr. President, to reflect that this figure represents more than the total United States contribution for the United Nations Force in Cyprus covering the same period of time and almost two-thirds of the United States contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East for the entire year 1966. In short, our support for Zambia in connection with the implementation of the Security Council's November resolution on Southern Rhodesia is comparable in cost to the support which we provide for the United Nations important peacekeeping operations.

I mention these costs not to use figures but to emphasize that these are costs which we accept gladly in support of the principles of legality, democracy, and self-determination in Africa. And we are glad that we were able to make this contribution because we deem the problem of Rhodesia to be a problem for all the world. We recognize, of course, the special concern of Africa in this problem, but we share that concern.

Mr. President, I think this is a proper occasion to strongly urge other countries which have not as yet moved to tighten this ring around the Smith regime to do so without delay. As for us, we continue to support the United Kingdom firmly as it discharges its responsibilities in this effort.

Now today we deal with a particular problem. The United Kingdom has brought to the attention of this Council the greatest current danger in our common effort: the risk of a serious breach in the program of oil sanctions as a result of the arrival and

the potential arrival of tankers at Portuguese ports with cargoes apparently destined for Southern Rhodesia.

U.S. Support for Resolution

The United States fully concurs in the British proposal that the Council act vigorously and promptly to meet this danger. And this resolution is, indeed, destined to meet firmly and clearly the immediate danger before us by calling on the Portuguese Government, and on any government whose vessels may be involved, to prevent the movement of oil into Rhodesia through Beira and, in case this is not sufficient, it calls on the United Kingdom Government to prevent such movement, by force if necessary.

Mr. President, all of us are realistic. We hope that these additional measures will be effective, but we recognize—and must recognize—the absolute necessity for moving in concert, step by step, as far as we can unitedly to meet this problem. And this Council, as before, remains seized of the problem so that the additional measures which become necessary, if they do become necessary, can be ventilated here, debated here, and decided upon here.

It has always been my conviction, Mr. President, that we should proceed practically to do what we can agree upon quickly and urgently, and then we should go on and consider other measures upon which other members of the Council may have doubts and reservations and see whether we can arrive at agreement upon such other measures. But we should never, in my opinion, fail to act quickly and urgently on those matters which we all desire and upon which we can all agree quickly in the interests of the common goal.

Perhaps, Mr. President, in saying so, I reflect a personal philosophy. As we sat here, I sent for a speech I made when I was appointed Secretary of Labor of the United States, where there are also many unfinished problems in my country, and I said this—but it is not an original idea of mine—I quoted a great democratic Spanish

philosopher as an illustration of my own philosophy, Salvador de Madariaga. And he said this:

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk in the right direction but we must walk step by step. Our tasks are to define what is desirable, to define what is possible at any time within the scope of what is desirable, to carry out what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable.

And, Mr. President, the resolution we have reflects no disagreement in this Council. I am sure we all want to stop these ships, and I am sure we all want to empower the British Government to stop them as quickly and as effectively as can be done.

The resolution we passed last November reflected the Council's determination to condemn the rebellion and to bring it to an end. It was paralleled by General Assembly action reflecting similar overwhelming sentiment. Implementing actions have been announced since then by an impressive majority of U.N. member nations. And, despite the fact that the ultimate end has not been achieved, we ought to take pride and satisfaction in what the great body of world opinion has done in response to an appeal by this Council. In fact, in my short experience here, few issues coming before this body have ever produced such a unanimity of response, a clear indication that we have the same goal and dramatic evidence that, as we affirmed last November, the nations of the world will not remain idle while a minority violates the principles which the world community holds sacred. And surely we can, and we should, agree today on the specific question before us, agree that we should take action to prevent these oil shipments.

Time, as we have been told, is of the essence, and we ought to act in the spirit that time is of the essence.

My Government appreciates the initiative which the British Government has taken and is ready to vote, and vote without delay, allowing time, of course, for reasonable debate on the resolution. We hope others will join us in acting with the dispatch which the situation calls for.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION³

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions Nos. 216 of 12 November 1965 and 217 of 20 November 1965 and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

Gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Rhodesia as the result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the CPMR pipeline with the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities,

Considering that such supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in being,

1. *Determines* that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. *Calls upon* the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia;

3. *Calls upon* the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia;

4. *Calls upon* all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the *Joanna V* upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there.

U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian Development Bank

The Senate on April 1 confirmed the following nominations to the Asian Development Bank:¹

Henry H. Fowler to be U.S. Governor;

William S. Gaud to be U.S. Alternate Governor; and

Bernard Zagorin to be U.S. Director.

³ U.N. doc. S/RES/221 (1966); adopted by the Council on Apr. 9 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, U.S.S.R., Uruguay).

¹ For a White House announcement of the nominations, see White House press release dated Mar. 17.

U.N. Security Council Extends Peace Force in Cyprus

Statement by James Roosevelt¹

Mr. President, we are indebted again to the Secretary-General for the excellence of his report² on the United Nations operation in Cyprus. This clear record of the past 3 months and the useful observations have assisted the Security Council materially in its task.

My Government, in voting for a 3-month extension of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, recognized the continuing need for a United Nations presence on the island. It is clear that this judgment was shared by all the other members of the Council. The United States has willingly, consistently, and fully supported the maintenance of the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in the past—by our statements in this Council, by our votes, and by our substantial financial contributions toward the cost of the Force. We continue to support the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

However, as the distinguished members of this Council well know, the Force has been in existence for nearly 2 years. It has been remarkably successful in keeping the peace during that time, although there is still underlying tension on the island, and, of course, I wish in no way to minimize the complexity of the situation on Cyprus. Nevertheless, it is the conviction of my Government that, after the passage of 2 years, the time is at hand to intensify the search for ways to reduce that tension and promote a solution to the basic problem.

In the interval since we last met to consider the question of Cyprus, my Government has been increasingly concerned that we not lose sight of the United Nations' eventual goal in Cyprus and that there should be significant movement toward a peaceful settlement and an agreed solution.

¹ Made in the Security Council on Mar. 16 (U.S./U.N. press release 4822). Mr. Roosevelt was Acting U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

² U.N. doc. S/7191.

My Government was therefore pleased to learn that the Secretary-General has recently given an enlarged mandate³ to his most capable Special Representative in Cyprus, Ambassador [Carlos A.] Bernardes, to employ his good offices and to make such approaches as may be productive in solving the problems of either a local or a broader nature. The United States regards this step as having great potential for the restoration of peace and order. We are hopeful that the efforts of Ambassador Bernardes will stimulate positive steps toward a settlement, and we believe that his experience as a principal architect of the March 4 [1964] resolution⁴ as well as his experience in Cyprus equips him admirably for his task. The United States is reassured and encouraged by the report of the Secretary-General that the parties most directly concerned have adopted a helpful and cooperative attitude toward this extension of Ambassador Bernardes' responsibilities.

We are keenly aware that the business of keeping the peace, of securing the peace, is not only difficult and prolonged; it is also costly. We hope that those who have so generously contributed in the past will continue to do so and that nations who have not yet contributed or have not done so on a regular basis, especially those here in the Security Council, will join in voluntary contributions to the support of the Force. The Secretary-General has spoken earnestly and persuasively on this subject in his latest report and here today as he has in the past.

Finally, I should like to record our shock and sense of loss upon the death in December of General [K. S.] Thimayya, late Commander of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. He served the cause of peace with dedication and high ability. He is sorely missed. I also wish to pay tribute to the

untiring efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in fostering a solution to the Cyprus question. My Government again wishes to express its admiration and gratitude for the courage, the patience, and the skill of the men of the Peacekeeping Force.⁵

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S. Tariff Concessions

The Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations announced on April 5 that the United States and the United Kingdom had on that day signed an agreement to reestablish in the language of the new Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) the trade agreement concessions previously granted to the United Kingdom by the United States. The agreement also grants several new concessions to offset the impairment in previous concessions incidental to bringing the TSUS into force.

The negotiation with the United Kingdom was one of some 30 negotiations envisaged by the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to bring the United States tariff concessions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a few bilateral trade agreements into conformance with the language of the TSUS. The entry into force in 1963 of the TSUS, recently amended by the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965, resulted in numerous incidental rate changes. On the whole, reductions offset increases, but for the United Kingdom (and Hong Kong, for which the United Kingdom has accepted the GATT) there were greater rate increases than decreases, and compensatory U.S. tariff reductions were called for.

The United Kingdom and the United States have agreed that new concessions on

³ For text, see U.N. doc. S/7180.

⁴ U.N. doc. S/5575.

⁵ In a resolution (S/7205) unanimously adopted on Mar. 16, the Security Council extended "once more the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus . . . for a period of three months ending 26 June 1966. . . ."

three tariff items covering 1964 U.S. imports valued at \$2.7 million would offset the net rate increases of the new tariff. (Total U.S. imports from the United Kingdom, together with Hong Kong, in 1964 were about \$1.4 billion.) In addition, a duty reduction on aircraft parts, which had already been provided for in a similar agreement with Canada,¹ that took effect on January 1, is being bound also to the United Kingdom. The three new concessions are as follows:

<i>TSUS No.</i>	<i>Brief Description</i>	<i>Existing Duty Rate</i>	<i>New Duty Rate</i>
222.60	Bamboo, rattan, willow or chip articles not specially provided for	25%	20%
531.37	Porcelain and subporcelain refractory articles	45%	22.5%
792.60	Ivory articles not specially provided for	12%	8%

All the duty reductions will be put into effect in five annual stages.

The agreement will be made effective on May 1 through a Presidential proclamation.²

The present agreement resolves issues between the two Governments arising from the entry into force of the TSUS. Other negotiations on reductions in tariffs and other trade restrictions are continuing between the two Governments at Geneva as part of the multilateral Kennedy Round of trade negotiations.

U.S. and Mexico Extend Radio Agreement

Press release 83 dated April 14

United States and Mexican officials signed a protocol in Mexico City on April 13 to extend until December 31, 1967, the agreement between the United States and Mexico on radio broadcasting in the stand-

ard broadcast band. The existing agreement, signed in Mexico January 29, 1957, entered into force on June 9, 1961, for a 5-year period.

The protocol will be transmitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It will also be necessary to obtain approval of Mexico's legislative body.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Defense

Memorandum of arrangement to cover reentry experiments in Australia (Sparta). Signed at Canberra March 30, 1966. Entered into force March 30, 1966.

Signatures: Australia, United Kingdom, United States.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Ratification deposited: Gabon, April 4, 1966.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Signed at The Hague October 18, 1907. Entered into force January 26, 1910.

Adherence deposited: Uganda, March 1, 1966.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Denunciation received: Switzerland, March 21, 1966.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes and final protocol. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Enters into force January 1, 1967.

Signatures: Afghanistan,² Algeria,³ Argentina,³ Australia,² Austria,³ Belgium,³ Bolivia,³ Brazil,³ Bulgaria,^{3,4} Burma,² Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,³ Cameroon,³ Canada,³ Central African Republic,³ Ceylon, Chad,³ Chile,^{3,4} China,⁴ Colombia,³ Congo (Brazzaville),³ Congo (Léopoldville),³ Costa Rica,^{2,3} Cuba,^{2,3,4} Cyprus,³ Czechoslovakia,^{3,4} Dahomey,^{2,3} Denmark,³ Ecuador,³ Ethiopia,^{2,3} Finland,³ France, Group of territories represented by French Overseas Post

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 106.

² For text of Proclamation 3712 dated Apr. 5, see 31 *Fed. Reg.* 5543.

³ Not in force.

² With reservations contained in final protocol.

³ With declarations contained in final protocol.

⁴ With statements contained in final protocol.

and Telecommunications Agency, Gabon,³ Federal Republic of Germany,³ Ghana,³ Greece,^{2,3} Guatemala,³ Guinea,^{2,3} Haiti, Hungary,^{2,3,4} India,^{2,4} Indonesia,^{2,3} Iran,² Iraq,³ Iceland,³ Ireland, Israel,⁴ Italy,³ Ivory Coast,³ Jamaica,³ Japan, Jordan,³ Kenya,^{3,4} Korea,³ Kuwait,³ Laos, Lebanon,³ Liberia,^{2,3} Liechtenstein,³ Luxembourg,³ Malagasy,³ Malaysia,³ Malawi,³ Mali,^{2,3} Malta,² Mauritania,^{2,3} Mexico,³ Monaco, Mongolia,^{2,3,4} Morocco,³ Nepal,³ Netherlands,^{2,3} New Zealand,² Nicaragua,³ Niger,³ Nigeria,³ Norway,³ Pakistan,³ Panama,³ Paraguay,³ Peru,^{2,3} Philippines,^{2,4} Poland,^{3,4} Portugal,³ Portuguese Overseas Provinces, Rhodesia, Romania,^{3,4} Rwanda,^{2,3} Saudi Arabia,³ Senegal,³ Sierra Leone,³ Singapore,³ Somali Republic,^{2,3} Spain,³ Spanish Provinces in Africa, Sudan,^{3,3} Sweden,³ Switzerland,^{3,4} Syrian Arab Republic,³ Tanzania,^{2,3} Thailand,³ Togo,^{2,3} Trinidad and Tobago,³ Tunisia,³ Turkey,² Uganda,^{2,3} Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,³ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,³ United Arab Republic,³ United Kingdom,^{2,3} Overseas Territories for international relations of which United Kingdom are responsible, United States,³ Territories of United States,³ Upper Volta,³ Vatican City, Venezuela,^{2,3} Yugoslavia,⁴ Zambia,³ November 12, 1965.

BILATERAL

British Honduras

Investment guarantee agreement. Signed at Belize City February 8, 1966. Entered into force February 8, 1966.

Canada

Air transport agreement with exchange of notes. Signed at Ottawa January 17, 1966. Entered into force January 17, 1966.

China

Agreement relating to the status of United States armed forces in China. Signed at Taipei August 31, 1965.

Entered into force: April 12, 1966.

Costa Rica

Agreement amending and extending the military mission agreement of December 10, 1945, as amended and extended (59 Stat. 1682, TIAS 2079, 3109, 4595, 4795, 5348). Effected by exchange of notes at San José March 17 and 28, 1966. Entered into force March 28, 1966.

Ghana

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Accra April 1, 1966. Entered into force April 1, 1966.

Jordan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Amman April 5, 1966. Entered into force April 5, 1966.

Singapore

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore March 25, 1966. Entered into force March 25, 1966.

Spain

Agreement superseding the agreement of March 11 and 18, 1960, as amended June 27 and 28, 1963 (TIAS 4463, 5393), and providing for the continued operation and expansion of the space-vehicle tracking and communications station on the Island of Gran Canaria. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14, 1966.

Agreement providing for a project in Spain to measure winds and temperatures at high altitudes and for continuing other cooperative space research projects. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14, 1966.

Sudan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of November 14, 1961 (TIAS 4910), and January 31, 1963 (TIAS 5495). Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum January 12 and 18, 1966. Entered into force January 18, 1966.

Turkey

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Ankara April 2, 1966. Entered into force April 2, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 21, 1966 (TIAS 5968). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon April 2, 1966. Entered into force April 2, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 5¢ each, unless otherwise indicated.

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Your Department of State (Revised). Pamphlet giving concise information on the history, organization, and activities of the Department (including basic facts about the main building). Pub. 7644. Department and Foreign Service Series 124. 16 pp., illus. 15¢.

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States (Revised). Booklet for the information of men and women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the Foreign Service of the United States to serve with the Department of State or the U.S. Information Agency. Pub. 7924. Department and Foreign Service Series 132. 32 pp., illus. Limited distribution.

U.S. Participation in the UN. Nineteenth annual report by the President to the Congress for the year 1964. Pub. 7943. International Organization and Conference Series 67. xvii, 353 pp., tables. \$1.75.

Foreign Affairs. Excerpt From the State of the Union Message: President Lyndon B. Johnson, January 12, 1966. Pub. 8011. General Foreign Policy Series 211. 17 pp. 15¢.

The Battle Act Report, 1965. Eighteenth report to Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. Pub. 8019. General Foreign Policy Series 210. 124 pp. 40¢.

Viet-Nam Today. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson addresses the New England Press Association at Boston, Mass. Pub. 8039. Far Eastern Series 139. 24 pp. 15¢.

Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1966. Compiled by the Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State. Pub. 8042. 322 pp. \$1.50.

The Issue in Viet-Nam. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball's speech before the Northwestern University Alumni Association at Evanston, Ill. Pub. 8043. Far Eastern Series 141. 24 pp. 15¢.

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free. Text of an address made by President Johnson, after being presented with the National Freedom Award at Freedom House, New York, N.Y., on February 23, 1966. Pub. 8048. Far Eastern Series 142. 16 pp. 15¢.

Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union. Pamphlet containing text of the Committee's report as issued by the White House. Pub. 8061. Commercial Policy Series 201. 22 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Mali, amending the agreement of July 14, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bamako December 8 and 15, 1965. Entered into force December 15, 1965. TIAS 5906. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade—Renegotiation of Schedule XX (United States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Interim agreement with Canada signed at Washington December 17, 1965. Entered into force December 17, 1965. TIAS 5912. 44 pp. 20¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iran amending the agreement of November 16, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran October 13, 1965. Entered into force October 13, 1965. TIAS 5918. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of October 5, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. TIAS 5926. 3 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1401 PUBLICATION 8072 MAY 2, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

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*78	4/11	Palmer sworn in as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic details).
79	4/12	Rusk: interview with Paris-Match.
80	4/12	U.S. reply to French aide memoire of March 29.
81	4/12	Regional foreign policy conference, Little Rock, Ark., May 5.
†82	4/14	Space agreements with Spain.
83	4/14	Agreement with Mexico on radio broadcasting bands.
†84	4/14	Mann: Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures.
†85	4/14	Mann: Pan American Society.
*86	4/15	Harriman: Democratic Midwest Conference, Columbus, Ohio (excerpts).
†87	4/15	U.S. observer delegation to CENTO ministerial conference.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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President Johnson Visits Mexico City

The President and Mrs. Johnson made an informal visit to Mexico City April 14-15. Following are texts of President Johnson's remarks upon his arrival there on April 14, his address at the dedication of the Abraham Lincoln statue on April 15 and remarks to the staff of the U.S. Embassy later that day, and a joint statement issued by President Johnson and President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz at the close of the visit.

REMARKS AT AIRPORT, APRIL 14

White House press release dated April 14; as-delivered text

Mr. President, Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, members of the First Family, my friends of Mexico: This is almost a homecoming for the Johnson family. Thirty-one years ago we came to Mexico on our honeymoon. Since then, on every occasion possible, we have used the border into your country, visited in your cities and your countryside, and we have enjoyed, on many occasions, visits from your leaders and your Presidents.

I first met President Adolfo López Mateos in the late 1950's when he came to the United States. Later, as President, I visited with him in the United States at the Chamizal at El Paso,¹ and in 1964 your own distinguished President honored us with a visit that he and his wife made in our home in Texas.²

So when I come to Mexico I feel that I come to the home of my friends. We are here today to present to your country a statue of one of our most beloved and most respected

Presidents, Abraham Lincoln. We present that statue to the people that we consider our most treasured friends.

Mr. President, we are grateful to you for this beautiful reception, for your gracious remarks. We will look forward to exchanging views with you in the hours that we are permitted together.

I said to your distinguished and able Ambassador, Ambassador [Hugo B.] Margain, on the way down on the plane today, that while we faced many trying problems in the world today, I did not believe there had ever been a period in the history of the United States and Mexico when we faced fewer problems, when we had better understanding, and when there was a stronger friendship that exists between the people than exists today.

That is because, Mr. President, you and your distinguished predecessors have understood our people and have provided a far-sighted leadership for your people that has brought us together in understanding and friendship.

Although in other parts of the world neighbors fight neighbors, neighbors are in dispute with neighbors, there are no armies that patrol our borders, there are no guns that protect the frontiers of Mexico and the United States. Our people cross the boundary freely and work and play together.

If I could have my one wish granted today, it would be that we could live in a world where we had the same peaceful relations with our neighbors as we have with the people of Mexico. But if we are to have peace in the world, we must try to solve the problems that cause the wars, the problems

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 545.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1964, p. 805.

of illiteracy, the problems of ignorance, the problems of disease, the problems of poverty, the problems of misunderstanding.

Mr. President, we salute you for the leadership that you are providing your own great nation and the contribution you are making to other nations in the world in a program that will bring peace to all human-kind. While war clouds hover over certain parts of the world as we meet here this afternoon, we truly and genuinely and sincerely hope that the day may soon come when all the world can live together in peace as do the people of the United States and Mexico.

Mr. President, our distinguished Secretary of State, the majority leader of the United States Senate, the minority leader of the United States Senate, leaders of our House of Representatives, join me on this occasion in thanking you for this very cordial welcome and in saying to you: *Muchas gracias, Señor Presidente, muchas gracias, todo Mexico.*

ADDRESS AT DEDICATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN STATUE, APRIL 15

White House press release dated April 15; as-delivered text

Mr. President, my friends: It is impossible for me to tell you how proud I am to be here with you today in company with the leadership of the United States Senate, prominent members of the House of Representatives, and the Senators and Congressmen from the States of Illinois and Kentucky, that gave us Abraham Lincoln. The President of the United States could ask for no greater honor than to be invited to stand on the soil of our friend, Mexico, beside a leader as beloved and respected as your great President, Diaz Ordaz.

For me, this occasion has a very special meaning. All my life I have known and lived with and worked alongside the sons and the daughters of Mexico. I have been here on many different occasions. My wife and I spent the first days of our marriage here in this beautiful city, Mexico City.

To come back now to the people and the scenes of so many pleasant memories, to come as the leader of your sister Republic to the north, where your country is held in such high esteem, is for me a moment never to be forgotten. The tribute that your great Foreign Secretary Carillo Flores has just paid to Abraham Lincoln will touch the hearts of all of my countrymen. All nations rightly praise their own famous men, but only a truly great people pause to pay tribute to the great of other lands. And that is what Mexico is doing today.

What Abraham Lincoln stood for is what binds our two nations and, indeed, this entire hemisphere together. More than geography and common economic interests and a regional system of mutual assistance, we are held together by common values and by shared beliefs. That is why we share equally Bolívar and Washington, San Martín and Jefferson, Juárez and Martí and Lincoln. They were sons of a common heritage.

In his time and place, Abraham Lincoln brought the best in our common civilization to bear on the cruelest problems that ever confronted a leader: civil war and the enslavement of a minority of his people. In these trials he clung to the belief that every human being was unique and precious—equal in the eyes of God and before the law.

He believed that the pillars of a great society were equality of opportunity, individual freedom to excel, and justice—political and social justice—for every citizen. And so he walked among us, bearing on his shoulders the burdens of a nation's greatest test, proving that true greatness lies in loyalty to those universal principles which span every age.

Now, in this age, we in this hemisphere are today engaged in another great test. We are engaged in a vast social revolution touching the lives of millions of people on two continents. And, like Lincoln's, this is a test of whether freedom can work. It is a test of whether men, through liberty, can overcome the weight of the past and lift

from their brothers the blight of hunger, the blindness of ignorance, and the burden of disease.

We are in the midst of that test. We must demonstrate to our peoples that their destiny is not class struggle but common struggle to achieve that proud and that modern Latin America which is at once the dream of a generation and the interest of the world community.

This is a battle which only the people of Latin America can win, but it is the desire of my people, our commitment and our privilege, to work side by side in this great human adventure.

History will judge us not only by the nobility of our sentiments or the poetry of our words. History will judge us by the action that we take to bring these sentiments to life.

For my country's part, we are guided by certain basic convictions upon which our faith in the future rests.

First, every member of the American community of nations has a natural right to its independence and sovereignty. No country may abridge those rights. As your own Benito Juarez said: "Respect for the rights of others is peace."

Second, the United States maintains its commitment to government by consent of the governed, a consent to be granted in free and honest elections. It does not seek to impose on others any form of government. But let us stand determined on this principle: Despots are not welcome in this hemisphere.

Third, my administration believes that both stable democracy and effective economic development depend ultimately on social justice. There has never been stable democracy where economic power and privilege were concentrated in the hands of the few. Where the many work, let the many earn.

Fourth, we believe the struggle for social justice and more efficient and equitable use of natural resources must be led by each country in its own behalf. My administra-

tion will not be deterred by those who tenaciously or selfishly cling to special privileges from the past. And we will not be deterred by those who say that to risk change is to risk communism.

Fifth, we do not wish to see communism spread in this hemisphere, but we believe that the threat to the liberty and independence of the Latin American peoples from communism cannot be met merely by force. We will continue to concentrate our assistance mainly in economic and social fields and to encourage our Latin American neighbors, where possible, to limit their outlays for military purposes. We are encouraged that democracy flourishes in countries such as Mexico, where expenditures for education and development are high.

Sixth, we are convinced that the future of Latin American industrialization, as well as the basic welfare of the people themselves, urgently requires the parallel modernization of rural life. This must combine more equitable forms of landholding and all the measures that are needed to raise production and productivity. Your two Presidents this morning discussed at length steps that we are going to take to do both.

Seventh, we shall continue to work with your own able President Diaz Ordaz and work with our Latin American friends throughout the hemisphere to augment and to stabilize earnings from traditional exports, while assisting efforts to expand those new exports on which Latin American trade will increasingly depend in the future.

Eighth, we believe that the drawing together of the economies of Latin America is critical to this hemisphere's future. Only in this way can the hemisphere develop truly efficient industries, expanded foreign exchange earnings, and a sound foundation for a full Latin American partnership in building a peaceful world community.

One of the challenges of hemispheric integration is the linking of North and South America through the Pan American Highway. It is one ambition of my Presidency to work with the other nations of this

hemisphere toward closing the several hundred miles of the gap that now exists. We must await the studies that are now nearing completion, but together we should look to the day when the old precolonial links across the isthmus are fully restored, the good lands of Panama are opened for agriculture, and families and commerce can move anywhere between Laredo and the southernmost tip of Argentina.

Señor Presidente Diaz Ordaz, my country takes great heart in what you in Mexico are doing. We see today a people who are forging ahead. We see today a nation that is proud and a people that are confident. You are confident of the future because you are confident that you can secure for your people a constant increase in material well-being and social justice. You are confident that you can deal with all other neighbors in independence, friendship, and dignity. You are confident that you can help your less advanced neighbors also to move ahead with you. And you are confident that you can maintain in the modern world your own personality, loyal to your own traditions and aspirations.

Mexico's progress is witness that the goals of the Alliance are realistic and its methods are valid.

I have served with four American Presidents who showed their concern and their friendship for Mexico and Latin America. Franklin Roosevelt lifted our eyes to the promise and problems of Latin America with the good-neighbor policy. Harry Truman's boldness brought forth Point 4 and its compassion to the Western Hemisphere and to the entire world. Dwight Eisenhower plowed new, fertile, and productive fields with the Act of Bogotá. And John F. Kennedy, building on and expanding and refining that act, gave fresh impulse to all our ideals in the Alliance.

Twenty-nine months ago, the first week of my Presidency, my first act as President of the United States was to pledge my country again to the faith and the direction of these four Presidents and their relations

with the nations of this hemisphere.³ I am proud today to report to the Mexican people and to all of our Latin American friends that our common effort is proving itself with specific results. Our dreams are becoming realities.

As I speak to you here today, I have been involved in the executive branch of my Government for 6 years. The first 3 years, the average growth rate in Latin America was 1 percent. In the last 3 years of my Presidency, that growth rate is now 2.5 percent. This achievement, in which Mexico, the United States, and all the other countries of Latin America can take great pride, will continue strong, I predict, in the year 1966. We believe that the growth rate in that year will exceed the 2.5 percent of this year.

Ahead, of course, lie many problems that are yet to be overcome. Hard work and perseverance, not hope alone, will bend them to solution.

At the recent meeting of the economic ministers in Buenos Aires,⁴ we were right to take stock of what we have learned since 1961, and to plan and to chart the course ahead. Now we must give necessary impulse to, as I said to your President this morning, new and additional initiatives. We must open new paths. We must breathe new energy into our efforts.

To that end I will, in the months ahead, join with Latin American leaders in exploring the proposal of the President of Argentina for a new meeting at the very highest level to examine our common problems and to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum. Such a conference should be prepared with the utmost care. We should examine every idea which might advance our common interest, be it old or new. Careful preparation need not be the enemy, however, of imaginative action and new adventures.

It will take time, faith, and stubborn ef-

³ For remarks made by President Johnson on Nov. 26, 1963, see *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912.

⁴ See p. 738.

fort to achieve together the goals that we set ourselves in the Charter of Punta del Este 5 years ago,⁵ but this we must do. This we will do. There is no other way, in our time and in this hemisphere, to show what free men and what free nations can do working together.

So let all the world know that we know our challenge. I saw it, riding through the streets of your beautiful city with your great President last evening. I saw it in the hopeful face of young Mexico, in the hundreds of thousands of little children who are the future of this great land. I saw young people, with minds to be educated, with bodies to be protected from disease. I saw young boys and girls who one day will be able to find a job and who will raise their families in peace. And some will lead this great nation tomorrow.

This is the challenge that faces the people of America and faces the people of Latin America. This is the challenge that we will, shoulder to shoulder, accept.

Once again I want to say how very proud and very happy I am to be here with you today, *Señor Presidente*—you, my good and warm friend—and to be among your gracious people of Mexico. Very shortly I will return to the other side of the river, but I will leave, to enjoy the hospitality of your great people, Mrs. Johnson and my Secretary of State and the distinguished delegation from the Congress.

Before I leave, I should like to say this: May we all always seek justice and peace together. Come what may, may we always be good neighbors. And may we always be good *amigos*.

REMARKS AT U.S. EMBASSY, APRIL 15

White House press release dated April 15; as-delivered text

Secretary and Mrs. Rusk, Ambassador and Mrs. [Fulton] Freeman, my friends, ladies and gentlemen: I drove down the street with great pride as my eyes looked upon this beautiful building put here by the talented

hands of architects from my State. As I walked into this building, I looked back over my memories in government and thought that never in my 35 years in public service in Washington had our country been more fortunate in its selection of a Secretary of State than it is now with Dean Rusk.

He is guiding our relations with other nations with a skill and an understanding and a compassion that is unequalled, in my judgment, in my lifetime. He has built around him 100 or more of the ablest ambassadors that any administration has ever assembled to serve the interests of our nation. It gives me great pride to pay just tribute to the work being done by Ambassador and Mrs. Freeman here in Mexico.

But what really gives me the greatest pride and the greatest pleasure is to come here and look into the smiling faces that stand around me in this beautiful building and see the folks that take care of the daily chores and that reflect such great credit to the country they serve. No nation ever had more competent or more loyal or more dedicated public employees than the United States of America, and no department ever had more of those kinds of employees than the Department of State.

I want to say to each of you at your desk and the tasks that engage you that your President is proud of the work you do, is grateful to you for the loyalty that you give and the sacrifices that you make, and the credit that you reflect upon your country.

I observed the other day a statement my father made to me, when I was a little boy and he was talking about public service. He said, "To understand people, you must know them and to properly speak for them and represent them, you must love them." For that reason he always leaned over backward to be democratic. There was no little farmer from the humblest village in the land that he didn't want to know, because he got more from the farmer than he gave.

I think that each of you who carry on with your work, serving our national interest each day, could profit by remembering

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

that statement: To know the people of Mexico, you must understand them and to represent them and carry out our program and our purpose with them, you must love them.

I have been coming across this border all my life. I have been working with the people of Mexico ever since I was a child. My first playmate was a little Mexican boy. We raced our horses together, when we were both just learning to ride. I remember he told me he didn't want to run a race with me, because his horse wasn't as fat as mine and therefore couldn't run as fast.

I said, "I will solve that problem. We will make him as fat." So we got a bucket and got in the oat bin and fed him all afternoon. Then we filled him full of water and then we took him out and ran the race. Then the horse died.

All my life the Mexican people have been my friends and my playmates, my closest associates and my most trusted allies, and my most loyal supporters. They have been intimidated, criticized, browbeaten, sometimes they have been hauled into court for voting for me, but they have always been there.

I brought my bride to Mexico City on our honeymoon. I have come back here at every opportunity. So we are very thankful we were given the chance to come here again and show the people of this nation the great respect and friendship we have for them and to say to those of you who serve my administration and your country so well that I am mighty grateful and proud of you.

JOINT STATEMENT, APRIL 15

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated April 16

President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and President Lyndon B. Johnson were greatly pleased that the occasion of the unveiling of a statue of Abraham Lincoln provided an opportunity to renew their cordial personal relationship and to resume their informal conversations begun during their meeting in November 1964.

The two Chiefs of State, conscious of the significance of the principles for which Benito Juarez and Abraham Lincoln both fought, have reiterated in their respective nations their adherence to freedom, human dignity, and a mutual respect among peoples. These principles are the basis of democratic life. The Presidents expressed their conviction that these also constitute the foundation of the firm friendship between Mexico and the United States. The two Presidents recognized with pleasure the high level of understanding reached in the relations between their two countries in recent years.

President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed to President Johnson the principles of the foreign policy of Mexico, in relation with the other American Republics, which, in addition to the fundamental principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and peaceful solution of controversies, include the need for maintaining constantly open the doors to dialogue. President Johnson reviewed with President Diaz Ordaz a number of problems of world-wide importance, and reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the same fundamental principles, as well as its commitment to a continuing search for peace throughout the world.

The two Heads of State reiterated the general opinion expressed in previous meetings of the Presidents of Mexico and the United States that it is in the interest of both countries to seek to maintain the access which each has to the markets of the other and to broaden these wherever possible. The Joint Trade Committee established in 1965 was discussed by both Presidents as a major step forward in expanding the already large area of mutual interests which exist between the two countries in matters of commercial interchange.⁶

Specific problems involving border trade between the two countries were mentioned by President Diaz Ordaz. The two Presidents agreed that their two Governments

⁶ For text of a joint communique released at the close of the first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Mexican Trade Committee, see *ibid.*, Nov. 8, 1965, p. 738.

should study these problems with the aim of determining what measures could be taken to expand legitimate border trade in goods produced in both countries to the benefit of the border region.

The two Presidents discussed their deep concern regarding the international market for cotton, which is the leading Mexican export product and is also of great interest to the United States and to other Western hemisphere countries. The Presidents agreed that their two Governments should consult with each other and with other interested governments on the problems of production and marketing of cotton. Regarding the International Cotton Institute, created for the purpose of promoting the increase in cotton consumption, both Heads of State expressed their determination to continue the support of their Governments for the greater success of its mission.

President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed his intention to continue the policy of promoting the economic development of Mexico at a rate substantially greater than the population increase, within a framework of monetary stability, which is so important in protecting the real income of the majority of the people. The two Presidents noted with satisfaction the increasing rate of economic and social progress in the hemisphere as a whole during the past two years and expressed their determination to continue their mutual cooperation to achieve the objectives of the Act of Bogotá of 1960, the Charter of Punta del Este of 1961, and the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro of 1965.⁷

The two Presidents were in agreement that the Supervised Agricultural Credit Program under the Alliance for Progress has proved an excellent example of the cooperation between the public and private banking institutions of both countries in carrying out the objectives of the Act of Bogotá and the Charter of Punta del Este, as already mentioned, contributing effectively to the

expansion of agricultural productivity and the modernization of rural life.

The two Presidents expressed their determination to improve the relations between the frontier cities of both countries, and to elevate the life of those who live in the border region. They agreed to create a commission which would study the manner in which these objectives could be realized by cooperative action to raise the standard of living of the respective communities, from a social and cultural as well as a material point of view.

The two Presidents expressed their determination to create an Abraham Lincoln Fund in Mexico and a Benito Juarez Fund in the United States in order to grant scholarships to the youth of the hemisphere who might be selected by a Joint Commission in order to continue their studies in institutions of higher learning of both countries.

The two Presidents agreed on the need to support the efforts for Latin American economic integration. President Diaz Ordaz expressed his satisfaction with the recent initiative of President Johnson in suggesting the creation of a special fund for the financing of pre-investment studies of multinational projects in support of regional integration.⁸ Both Presidents expressed their satisfaction that this work is moving forward under the leadership of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) with the active participation of the Inter-American Development Bank. They also noted with satisfaction the progress being made toward integration through the work of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market.

The two Presidents were pleased to note the progress achieved in the acquisition of lands, the transfer of residents and the construction of installations provided for in the convention for the solution of the Chamizal problem. They agreed to instruct the mem-

⁷ For background and text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

⁸ For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17, 1965, see *ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426.

bers of the International Boundary and Water Commission to intensify their efforts to bring about the change in the boundary as soon as possible.

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction at the manner in which the agreement reached on March 22, 1965, regarding the problem of the salinity of the waters of the Colorado River, is operating.⁹ They were in agreement regarding the need for mutual consultation before proceeding to carrying out works which in the future might create problems of a nature similar to that mentioned previously.

The two Presidents agreed on the importance for their countries of the study which, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is being carried out to determine the technical and economic possibilities of installing, at some point in Mexico near the United States border, a plant to desalinate sea water through the use of nuclear energy.

Finally, the two Presidents requested their respective Foreign Secretaries to continue their discussion of matters of common interest. President Diaz Ordaz expressed to President Johnson the deep gratitude of the Mexican people to the American people for

the gift of the statue of Abraham Lincoln and reaffirmed that he considered it a most friendly act that the Chief of State of the United States should have desired to come in person to associate himself with the homage rendered to the Great Emancipator. President Johnson expressed his appreciation for the extraordinarily generous and friendly reception by the Mexican Government and people.

OFFICIAL DELEGATION

The White House announced on April 13 (White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.)) that the following official delegation would accompany President Johnson to Mexico City:

The Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Lincoln Gordon and Mrs. Gordon
Senator and Mrs. Michael J. Mansfield
Senator and Mrs. Everett McKinley Dirksen
Senator George D. Aiken
Senator and Mrs. Paul H. Douglas
Senator and Mrs. Joseph M. Montoya
Representative and Mrs. Frank Chelf
Representative and Mrs. Eligio de la Garza
Representative and Mrs. Henry B. Gonzalez
Representative and Mrs. Glenard P. Lipscomb
Representative Edward R. Roybal
Mr. and Mrs. Felix de Weldon
Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Strelsin

⁹ For background and text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1965, p. 555.

Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and Social Progress

by Thomas C. Mann
*Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

To participate in this meeting of the Pan American Society with so many who have contributed so much to hemisphere progress is a particular pleasure for me.

It was only 20-25 years ago that the intellectual and political leaders of Latin America first turned their talents and energies to the task of modernizing their economic and social systems. Less than 25 years ago one heard in Latin America a great deal of discussion and debate about the politics of democracy and peace, about cultural values, about literature and history. The need of achieving a high and sustained rate of economic growth and the need to redress the social imbalance created by the existence of extremes of poverty and wealth were topics seldom mentioned. Words and phrases such as "gross national product," "per capita income," and "social justice," as we in this country use them today, were outside the vocabulary of everyday use. On the contrary, many asserted then that we were giving too much attention to the material things of life, to the "dollar," to "plumbing," "gadgets," and "comfort," and too little attention to superior Greco-Roman spiritual values.

The economic and social dimensions of inter-American cooperative programs were,

then, in comparative terms, only gradually and recently conceived of. Many of the innovations which have since been adopted were suggested by Latin Americans, as, for example, the social program suggested by the Government of Brazil in "Operation Pan America."

Allow me to suggest some of the principal landmarks of recent inter-American economic and social achievement which began in a program of cultural and technical cooperation in 1939.

1942

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs was established and began the first technical cooperation program, principally in agriculture and health.

1944

The Bretton Woods agreement was signed, bringing into being both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank.

1949

The Point 4 Program was formally launched. It extended the technical assistance program to other developing areas of the world and greatly enlarged our technical assistance efforts in Latin America.

1957

The Development Loan Fund was created. A few grants and concessional loans for economic development had been extended earlier, but this was the first large-scale, organized approach to the problem.

¹Address prepared for delivery before the Pan American Society of the United States at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 14 (press release 85) and read by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Robert M. Sayre. Mr. Mann accompanied President Johnson on his visit to Mexico Apr. 14-15.

1958

The Coffee Study Group was formed. This later became the International Coffee Agreement, which our Senate ratified in 1963.

1959

The Inter-American Development Bank was created with both hard- and soft-loan windows. And, in 1960, the Bank undertook to administer the Social Progress Trust Fund.

1960

The general treaty of economic integration of the five Central American Republics was signed, setting up the first common market in Latin America. And in the same year the Central American Bank for Economic Integration was created.

The Latin American Free Trade Area was brought into being by the Montevideo treaty.

The Act of Bogotá enlarged and formalized the program for economic development in the hemisphere and added a new social dimension. This act for the first time recognized the need for land tenure legislation "with a view to insuring a wider and more equitable distribution of the ownership of land in a manner consistent with the objectives of employment, productivity and economic growth." It called for reforms of "tax systems and procedures and fiscal policies"; assistance to the farmer by new or improved marketing organizations, extension services, demonstration, education, and credit facilities; the creation of building and loan and other institutions to finance low-cost housing and community development programs; expanded education and public health programs; mobilization of domestic savings and reforms of national fiscal and financial policies; the preparation of national development plans; and an annual consultative meeting to review measures taken to intensify social and economic progress.

1961

The program outlined at Bogotá was launched and given new spirit and purpose as "The Alliance for Progress."

1964

The CIAP [Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress] was created and began functioning.

1964-65

The levels of United States contribution to the cooperation effort were increased, and the average annual per capita income increases reached the Punta del Este goal.

1965

Our Congress passed the legislation permitting this country effectively to participate in the International Coffee Agreement.

Our Congress passed the Sugar Act with provisions which restored to Latin America their full share of the value of sugar sold in this market.

Creating the Conditions for Progress

Thus, since the 1940's, considerable progress has been made in getting on with an inter-American development program. And any objective stocktaking must recognize the vital role of the private sectors throughout the hemisphere and especially of private United States financial institutions which have made available on a large scale short- and medium-term credits and, in some cases, long-term credits, usually at interest rates considerably below the world level.

If noteworthy progress has been made since the midforties—and it has—then it is fair to say that every American Republic is entitled to claim its share of the credit. Neither economic and social progress nor bold, fresh ideas can be claimed as the monopoly of any country or any single group within a country. In the United States, for example, innovations designed to enlarge the scope, improve the quality, and increase the dimensions of the contributions of our public and private sectors to hemisphere progress have always received broad bipartisan support.

A great deal remains to be done. We are only on the threshold, only in the beginning stages, of our great hemisphere cooperative

program to speed up the process of economic and social development. The unprecedented growth in population poses formidable difficulties in terms of raising per capita income at the rate which the charter of Punta del Este fixes as the goal.

To the extent that our balance-of-payments and budgetary situations permit, I would hope that our own rapid economic growth will make it possible for us in the reasonably near future to raise the level of our contribution from both our public and private sectors. There is too much at stake for those of us here at home to grow faint-hearted, weary, or discouraged.

But our national efforts and those of other capital-exporting countries will not be enough. Foreign capital and international trade can, after all is said and done, only supply missing components in otherwise favorable situations. Only the developing country can create, within its own territory, those conditions which are propitious for rapid economic and social progress.

These conditions will not be created by rhetoric alone. It is idle to speculate on which group or country feels more compassion toward our fellow human beings. Compassion there is, I am convinced, in abundance in the hearts of most men.

The kind of "heart" we need in national and inter-American development programs is the heart to sweat through programs which can bring economic stability while increasing the production of goods for the consumer as well as the productivity of the worker. We need the "heart" to reform tax policies and improve tax collections so that governments may have the resources to provide the infrastructure necessary for rural and industrial development as well as adequate educational and health facilities, without which there can be no equality of opportunity. We need the "heart" to tackle all the difficult and, at times, unpopular tasks required to build and to modernize social and economic systems in order to bring about, in the phrase of Lincoln, "the greatest good for the greatest number." We need the "heart" to work not for that

kind of land distribution which leaves the farmer poorer than before but for the kind of rural modernization that will permit the farmer to raise the living standards of his family and provide his children with an opportunity to live more useful and creative lives.

There are, of course, differences of opinion between individuals and between states about the policies which are best designed to produce the ends which we seek. I do not believe either we in this land or those in other lands have a monopoly on wisdom or good judgment. A policy that produces good results in our society may not work in another environment or culture. I personally welcome a world of diversity as opposed to one of monotonous uniformity which dulls the spirit. We must remind ourselves, too, that each nation not only has a right to choose its own policies and its own path to progress but that they know their societies much better than we do.

Some Basic Guidelines

With these caveats, I would like to refer to a few basic guidelines that the experience of many countries in the last 100 years seems to me to suggest are some of the components of successful development policies.

First is the value of an adequate degree of competition. An economy which fosters and protects monopolies on a wide scale, whether they are state-owned or family-owned, is one which cannot produce high-quality goods at a low price for its people because monopolies have no incentive to become efficient. The result is that the real income of the people—their standard of living—is reduced. The result is that the worker loses his opportunity for noninflationary, and hence real, wage increases based on improved productivity. Another result is that inefficient industries cannot compete on the world market and hence cannot earn foreign exchange in quantities necessary to finance their growing development needs.

Second is the need for developing coun-

tries to compete with each other. This can be done within the framework of regional markets, such as the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area. And there should be preparation for eventual competition with the outside world. Regional trading arrangements provide regional markets of a sufficient size to justify new, large, and efficient industries. But the effective creation of adequate regional markets depends on the degree of competition permitted within the region.

Third is the need to avoid excessive and unnecessary centralized controls which introduce excessive administrative delays and impede the decisionmaking process in farms and factories and in service industries. Those economies in the world today which operate in relative freedom, which make it possible for the private sector to exercise its ingenuity and initiative, are, by and large, those which are experiencing dynamic growth and earning the most foreign exchange. They are also doing the most to improve the living standards of their people. Conversely, those economies which are burdened down with excessive controls are those, by and large, which are progressing at the slowest rate and, in some cases, beginning to look seriously at the advantages of "decentralization."

And, as a corollary to this, I would suggest that we examine carefully the advantages of each country creating, in its own economy, an atmosphere which encourages savings by the people and the investment of those savings in tax-paying, job-creating, and foreign-exchange-earning enterprises.

All this does not by any means suggest a *laissez-faire* economy of the kind which existed in the 1800's is desirable. Indeed, incentives to the private sector should be accompanied by measures to prevent abuse and exploitation of man by man. The reason why we have restraints built into our laws is that we learned long ago, as an early American observed, that "men are not an-

gels." But it is far easier for government to prevent abuses of power by capital or labor than it is to manage efficiently a complex modern economy.

Nor do I suggest that governments should not use their fiscal and monetary authority to create conditions propitious for a high rate of employment and utilization of plant capacity, or that government ownership or management of a limited number of enterprises truly affected with a public interest is necessarily bad. All modern government policies today must take into account their effect on the process of development. It is the degree of government intervention, rather than any doctrine, which is important.

Fourth, the production of food for growing populations deserves a higher priority in comparison to industries which are promoted for nationalistic or "prestige" reasons. Not only should industrial and agricultural development be balanced; they are in fact indivisible. One cannot proceed without the other.

Fifth, we need continually to reexamine the whole complex range of self-help measures so essential to national and regional economic and social progress. Fiscal and monetary discipline, for example, is not always easy to achieve or to maintain. Like all countries, we have our own problems. But we have learned by trial and error that it is an essential part of any viable program of sustained progress, either social or economic.

I am sure that many of you here have your own ideas about what we of the "inter-American family" could usefully do to speed up the rate of progress. I am sure that there is considerable room for improvement on those ideas which I have discussed tonight. I would hope that all Americans from the Strait of Magellan to the Arctic Circle will continue to think and talk about these and other issues which really matter. If we can learn to do so in a friendly, tolerant fashion, perhaps all of us can benefit.

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective Action

*Statement by Lincoln Gordon
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

It is a privilege to represent my Government at this fourth annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the ministerial level. The great city of Buenos Aires is an especially appropriate setting for this meeting. We are all deeply indebted to President [Arturo Umberto] Illia, Minister [Juan Carlos] Pugliese, and the other Argentine authorities for their hospitality and for the remarkably fine environment which they have provided for our work.

We are here to review the status of the Alliance for Progress after almost 5 years, to evaluate objectively its strengths and its weaknesses. Above all, we are here to identify the fields of action in which a new collective impulse is required and the ways and means to provide that impulse.

If you will permit a personal reference, Mr. President, I should like to say that I find it an especially welcome task to participate in this work with my colleagues and friends of Latin America. The seeds of the Alliance for Progress were planted during the last decade by scholars and leaders of public opinion from all parts of this hemisphere. They saw the need for a new cooperative effort, comparable in spirit to the Marshall Plan for European recovery although obviously different in content, methods, and timing, since it was addressed to a

wholly different kind of problem. This concept was endorsed by many North Americans concerned with inter-American relations, including several of us who later became advisers to President Kennedy. These facts, by the way, should correct an often-heard error that the Alliance for Progress was merely a response to events in Cuba in 1959 and 1960.

With the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank and the adoption of the Act of Bogotá, circumstances were ripe in 1961 for the launching of a comprehensive and imaginative program. Even before he took office, President Kennedy decided to make United States participation in an Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere a cardinal element of his foreign policy. He won prompt enthusiasm and support from our own Congress, both of our political parties, and our public opinion, and a warm response from governments and peoples throughout the continent.

It was not enough, however, to have good will and a valid philosophy of cooperation. It was necessary to work together with the governments of our sister nations in refining objectives and in defining the national and international actions and mechanisms to set in motion the mobilization of resources, the institutional changes, and the structural reforms which would make the Alliance for Progress a going concern, bringing real and continuing benefits to our respective peoples. That step was well accomplished at Punta del Este.

¹ Made before the fourth annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Buenos Aires, Argentina, on Mar. 29 (press release 72 dated Mar. 31).

During 4½ years as United States Ambassador to Brazil, my own central concern was the development of the Alliance for Progress in that great neighboring nation. At the halfway point of my assignment there, when Vice President Johnson succeeded to our Presidency at a tragic moment of history, I wondered, like many others, what the effect would be on United States policy toward the Alliance for Progress. The answer was prompt in coming. As his first act in the field of foreign affairs, President Johnson invited the Latin American Ambassadors in Washington to meet with him and to learn of his unequivocal resolve to carry forward our part of this collaborative effort—to help give it ever greater substance and vigor.²

As the United States report³ to the meeting makes clear, this continuing resolve has been demonstrated not merely by words but by concrete actions year after year. The program continues to enjoy the support of our Congress, our two political parties, and our public opinion. Since my recent return to Washington as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and United States Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, President Johnson has again made clear—in private and public—that the Alliance continues to be the cornerstone of United States policy in the Western Hemisphere. His deep concern is that it should produce real and measurable results, that it should truly accelerate economic growth, greater social justice, and stronger democratic institutions, and that none of us should falter in our sense of urgency to secure these results.

On the plane of basic principles which govern our mutual collaboration in the economic and social fields, the Charter of Punta del Este was not only reaffirmed but in important respects broadened by the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro, unanimously adopted by the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference last November.⁴ It was also agreed there that the central concepts of a permanent character should be incorporated into the basic charter of our organization. A special com-

mission was established in Panama to propose to our governments specific language for this new and forward-looking charter. Their work will now be carried forward by the Council and will be concluded at the Third Extraordinary Inter-American Conference, to take place in this city 4 months hence. I am certain that it will be a successful and fruitful conclusion.

Given the necessary period for ratification by our various congresses, it will doubtless be some time before the new charter is juridically in force. My own Government, however, considers the principles agreed to at Rio de Janeiro to be already operative as a statement of governmental policy, adopted by the highest organ of the inter-American system. Temporary differences of opinion as to precisely what words should be incorporated into treaty obligations, consonant with our respective constitutional procedures and requirements, should not be misconstrued as differences of principle or policy. The United States stands by the principles of Punta del Este and Rio de Janeiro. It is our task here, as a Council subordinate to the conference, to work within those principles in developing concrete programs of action for carrying forward our common enterprise.

Balance Sheet of First 5 Years

The balance sheet of these first 5 years, Mr. President, has been well prepared for us in the country reports and in the documents of CIAP [Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress], the secretariat, and the various international bodies who cooperate in the work of the Alliance, all masterfully summarized by our meeting

² For remarks by President Johnson on Nov. 26, 1963, see BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1964, p. 912.

³ *Report to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council Presented by the Government of the United States of America, 1966*; single copies are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

⁴ For background and text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

of experts. In fact, much has been done. The overall indexes of growth, especially during the past 2 years, are promising, despite the unevenness which is inevitable in a continent as varied as ours.

There has been a strong surge forward in infrastructure, notably electric power and transportation. Industrial expansion and diversification are proceeding, although more slowly than we would like. Social investment still lags badly, but there has been notable progress in the availability of pure water—the first step toward improved public health—in the eradication of malaria, in the building of primary schools, and in some countries in low-cost housing. Additionally, a whole series of new intermediate credit institutions has been established to provide reasonably priced credit in the fields of industry, housing, and agriculture.

Among the sectors of least progress are agricultural modernization, export diversification, and education beyond the primary level.

We have no reason to be complacent. But as we listen to reports from country after country, we can say with assurance that we have reached what Winston Churchill called the end of the beginning. And far from being moribund, as some journalists would like to pretend, the Alliance for Progress has never been more alive.

It is true, as Minister Roberto Campos said yesterday, that the Alliance has not taken on the aspect of a continental charismatic crusade. All of us know, however, that there has been a profound change of attitudes in these 5 years. There is a concentration of governmental effort and of popular interest in economic and social progress. There is an enormous advance in realistic understanding of the obstacles to development and of the basic lines of public policy and institutional modernization required to overcome them. The concept of more realistic planning has taken a firm foothold. There have been notable successes in coming to grips with excessive inflation. Tax reform is no longer simply a slogan in much of the hemisphere. Agrarian reform

is no longer a demagogic banner but part of a growing effort to secure simultaneous higher agricultural output, improved productivity, greater social justice in land tenure and systems of tenancy, and greater integration between agriculture and industry. The movement for regional economic integration, in its infancy 5 years ago, has made important strides.

The Alliance is benefiting from an effective mobilization of the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank group, and the International Monetary Fund. Steady progress is being made by the CIAP in giving our mutual cooperation a truly multilateral character and providing it with continuity and consistency. The establishment of priorities and the preparation of projects for public investment is an increasingly understood art. Realistic incentives and institutional improvements for strengthening the private sector have been introduced in many countries. And perhaps of greatest importance, there has been universal acceptance in the hemisphere of the principle of mutual assistance among all the member countries.

These developments form part of the "self-help" recognized as indispensable at Punta del Este, not as a condition imposed to secure external assistance but as the basis for any meaningful development effort and the foundation for useful international cooperation. It is these changes of attitude which indeed justify Secretary General Mora's [José Mora, Organization of American States] suggestion that we are now an alliance not only *for* progress but an alliance *in* progress.

A Program of Action

How, then, Mr. President, do we move forward from here? I would hope that out of this annual meeting of economic ministers would come a clear-cut program of action, framed in practical terms against which progress can be measured when we meet again next year.

Let me suggest some items which might figure in such an action program, beginning

with measures of critical importance in the national programs of the Latin American member countries.

First, surely there should be an intensive study in each nation, beginning now, of manpower needs as the basis for the planning and financing of national education programs. Education is not a social welfare luxury to be assigned marginal resources left over from more important objectives. Properly conceived and administered, it is a highly productive investment in human capital and a vital ingredient of development. It is indispensable to social mobility and a cardinal prerequisite of effective political democracy. Year after year has gone by without the development of workable plans for educational modernization and expansion. The external financial institutions, national and international, have for some years indicated their readiness to assist in such programs if sound projects were submitted to them. Is it too much to ask the governments of Latin America to have ready by the time of the CIES [Inter-American Economic and Social Council] meeting their plans for educational development?

Secondly, there is the sector of agricultural production and agrarian reform, already commented on by Dr. Santa Cruz [Hernán Santa Cruz, Assistant Director-General for Latin American Affairs, Food and Agriculture Organization] and many other delegates to this conference. Here again, it would seem appropriate to recommend that each member state report in detail at the next meeting of CIES on the steps that have been taken during the coming year to modernize the production of foodstuffs and the systems of land tenure and tenancy. This would include actions to increase productivity through the production and use of fertilizer and pesticides, to provide better credit and technical assistance to the farmer, and to improve marketing and distribution methods, as well as an evaluation of other government measures such as exchange and price policies.

Third, in the field of health, which clearly

affects development and also strikes at our conscience, most national programs have been seriously inadequate in determining priorities and assigning resources. Malnutrition, prevention of endemic diseases, training of specialized personnel, and establishment of minimal health services in remote areas are all key elements of this sector, as is the burden on development in some areas posed by very rapid demographic growth. We should be able to hope for specific national programs in the health field, which might become the basis for significant international support.

Fourth, tax reform, both structural and administrative, has made great headway in the last 5 years, but there is still much to be done. In many countries the structure of consumer taxes still provides artificial encouragement of vertical integration of industries through their application at several levels of production and distribution. Also, there is little use of well-known procedures for accelerating tax collection, such as pay-as-you-go systems and withholding taxes at the source. Such measures assist in combating inflation as well as in mobilizing governmental revenues. In its country reviews CIAP should give special attention to further improvements in tax systems.

Fifth, the report of our experts meeting amply demonstrates the need for closer ties between the planning offices of the various governments and the key political and administrative authorities responsible for budgetmaking, fiscal control, and public investment. Prompt steps would appear advisable to accomplish this end.

U.S. Trade Policy

Turning now to areas of policy which fall in the external sector and which more directly involve multilateral cooperation, let me first refer to foreign trade. The documents and speeches presented at this meeting leave no doubt as to the vital interest of Latin America in wider trading opportunities and increased earnings from exports. Much has been said about restrictions in the United States market on certain commodi-

ties of major export interest to Latin America. These presentations will be given most sympathetic consideration by my Government.

For over 30 years, United States foreign economic policy has been pointed toward greater liberalization of trade and more efficient worldwide arrangements for commercial and financial transactions. That effort has been accelerated in the postwar years, with very substantial results. It is continuing in the current negotiations on the Kennedy Round and the discussions of international financial liquidity. We believe that the success of these efforts will redound to the benefit of Latin America as well as other regions.

Where considerations of national security or structural problems within our own economy have led to the imposition of import restrictions, we have endeavored to avoid unduly adverse effects on Latin American suppliers. In the case of meat, for example, standby import restrictions were set substantially above the level of recent imports to insure that foreign suppliers will be able to share in market growth. Our sugar legislation has greatly enlarged the quotas for Latin American sales at a premium price nearly three times the world level. Current cotton policy includes a strong disincentive for domestic production so that we expect the United States cotton area to fall this year by 1.3 million acres. We have recently removed import charges on lead and zinc. Only a few days ago our Secretary of the Interior announced the termination of import controls on residual petroleum fuels for the eastern district of the United States.

In the administration of our Public Law 480, which has been of substantial benefit to several Latin American development programs, we have scrupulously sought to respect the market positions of normal suppliers, including provision for their participation in market growth.

Moreover, we are actively engaged in cooperative efforts to help stabilize and improve Latin American export earnings for several of the major traditional commodi-

ties. In this field we strongly endorse the recommendations of the experts for reduced trade barriers and elimination of trade discrimination, reduced obstacles to increased consumption, scrupulous observance of the standstill principle, strengthening of existing commodity agreements, and the encouragement of new agreements or other appropriate arrangements for other primary commodities, and an improvement of the financial mechanisms presently available to compensate for undue price fluctuations beyond the control of the exporting countries.

Even more important for the future is the potential for Latin America's nontraditional exports. In the long run, the only satisfactory basis for an adequate capacity to import is expanded and diversified exports of products in growing world demand, whether primary, semiprocessed, or manufactured. Although still small in volume, the recent record of Latin America in nontraditional exports is a dynamic one. This momentum must not be lost. Here, again, we have before us action recommendations from the experts, including financing facilities for such exports, stronger national institutions to stimulate exports, establishment of an Inter-American Export Promotion Agency, and exploration of an international export credit insurance system. We will cooperate with action along these lines.

In this field, trade and aid should be recognized as complementary rather than conflicting. Both public international credits and foreign private investment can play a large role in capitalizing new export industries and providing techniques for production at competitive cost levels.

Regarding the international monetary system, I wish to reaffirm the position set forth by our Secretary of the Treasury at the last meeting of the International Monetary Fund.⁵ This is that all nations, developed and developing alike, have a vital interest in the nature and scope of any changes which may be made in this system.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1965, p. 619.

The views of all the countries of the free world, decidedly including those of Latin America, must be heard and considered in the process of international monetary improvement.

Intimately related to this problem is the successful outcome of the current efforts of my Government to achieve equilibrium in the United States balance of payments. Almost all the ministers here have struggled with severe balance-of-payments problems in their own countries, and I know they will appreciate the special constraints which the present situation imposes upon us.

One aspect of these constraints has received special attention at these meetings—the problem of tied aid. In principle, we accept the ideal that the assistance from all capital-supplying nations should be usable under the most advantageous possible conditions. This policy was followed by the United States for many years, despite our inability to persuade other capital-exporting nations to do likewise even when they enjoyed balance-of-payments surpluses. But now, under our present balance-of-payments conditions, the United States has no option but to insure that our foreign assistance involves a transfer of real resources, and not merely financial resources, from the United States.

It should also be recalled that in securing the voluntary cooperation of industrial concerns and financial institutions in the effort to correct our balance-of-payments deficit, special care has been taken to avoid limitations on direct investment or financial credits to Latin America.

Happily, considerable progress has been made toward the objective of balance-of-payments equilibrium. We have not yet reached the stage, however, where any relaxation of our efforts is possible. The struggle for freedom in Viet-Nam has to some extent magnified the difficulties. Achievement of payments equilibrium, however, will be of benefit not only to the United States and its dollar but also to the rest of this hemisphere and to the entire free world.

Program Assistance and Project Loans

We have also noted, Mr. President, the concern expressed by the experts and by several of the delegates regarding the forms of external assistance, notably the relative merits of so-called program assistance in relation to project loans. In fact, both types of assistance are and have been fruitful means of supporting national development efforts. The program loan has been of special value in supporting integrated programs of stabilization, development, and reform, accompanied by far-reaching commitments of economic performance presented to and reviewed by CIAP. The counterpart in local currency of such loans has also been of great value in financing intermediate credit institutions and other high-priority investments in line with the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

Obviously, neither these local currencies nor local currency made available through project loans should be mere substitutes for the mobilization of local resources. They should be provided only when the overall mobilization and application of local resources meets the standards of the Alliance. It is equally essential that such loans be matched by real imports and not merely add excessively to foreign exchange reserves, since their purpose is a transfer of real resources for additional investment.

Nor does the use of program loans avoid the necessity for project development, whether in the public or the private sector. This is an inescapable requirement of the development process, and it is one on which progress has been seriously inadequate. As President [George] Woods of the World Bank has repeatedly pointed out, redoubled efforts must be devoted to project formulation, whatever the form of external assistance that may be made available.

One signal disappointment in our progress thus far, compared with the targets of Punta del Este, is the small volume of new private foreign investment participating in expanded Latin American development. The hindrances posed by political instability and by unrestrained inflation are well known.

Fortunately, recent trends appear favorable, but we should lose no opportunity to reinforce them.

In this connection one useful device might be the multilateralization of investment guarantees through a joint agreement providing uniform procedures whereby individual governments guarantee the investments of their nationals in other participating nations. Such an agreement could make a valuable contribution toward the establishment of uniform standards in the relationships between host countries and those issuing guarantees to their investors. Several of the Latin American countries are now beginning to develop a flow of private investment into other countries of the hemisphere, a gratifying development eminently consistent with the spirit of the Act of Rio.

I have asked to be circulated for the information of the delegates a possible form of multilateral investment guarantee agreement to illustrate the sort of instrument I have in mind. I would suggest that CIAP be requested to consult with member governments to determine the extent of interest on their part, and if there is significant interest, to convoke a conference for the negotiation of an agreement. Any such agreement would, of course, be kept open for the eventual accession of other governments. In any such conference, it would be well to request representation from the World Bank, which is also giving intensive consideration to this topic.

Financing Multinational Projects

I mentioned earlier the heartening progress in the movement for Latin American economic integration, both through the Central American Common Market and through the Latin American Free Trade Area. How to press forward with this vital process, and how best to relate these two institutions, is of course primarily a matter for the governments directly involved. My Government heartily supports this movement and is disposed to cooperate with it.

One especially promising area for outside

support is in the study and eventual participation in the financing of multinational projects. I need not repeat the declarations on this topic made by Secretary General Mora, CIAP Chairman [Carlos] Sanz de Santamaría, and Inter-American Bank President Felipe Herrera. Dr. Herrera has indicated his intention to propose that the Inter-American Development Bank establish a fund for feasibility studies of multinational projects. We will support this proposal. Moreover, we are prepared to reinforce the Bank's resources by providing supplementary loans for large-scale feasibility studies when preliminary investigation under the Bank's auspices indicates their desirability. The longrun contribution of such projects to the region's development can scarcely be overestimated. The interior of South America contains the largest area on the face of the globe which is readily habitable by man but still largely unoccupied and undeveloped. Both here and in Central America there are prodigious opportunities awaiting systematic study and joint action.

Other speakers have mentioned the main fields: river basin development for electric power, irrigation, and flood control; main connecting highways and access roads; and networks of telecommunications. Others may come to the surface, such as natural gas pipelines or international complexes for fertilizer production and distribution. What is essential is that action be started now to appraise these opportunities realistically so that their planning and programing can be given proper priority in regional development alongside purely national projects. We also suggest for your consideration that, even now, it would be appropriate for the suppliers of external resources to the Alliance to plan that a regular proportion of their funds be made available to finance multinational projects.

In this connection, also, new steps must be taken to improve the capacity for research and technological development for the special conditions of Latin America. The beginnings have already been made in small but high-quality research centers staffed by

specialists of great talent. Surely international cooperation could greatly fortify these efforts. As two examples which readily come to mind, there are the field of tropical agriculture and the combating of endemic diseases which plague large areas of the continent. The great private foundations of the United States have done pioneering work in some of these fields, and my Government is prepared to join in cooperation with Latin American public and private agencies to these ends.

An additional virtue of such a development would be the attraction of gifted young people into scientific and technological specialties and their retention in the service of Latin America, instead of their loss to more advanced countries, which all too often now occurs. Only in this way can Latin America come to play its full part in the mainstream of modern technological development, which is transforming the world around us from decade to decade.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to endorse the suggestion made yesterday by the delegate of Brazil concerning our own future method of work. It is entirely appropriate that at this 5-year mark we should have undertaken a comprehensive review of where we stand and how we should move forward. Our mechanisms should certainly continue to provide for an annual review of progress and problems, country by country, and for the region as a whole.

At the ministerial level in future years, however, I believe that we should concentrate our discussions on a more limited number of topics which could be examined in depth. They might include, first, a review of the progress made in accordance with our own specific program of action and then a thorough examination of a few issues of highest urgency. To this end, it might be well for the CIAP at a time 2 or 3 months in advance of the next annual meeting to recommend such fields for examination so that the proper documentation could be prepared and studied by all of us with a view toward thorough analysis and appropriate decision for action on our part.

Spirit of the Alliance for Progress

Mr. President, as economic ministers we are concerned in our daily tasks with the dry materials of economic policymaking—with budget and credit and balance-of-payments statistics, with production and trade and wages and prices, with laws and decrees and the texts of international agreements. We should never forget, however, that what is at stake is the lives and welfare of human beings—their opportunities, their liberties, and their dignity. Even in these early years of the Alliance, some of us have had the privilege of seeing electricity and access roads brought to hitherto isolated communities; of seeing healthy children where polluted water supplies had previously brought early death to one newborn infant out of two; of seeing the pride of parents and the hopes of children attending schools where for centuries the fate of each new generation was merely to plod through life in the weary patterns of its forebears. Our task, however, is not to help change these conditions for the people; it is to change these conditions with the people. It is their participation, their full integration into the active life of modern society, which gives the Alliance for Progress its moral basis. This is what has enlisted the enthusiasm of our own Peace Corps and is increasingly enlisting the enthusiasm of national youth corps in many other member countries.

This is also the spirit that infuses the concept which President Johnson has called the Great Society. The goals of that society are material in part—to cope with problems of urban congestion, river pollution, medical care for the aged, and the continuous upgrading of working skills. But their essential purpose is more than material. It is to eliminate the last vestiges of discrimination and inequality of opportunity which have become intolerable to the national conscience of a free and democratic society. We in the United States, therefore, are also a nation in continuing development, guided by the same spirit as the Alliance for Progress.

Nor can we lose sight of the fact that

the end of our efforts is not only economic and social progress. It is in equal measure respect for human rights and the constantly improved functioning of representative democracy. We see the objectives of development and democracy as indivisible. Without advance in the material condition of our peoples, democracy cannot survive. But freedom of expression, initiative in experimentation, and the capacity for responsible self-government are also stimuli to economic development as well as most precious ends in themselves.

We also believe that nations developing in this spirit will inevitably strengthen their bonds of solidarity and mutual cooperation in a nexus of ever-growing interdependence. In the wider context beyond this hemisphere, we foresee the role of a free and increasingly prosperous Latin America as a vital force in the cause of peace and freedom and human dignity throughout the world.

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1966

A PROCLAMATION¹

On the fourteenth of April, seventy-six years ago, the nations of the Western Hemisphere formally pledged themselves to the joint pursuit of peace and justice for all our peoples. The regional system then freely established, and now known as the Organization of American States, has been a great instrument for cooperation throughout the Americas.

Seven years ago the American governments at Buenos Aires began charting new directions for economic and social advancement in the hemisphere. In 1959, we jointly agreed to establish the Inter-American Development Bank to give new impetus to economic development. At Bogota the following year, social progress was recognized as a parallel objective for inter-American cooperation. In 1961 at Punta del Este we joined with nineteen of our sister Republics in a vast collective enterprise of development and reform: the Alliance for Progress. Since assuming office in November 1963 it has been my deep concern that the Alliance should produce

real and measurable results—in accelerating economic growth, expanding social justice, and strengthening democratic institutions.

What has been accomplished in Latin America in the last two years shows how far we have forged ahead.

In political terms there is:

—A growing number of vigorous political leaders committed to revolutionary change through reform in freedom.

—Wider participation in the democratic process, particularly at the grass roots level.

—Increasing appreciation of the need for full citizen involvement in national affairs.

—Greater stability and a strengthening of democratic institutions.

—Keener awareness of the danger of communist subversion and greater resolve to combat it.

In economic and financial terms:

—The rate of growth in Gross National Product has exceeded the Punta del Este target.

—The annual volume of national savings has increased by 1.5 billion dollars.

—Central government revenues have risen by almost 20 percent.

—The annual level of exports has grown by close to a billion and a half dollars.

—The annual level of imports has advanced by almost one billion dollars.

—Loan authorizations and commitments from the United States and the international financial institutions have increased by 863 million dollars.

In human terms, the Alliance in the past two years has made possible the training of over 100,000 school teachers; it has built many thousands of new schools and homes; it has brought safe drinking water to tens of millions; and it has opened up opportunities for fuller participation in modern industry and agriculture.

But these achievements from common endeavors represent only a beginning. Major deficiencies remain to be overcome. Vast new opportunities for progress wait to be conquered. We must continue our present programs—quicken the pace. We must also move boldly toward the new frontiers. One of these is the economic integration of Latin America: the key to larger markets, greater production, more rational utilization of resources, better communication, and new levels of material prosperity and mutual understanding. We heartily support this vital process and pledge our cooperation.

Another is to open up the vast, untapped interior of South America through multinational projects to which I referred last August.² Between Panama in

¹ No. 3713; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 5603.

² For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17, 1965, see *BULLETIN* of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426.

the north and Argentina in the south lie hundreds of thousands of square miles of fertile land waiting to be cultivated; mineral and petroleum deposits to be discovered and forged into new industries. We in the United States stand ready to help the peoples of Latin America in making these dreams become a reality. This will require a new kind of cooperation because these horizons touch more than one nation.

On this anniversary, the United States strongly reaffirms its own continuing commitment to the common task of building a Western Hemisphere of economic abundance and political freedom in which every individual will have his full and equitable share.

We call upon our sister Republics to join us once again in renewing the hope and the promise which first beacons our ancestors to the New World, and which are our most solemn obligations to the generations which will come after us.


NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Thursday, April 14, 1966, as Pan American Day, and the week beginning April 10 and ending April 16 as Pan American Week; and I call upon the Governors of the fifty States of the Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the officials of all other areas under the flag of the United States to issue similar proclamations.

I call upon my fellow countrymen to renew their commitment to our neighbors in this hemisphere, and to reaffirm that commitment by support for the Organization of American States.

Further, I call upon this Nation to rededicate itself to the ideals of the inter-American system, as embodied in the Charter of the Organization of the American States, and to the goals of economic and social progress of the Charter of Punta del Este and the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro,³ which are so firmly founded on our belief in the dignity of man, and on our faith in the future of freedom.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998.

President Hails Congressional Support of Food Aid to India

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated April 19

I have approved H. J. Res. 997, "To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people."

Through this joint resolution the Congress has acted with dispatch, statesmanship, and humanity. It supports and endorses my recent offer to enlarge our food shipments to the people of India to help them avoid the suffering that would otherwise result from the worst drought in a century.¹

India simply cannot sustain its 500 million people from its drought-stricken resources until the next major harvest in November.

When others were in need and we could help, our people have always responded with responsibility and compassion. However distant other lands may be, in the end our people understand that we are a part of a human family.

I am confident that the prompt reaction of the Congress will encourage the governments of other nations to help bridge the gap left in India by this great natural disaster. Some nations, among them Canada, have already responded on a substantial scale. Others, with limited resources of their own, have, nevertheless, reached out generously to help.

We hope that all nations will pause now and ask themselves: What more can we do? At stake is the salvation of countless families and, in particular, millions of children: a great nation's future citizens. None of us can rest easy until we know in our hearts that we have done everything that is possible to protect them from malnutrition, hunger, and even from starvation itself.

¹ For the President's message to Congress concerning the Indian food problem, see BULLETIN of April 18, 1966, p. 605.

I am confident from my talks with Prime Minister [Indira] Gandhi² that the Indian Government will use the time gained by our assistance—and that of others—to mount a determined and effective policy to raise India's own agricultural production. In the end, only by its own efforts can the people of India be fed.

Our assistance has already looked beyond the present drought to enlarging the next harvest. We granted some time ago a \$50 million loan for chemical fertilizers and are helping Indian agriculture in many other ways. The assistance of many governments, international organizations, and private industry will all be required in this essential longrun effort.

In other times, famine in one nation was regarded as a fact to be passively accepted. Now, however imperfect our organization, we must learn to behave like a world community; for modern communications have brought nations closer than our own States were, not so long ago.

The joint resolution I approve today [April 19] recognizes and contributes to this vision of where we are and where we must go.

TEXT OF CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

JOINT RESOLUTION³

To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this Nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress is considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem;

Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not the lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-

² *Ibid.*, p. 603.

³ Public Law 89-406, 89th Cong., H. J. Res. 997, Apr. 19, 1966.

tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress endorses and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by making available to India under Public Law 480 agricultural commodities to meet India's normal import needs plus added quantities of agricultural commodities as the United States share in the international response to the Indian emergency;

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production;

That the Congress urges the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in a truly international response to India's critical need.

The Congress urges that to the extent necessary the food made available by this program be distributed in such manner that hungry people without money will be able to obtain food.

President Johnson Holds Talks With SEATO Secretary General

Following is the text of a White House statement released on April 19 following President Johnson's meeting with Jesús Vargas, Secretary General of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

White House press release dated April 19

President Johnson extended a warm welcome to Secretary General Vargas on behalf of the United States Government. The President noted with pleasure that the Secretary General had had an opportunity to meet with the Vice President and senior officials here in Washington, including Secretary Rusk. General Vargas also will be meeting with Secretary McNamara later today and with United Nations Secretary-General U Thant and Ambassador Goldberg in New York.

The President was glad to have had an opportunity to talk personally with the Secretary General, not only because the United States considers SEATO vital to the security of Southeast Asia, but also because Gen-

eral Vargas has himself been a champion of the cause of freedom in his own country and now in a distinguished international capacity.

Secretary General Vargas expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the President as well as other United States Government leaders. His visit to the United States was one of a series he is making to all SEATO member countries for the first time in his present capacity. He hoped to complete those visits prior to the next SEATO Council meeting, to be held in Canberra at the end of June. The Secretary

General expressed his gratitude for the very strong United States support for all the organization's activities, including joint military planning, countersubversion, and other efforts designed to deter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

The President expressed his hope that the Canberra Council meeting would succeed in furthering the objectives of the Organization. He noted that Secretary Rusk was expected to head the United States delegation on that occasion. The President wished General Vargas every success in his tenure as SEATO Secretary General.

The United Nations: A Progress Report

by Arthur J. Goldberg

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

Your invitation gives me an opportunity which I value highly, because I know well the vital importance of close and frank contact between public officials and you gentlemen of the working press. And there is no area in which this contact is more necessary than in the arduous and complex search for international peace which we pursue at the United Nations.

Today I would like to give you a short progress report on the major questions that have taken up most of our time and energy at the United Nations in these 9 months since it fell to me to succeed—I will not say “replace,” because nobody could replace him—the illustrious Adlai Stevenson.

The major questions have been, first, the crisis over the financing of certain U.N. peacekeeping operations; then the Kashmir crisis; then the Vietnamese question which

we laid before the Security Council. In the background of Viet-Nam we have also the question of Red China's relation to the world community and specifically to the U.N. Finally, and most recently, we have had the crisis over Rhodesia. I would like to take up these topics in order, and then I will reply to your questions.

Financing and Peacekeeping

When I arrived at the U.N. the organization was virtually paralyzed by the controversy over the obligation of member states to pay their assessed share for its peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. It had become clear that, despite the opinion of the World Court and our own best efforts, the majority in the Assembly was not prepared to impose upon the delinquent member states the penalty laid down in article 19 of the charter—namely, the loss of their vote in the General Assembly.

¹ Address made before the National Press Club at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 19 (U.S./U.N. press release 4833 dated Apr. 18).

In this situation it fell to me to announce our distasteful decision to agree that the General Assembly should resume its normal functioning with all members voting.² I have no regrets over this decision. What was most immediately urgent was that the organization be enabled to continue to carry on its business.

But in the long run the U.N. has no more important objective than that of developing its peacekeeping capacity, and we remain very active in promoting that objective. Next week in New York the 33-member Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations will meet to consider changes in U.N. procedures for authorizing and financing peacekeeping operations. We attach great importance to the work of this body. The capacity of the United Nations to help in keeping the peace must not be weakened; it must be made stronger, and the United States will join wholeheartedly with those in the Committee and in the Assembly who work to make it stronger.

Kashmir

Of course, even now, despite the financing crisis, the U.N. remains a potent peacekeeper. This was proved last September when the long-smoldering conflict over Kashmir erupted into large-scale violence. The United Nations was thereby confronted with what was perhaps the most serious armed clash between two member states with which it had ever dealt. It was of course all the more alarming to the United States, because India and Pakistan are two very important nations whose friendship and progress we highly value and because just over the Himalayas Red China was sitting, eagerly waiting for a chance to pick up the pieces.

The cease-fire, which was the prerequisite to all the steps that followed, was achieved on September 22 as a direct outgrowth of the Security Council resolution 2 days earlier.³ This in turn paved the way for the Tashkent agreement which followed in January, leading to the withdrawal of forces. Tashkent, incidentally, offers a vivid illus-

tration of a situation in which the Soviet Union perceives that its interest in a step toward peace runs parallel to that of the vast majority of nations of the world. May there be more such situations!

Of course the Kashmir question remains on the Security Council's agenda. It is a deep-lying issue involving long-entrenched interests and emotions on both sides. But by moving the immediate conflict off the battlefield and into the conference room, we achieved something substantial not only for India and Pakistan but for the peace of the world. If the U.N. had done nothing else in 1965, that achievement alone would justify many times over the annual cost of the United Nations.

Viet-Nam

Now let me comment briefly on activity at the United Nations relating to the conflict in Viet-Nam.

One of my first actions after presenting my credentials last July was to send a letter to the President of the Security Council,⁴ emphasizing the United States' continued willingness to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Council in finding a formula which would restore peace to Viet-Nam. This was only one step in a continuous process of consultation with Secretary-General U Thant and with many member states, particularly members of the Council.

Then in early January we informed all 117 members of the United Nations of our unprecedented diplomatic effort—unprecedented in intensity and variety—to open the path to negotiations; and we made crystal clear our willingness to begin negotiations and the goals we would seek in them.⁵

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 454.

³ For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 602.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278.

⁵ For text of a letter from Ambassador Goldberg to Secretary-General U Thant, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 117.

But this effort—which included a 37-day unilateral suspension of bombing of North Viet-Nam—brought forth no helpful response. There was no letup in acts of war by Hanoi or the Viet Cong; there was no reduction in infiltration, in acts of terror, in the supply of men and arms. The response in words was equally negative: a restatement of old conditions and the addition of still another condition which the United States must accept before negotiations could begin.

It was against this background that the President ordered an end to the 37-day suspension of bombing of North Viet-Nam and, simultaneously, instructed me to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council.⁶ Our purpose in resorting formally to the Council was to make it clear that even though all the peace moves we and others had made had been rebuffed, we remained resolved to seek a peaceful settlement. Although the Council was unable to agree on any formal action, the presence of the Viet-Nam item on its agenda gives us a reference point which could be highly useful in the future.

On the Viet-Nam question, then, the United Nations up to now has served chiefly as a center of diplomatic communication. It is fair to ask whether we can realistically expect it to render any other kind of service in the search for a secure peace in Viet-Nam. The most immediate necessity is one which, in all realism, the United Nations is not now prepared to undertake—namely, the defense of South Viet-Nam against armed aggression. The situation is not the same as it was when South Korea was attacked 16 years ago, and a similar United Nations response cannot be expected. The United States must continue to help South Viet-Nam defend itself. As I have said before, America is probably not the ideal policeman, nor do we wish to be; but we are willing to bear our part of the burden.

In the longer run, however, we anticipate another need which will call for an interna-

tional instrumentality such as the United Nations. Once the Geneva agreements have been reaffirmed and revitalized as a basis for an end to the fighting, somebody must police those agreements through effective patrol and supervision and thereby keep the people of South Viet-Nam secure while they freely decide their government and the future of their homeland.

The United States has no desire to exercise that responsibility itself, and we recognize there would be valid objections to our doing so. In thinking of suitable machinery our thoughts turn naturally to the United Nations or some other appropriate international body. The U.N. has a record for effective, impartial, and independent actions in other situations where passions are high and suspicions ingrained.

Meanwhile, our search for peace, as President Johnson has made abundantly clear, will continue both steadfast and flexible. We will eagerly welcome any initiative, whether in the United Nations or elsewhere, that helps to move the Viet-Nam conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

China

Now I come to a question which has become somewhat interlocked with the Vietnamese problem, namely, the perennial and multiple problem of Communist China. I will not rehearse past history but only comment briefly on the current China situation as it relates to the United Nations.

The argument is sometimes made that the Vietnamese question or the disarmament question, for example, cannot be effectively dealt with in the United Nations as long as Communist China is not a member. This does not necessarily follow, since there are plenty of precedents for the participation of nonmembers in matters before the Security Council and other United Nations organs. I might add that we have been trying to interest Red China in exploratory disarmament talks *outside* the U.N.—but so far they have refused to join in such talks.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 222.

Leaving that point aside, however, the question recurs—as it has every year since 1950—what answer the United Nations should give to Peking's perennial claim to represent China in the U.N. In that context we still hear criticism that the United States has taken it upon itself to ostracize Red China, and that except for our strenuous efforts Red China would be sitting in the U.N. today, and so forth.

I doubt that very much. The country that has really ostracized Red China is not the United States; it is Red China itself. The list of their conditions for deigning to accept a seat in the United Nations is long and unrealistic. Among other things, they demand that the Republic of China on Taiwan be ejected from the United Nations, along with whichever other countries they have put on their "imperialist puppet" list. I don't think this would be an acceptable proposal among the members of the U.N.

In this situation some people have questioned whether the United States should continue this year the parliamentary strategy that we have followed in past years to exclude Red China at the annual session of the General Assembly. This is a highly intricate question, and no change in our policy has been made. Our tactics, of course, are under review. In any case, the matter of tactics ought not to obscure the underlying reality. The Communist revolution in China, coming to power in 1949, put that enormous country under the domination of a group which still adheres to the dogma that, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, "all political power grows out of a barrel of a gun." They are pressing constantly in South and Southeast Asia and elsewhere—even as far away as Africa and Latin America, although with dwindling success—to enlarge their power and domination in the world by subversion and by force of arms. Secretary Rusk has well described their state of mind as "a combination of aggressive arrogance and obsessions of . . . (their) own making."⁷

We desire very much, in the interest of

world peace, to see the rulers of mainland China come to terms with the international community. Along many avenues, even in the face of numerous rebuffs, the United States has been trying to promote that result—not by yielding to their demands, which would bring only further demands, but by such means as our 11 years of contacts with Chinese representatives in Geneva and Warsaw; our proposals for contacts involving newspapermen, scientists, and others; and our expressed desire to see the representatives of Peking sit down and discuss disarmament and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with the other powers. They may not respond to these appeals next week or next year, but we look forward to the day when they will. Much is said about the patience and persistence of Communists; but we can be patient and persistent too.

Southern Rhodesia

Finally, I come to the Rhodesian question which has most recently been the center of our peace efforts at the United Nations. When the independence movement began to sweep through Africa a few years ago, the British Government made strenuous efforts to conciliate the white and African communities in their Rhodesian colony and to find a basis by which all the people could participate in the political life of an independent Rhodesia. As you know, these efforts failed. After the so-called "unilateral declaration of independence" by the Smith regime last November, the Security Council adopted two very strong resolutions urging member states not to recognize the illegal Smith regime—which none have—and calling for economic sanctions, including a specific embargo on oil and petroleum products.⁸

Our latest action in the Council arose

⁷ *Ibid.*, May 2, 1966, p. 686.

⁸ For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 908.

from attempts to break that oil embargo.⁹ The United Kingdom quite properly asked for the Security Council's instructions before taking the drastic step of intercepting oil tankers on the high seas. The Council promptly gave the authority that was sought, and the British proceeded to use it when their frigate turned away the tanker *Manuela* on its way into the port of Beira.

There has been some criticism from those who maintain that the step sanctioned by the Council—namely, the interception of ships on the high seas—was too novel and perhaps even unjustifiable under international law.

I agree that the step was novel, but it was not unjustifiable. At the Council meeting I said, and I repeat, that we made some new international law that night. International law is not a static concept; it is a developing concept. The United Nations Charter itself was new international law, and the decisions made pursuant to it add to that body of law—the process that moves us inch by inch toward the still unrealized goal of the rule of law throughout the world.

Article 39 of the charter gives the Security Council the duty to determine, among other things, when there is a threat to peace and the further duty of deciding what to do about it. Pursuant to this article, the Council, wisely and properly, found that the imminent arrival of tankers in defiance of the embargo and in support of the rebel regime was a threat to peace. Some people disagree with this finding and even say that what has happened in Rhodesia is an internal matter. But I don't think anybody conversant with Africa can deny for a moment the incendiary nature of the situation in that part of the world. Happily, article 39 does not require the Security Council to hold its hand until the fire has broken into open flames.

Having made its finding, the Council fur-

ther concluded that the necessary action to prevent this imminent circumvention of the embargo should be taken by the power which bears the chief responsibility in this whole matter—namely, the United Kingdom.

Was the United Nations wrong to take this action which was, in some respects, without precedent? Certainly not. The situation itself was without precedent, and, as the old saying goes, "new occasions teach new duties." This emergency was one more in the record of such new occasions which have punctuated the life of the United Nations from its inception: Iran, the Berlin crisis, Korea, the Uniting-for-Peace resolution, Suez, and the Congo, among others. If in each of these novel situations the organization had shrunk from taking new steps to uphold the charter, the United Nations today would be a dead letter, with consequences that I do not like to imagine.

Actually, what was done in the Security Council on April 9 is being criticized from two opposite directions. Some say it was too strong; others that it was too weak. Some would have us turn our backs on the whole situation; others insist that it be solved in a single stroke.

I think Lord Caradon, speaking for the British Government, wisely avoided both these extremes when he stressed the need to proceed "step by step." It is clear that the one step we took on April 9 has had a major effect on the attempt to break the embargo. We will know in due time whether further steps are necessary to achieve the aim which has the overwhelming backing of the world community: namely, the restoration of the lawful British authority in Rhodesia in order that all of the people of that country may be enabled to join in determining their national future.

Let me conclude by expressing two convictions which I have long held, but which I find relevant to this work at the United Nations.

One is my belief as a lawyer, which was reinforced during my service on the Supreme Court, that law by itself cannot

⁹ For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg and text of a resolution adopted by the Council on Apr. 9, see *ibid.*, May 2, 1966, p. 713.

bring peace and stability. What brings peace and stability is *just* law—law that takes careful account of new facts and deals adequately with the legitimate grievances that arise. This requires a willingness to innovate and to work for peaceful change—because change itself is inevitable, and if we cannot keep it peaceful then heaven help us all.

My second conviction is that just law cannot always simply be imposed. On the Court the most important and, I must say, the most satisfying words I could use were those at the end of an opinion: "It is so ordered." We can't use those words very often at the United Nations. Into every

ounce of enforcement we must mix a ton of persuasion and conciliation and careful listening. And then we must not expect to build the new Jerusalem in one day but must be content to proceed step by step.

When I spoke to the Press Club in 1961, I remember quoting a favorite passage of mine by the eminent Spanish philosopher Salvador de Madariaga, and I want to quote it again because nothing could better express my point:

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk in the right direction but we must walk step by step.

Now I think the next step is for me to listen to your questions. Thank you.

International Education Act of 1966

by Charles Frankel

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

I am grateful for the privilege of appearing before you in behalf of the proposed International Education Act of 1966.² I believe that this proposed legislation can open an important new chapter in the history of American education and in the history of our country's relations with other nations. Not only as a member of this administration but as one who has spent most of his life in education, and simply as a citizen, I feel particularly honored to appear before this group in connection with your consideration of this significant proposal.

The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [John W. Gardner] has already ap-

peared before you to discuss the International Education Act of 1966, which places special responsibilities on his Department. In my remarks I propose to focus upon the significance of this bill as it affects the Department of State and the international relations of this country. From this point of view, this proposed legislation is important for at least three reasons.

First, it offers a better chance to American citizens to acquire the education they need to cope with the facts of international life.

Second, it strengthens the American capacity for foreign affairs.

Third, it takes steps that are essential if this country, in conjunction with other countries, is to move ahead purposefully in a great effort to bring the people of the world closer together in mutual tolerance and understanding.

¹ Statement made before the Task Force on International Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor on Mar. 31.

² For text of a message from President Johnson to the Congress, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

With your permission I should like to say something about each of these purposes. Let me begin by addressing myself to the contribution of this proposed program to the education of Americans.

It is now a truism to which I believe everyone gives assent that the United States lives in an international environment and that the future of our own country is intimately linked to the destinies of other nations thousands of miles away. But the full significance of this truism is often hidden, perhaps precisely because we find it so easy to agree with it.

The fact is that the international environment of the United States does not begin at the ocean's edge. This international environment penetrates almost every corner of our society. It is revealed in the news we hear, the coffee we drink, the movies we see, the political decisions we debate. Indeed, we hear so much about the rest of the world that it is very easy to imagine that we know what we need to know. But this, of course, is not true. We do not know what we need to know until we can go behind the noises we hear and the signals of other peoples' existence that we receive and get some comprehension of what really causes those noises and what those signals really mean. An education, to be valid, must give the individual the information he needs to cope with important facts in his environment.

Today, for the ordinary American, including the American who never goes overseas, education must provide a capacity to deal with the facts of the international environment. An education without an international dimension is an inadequate education for Americans in this century. One of the significant points about the legislation you are considering, I venture to suggest, is that it takes account of this consideration. It adds a new dimension to the Federal Government's interest in education.

This brings me to the second reason why I hope that you will give this proposed legislation favorable consideration. In strengthening the education of Americans at home, it also strengthens the American capacity

for foreign affairs. To work effectively in ventures beyond our borders, we need more people with specialized skills. But in addition to their competence as doctors, teachers, agronomists, or economists, such people must also have special knowledge of the societies in which they are going to apply their skills.

They need to have a special sensitivity and sympathy—a special eye and a special ear—for the differences in outlook and feeling that mark the people with whom they must work. Such special knowledge and sensitivity are not easy to come by. A difficult educational effort is required to produce them. A nation like our own, which wishes to work collaboratively and in a spirit of equality with other nations, must take deliberate steps to insure that such an educational effort is strong and continuing. That is one of the purposes, as I understand it, of the International Education Act of 1966.

Moreover, as I have partly suggested already, we need not only more specialists who combine technical skills and international sophistication, but we also need a citizenry that has received, as part of its general education, an exposure to the complex facts of the international scene. In the long run, as the President has observed, a nation's foreign policy can progress no faster than the curricula of its classrooms. American schools and colleges have done much in recent years to improve the study and teaching of international affairs. But much more still needs to be done if we wish to insure for the decades ahead that the citizens of this country have the awareness and the resilience to generate and support enlightened policies and to pursue long-range policies with the understanding, patience, and resolution such policies require.

I come now to the third reason for suggesting that the legislation you are considering is of importance to the United States in its foreign relations. It is that education has moved front and center in this nation's affairs and in every nation's and that close cooperation between the educational systems of different countries is one major instrument for building the structure of peace in

diversity which has been the goal of this administration and those before it.

Today, for the first time since the invention of writing 5,000 years ago, more than half of mankind is literate. Nevertheless, in an era in which the ability to read and write is increasingly necessary to an individual's or a society's well-being, 4 out of 10 of the world's population are illiterate.

Today the desire for education has become almost universal, and in all countries a larger number of people than ever before have a chance to realize this desire. Nevertheless, equality of educational opportunity remains, in most parts of the world, only a distant ideal.

Today ideas, techniques, information, and works of art travel between the men of different countries with unprecedented speed. This process has created new possibilities for cooperation and mutual understanding among the nations. But it has also created new sources of tension and misunderstanding. Over the long run the educational systems of the nations have as much power as any other human agency to promote understanding and sympathy at their roots.

The legislation that is before you today proposes that we in this country set about to prepare ourselves to do our part with regard to this situation. It proposes that we make ourselves ready to join with others in finding, in the words of William James which the President quoted in his message, "a moral equivalent of war." The hope behind it is that if the teachers and students of different countries can be brought together, working purposefully on common projects, they can educate each other. Given time they can reduce the influence, it may be hoped, of such ancient human emotions as hostility toward the stranger. That is what our schools have done at home. To be sure, they have not wholly succeeded. Provincialism and fear of the outsider are perhaps inevitable facts of human nature. But the skeptic who doubts what education can do to reduce the influence of such attitudes should study the record of what American schools have done to promote habits of

mutual respect and forbearance between different kinds and groups of people. The vision that lies behind the legislation you are considering is that this is possible on the international scene.

Yet while this is the vision behind the program, the proposals before you are, I believe, measured and modest. There are certain things which these proposals do *not* contemplate. They do not suggest that it is America's duty to educate the world. They do not commit the American taxpayer to underwriting the goal of universal education everywhere in the world. They do not propose to accomplish miracles in a year—or ever. They are addressed, in all humility, to meeting certain specific needs in our country so that we will be better able to work with others to advance education and particularly the process of mutual international education. They look ahead to a shared adventure with other nations in which, together, we work to produce school systems that will release children from the awful handicap of ignorance and bring them up to look on people in other nations with understanding and respect. And this hope is joined to a sober recognition that education needs time to achieve its goals.

In sum, from the standpoint of foreign policy, I endorse this proposed legislation because it lays the foundation for an international effort that gives proper attention to the crucial role that education can play in realizing the promise of our time and offsetting its perils. The legislation you are considering gives expression to the proposition that education is a major and enduring activity of this nation and that educational cooperation with other nations constitutes an abiding national interest. It projects to the forefront of our national policy the conviction that the advancement of education, at home and abroad, is properly a national objective of the United States, and it offers a program that is not a crash program for an emergency but a deliberate effort to seek such long-range goals.

Not least, it recognizes the crucial truth that American educational activity at home

and American educational activity abroad comprise a single interrelated whole. They are not separate. Each grows more effective as it is reinforced by the other. This program is offered not as a one-sided American venture but as a sign of our desire to work cooperatively with others. Its object is to strengthen American education so that we can assist other countries in strengthening theirs and so that, in this process, our education will be strengthened too. In the words of the President, "The knowledge of our citizens is one treasure which grows only when it is shared."³ A truly international educational endeavor cannot be the work of one country. The passage of the International Education Act of 1966 would indicate that this country is prepared to make a contribution to an international enterprise in which other nations are invited to join.

Finally, it may be of interest to you if I say just a few words about the relationship of the International Education Act of 1966 to the programs in mutual education and cultural exchange which are conducted by the Department of State. The programs envisaged in the act before you do not in any way duplicate the activities of the Department of State but rather support and complement them. The search for people of high quality to take part in our programs takes much of our time and effort. I would hope and expect that the initiation of programs such as those contemplated in the International Education Act would make it easier to find the people we need. Moreover, the programs in the Department of State have been aimed, in the main, at individuals apart from their institutional affiliations and have been conceived as part of our effort in other countries. The International Education Act of 1966 will focus on institutions and on the needs of American education at home. Accordingly, from the point of view of the Department of State, the passage of the International Education Act will not obstruct or overlap our efforts. On the contrary, it will greatly aid these efforts.

³ *Ibid.*

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet in July

Press release 91 dated April 19

The fifth meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be held in Japan July 5 through July 7, 1966. The agenda and detailed arrangements for the meeting will be announced at a later date.

Liquidation of Banco Territorial de Cuba

Press release 90 dated April 19

The Department of State has received through the Government of Switzerland a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba dated March 15, 1966, reading in translation as follows:

The Commission designated by the President of the National Bank of Cuba to liquidate, pursuant to Special Provision No. 6 of Law No. 930 of February 23, 1961, all private banks of any kind which, because they were in a technical state of bankruptcy or insolvency, were subject on October 13, 1960 to intervention or other precautionary measures adopted by the National Bank of Cuba or the Deposit Insurance Fund, which banks include Banco Territorial de Cuba, S.A., whose administration, for the purpose of its final liquidation, has been entrusted to this Commission, hereby issues the following notice:

"On the date of issuance of this notice, the activities of the said Bank are to be suspended, and its creditors of all kinds must submit their claims within 90 calendar days of March 15, 1966, after which any legal action shall be considered to have lapsed, and all rights the claimants may have shall be regarded as waived.

"Holders of obligations, mortgage bonds, and coupons that have matured must deposit with the provincial offices of the National Bank of Cuba in the district in which they are domiciled, within 90 calendar days of March 15, 1966, whatever securities they hold for consideration by the Liquidating Commission. The Provincial Offices shall supply the official form for submitting such securities. Payment of interest on each and every obligation and bond issued by Banco Territorial de Cuba, S.A., shall be suspended as of December 31, 1965 as a result of its liquidation.

"The Liquidating Commission shall have its of-

fice at the Central Office of the National Bank of Cuba, located at 402 Cuba [Street], Habana."

Anyone desiring to record a claim against the Liquidating Commission of Banco Territorial de Cuba, S.A., is informed that they should communicate with the Office of Special Consular Services of the Department of State if assistance is required.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284. *Acceptance deposited:* Jordan, April 18, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹ *Signature:* Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones S.A. of Chile, April 22, 1966.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8, 1965.¹ *Ratification deposited:* Norway, April 1, 1966. *Signature:* Uruguay, March 30, 1966.²

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Opened for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Signatures: Ecuador, April 21, 1966; Finland, April 21, 1966; Federal Republic of Germany, April 21, 1966; Guatemala, April 12, 1966; Israel, April 19, 1966; Saudi Arabia, April 21, 1966; South Africa, April 20, 1966; Switzerland, April 4, 1966; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 18, 1966;³ United Arab Republic, April 7, 1966; United States of America, April 4, 1966.

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: Finland, April 21, 1966.

BILATERAL

Australia

Understanding concerning income tax pursuant to article III, paragraphs 3 and 5 of the memorandum of arrangement of March 30, 1966, to cover reentry experiments in Australia (Sparta). Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra March 30, 1966. Entered into force March 30, 1966.

Understanding relating to claims (other than contractual claims) resulting from the memorandum of arrangement to cover reentry experiments in Australia (Sparta) of March 30, 1966. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra March 30, 1966. Entered into force March 30, 1966.

Mexico

Protocol to amend the agreement of January 29, 1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcasting in the standard broadcast band. Signed at Mexico April 13, 1966. Enters into force on the date of exchange of ratifications.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 21, 1966, as amended (TIAS 5968). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² Ad referendum.

³ With reservation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1402 PUBLICATION 8076 MAY 9, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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*88	4/18	Rusk: statement on foreign aid before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
*89	4/19	Harriman: Canadian Press Club, Toronto (excerpts).
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91	4/19	Joint U.S.-Japan Trade Committee.
†92	4/21	Solomon: Subcommittee on Anti-trust and Monopoly of Senate Judiciary Committee.
†93	4/22	CENTO communique.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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May 16, 1966

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The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

Not long ago a whimsical friend, still under the spell of reading all dozen volumes of Mr. Toynbee's massive work on the life cycle of nations and civilization, said to me: "When America has run its course, I know what headnote will appear in the history books. It will be 'The United States—a nation that died of a surfeit of pragmatism.'"

Like a highly seasoned salad this remark stayed with me for several days. I am afraid there is a grain of truth in my friend's irreverent observation. We are a pragmatic people, and—especially in the area where I toil—pragmatism is the course of least resistance. It is easy—and tempting—to become absorbed in the operational aspects of foreign relations and to ignore the longer term implications of policy. But, if America is to survive as a civilization, if in fact the world is to survive as a healthy environment for human beings, then we do have to remind ourselves of the larger framework of policy—something better than the habits, the improvisations, the expedients of years gone by—or we shall find ourselves repeating old mistakes in a world where mistakes by great nations can mean world destruction.

Today there is a special temptation to pragmatism in our relations with Western Europe, where we are faced once again with the reappearance of an assertive nationalism that challenges the whole structure of our postwar arrangements.

Yet there is no area where it would be more dangerous for us to become absorbed merely in the operational aspects of policy, to make adjustments, accommodations, compromises, and concessions without regard to our great common objectives. For our relations with Western Europe carry a heavy freight of history. They form the longest and persistently the most important element of United States foreign policy. We have benefited greatly from events in Europe and we have suffered from them. And, at the end of the day, we cannot forget that jealousies, ambitions, and aggressions in Western Europe were responsible for the two greatest wars of modern history—cataclysms that created many of the ills and troubles that harass us today. If we are to avoid new and even more terrible conflicts, we must know where we are going and we must have some sense of how we are to get there.

We have not always had a sure sense of direction in these matters.

America spent the early years of this century in a state of innocence which, in

¹ Made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 29 (press release 101).

retrospect, seems both attractive and surprising. World War I came upon us while we had our backs turned, preoccupied as we were in transforming a continent into a nation. It took us a long time to sort the issues in that struggle. But in 1917 we entered the fight, and the weight of our effort turned the tide of battle. Yet in retrospect it seems clear enough that we did not comprehend the full meaning either of the war or of our involvement. When we had brought the boys home again we had a frustrating try at international peacemaking. Then we turned our backs on the world in the interests of what we awkwardly referred to as "normalcy."

We pretended, in other words, that we were not a great power and that we had been wrong in trying to act like one. The fount of our foreign policy remained the admonitory passages in Washington's farewell address—advice given more than a century before to a fledgling Republic. If staying clear of entangling alliances had been good enough for the Founding Fathers, it was good enough for us.

America's policy, as we told the world, was isolationism—the early 20th-century version of what would be known today as neutralism or nonalignment—and we meant to stick by it.

The Hard Lessons of Two World Wars

The Second World War ended our adolescence. We fought valiantly and well in all four corners of the earth. When the conflict was over, America at long last had grown up, and we had learned certain hard lessons the hard way.

I shall not try to review all of those lessons here tonight, but I think it essential to mention some of them.

The first was that the United States is indubitably a great power and, as such, cannot escape involvement in the world's main concerns. Moreover, the world has become so interdependent that our interests are necessarily engaged by any new aggression in any strategic area of the world—and particularly in Europe.

Second, we admitted with nagging conscience that our own neutralism had served as an encouragement—or at least had posed no discouragement—to aggressors in Europe. We could deter aggression in the future only by making it crystal clear that American power would be committed instantly and automatically if any friendly European state were attacked.

Within months after the end of the war we began to learn another hard lesson—that another nation, itself also organized on a continent-wide basis, was bent on extending its dominion, and the ideological system it represented, through force and subversion around the world. As one after another of the European states were caught within the encircling net of the Iron Curtain, we awoke with a shock to this new and imminent peril.

Along with our European friends we began to rethink the mistakes of the past. Together with them we reached certain conclusions which we put in treaty or institutional form. One was the recognition—not of the theory but the fact—that an attack on one of the North Atlantic states was an attack on all. In the case of major aggression against Europe, the power of the New World would inevitably be called upon to redress the balance of the old. That, however, was not enough by itself. The nations of Europe that had been occupied, and particularly the leaders of France, were emphatic in telling us that Europeans could not endure another period of liberation. This time they must be protected, not liberated.

We concluded with them, therefore, that our Western alliance must be more than an agreement for liberation. It must be made an effective deterrent so as to dissuade any aggressor from reckless adventures. To achieve this we must create an instrument for instant collective defense by forces in being, acting under common command and common plans.

For this, too, we had the hard lessons of two world wars to guide us.

In World War I it had taken 4 years for the Allied Powers to pull themselves to-

gether and agree on a combined command under Marshal Foch. The obstinate insistence of the individual nation-states on sovereign and separate national commands cost hundreds of thousands of lives.

In the Second World War the Western Powers again reaped the tragic consequences of their unpreparedness and their blind rejection of common plans and a common command. Denmark fell, then Norway, then the Low Countries, then France. Almost 5 years elapsed before the Allies accumulated the military strength, unified under the integrated command of SHAEF, that made it possible to mount the Normandy invasion and win the war.

It was against this tragic background that the Atlantic Powers—inspired particularly by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman—undertook in 1950 to transform the alliance from a classical mutual defense pact into a full-fledged collective security system. An integrated command was established under General Eisenhower. Common planning was undertaken. Forces were put in place for the defense of Europe that now total 2.5 million men. And over the years that followed the nuclear power of the United States was targeted against the Soviet rockets aimed at Europe.

For the first time in history the Western Powers were acting together with little regard for special national advantage, not merely to meet but to deter a potential aggressor. In what otherwise would have been a time of grave peril, Europeans could go about their affairs without an overhanging fear of invasion. They did so, and they have prospered beyond their fondest dreams.

Construction of the Western Alliance

The construction of the Western alliance, and even more the building of the collective security system known as NATO, meant a great national decision for us as Americans and a great common achievement for the West. Looking across the Atlantic, we decided that we must work actively with our European friends in deterring aggression in Europe. But even more important, we and

they concluded that peace could be permanently secured only if steps were taken to remove the underlying causes that had created so many disasters in the past.

Of all those causes one stood out above all others. That was the persistent rivalry among the individual nation-states of Europe, each striving in turn to gain dominance by force over its neighbors. From the time of the Treaty of Westphalia in the middle of the 17th century for more than a century and a half, the peace of the world was periodically disturbed primarily by the efforts of European nations—and particularly France, then the largest and strongest—to achieve hegemony over the rest of the Continent. Those efforts were thwarted by shifting coalitions of other European states aided by the astute diplomacy of Britain, which for centuries allied itself always on the side of the weaker group in order to maintain a balance. These European struggles were not always confined to the Continent. Throughout the whole of our colonial life they tended to spill over into the Western Hemisphere, until, when we secured our independence, we were able to insulate ourselves through a policy of isolation made possible by the Monroe Doctrine and the British Fleet.

We thus kept aloof from the European wars of the 19th century while the preponderance of power shifted in Europe. France, worn out by the exertions of the Napoleonic era and outstripped by the other major European powers in population, was defeated by the Second Reich, which under Bismarck's leadership had been created by Prussia out of 25 German kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and free cities. Yet the Franco-Prussian War was but a prelude of things to come. For in the first half of the 20th century the two world wars, which had their roots in European rivalries, brought all of us close to disaster.

Against this history it was clear that, if there was to be peace in Europe and in the world, the old national rivalries had to be replaced by something more constructive. Yet this was nothing America could bring

about by itself. We could assist the Europeans to rehabilitate themselves through the Marshall Plan. We could encourage them to sublimate their national rivalries in a new unity. But the actual achievement of that unity was something that only the European peoples could create.

Still the climate was ripe for action. The peoples of Europe were themselves thoroughly tired of wars that sprang from the competing ambitions of nation-states. And so they began to work brilliantly, principally under French leadership, on a whole series of measures: the Schuman Plan, which created the Coal and Steel Community; the proposal for a European army within a European Defense Community (which, had it succeeded, would have avoided many of the problems that haunt us today); and the European Atomic Energy Community. Most important was the great breakthrough of the Treaty of Rome that changed the economic face of Europe by creating a vast Common Market.

This then was the prospect in the early part of the 1960's—a Europe making massive strides toward unity with the strong prospect that its geographical boundaries would be expanded to include the United Kingdom and certain other European nations, a Europe growing prosperous with its burgeoning Common Market under the protective umbrella of NATO.

The organization of Europe is, of course, primarily a matter for Europeans. But it is a matter that deeply affects the United States as well. The thousands of Americans who gave their lives in the Argonne Forest—or, a quarter of a century later, in the Battle of the Bulge—have established our right and indeed our obligation to speak frankly on issues that so critically involve both our safety and our future. Our fate and the fate of Western Europe are tied inextricably together. We recognized that on two occasions when we sent our young men overseas, and Europe recognized that on two occasions when it called for our help in an extreme hour. And, whatever words may be uttered in the current discussion, Euro-

peans know today that American men and American might will be there when they need us. So we are not very much impressed by specious homilies about doctrine that obscure the point of America's demonstrated reliability in times of crisis.

We have seen in European progress toward unity the chance for a new and fruitful relationship. As President Kennedy said in June 1963, in his speech at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt,² we "look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership—an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace."

The Threat to European Unity

The idea of a united Europe linked in equal partnership across the Atlantic had great resonance on both sides of the ocean. But already there were forces working against it, in particular the decision of the government of one European nation-state to separate itself from the others and to seek a special position of primacy in Western Europe. The purposes of that government should not be a matter for polemics; they are on the public record, fully expressed or implied in any number of official statements.

That government has sought to halt the drive toward European unity in the name of uniting Europe; to transform the European Common Market into a mere commercial arrangement by hobbling the powers of the executive; to prevent other Western European nations from achieving any participation in the management of nuclear power so as to preserve its own exclusive position as the sole nation with nuclear weapons on the Western European Continent; to reduce the influence and ultimately the presence of the United States in Europe; and, finally, to free itself from obligations to the great postwar system of European and Atlantic institutions in order to achieve freedom of political and diplomatic maneuver that could

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

permit it to deal, to its own advantage, with what it has described with a curious impartiality as "the two great hegemonies."

The attack that has been launched against NATO deeply concerns all Western nations. Let us make no mistake about the fact that the withdrawal of an important power from participation in the arrangements that give reality to the Western alliance will weaken the common defense. More than that, it will weaken the Western deterrent. Finally, it is likely to delay and confuse the possibilities of moving toward an ultimate settlement of the great unfinished business of Europe. For it is clear to anyone who has closely followed the events of the past decade that the gradual changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have been hastened, not delayed, by the firm and common purpose of the West. And it is clear also that if the West ceases to stand firm and unified, if each individual Western nation seeks to make a separate deal for itself, the gains we have achieved will be quickly lost and the hope for an ultimate European settlement long deferred.

Obviously the Communist world has undergone major transformations since the death of Stalin. But the change has not been without its perils for the West. The Khrushchev who preached peaceful coexistence punctuated his message with attempted blackmail in Berlin, nuclear threats at the Parthenon, and missiles in Cuba. Yet, it is plainly right to build bridges to the Communist countries, bridges of trade and travel across barriers that cruelly divide a continent. It is right to welcome the citizens of East Europe to see for themselves that capitalism can yield economic progress and social justice side by side. These things are right, and they should be continued.

But those bridges to the East must be anchored in the solid foundation of a strong and cohesive Western alliance. For it is only when the security issue is beyond dispute that lasting progress can be made toward permanently improved relations with the Communist states. This is the basis on which

there can be secure movement toward a political settlement in Europe, leading to the reunification of Germany in conditions of peace and freedom and to real progress toward international arms control—goals that we and Europe share.

Over and above the attack on NATO there is, therefore, grave cause for uneasiness in the resurgence of a self-centered nationalism. For each country's nationalism is a force that, particularly in Europe, tends to create equal and opposite forces in neighboring countries. Ever since the war we Americans have known that the peace of the world depended to a great extent on the gamble that Europe would transform itself, that the nations of Western Europe would, after all these centuries, put aside those corrosive national rivalries that have been the cause of past disasters and sublimate their energies in a common purpose and a new unity. At the same time, we have always recognized the danger that the European people, with reflexes conditioned by history, might from time to time be tempted to lapse into the old bad habits of the past, to unfurl the dusty banners of other centuries, and to re-create the conditions in which Europe might again become the cockpit of the world.

Concept of Equal Partnership

There are, to be sure, voices even in this country that tell us almost with satisfaction that the latter development is inevitable and knowledgeable men should accept it. After all, they say, haven't the European nations regularly, 12 or 13 years after each war, dissolved their alliances and returned to their old rivalries?

This sounds strangely like the contention of the early 1920's that we should return to "normalcy." For the kind of Europe envisaged by these critics is a Europe no more suitable to the needs of today than would "normalcy" be for today's America.

What exactly would these men have us do? The realistic hope for peace in the world, they contend, is not for a unified Western Europe but for a Europe of nation-

states extending from the Atlantic to the Urals—or, in other words, a Europe in which each of the middle-sized states would seek to make its own deal with one or the other of the “great hegemonies” in the hope of establishing for itself a first-class power position while keeping the others in an inferior role.

Such a Europe—a continent of shifting coalitions and changing alliances—is not the hope of the future; it is a nostalgic evocation. It would mean not progress but a reversion to the tragic and discredited pattern of the past—a return to 1914, as though that were good enough, and with the same guarantee of instability—yet made more dangerous, not less, by the ideological drive of the Soviet Union and the existence of nuclear weapons.

To move toward such a Europe is not the way to reach a settlement of the unfinished business of the last war. It is not a way to remove the Iron Curtain except on terms that would preserve and exacerbate discrimination and inequality and thus lay the groundwork for new disasters in the future.

Such a Europe would not secure a lasting peace nor would it bring fulfillment to the European peoples. For there is a new requirement of size in the world which makes it imperative that, if the peoples of Europe are to make their full contribution to world affairs, they must organize themselves on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the modern age. Let us not deceive ourselves; no matter how adroit diplomacy may be, it cannot achieve first-power status for a nation of limited size and resources.

The true course of Western Europe lies not in fragmentation but in unity—a solid unity that will bring not varying degrees of status and citizenship but equality for all. A united Europe will not need to seek first-power status; it will have it. And unity, moreover, will enable the gifted European peoples to play their major role in the large affairs of this turbulent world and make their rich and proper contribution to civilization.

If Europe unites, the world will no longer be faced with the dangers of middle-sized states trying to play a game of maneuver with one another and with the “hegemonies,” after the pattern of the past. There will be a third large center of power and purpose—capable, because it is strong, of bringing about a European settlement, competent to come to terms with the East on a basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain and reunify the German people as equal members of a great community.

As this develops, and only as it develops, will we Atlantic peoples be able to give full meaning to the concept of equal partnership. For no longer will the European nations have to fear, as some apparently do, the preponderance of American weight in our common political councils or the preponderance of American industrial strength in our economic affairs. There will be equality in a realistic sense—not something enacted by international law, not something the United States has conferred. It will be an equality founded on unassailable fact, since a united Europe will command vast resources of technology and production, brain power and material.

“We Want a Europe Strong, Not Enfeebled”

Americans join with Europeans in wanting this kind of Europe. We want a Europe strong, not enfeebled. We want a Europe independent in spirit as it is interdependent in fact. As President Kennedy once said,³ “It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually.” But what we look forward to, he said, is “a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.”

Perhaps there are some Americans who would like to see a fragmented Europe, but

³ *Ibid.*

they have not read history carefully—or if they have, they have not understood it. Certainly, it is not the policy of this administration any more than it was the policy of the Kennedy or the Eisenhower or the Truman administrations to see Europe disunited.

For we are prepared to take our chances on a Western Europe united on principles of equality, a Europe with a common voice. To be sure, it will be an independent voice, not always agreeing with us—but then the United States has no monopoly of wisdom. What we can be sure of is that we and our Western European partners will agree on the broad outlines of the kind of world we want, a world of peace and freedom. For we draw from the deep well of Western civilization, cherish the same ideals of liberty, seek together the dignity of the individual and not the tyranny of the mass.

A Europe so united was the bright hope and the high accomplishment of the fifties. It remains the real hope of Europeans and Americans today. For, as President Johnson said more than a year ago:⁴

“The unknown tide of future change is already beating about the rock of the West. These fruitful lands washed by the Atlantic, this half-billion people unmatched in arms and industry, this measureless storehouse of wisdom and genius can be a fortress against any foe, a force that will enrich the

life of an entire planet. It is not a question of arms or wealth alone. It is a question of moving ahead with the times, and it is a question of vision and persistence and the willingness to surmount the barriers of national rivalry against which our ancestors have always collided.”

U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

The United States regards the problem of nuclear sharing as major unfinished business. The development of an arrangement to provide participation for NATO non-nuclear nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in the management of nuclear power is under the most serious discussion among interested governments.

The United States Government has made no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic nuclear force or any other collective approach to the problem. The position of the United States remains as stated in the communique of President Johnson and Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard December 21, 1965.²

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Apr. 27.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 50.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

"Leadership today requires understanding of the problems we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we seek. It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead and inspire others—to lead and inspire in a sense of common enterprise."

The Responsibilities of World Leadership

Address by Vice President Humphrey¹

It is always a risk to speak to the press: They are likely to report what you say. Today I will take that risk, for I have some thoughts I am quite willing to have repeated.

Today our America stands as the most powerful, the most prosperous, and the freest nation in the history of the earth. And in our power, wealth, and freedom we stand as leader of the Western World.

As a nation cautioned from the first against entangling alliances, this role is not an easy one. And, indeed, to many other nations of the world we remain a relatively unknown quantity. For it has been only in recent years that we have ventured into the world with any real seriousness.

And thus we hear questions asked: Are we overreaching ourselves? Will we tire of our tasks? Will our economy be able to support the burdens we carry at home and abroad? Are we equal to the role of world leadership?

Fair enough questions they are. For the answers affect the great majority of nations and the great majority of the world's peoples—not only because of the weight of our power but because of the things we stand for. In Tom Paine's words: "The cause

of America is in great measure the cause of all mankind."

In the final analysis the questions asked about us can only be answered by how we measure up to the challenges before us.

Today we face three great and interrelated tasks in the world: the pursuit of peace, the effort to narrow the gap between the rich and poor nations, and the necessity of sustaining an American economy able to carry a thousand future burdens here and around the world.

The Search for Peace

Our search for peace finds its best expression in our support for the kind of world envisioned in the United Nations Charter—a world where large and small nations might live alike in harmony without threat of external coercion.

No nation has done more for peace than has ours since World War II. The U.N., the Marshall Plan, Point 4, the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Food for Peace, the nuclear test ban treaty—these have come from initiatives worthy of our position of leadership. These have come from our search for peace.

But other initiatives, too, have come from

¹ Made before the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 25; advance text.

our search for peace: firmness in Berlin; aid to Greece and Turkey; the founding of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; resistance to aggression in Korea; the determination that nuclear missiles should not be introduced into the hemisphere. For we have long since learned that peaceful development cannot exist in an environment of violence, aggression, and fear.

Today peace is at stake in Asia. Peace is at stake in a hundred thousand Asian villages, in the struggle of peasants against a millennium of poverty, disease, and despair.

Peace is at stake in a tortured South Viet-Nam, in the struggle against the classic power tactics of communism.

We must not lose the peace in either struggle. That is why we have committed once more—as we have had to do before—men, money, and resources to help the nations of Asia help themselves toward security and independence.

It won't be easy. It will be frustrating and at times heartbreaking. But if we are not to deny our leadership, if we are not to deny the principles in which we believe, we must stay and see it through. And the free nations of the world need to know that we have the vision and the endurance to do so.

Those who threaten their neighbors in Asia should know it too. They should know that we will resist their aggression.

Narrowing the Gap Between Rich and Poor

But they should also know that we bear no consumptive hate against their people, that we have no design on their sovereignty. We look only toward the day when all nations may choose to live in harmony with their neighbors, when they may turn together their energies to building a better life for their peoples.

For this is, after all, the second great task before us—the desperate need to narrow the widening gap between the rich and poor nations of the world. I give you the words of Pope John XXIII in his encyclical *Mater et Magistra*:

The solidarity which binds all men and makes them members of the same family requires political communities enjoying an abundance of material goods not to remain indifferent to those political communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elementary rights of the human person.

This is particularly true since, given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist. . . .

We are all equally responsible for the undernourished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to educate one's conscience to the sense of responsibility which weighs upon each and every one, especially upon those who are more blessed with this world's goods.

We sit here today comfortably examining this situation. But for the disinherited and left out of this world, it is no matter for examination: It is a matter of day-to-day survival.

Today there are families spending their last day on earth because they haven't the strength or health to keep going.

But those who remain—and you can be sure of this—those who remain will take to the streets, they will turn to any master, they will tear the fabric of peace to shreds, unless they have some reason to believe that there is hope for life and hope for justice.

To put this on a more immediate and practical level, let me call to your attention the foreign aid request now before the Congress.²

The expenditure for the first year of the Marshall Plan was about 2 percent of our GNP, and 11½ percent of the Federal budget. Today, thanks to the growth of our American economy, our foreign aid request is for only 0.29 percent of our GNP and about 1.9 percent of the Federal budget—that is, about 2 cents out of every tax dollar. Yet we hear the same doubts and complaints today that we heard 20 years ago.

If someone has a substitute for foreign aid, I'd like to hear about it. The investment we make in foreign aid—in preventive med-

² For text of President Johnson's message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

icine, if you will—is certainly less than that necessary to treat the symptoms of massive economic crisis and disorder and, yes, of war.

The Marshall Plan saved Western Europe and the peace. It created a great new economic market for us. But there is more: The revived nations of Western Europe have not only repaid their Marshall Plan debts; they have already provided more aid to the developing countries than they ever received from us. The rewards can be just as great tomorrow in other continents.

If there are questions asked about our ability to meet this task, I think they must be answered affirmatively and without equivocation.

We do not seek to do this task alone nor should we. But how can we expect others to follow if we do not lead?

Fashioning an America Able To Lead

President Eisenhower described the third great task we face today: “. . . the firm base for the problem of leading the world toward the achievement of human aspirations—toward peace with justice in freedom—must be the United States.”

We must fashion an America so strong, so free, so able to lead, that there may be no question about our purposes or our endurance. Basic to this is the necessity of building an economy of growth and opportunity, yet stable in time when it is tested.

I need not remind this audience of the Communist belief—I suppose some of them still hold it—that the United States was teetering on the brink of economic chaos, that it was just a matter of time until our production lines would grind to a halt, until an army of unemployed would seize the state, until economic warfare among the Western nations would open the door to communism.

I think by now some of the Communist doctrinists have come to realize that Lord Keynes was speaking to them as well as others when he wrote: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from

intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”

The American economic miracle is the world's greatest success story. Last year alone we increased our GNP by \$47 billion, increased our total personal income by \$39 billion, and increased our Federal cash receipts by \$81½ billion.

All this did not happen by accident. Part of it is certainly due to the influence of Mr. Keynes and the so-called New Economics. But I believe the basic, underlying reason behind our economic success is this: There is today a creative partnership for prosperity among those in our society who used to think of themselves as natural antagonists.

We are dispelling old myths. How long has it been since we've heard old empty labels such as “labor boss” and “economic royalist.”

The fact is that American Government, business, and labor are increasingly united in the premise that a stronger and better America will be to the common benefit of all. Among other things, we are united in our determination to accomplish something that no nation has previously dared to try: to make every citizen *in* our society a full and productive member *of* our society.

And so today we make national investments in our country and in our people—investments in productivity, in opportunity, in enterprise, in greater social justice, in self-help. That is what our Great Society programs are all about.

Education, medical care, war against poverty, programs of retraining and redevelopment, better cities and transportation, an even more productive agriculture, yes, equality at the ballot box and before the law—these are the most basic investments of all in an America able to keep its commitments both at home and abroad.

As the President has said so often, it is not a matter of a Great Society or fulfillment of our international responsibilities. It is not a matter of guns or butter, foreign aid or domestic education. They are tied together, and you cannot separate them.

If we can build a society operating on all its cylinders, others in the world may have some hope of doing the same. If we cannot, what hope may others have?

To make our free system work, to sustain it, to keep our pledges all the while—this indeed is the way to erase any doubts the world may have about our ability to fulfill the responsibility of leadership.

In closing, may I say a word about the nature of that responsibility.

Leadership in today's world requires far more than a large stock of gunboats and a hard fist at the conference table.

Leadership today requires more than the ability to go it alone—although we must not be afraid to do so when necessary.

Leadership today requires understanding of the problems we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we seek.

It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead and inspire others—to lead and inspire in a sense of common enterprise. For as strong and rich as we may become, our goal of a just and peaceful world will never be achieved by America alone.

It will be achieved only when the resources of strong and weak, rich and poor alike, are allocated, in the most efficient manner possible, to challenges that are far too great for any one nation or group of nations to attempt to overcome.

This, then, is the test of ourselves: not to march alone but to march in such a way that others will wish to join us.

I will add one caveat: In none of this should we expect either friendship or gratitude. We have already eaten breakfast to the accompaniment, in our morning newspapers, of too many "Yankee Go Home" signs, too many riots, too many denunciations of ourselves, to believe that leadership can reward us with international laurel wreaths.

I think the most we can expect is this: that those who question us will one day find no reason to question; that in the world there may be no doubt that Americans have the vision, the endurance, and the courage to stand and see it through for what we believe in.

Secretary Comments on Peiping's Militancy in Southeast Asia

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by John Scali for the American Broadcasting Company's hour-long television program, "Red China: Year of the Gun?" on April 27.

Press release 100 dated April 27

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, who is to blame for the isolation of China from the free world? Is our policy at fault?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this goes back for many years. I think that undoubtedly there have been problems on both sides. But in these more recent years I think that it is clear that the attitudes in Peiping have isolated them from most of the rest of the world. For example, they are having great difficulties inside the Communist world. They refused to attend the 23d Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow. They have had similar difficulties in the Afro-Asian world. They had a debacle last year in attempting to work out arrangements for a second Bandung conference. Their policies have caused deep divisions between themselves and almost everyone else.

Now, as far as the United States is concerned, we have been engaged in conversations with them for more than 10 years. We have had our 129th bilateral talk with them—talks that were carried on in Geneva and in Warsaw. We will be having another one with them next month. We have been in closer touch with them, I suppose, than almost any government that has diplomatic relations with them, with the exception possibly of Moscow.

This is not a deliberate attempt by everyone else to forget Peiping or to freeze them out of the total situation. We know they are there. We know that they ought to be drawn into the major questions, such as peace in Southeast Asia, such as disarmament. And many efforts have been made to bring them into those discussions. But their own attitude has made it very difficult to get them

into a position of real discussion with those with whom they bitterly disagree.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how can we be sure that the Chinese won't miscalculate the depth of our determination, for example, in Viet-Nam, unless we have regular systemized discussions with them, perhaps through diplomatic recognition?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe that formal diplomatic recognition is required for discussions. I have already indicated we have had 129 talks with them ourselves and we will soon have another one. Formal relationships with them run into a very serious and central obstacle.

You will recall that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had a series of hearings about China, and in connection with that and in other discussions it has been indicated that we have tried to exchange newsmen and scholars and doctors and we have tried to establish some sort of better contact with Peiping.¹

Well, in a very important article in the *People's Daily*, signed by "Observer"—which is the pen name for some very high official—they said once again publicly that:

So long as the United States Government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, the normalization of Sino-American relations is entirely out of the question. And so is the solution of such a concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries.

Now, there they said publicly only last month what we have been saying privately for 10 years. In effect, that there is nothing to discuss until we are prepared to surrender Formosa, and when we indicate that we can't surrender these 13 million people on Formosa as far as we are concerned, then the conversation gets to be very difficult and very strained, very formal, very unproductive.

Mr. Scali: In fighting the war in Viet-

Nam, do we seek to avoid military moves which the Chinese might regard as a prelude to an American invasion of the China mainland?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it's only on the basis of an ideological bias that they would have any idea that we have an interest in attacking mainland China. There have been many occasions when we might have done so, had that been our desire. The Korean war was such an occasion. The offshore islands crisis was another one. Southeast Asia is another one.

Now, the United States is not interested in war with mainland China. We are not interested in expanding these operations in Southeast Asia. The escalation of that war has been a responsibility of Hanoi, encouraged and backed by Peiping. It had moved, for example, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Regular Army from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam, before we started bombing North Viet-Nam.

What we are after there is to stop that infiltration of men and arms from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. We are not interested in getting into a war with anybody, and there would not have been any shooting there had North Viet-Nam elected to leave its two neighbors, Laos and South Viet-Nam, alone. And if they should stop doing what they are doing, peace could come very quickly and our troops could come home.

Mr. Scali: Have the hearings before Senator Fulbright's committee, Mr. Secretary, helped you in deciding what next to do in confronting China?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that the hearings have been very useful in having extensive and thoughtful and far-ranging discussions of the total problem of China. I think they have brought out the fact that the policies pursued by Peiping have been pretty widely rejected throughout the world. Militancy of Peiping's attitude has caused very deep divisions inside the Communist world, quite apart from the problems that it has caused in the free world. And we have seen in the past 15 months that Pei-

¹ For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see *BULLETIN* of May 2, 1966, p. 686.

ping's policy, by and large, has been rejected right around the globe. They have been thrown out of five or six African countries. They have had a major setback in Indonesia. They objected strenuously to the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan and the treaty between Japan and Formosa. So that they have made it very clear that their policy is harsh and militant, and they are finding that the rest of the world just can't adjust itself to that kind of policy and attitude.

Mr. Scali: Senator Fulbright, in scheduling his congressional hearings on China, said he did so because there are some administration officials who felt that war with China is inevitable. Do you know any of these people?

Secretary Rusk: I haven't heard anyone, senior or junior, say to me they consider war inevitable. Certainly from our point of view we have no interest in a war with mainland China. One does hear out of Peiping itself a discussion of the inevitability of war, and they have on occasions said that they would hope that the revisionists—meaning the Soviets—would not take such a gloomy view of war. Well, I think most of the world takes a pretty gloomy view of war, and ought to.

But I must say that I don't believe that the leaders in Peiping are imprudent enough to act as though they consider war inevitable. They have been somewhat more cautious and prudent in their actions than they have been in their words. So I think there is a prospect that the situation can be stabilized on a basis of the security of the smaller countries in Asia and that over time prudence will make itself felt in Peiping.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in trying to decide what China will do, how much room do we leave for moves which we would regard as irrational, such as the Russian decision, for example, to move offensive missiles into Cuba or, indeed, the Chinese decision to intervene in Korea?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there is always a danger of miscalculation, and it is always difficult for democracies to get across the

right signals to totalitarian regimes. We have had a number of instances in the past where totalitarian leaders have assumed that somehow at the end of the day democracies would not do what is required to defend their security and to maintain freedom.

I suppose that it's easy for a regime in Peiping to misunderstand our own domestic debates here at home. They may not be sophisticated enough to know that the United States is going to meet its commitments and that some of the things they hear are not really relevant to the basic decision of the country in such matters.

But, again, I do believe that there is in fact a prudence in Peiping. I do believe their leaders are rational. I don't expect completely irrational action from them. I think it is possible that they may underestimate our determination, that they may make some miscalculation on the assumption that somehow we would not follow through to the end of the day. But I think, little by little, they must be getting the impression that we are serious in Southeast Asia and that there can be peace just as soon as the infiltration of men and arms from the North stops.

Mr. Scali: As you look ahead, Mr. Secretary, in the years to come, what do you see in Asia—any real prospect that the Chinese will somehow moderate their harsh policies and change their rather primitive view of the world?

Secretary Rusk: I think there is some prospect of that over time. I don't think that it's a matter that depends upon United States military action. I think we have certain specific commitments—Korea, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, with whom we have defense agreements—where we act jointly with our allies to insure the safety of those countries.

But I have great faith in the ordinary common people in these matters. After all, people just don't like to be pushed around too much. And we have seen the reactions in India when Peiping attacked India. We

have seen the reactions in Indonesia. We have seen many demonstrations of the fact that people don't want what Peiping is trying to offer or impose upon them.

So I think that over time there will be a blunting of the revolutionary militancy that

is being preached these days from Peiping, simply because the world won't have it. The world won't have it, and they will come to recognize it.

Mr. Scali: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara

The 14th session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Ankara, Turkey, April 20 and 21. Following are texts of an opening statement made by Secretary Rusk on April 20 and a final communique issued at the close of the meeting, together with remarks made by Secretary Rusk at the dedication of the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications System on April 20 and the transcript of a press conference he held at Esenboga Airport, Ankara, on April 22.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. Prime Minister, esteemed colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: Five years ago, here in Ankara, I had my first opportunity to attend a Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization as chairman of the United States observer delegation.¹ It is a great personal pleasure to be again* in this impressive capital city of the Turkish Republic, to review with you the work of the organization, and to reaffirm the intention of my Government to continue its association with the high purposes of the CENTO alliance.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for the cordial welcome and the thoughtful hospitality which the Turkish Government and the Turkish people have extended to the

visiting delegations. I also want to express the thanks of my delegation for the very gracious message of welcome from the President of the Republic of Turkey, which Mr. Alpan [Cihat Alpan, Secretary General of the Office of the President of Turkey] has conveyed to us this morning. In a sense, Turkey is year-round host to CENTO, for Ankara is the site of the headquarters of the alliance and of the biweekly meetings of the Council Deputies. The special debt of gratitude all of us connected with CENTO owe to Turkey is never far from our thoughts.

Our plenary sessions later today are to be held in the historic edifice of the former Turkish Grand National Assembly, now the home of the CENTO International Secretariat. That building is filled with memories of the beginning of the Turkish Republic under the incomparable Kemal Ataturk. I am sure that our distinguished Secretary General and his dedicated staff of the secretariat draw special inspiration from their daily association with this great shrine of modern Turkey.

In the 11 years since this organization was formed, the adversaries who threatened the region in 1955 have come to understand that this defensive shield was forged by CENTO not to threaten anyone but to warn that efforts to molest or subvert the independence of the CENTO countries will be met with resolution and strength—and with growing confidence.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 22, 1961, p. 778.

The need for this defensive shield continues. Although they may differ among themselves, our adversaries have not renounced the Communist world revolution; they are bent on destroying the type of world community framed in the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, some Communist leaders continue openly to advocate the use of force for this purpose, as we have learned through bitter experience in South-east Asia. Nations which value their independence and freedom therefore, as my other colleagues have pointed out, dare not let down their vigilance. If there is, or seems to be, less danger of war in some parts of the world, it is because those who would coerce their neighbors have a healthy respect for the strength and determination of those whose dedication is to freedom.

Free men everywhere can find much to admire and to emulate in the record of progress registered by the peoples of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan over the past decade.

In Turkey the gross national product in real terms has grown almost 50 percent; per capita income has increased about 20 percent. Important gains also have been made in industrial productivity—the index now is about 150 percent of the base year of 1958. The Turkish educational system is teaching and training more than twice as many students as it did 10 years ago.

In Iran the budget for education has grown by some 93 percent since 1955, and the number of students has grown accordingly. Since Iran's Literacy Corps was organized in 1962, more than 30,000 young Iranian men have met their obligations of national service by teaching rural people to read and write. The successful work of the corps in the campaign for literacy is now being mirrored in the companion Health Corps and the Development Corps. Fundamental changes are also being wrought in the agricultural economy of Iran. One manifestation is the total of nearly 50,000 villages which have been distributed in whole or in part to more than 1 million farmers, through the land reform program.

In Pakistan agricultural productivity has

increased 30 percent since 1954. The manufacturing index shows an increase of nearly 100 percent. Per capita production of electricity for public use has increased nearly 21½ times since 1960. In a decade the number of elementary schools has increased by 50 percent, and total enrollment has approximately doubled.

No one will profess that CENTO itself, as an organization, is directly responsible for these various gains. What is relevant here is that, behind the protective shield of CENTO, the peoples of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have been able to register very substantial progress.

This record of progress and the self-reliance it engenders have a direct significance for CENTO as an organization. During the first decade of CENTO's economic programs, major attention was directed to regional capital projects requiring large elements of assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States. Today most of those projects are completed or are so near completion that we, in this Council, shall be planning the inauguration of many of these projects over the next few months.

It may be that CENTO will design still other plans for additional capital projects, but it is perhaps wise to acknowledge that the CENTO organization is not now at this moment drafting new projects on the scale of the microwave system, which we are dedicating this afternoon, or the railroad link, which will be in operation some 18 months hence. I do not cite this prospect in any spirit of finality but rather with pride in cooperative accomplishment.

Cooperation has become a habit among the regional governments—Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. It has found fruition in many fields. It owes much to the shared experience provided through the undramatic but very intimate personal interchange afforded by CENTO's technical assistance program.

It is gratifying that this habit of cooperation has reached out beyond CENTO, too. The Regional Cooperation for Development Organization, now nearly 2 years old, is demonstrating that many fields for mutual

planning and interchange are open to governments in the region, without help or advice from the outside. The United States congratulates the architects of RCD and looks for valuable accomplishments to flow from this new association. We have every reason to believe that the activities of RCD and CENTO, separately but with complementary objectives, can play important and distinct roles in the economic and commercial progress of the region.

President Johnson has expressed our support for the concept of regional solidarity in these terms: "Regional cooperation," he said, "is the best means of economic progress as well as the best guarantor of political independence."² We are ready to continue and enlarge our support of institutions which create and preserve a regional unity of effort in economic and social development.

President Johnson also spoke recently of our "continuity of purpose in a generation of change."³ Here, among old friends and allies, I do not think that I need to dwell at length on our continuity of purpose. What engages the interest of CENTO most, perhaps, is the quality and character of the changes in the work of this alliance. In speaking of this "generation of change" in which we live and work together, it is natural that we think of the younger generation. It would be hard to find a more universally accepted precept for planning for our young people than the familiar goal of a "sound mind in a sound body." Within the United States Government, our President, in his recent messages to the Congress, has proposed a sober and searching review of our targets in the foreign aid program, taking account of the basic changes the times demand. The President has highlighted our new tasks by calling for special attention to assisting international efforts in education, health, and food supply.⁴

Education, health, and food programs already claim major attention of the regional member governments. Educators, agriculturalists, and health experts, through CENTO's Multilateral Technical Coopera-

tion Fund, are continuously discovering new ways in which we can assist one another in coordinating efforts in these essential fields. Here is the opportunity, and the need, to refine and focus our efforts.

Of particular interest to CENTO, I believe, will be the emphasis that we, in the United States, seek to give to progress in teacher training, vocational and scientific education, and publishing of badly needed textbooks. In the field of public health, CENTO's experience in regional cooperation suggests that the organization could have a special role in a concerted attack on communicable diseases. The war on hunger and malnutrition demands enormous resources and ingenuity from every government and every person who can find a role to play. Here CENTO has not been laggard. Indeed, the organization has given high priority to agriculture, from the first beginnings of this alliance. Now we should draw on that experience to enhance the effectiveness of national campaigns to improve and modernize production and distribution of food.

While considering new opportunities in these fields, let us pay well-deserved attention to such sustaining CENTO programs as the professional military development program, the military training exercises, the countersubversion program, the technical programs in agriculture, communications, and the other CENTO activities which contribute to so many solid accomplishments in the region.

We cannot sketch out a blueprint here this week which will meet all our needs for an entire decade. When we meet again next year, I am certain that we shall consider then new opportunities and new challenges. But let us draw strength from our continuity

² For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

³ For text of President Johnson's address before the Foreign Service Institute, see *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1966, p. 554.

⁴ For texts of President Johnson's messages to Congress on international education and health and on food for freedom, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, pp. 328 and 336.

of purpose amid these changes. As for the United States, I am proud to reaffirm the determination of my Government to continue its contribution to the purposes for which the CENTO organization is dedicated.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Press release 93 dated April 22

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held their fourteenth session in Ankara on April 20 and 21, 1966. Leaders of the five delegations were:

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran
H.E. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey

The Right Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, United States of America

A message of welcome from the President of Turkey was read at the opening of the meeting. The leaders of the national delegations expressed their appreciation for the message and of the warm hospitality extended by the Turkish Government.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey, as host, was in the chair. He welcomed the delegations on behalf of the Turkish Government. Mr. Caglayangil was in turn welcomed by the other members to his first meeting of the Council since he became Foreign Minister.

The Council expressed its deep regret at the continued illness of the former President of Turkey, General Cemal Gursel, and paid tribute to his distinguished services to Turkey, as a soldier and as a statesman.

Engaging in a wide-ranging exchange of views on international developments since its last meeting in Tehran,⁵ the Council agreed that the need for collective security is imperative in present world circumstances. They reaffirmed their determination to maintain the defensive strength of CENTO. The Council recognized that threats of subversion and aggression against the countries of the region still remained. In this regard the Foreign Minister of Iran drew the Council's attention to subversive activities in the Persian Gulf area. The Ministers reaffirmed their sincere desire to contribute to the utmost to the reduction of international tensions and to measures of disarmament and the strengthening of peace.

The Council reviewed the report of the Military Committee which included a report on CENTO's joint military exercises. They discussed suggestions for further strengthening of the mutual defense potential of the Alliance.

Taking into consideration existing treaties, the Ministers expressed their deep concern over the continuation of the Cyprus conflict with all its inherent dangers. They also expressed their earnest desire for an agreed settlement which would preserve peace in the Island in accordance with the legitimate interest of all its peoples.

The Ministers deplored the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. The agreement to a cease-fire was welcomed as a step towards the "peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters", contemplated in the Security Council's resolution of September 20, 1965,⁶ and the Tashkent Declaration.

The United States Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary gave the Council full accounts of recent developments in Viet-Nam and Rhodesia respectively.

Pleasure was expressed at the accelerated economic development of the regional countries through their own efforts, and the Council was pleased to note the extent to which CENTO had been able to contribute to the strengthening of the region through sponsorship of joint economic projects, its cultural programme and the opportunities it was able to provide for people of the CENTO countries to meet, confer and work together on productive joint enterprises.

In approving the report of the Economic Committee, the Council noted that a number of major joint communications projects have been completed and are already in operation. The significant contribution they are making to the CENTO area was symbolized during the meeting when members of the Council participated in the formal dedication of the CENTO microwave system. The Ministers expressed pleasure at the very great increase in the telephonic communication that has taken place since the 3,060-mile system was opened to traffic in June last. The Council also noted the completion of the CENTO road linking Turkey with Iran, and that both the CENTO airway and the CENTO high frequency telecommunications link joining London with key regional cities would be completed this year.

The Ministers approved new directions to guide CENTO's economic activities in the years ahead as submitted by the Economic Committee and congratulated the Committee on their constructive and realistic recommendations.

The Ministers approved priority for public health measures which have been or will be selected for

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, May 3, 1965, p. 685.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 608.

attention by CENTO in coordination with other international organizations including measures for the control of epidemic diseases in the area.

The Council agreed that the proposal to expand and intensify CENTO's multilateral technical co-operation programme should advance the basic CENTO economic objective of increasing the technical self-sufficiency of the region.

The Council decided that their next meeting would be held in London in April, 1967.

MICROWAVE SYSTEM DEDICATION

Remarks by Secretary Rusk

Mr. Secretary General, esteemed colleagues, and distinguished guests: The successful completion of the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications System is not merely a triumph of technology and engineering. That in itself would be impressive enough even in this era of breathtaking scientific achievement. The CENTO microwave system is also a triumph of cooperation.

This new system could never have been erected without sharing—sharing of talents, sharing of resources, and sharing a sense of dedication to the cause of a better life for all men. This microwave system clearly was not built by dollars alone but by dollars working with rials, and rupees, and liras. The American engineers alone could not have achieved it.

A host of technicians in Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey devoted their talents and energies to achieving this important advance in our capacity to communicate with one another. I understand that, at the height of construction activity, about 7,000 men were at work on the hundreds of interrelated jobs required.

The implications of this new tool of communication are truly thrilling, but we dare not regard it as an unmixed blessing. As ideas and information flow now almost instantaneously from one nation to another, the minds of our peoples will be stirred to reach for still greater horizons, and they will be less patient with delays in fulfillment of their hopes for a better life. In

that sense, our work has only just begun.

With these things in mind, may I now convey to you a message from the President of the United States.

Message From President Johnson

It gives me particular pleasure today to send to you, the representatives of the governments and peoples of the CENTO alliance, and through you to His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah, to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, to His Excellency President Ayub, and to His Excellency President Sunay, my personal greetings and those of the American people. Through the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications System that we are now inaugurating, we are all drawn closer together; closer in time and closer in bonds of friendship.

Only with communication can we have understanding, and we must have understanding in order to have peace. Only with communication can we share knowledge, and we must share a great deal of knowledge in order to foster the trade and economic development in which all our peoples are so deeply interested. By building together this vital new communications link, we have built an important instrument for the preservation of peace and for the promotion of prosperity. We can all be proud of this, our cooperative accomplishment.

PRESS CONFERENCE, APRIL 22

Secretary Rusk: I wish to express to the Foreign Minister and to the Mayor and the Governor my very warm appreciation for their hospitality during this meeting.

We have had a very good meeting of CENTO, and, in addition, I have had a chance to have bilateral discussions with my colleagues. I want to express also our good fortune in having such beautiful weather here during this meeting. It has been spectacular and it is with some regret that we leave. I will be happy to take some of your questions before we depart.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you describe your talks that you had last night with Mr. Bhutto [Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan], please?

A. Well, we talked for about 2 hours last evening and covered a wide range of subjects, not only those of international importance such as the situation in Southeast Asia and some of our recent contacts on both sides with China but also on our bilateral relations. I found the talks very useful, and I think we made some progress in achieving a better understanding of some of the points on which we had minor differences in the past, but I am sure this conversation will go on through our regular diplomatic channels and I will be seeing Mr. Bhutto again in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] in June.

Q. But could you say anything—are you able to say anything at the moment about military and economic aid to Pakistan?

A. We did not actually get into that subject very much because the Minister of Finance of Pakistan, Mr. [Mohammed] Shoaib, is now in Washington having discussions with the International Bank and with the United States Government; so that is the forum through which we will discuss those matters. Mr. Bhutto and I did not spend much time on that.

Mr. Lincoln [Robert Lincoln, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Ankara]: Mrs. Salus has seven or eight questions on behalf of the Turkish journalists here. They got together questions.

Secretary Rusk: All right.

Q. Has CENTO become an organ for defense—regional defense? If it has established itself as an organ, then why does the United States feel it necessary to have bilateral agreements with the regional countries?

A. Well, first, I would like to express my own respect for the role which CENTO has played here these past 10 years. I think when one looks at the region one can see that the threats against the region are

somewhat less than they were and the countries in the region have made some substantial progress in their own development during the 10-year period. The United States, of course, has close, strong bilateral relations with all of our allies and all of those with whom we are closely associated, as we are with CENTO.

As you know, we are not in a technical sense a formal member of CENTO. We are associated with it very closely. I'm, in a technical sense, here as the head of an observer delegation. But we work very closely with CENTO and participate actively in all of its programs and activities, but we do have strong bilateral relations with the three regional members of CENTO.

Q. Is there a danger besides communism in this region that CENTO should take up? But if there is such a thing—such danger of another threat rather than communism—would the United States be taking measures to prevent it?

A. Well, as far as the United States is concerned—and I will speak only for us, because the formal members of the CENTO can speak for themselves—as far as the United States is concerned, our association with CENTO is for the purpose of assisting in deterring Communist aggression. Now, we are aware that there are other problems, and we try to work closely and cooperatively with our CENTO partners on those other problems, but those are not strictly on the basis of our own association with CENTO, which is limited in character to Communist aggression.

For example—if I might just illustrate this last point and perhaps anticipate another one of your later questions—your distinguished Foreign Minister presented Turkish views on Cyprus with a very great ability during our CENTO meeting and, of course, this question was a major topic of conversation in our bilateral discussions this morning.

As you know, the United States is very much interested in the position of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, and we hope very

much that much more can be done to improve their position with respect to the common needs of ordinary life and their sense of safety.

We also work with this problem in the United Nations. We are the major contributor to the United Nations Force on the island and, during the last meeting of the General Assembly, I think you will recall Turkey and the United States found themselves voting together on the resolutions on Cyprus.

I think I have time for about two more questions; then I will have to take off.

Q. Did you—during any of your discussions with the Secretary General this morning—did you come to agreement of principle to the review of the bilateral agreement between the two countries? If such agreement has been reached, when may discussions be started?

A. I am happy to say that we did come to complete agreement on that point, and those discussions can start here in Ankara for the convenience of the Turkish Government as soon as possible. Both sides are ready, and I would suppose that could be in a few days as far as we are concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your talks with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, do you feel that Pakistan might be able to play a role in settling the Viet-Nam war?

A. Well, we are very much interested in any opportunity anyone has to maintain contact with the other side to explore the possibility of peace. This would include Pakistan. There are a number of other governments who have regular contact with Hanoi and Peiping who are also aware of our interest in this matter.

But the problem is not really one of a channel of communication. The problem is not the diplomatic problem of establishing contact. The problem is that, despite all of the contacts that have occurred thus far, we have not yet seen any intention on the part of Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over South Viet-Nam by force. So that is the key

point. There are many contacts. But what is needed here is a readiness to come to the conference table and take this problem into discussion and away from the battlefield. We do not see, at the present, any readiness on the part of the other side to come. I would be at Geneva tomorrow afternoon if there was anyone there to talk to, literally.

Q. Thank you.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Minister, I hope that you will take to your distinguished President and your Prime Minister our great thanks for your hospitality here. We have enjoyed it very much.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on April 15 (press release 87) that Secretary Rusk would head the U.S. observer delegation to the 14th Ministerial Council session of the Central Treaty Organization, held at Ankara April 20–21. Parker T. Hart, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and U.S. observer in the Council of Deputies, served as alternate U.S. observer.

Advisers of the delegation included:

Senior Adviser:

Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Advisers:

Scott L. Behoteguy, Economic Coordinator for CENTO, U.S. AID Mission, Ankara

C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Col. Stanley P. Hidalgo, CENTO Action Officer, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Charles W. Naas, Second Secretary, American Embassy, Ankara

Daniel O. Newberry, Officer-in-Charge, CENTO Affairs, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Ashton H. Manhart, U.S. Permanent Military Deputy, Central Treaty Organization

Christopher Van Hollen, Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Ankara

John Patrick Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire Safety of Ships

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 95 dated April 25

Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, will visit London, Paris, Rome, Hamburg, and Athens this week [April 25-30] to discuss with government officials the problem of fire safety of passenger ships and to make clear the importance the Government of the United States attaches to a satisfactory resolution of this problem. Mr. Solomon will be accompanied by Rear Adm. Charles P. Murphy, Chief of the Office of Merchant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard.

These discussions will precede a meeting, requested by the United States as an outgrowth of the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster last December, of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization's Maritime Safety Committee in London May 3-10 to consider the fire-safety problem.

The United States has proposed amendment with respect to fire safety of passenger vessels of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 1960,¹ to which the United States and 44 other countries are parties. After the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster, the United States informed the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the parent organization of the convention, that the United States wished to add the subject of fire safety of passenger vessels to the agenda of the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee's meeting scheduled for January 31-February 4, 1966. Fire safety was discussed by the Committee, and it was agreed, at the request of the United States, to devote an extraordinary session of the Committee beginning May 3 exclusively to the problem of fire safety of passenger vessels.

The U.S. representative at the February meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee

set forth the following U.S. objectives in seeking a solution to the fire-safety problem:

1. To obtain the agreement of all governments parties to the SOLAS Convention of 1960 that future passenger ships should conform to the Method I construction standards of the convention (that is, the use of noncombustible materials).

2. To revise the "grandfather" provisions, which exempt old ships from meeting the standards of the convention for new ships.

3. To require certain improvements in the standards of the convention for all passenger ships and particularly for those that do not conform to Method I.

The United States believes that the proposals it has made in more detail in a paper on fire protection which was circulated through IMCO to the interested governments last month would meet the problem. It is, of course, also prepared to consider other proposals to accomplish the same results. However, especially in view of the latest cruise ship fire—that of the *Viking Princess* on April 8—the United States attaches the greatest importance to providing at the earliest date improved safety standards for passengers embarking at U.S. ports.

U.S. DELEGATION TO IMCO MEETING

The Department of State announced on April 30 (press release 102) that Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman would present the views of the U.S. Government on the problem of fire safety of passenger ships at the opening of an extraordinary session of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization at London on May 3. The United States requested the special meeting of the Committee earlier this year as a result of the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster last December.

Ambassador Harriman's presence and his statement will emphasize further the great

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5780.

importance the U.S. Government attaches to a satisfactory solution of the fire-safety problem as soon as possible.

Adm. Edwin J. Roland, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, will head the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming Maritime Safety Committee meeting, as he did at the Committee's previous meeting January 31-February 4, 1966.

U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends

Press release 103 dated April 30

The emergency mission of the United States petroleum airlift to aid Zambia has been accomplished and therefore is being terminated, as is the Canadian airlift. The other supply routes—through Tanzania, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola—by road, rail, river, lake, and sea, as well as continuing British air transport, are now regarded as sufficiently well developed to meet Zambia's current petroleum consumption levels and to continue to build up Zambia's petroleum reserves.

Farewell ceremonies to commemorate the American-Canadian contribution to this multinational effort were held by the Zambian Government April 30.

The Vice President of Zambia, Mr. Reuben Kamanga, expressed his country's appreciation of the United States and Canadian airlifts in a broadcast April 21 over Zambian radio and television. He said in part:

We have now assured our supplies of petroleum products and have built up our stocks to the highest levels there have ever been in this country. The American and Canadian airlifts have made a great contribution to meeting our needs and to building up our stockpiles. I would like to bid them farewell and place on record our great appreciation of the work that they have done and of the vital contribution that they have made to the solution of our petroleum problems.

Both the Pan American and Trans World Airlines jets commenced service in the airlift in early January of this year, carrying

petroleum products from Léopoldville to Elisabethville. The products were then transported from Elisabethville to Zambia by rail and road. The Congolese Government as well as many commercial enterprises in the Congo cooperated actively in carrying on the airlift. The two United States airlines have carried more than 3.6 million gallons of petroleum products in this airlift.

The United States Agency for International Development in late 1965 and early 1966 signed the airlift agreements with Pan American Airways and TWA.¹ The multinational transport effort to Zambia was initiated in order to minimize the impact upon Zambia of the cessation of petroleum supplies normally received from and through Southern Rhodesia.

May 21 Deadline Set for Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses

Press release 99 dated April 26

The American Embassy at Santo Domingo has informed the Department of State that on April 7, 1966, the Government of the Dominican Republic established, in accordance with Law Number 172 of April 6, 1966, a special Commission for receiving, investigating, and processing all claims for losses resulting from the damage and destruction of property in the National District of Santo Domingo as a result of the civil strife which began on April 24, 1965.

American nationals who desire to file such claims should write with the least possible delay to: Comisión Depuradora de Reclamaciones por Daños de Guerra, Calle Las Damas esq. El Conde (Altos de Rentas Internas), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

The Department of State is informed that claims are required to be filed with the Commission by May 21, 1966.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 85, and Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters

*Statement by Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

It is a pleasure for me to appear here to discuss with you the position of the Department of State on the population growth aspects of economic and social development programs abroad.

The Department of State, together with the Agency for International Development, has been giving increasing attention to these problems over the past 5 years. It has participated in numerous meetings, both in the international field and here at home, with private organizations concerned with population growth. Its senior officers have spoken publicly on this subject and have met with many private groups to exchange views on the problem.

In some areas the population threatens to double itself in a generation. The long-term implications of such increases in population are sobering. They are a serious challenge to us if we are to succeed in the long efforts we have been making to assist a large part of the world in its orderly economic and social development.

The problem is summarized very well in the bill [S. 1676] introduced by the chairman of this subcommittee and other Members of the Senate:

... (1) the application of public health measures and the introduction of modern medical life-saving and life-prolonging techniques have contributed to a doubling of the annual rate of world population growth within the past eighteen years, and may

be expected to continue to increase rates of such growth in the future;

(2) population growth is a vital factor in determining the extent to which economic development and political stability will prevail in any country, especially in countries which are in the early stages of economic and political development;

(3) at present, because of the rapid and continued growth in population, hundreds of millions of parents are unable to provide adequately for themselves and their children;

(4) those nations in which population growth is most extreme and where the problems arising from such growth are most acute are, because of economic, technical, and other considerations, also the nations least able independently to cope with such growth and the problems connected therewith. . . .

So much for the problem. What are we doing about it?

First, we have been active in the formulation and expression of international policies and programs on population matters. In 1962, for example, we supported a resolution in the General Assembly which endorsed United Nations encouragement and assistance to governments "in obtaining basic data and carrying out essential studies of the demographic aspects, as well as other aspects, of their economic and social development problems."² We have consistently en-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on Apr. 11 (press release 84 dated Apr. 14).

² For U.S. statements and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

couraged and supported United Nations activities devoted to the study of the nature and scope of population problems and their possible solutions. We have, in the United Nations and on the international scene, underlined our concern about the social consequences of our own population trends and our interest in learning more—and helping others to learn more—about population trends in the developing countries.

We have, however, also been keenly aware of the many complexities involved in the population problem and its possible solution. To the extent we can help other countries in this field we are ready to do so, but it is essential to our foreign policy goals that there be no misunderstanding about the dimensions of our activities and intentions. Therefore, as far back as 1962, the Department of State made it clear that the United States did not—and will not—advocate any specific policy that another country might follow in approaching its population growth problems. We stated that the United States was prepared to help other countries—but only upon their request—to find possible sources of information and assistance on ways to deal with the problem.

Ambassador Stevenson set forth additional aspects of our policy in the field of international cooperation when, in a public speech in 1963, he called upon the United Nations to be prepared to extend to member countries technical assistance for surveys on attitudes toward marriage, child rearing, and family size. Ambassador Stevenson also stated that the United Nations, together with UNESCO and the World Health Organization, could advise other countries, at their request, on how best to inform their nationals about family planning consistent with the cultural and religious values of the country concerned. We have supported the World Health Organization in a research program on fertility and human reproduction.

Second, we have continued to expand our own activities abroad. The guideline for the greater concentration of resources, both by the Department of State and the Agency for

International Development, in our international programs is to be found in the President's statement in January 1965, when he said, "I will seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources."³

Shortly after the President's statement—early in March 1965—the Department sent an instruction to our embassies around the world to insure the closest cooperation between our embassy staffs and those of the Agency for International Development in each country in working on population matters. We stressed to our embassies the continuing responsible concern of our Government in this field. This is consistent with the proposal in S. 1676 concerning the transmission of data to United States diplomatic personnel and other mission officers so that they may be advised with respect to the problems and their duties.

We also informed them in this circular that our AID missions abroad were being supplied with general reference materials and technical publications dealing with a wide range of subjects, from demographic studies to family planning booklets. In each AID mission abroad there is not only a small library of reference material and technical publications but, in virtually all, an officer who has been designated to coordinate mission activities in this field. This is consistent with the suggestion concerning demographic attachés in S. 1676.

Here at home, the Agency for International Development has organized a Population Reference and Research Branch. This branch serves as the focal point for coordinating all AID operations around the world in this field. I am informed that AID already has good files on programs in other countries. This is consistent with the suggestion made in S. 1676 for the collection of data on all foreign population programs whether or not instituted or assisted by the United States.

³ For text of President Johnson's state of the Union message, see *ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

Working within this AID framework are a number of consultants. They advise us on the demographic, economic, medical, and public health aspects of the population problem. But more than that, they maintain contact and coordinate with interested United States and foreign private institutions and groups concerned with the population problem. Dr. [Edgar F.] Berman, for example, traveled extensively in Latin America when I was in charge of the Inter-American Bureau, where he sought out and talked with all those in the public and private sectors interested in the problem. These consultants are performing a number of the functions suggested in S. 1676.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which has merged into one organization the functions and staffs of the Department and AID with respect to Latin America, has created a Population Unit in its Institutional Development Office. The AID geographic Bureaus for the other regions also have population officers in their health units.

The Department's Office of Research and Analysis has undertaken several population research projects. We should be alert to the possibilities of using this office on additional research projects.

An increasing amount of AID funds has been used in support of population programs in those developing countries which have asked for our assistance, and AID programs in this field are scheduled to be increased substantially over the next few years. Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency for International Development] informed this subcommittee on April 8 of some of the principal programs AID has undertaken abroad: in the Republic of China, Turkey, Honduras, Pakistan, and in other countries. Many countries are becoming more aware of the need for action on their population problems, and a growing number are seeking advice and assistance.

We agree with this subcommittee on the need for a focal point in the Department of State to undertake policy coordination in all our programs abroad; to insure full consideration of our foreign policy objectives, par-

ticularly those of a political nature, in the carrying out of these programs; to keep our embassies fully informed of our thoughts and plans and, where necessary, to make sure our posts abroad are giving this serious problem all the attention it deserves; and, finally, to maintain close liaison with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, all other United States Government agencies, and private institutions and organizations concerned with this problem, as well as with this subcommittee.

To this end, my own office—that of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs—will serve as the needed focal point for policy matters and coordination. Working under me will be a Special Assistant for Population Matters, a position comparable with that of the special assistants who are now in charge of such important fields in our international relationships as fisheries, food for peace, and labor. Working with me, through a Special Assistant for Population Matters, will be officers representing the bureaus in the Department, as well as the AID offices, which work on the various aspects of the problem—for example, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which is in charge of handling matters with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In addition, the geographic bureaus, particularly those which cover those areas of the world in which the population problem is a serious one—Latin America, the Near East and South Asia, and the Far East—will, as I have said, designate one of their senior officers to work with my office on this subject.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Department has done and will continue to do everything it can properly do to encourage other governments to give this problem the attention it deserves and to respond to such requests for assistance as we receive, subject only to the limitations which Mr. Bell has already described to this committee and which I will not repeat here. We have all the legislative authority we need at this time. Should the future demonstrate a need for additional legislation in this field, we shall not hesitate to ask for it.

Mr. Chairman, we have a vital national interest in this subject and are grateful for the thought you and your associates are giving it. I assure you that the Department of State fully shares your concern and that it hopes that its increasing efforts in this field, and those of all of our official and private institutions, may soon point the way to a solution of this worldwide problem.

International Health Act of 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 12453. H. Rept. 1317. March 11, 1966. 27 pp.
 Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 13546. H. Rept. 1316. March 11, 1966. 24 pp.
 Interim Trade Agreement Between the United States and Canada. Message from the President transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 411. March 15, 1966. 32 pp.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

The Atlantic Alliance: Allied Comment. Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. January 1966. 82 pp. [Committee print.]

Regional and Other Documents Concerning United States Relations With Latin America. Prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January 28, 1966. 330 pp. [Committee print.]

Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966—Vietnam. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part I. January 28—February 18, 1966. 743 pp.

The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. February 1966. 14 pp. [Committee print.]

Visit to Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Israel. Report of Senate Delegation Named by the Vice President To Respond to Certain Official Invitations from Foreign Parliamentary Bodies and Governments. By Senator Wayne Morse. February 10, 1966. 27 pp. [Committee print.]

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II. February 15—March 10, 1966. 258 pp.

Third Special Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. H. Doc 386. February 22, 1966. 60 pp.

United States—South African Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I. March 1—17, 1966. 253 pp.

Refugee Problems in South Vietnam. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1058. March 4, 1966. 35 pp.

Twenty-First Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 403. March 7, 1966. 41 pp.

Amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Report (together with supplemental views) to accompany H.R. 12169. S. Rept. 1060. March 9, 1966. 12 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Spain Conclude Agreements on Space Cooperation

Press release 82 dated April 14

Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Castiella and United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk on April 14 exchanged notes confirming two agreements involving cooperation between Spain and the United States in space. Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., represented the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The first agreement provides for continued use by NASA of its manned space flight station on Grand Canary Island, while the second agreement provides for a cooperative Spain—United States scientific sounding-rocket program to measure winds and temperatures at high altitudes.

The Canary Islands agreement outlines expansion of facilities at the station to support the Apollo lunar landing project and other space exploration programs. The original agreement of March 1960¹ established the station for one-man Mercury missions, and it has continued in service for the two-man Gemini flights. The new agreement for the three-man Apollo missions and more advanced programs runs until January 29, 1974.

The Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aero-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4463 and 5393.

spacial (INTA) representing the Comisión Nacional de Investigación del Espacio (CONIE) will continue to be responsible for the participation of Spanish personnel in the operation of the station.

The initial function of the Canary Islands station during Gemini is to support the astronauts' first orbit. The station picks up the spacecraft as it goes beyond the range of tracking from Bermuda, continuing coverage as the flight passes over Africa toward Kano, Nigeria.

One of the seven primary stations supporting Gemini, the Canary Islands site is essential to the entire mission for its real-time voice communications and telemetry between the spacecraft and Mission Control at Cape Kennedy and Houston.

The Apollo assignment will be equally vital. Following insertion into orbit over an Apollo ship in mid-Atlantic, the first data from the spacecraft will be received by the Canary Islands station or, if the launch angle is farther south, by the NASA station at Ascension Island.

The second agreement, part of a continuing Spanish-U.S. program of cooperation in space investigation, was confirmed by an exchange of notes between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State. It provides that four Nike-boosted rockets carrying small acoustic grenades will be launched in Spain.

Acoustic grenades will be ejected and detonated at regular intervals during the ascent of the rocket to approximately 56 miles. Average temperature and winds in the area between grenade detonations will be determined by measuring the exact time of detonation of each grenade, the time of arrival of each sound wave at ground microphones, and the exact position of each grenade detonation. Thus, the speed of sound in the area between two detonations is measured and the wind speed and direction can be derived from the horizontal drift.

The agreement is in the form of a memorandum of understanding² concluded be-

tween INTA and NASA. The memorandum provides that INTA will establish a sounding-rocket range, construct grenade-type payloads, provide two Nike-boosted rockets, conduct launchings, and analyze and publish the data obtained. NASA will lend range-tracking and telemetry equipment and a launcher, provide two Nike-boosted rockets, provide a prototype payload, and train Spanish personnel as needed. INTA and NASA will each bear the cost of discharging their respective responsibilities.

The results of the experiments will be made available to the world scientific community.

United States and Romania Agree on 1966 Program of Exchanges

Press release 94 dated April 25

The U.S.-Romanian program of exchanges for 1966 was agreed upon in an exchange of letters between Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., the Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Petre Bălăceanu, the Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Romania, at the Department of State on April 25.

Most of the specified exchanges are in the field of education and cultural affairs. Provisions are also made for exchanges in public health, science and technology, exhibits, publishing, radio and television, and performing arts.

Since 1960, U.S.-Romanian exchanges have been carried out in accordance with diplomatic notes exchanged every 2 years. The 1966 program is covered by notes exchanged on December 23, 1964.¹

The new program includes provisions for each country to send to the other 10 graduate students and researchers, 2 professors of language and literature, 2 public health specialists, and 10 cultural specialists.

² Not printed here.

¹ For a Department announcement and text of the U.S. note, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1965, p. 87.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Commodities—Wheat

Agricultural commodities agreement between the United States and Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731—1736), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Dar es Salaam February 18, 1966, and at Nairobi February 19 and 22 and March 4, 1966. Entered into force March 4, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹
Signature: Korea, April 18, 1966.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Done at Geneva May 20, 1965.²
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, March 29, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.³
Acceptance received: United Arab Republic, March 11, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Italy, April 29, 1966.
Entered into force: April 29, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Denunciation received: Belgium, March 22, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹
Signature: National Telecommunications Council of Brazil, April 25, 1966.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the international sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London November 1 through December 23, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5933.
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, February 17, 1966.
Accessions deposited: Ghana, January 24, 1966; Guatemala, February 9, 1966; ² Panama, March 8, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).

Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Signatures: Argentina, April 26, 1966; Austria, April 27, 1966; Brazil, April 25, 1966; Canada, April 28, 1966; Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; El Salvador, April 26, 1966; France, April 25, 1966; Iceland, April 25, 1966; India, April 28, 1966; Ireland, April 25, 1966; Italy, April 27, 1966; Japan, April 25, 1966; Mexico, April 26, 1966; Netherlands, April 28, 1966; New Zealand, April 26, 1966; Norway, April 26, 1966; Peru, April 28, 1966; Philippines, April 25, 1966; Sierra Leone, April 28, 1966; Spain, April 27, 1966; Sweden, April 25, 1966;³ Vatican City State, April 27, 1966; Venezuela; April 28, 1966; Western Samoa, April 26, 1966.
Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance: Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; Japan, April 25, 1966.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, April 25, 1966.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul April 2 and 4, 1966. Entered into force April 4, 1966.

China

Agreement amending the agreement of October 19, 1963, concerning trade in cotton textiles, as amended (TIAS 5482, 5549, 5754, 5820). Exchange of notes at Washington April 22, 1966. Entered into force April 22, 1966.

Spain

Amendment to the agreement of August 16, 1957 (TIAS 3988) for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington November 29, 1965.
Entered into force: April 1, 1966.

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701—1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Khartoum April 13, 1966. Entered into force April 13, 1966.

Turkey

Agreement extending the agreement of February 16 and July 1, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3042, 4309), and the agreement of October 14, 1958 (TIAS 4117), relating to the loan of certain naval vessels to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 14, 1965, and February 28, 1966. Entered into force February 28, 1966.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731—1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Belgrade April 11, 1966. Entered into force April 11, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² With a declaration.

³ Subject to ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

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Military Bases in the Philippines—Relinquishment of Certain Base Lands; Use by the United States of Certain Other Areas. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965. TIAS 5924. 6 pp. 5¢.

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Health and Sanitation—United States Naval Medical Research Unit. Agreement with Ethiopia—Signed at Addis Ababa December 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. TIAS 5936. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon December 20, 1965. Entered into force December 20, 1965. TIAS 5944. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5950. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5951. 8 pp. 10¢.

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Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention—Signed at Washington December 2, 1946. Adopted at the seventeenth meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, July 2, 1965. Entered into force October 6, 1965, and January 4, 1966. TIAS 5953. 9 pp. 10¢.

Telecommunications—Television Broadcasting in Viet-Nam. Agreement with Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. TIAS 5954. 4 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1403 PUBLICATION 8079 MAY 16, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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95	4/25	Solomon to discuss fire safety of passenger ships with European officials.
†96	4/25	Frankel: "The Era of Educational and Cultural Relations."
†97	4/26	U.S.-China cotton textiles agreement.
†98	4/26	MacArthur: "Your Stake in the Balance-of-Payments Problem."
99	4/26	Claims for property losses in National District of Santo Domingo.
100	4/27	Rusk: television interview on Red China.
101	4/29	Ball: "The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis."
102	4/30	Harriman to present U.S. views at IMCO meeting (rewrite).
103	4/30	End of U.S. airlift to Zambia.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

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May 16, 1966

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The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

Not long ago a whimsical friend, still under the spell of reading all dozen volumes of Mr. Toynbee's massive work on the life cycle of nations and civilization, said to me: "When America has run its course, I know what headnote will appear in the history books. It will be 'The United States—a nation that died of a surfeit of pragmatism.'"

Like a highly seasoned salad this remark stayed with me for several days. I am afraid there is a grain of truth in my friend's irreverent observation. We are a pragmatic people, and—especially in the area where I toil—pragmatism is the course of least resistance. It is easy—and tempting—to become absorbed in the operational aspects of foreign relations and to ignore the longer term implications of policy. But, if America is to survive as a civilization, if in fact the world is to survive as a healthy environment for human beings, then we do have to remind ourselves of the larger framework of policy—something better than the habits, the improvisations, the expedients of years gone by—or we shall find ourselves repeating old mistakes in a world where mistakes by great nations can mean world destruction.

Today there is a special temptation to pragmatism in our relations with Western Europe, where we are faced once again with the reappearance of an assertive nationalism that challenges the whole structure of our postwar arrangements.

Yet there is no area where it would be more dangerous for us to become absorbed merely in the operational aspects of policy, to make adjustments, accommodations, compromises, and concessions without regard to our great common objectives. For our relations with Western Europe carry a heavy freight of history. They form the longest and persistently the most important element of United States foreign policy. We have benefited greatly from events in Europe and we have suffered from them. And, at the end of the day, we cannot forget that jealousies, ambitions, and aggressions in Western Europe were responsible for the two greatest wars of modern history—cataclysms that created many of the ills and troubles that harass us today. If we are to avoid new and even more terrible conflicts, we must know where we are going and we must have some sense of how we are to get there.

We have not always had a sure sense of direction in these matters.

America spent the early years of this century in a state of innocence which, in

¹ Made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 29 (press release 101).

retrospect, seems both attractive and surprising. World War I came upon us while we had our backs turned, preoccupied as we were in transforming a continent into a nation. It took us a long time to sort the issues in that struggle. But in 1917 we entered the fight, and the weight of our effort turned the tide of battle. Yet in retrospect it seems clear enough that we did not comprehend the full meaning either of the war or of our involvement. When we had brought the boys home again we had a frustrating try at international peacemaking. Then we turned our backs on the world in the interests of what we awkwardly referred to as "normalcy."

We pretended, in other words, that we were not a great power and that we had been wrong in trying to act like one. The fount of our foreign policy remained the admonitory passages in Washington's farewell address—advice given more than a century before to a fledgling Republic. If staying clear of entangling alliances had been good enough for the Founding Fathers, it was good enough for us.

America's policy, as we told the world, was isolationism—the early 20th-century version of what would be known today as neutralism or nonalignment—and we meant to stick by it.

The Hard Lessons of Two World Wars

The Second World War ended our adolescence. We fought valiantly and well in all four corners of the earth. When the conflict was over, America at long last had grown up, and we had learned certain hard lessons the hard way.

I shall not try to review all of those lessons here tonight, but I think it essential to mention some of them.

The first was that the United States is indubitably a great power and, as such, cannot escape involvement in the world's main concerns. Moreover, the world has become so interdependent that our interests are necessarily engaged by any new aggression in any strategic area of the world—and particularly in Europe.

Second, we admitted with nagging conscience that our own neutralism had served as an encouragement—or at least had posed no discouragement—to aggressors in Europe. We could deter aggression in the future only by making it crystal clear that American power would be committed instantly and automatically if any friendly European state were attacked.

Within months after the end of the war we began to learn another hard lesson—that another nation, itself also organized on a continent-wide basis, was bent on extending its dominion, and the ideological system it represented, through force and subversion around the world. As one after another of the European states were caught within the encircling net of the Iron Curtain, we awoke with a shock to this new and imminent peril.

Along with our European friends we began to rethink the mistakes of the past. Together with them we reached certain conclusions which we put in treaty or institutional form. One was the recognition—not of the theory but the fact—that an attack on one of the North Atlantic states was an attack on all. In the case of major aggression against Europe, the power of the New World would inevitably be called upon to redress the balance of the old. That, however, was not enough by itself. The nations of Europe that had been occupied, and particularly the leaders of France, were emphatic in telling us that Europeans could not endure another period of liberation. This time they must be protected, not liberated.

We concluded with them, therefore, that our Western alliance must be more than an agreement for liberation. It must be made an effective deterrent so as to dissuade any aggressor from reckless adventures. To achieve this we must create an instrument for instant collective defense by forces in being, acting under common command and common plans.

For this, too, we had the hard lessons of two world wars to guide us.

In World War I it had taken 4 years for the Allied Powers to pull themselves to-

gether and agree on a combined command under Marshal Foch. The obstinate insistence of the individual nation-states on sovereign and separate national commands cost hundreds of thousands of lives.

In the Second World War the Western Powers again reaped the tragic consequences of their unpreparedness and their blind rejection of common plans and a common command. Denmark fell, then Norway, then the Low Countries, then France. Almost 5 years elapsed before the Allies accumulated the military strength, unified under the integrated command of SHAEF, that made it possible to mount the Normandy invasion and win the war.

It was against this tragic background that the Atlantic Powers—inspired particularly by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman—undertook in 1950 to transform the alliance from a classical mutual defense pact into a full-fledged collective security system. An integrated command was established under General Eisenhower. Common planning was undertaken. Forces were put in place for the defense of Europe that now total 2.5 million men. And over the years that followed the nuclear power of the United States was targeted against the Soviet rockets aimed at Europe.

For the first time in history the Western Powers were acting together with little regard for special national advantage, not merely to meet but to deter a potential aggressor. In what otherwise would have been a time of grave peril, Europeans could go about their affairs without an overhanging fear of invasion. They did so, and they have prospered beyond their fondest dreams.

Construction of the Western Alliance

The construction of the Western alliance, and even more the building of the collective security system known as NATO, meant a great national decision for us as Americans and a great common achievement for the West. Looking across the Atlantic, we decided that we must work actively with our European friends in deterring aggression in Europe. But even more important, we and

they concluded that peace could be permanently secured only if steps were taken to remove the underlying causes that had created so many disasters in the past.

Of all those causes one stood out above all others. That was the persistent rivalry among the individual nation-states of Europe, each striving in turn to gain dominance by force over its neighbors. From the time of the Treaty of Westphalia in the middle of the 17th century for more than a century and a half, the peace of the world was periodically disturbed primarily by the efforts of European nations—and particularly France, then the largest and strongest—to achieve hegemony over the rest of the Continent. Those efforts were thwarted by shifting coalitions of other European states aided by the astute diplomacy of Britain, which for centuries allied itself always on the side of the weaker group in order to maintain a balance. These European struggles were not always confined to the Continent. Throughout the whole of our colonial life they tended to spill over into the Western Hemisphere, until, when we secured our independence, we were able to insulate ourselves through a policy of isolation made possible by the Monroe Doctrine and the British Fleet.

We thus kept aloof from the European wars of the 19th century while the preponderance of power shifted in Europe. France, worn out by the exertions of the Napoleonic era and outstripped by the other major European powers in population, was defeated by the Second Reich, which under Bismarck's leadership had been created by Prussia out of 25 German kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and free cities. Yet the Franco-Prussian War was but a prelude of things to come. For in the first half of the 20th century the two world wars, which had their roots in European rivalries, brought all of us close to disaster.

Against this history it was clear that, if there was to be peace in Europe and in the world, the old national rivalries had to be replaced by something more constructive. Yet this was nothing America could bring

about by itself. We could assist the Europeans to rehabilitate themselves through the Marshall Plan. We could encourage them to sublimate their national rivalries in a new unity. But the actual achievement of that unity was something that only the European peoples could create.

Still the climate was ripe for action. The peoples of Europe were themselves thoroughly tired of wars that sprang from the competing ambitions of nation-states. And so they began to work brilliantly, principally under French leadership, on a whole series of measures: the Schuman Plan, which created the Coal and Steel Community; the proposal for a European army within a European Defense Community (which, had it succeeded, would have avoided many of the problems that haunt us today); and the European Atomic Energy Community. Most important was the great breakthrough of the Treaty of Rome that changed the economic face of Europe by creating a vast Common Market.

This then was the prospect in the early part of the 1960's—a Europe making massive strides toward unity with the strong prospect that its geographical boundaries would be expanded to include the United Kingdom and certain other European nations, a Europe growing prosperous with its burgeoning Common Market under the protective umbrella of NATO.

The organization of Europe is, of course, primarily a matter for Europeans. But it is a matter that deeply affects the United States as well. The thousands of Americans who gave their lives in the Argonne Forest—or, a quarter of a century later, in the Battle of the Bulge—have established our right and indeed our obligation to speak frankly on issues that so critically involve both our safety and our future. Our fate and the fate of Western Europe are tied inextricably together. We recognized that on two occasions when we sent our young men overseas, and Europe recognized that on two occasions when it called for our help in an extreme hour. And, whatever words may be uttered in the current discussion, Euro-

peans know today that American men and American might will be there when they need us. So we are not very much impressed by specious homilies about doctrine that obscure the point of America's demonstrated reliability in times of crisis.

We have seen in European progress toward unity the chance for a new and fruitful relationship. As President Kennedy said in June 1963, in his speech at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt,² we "look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership—an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace."

The Threat to European Unity

The idea of a united Europe linked in equal partnership across the Atlantic had great resonance on both sides of the ocean. But already there were forces working against it, in particular the decision of the government of one European nation-state to separate itself from the others and to seek a special position of primacy in Western Europe. The purposes of that government should not be a matter for polemics; they are on the public record, fully expressed or implied in any number of official statements.

That government has sought to halt the drive toward European unity in the name of uniting Europe; to transform the European Common Market into a mere commercial arrangement by hobbling the powers of the executive; to prevent other Western European nations from achieving any participation in the management of nuclear power so as to preserve its own exclusive position as the sole nation with nuclear weapons on the Western European Continent; to reduce the influence and ultimately the presence of the United States in Europe; and, finally, to free itself from obligations to the great postwar system of European and Atlantic institutions in order to achieve freedom of political and diplomatic maneuver that could

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

permit it to deal, to its own advantage, with what it has described with a curious impartiality as "the two great hegemonies."

The attack that has been launched against NATO deeply concerns all Western nations. Let us make no mistake about the fact that the withdrawal of an important power from participation in the arrangements that give reality to the Western alliance will weaken the common defense. More than that, it will weaken the Western deterrent. Finally, it is likely to delay and confuse the possibilities of moving toward an ultimate settlement of the great unfinished business of Europe. For it is clear to anyone who has closely followed the events of the past decade that the gradual changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have been hastened, not delayed, by the firm and common purpose of the West. And it is clear also that if the West ceases to stand firm and unified, if each individual Western nation seeks to make a separate deal for itself, the gains we have achieved will be quickly lost and the hope for an ultimate European settlement long deferred.

Obviously the Communist world has undergone major transformations since the death of Stalin. But the change has not been without its perils for the West. The Khrushchev who preached peaceful coexistence punctuated his message with attempted blackmail in Berlin, nuclear threats at the Parthenon, and missiles in Cuba. Yet, it is plainly right to build bridges to the Communist countries, bridges of trade and travel across barriers that cruelly divide a continent. It is right to welcome the citizens of East Europe to see for themselves that capitalism can yield economic progress and social justice side by side. These things are right, and they should be continued.

But those bridges to the East must be anchored in the solid foundation of a strong and cohesive Western alliance. For it is only when the security issue is beyond dispute that lasting progress can be made toward permanently improved relations with the Communist states. This is the basis on which

there can be secure movement toward a political settlement in Europe, leading to the reunification of Germany in conditions of peace and freedom and to real progress toward international arms control—goals that we and Europe share.

Over and above the attack on NATO there is, therefore, grave cause for uneasiness in the resurgence of a self-centered nationalism. For each country's nationalism is a force that, particularly in Europe, tends to create equal and opposite forces in neighboring countries. Ever since the war we Americans have known that the peace of the world depended to a great extent on the gamble that Europe would transform itself, that the nations of Western Europe would, after all these centuries, put aside those corrosive national rivalries that have been the cause of past disasters and sublimate their energies in a common purpose and a new unity. At the same time, we have always recognized the danger that the European people, with reflexes conditioned by history, might from time to time be tempted to lapse into the old bad habits of the past, to unfurl the dusty banners of other centuries, and to re-create the conditions in which Europe might again become the cockpit of the world.

Concept of Equal Partnership

There are, to be sure, voices even in this country that tell us almost with satisfaction that the latter development is inevitable and knowledgeable men should accept it. After all, they say, haven't the European nations regularly, 12 or 13 years after each war, dissolved their alliances and returned to their old rivalries?

This sounds strangely like the contention of the early 1920's that we should return to "normalcy." For the kind of Europe envisaged by these critics is a Europe no more suitable to the needs of today than would "normalcy" be for today's America.

What exactly would these men have us do? The realistic hope for peace in the world, they contend, is not for a unified Western Europe but for a Europe of nation-

states extending from the Atlantic to the Urals—or, in other words, a Europe in which each of the middle-sized states would seek to make its own deal with one or the other of the “great hegemonies” in the hope of establishing for itself a first-class power position while keeping the others in an inferior role.

Such a Europe—a continent of shifting coalitions and changing alliances—is not the hope of the future; it is a nostalgic evocation. It would mean not progress but a reversion to the tragic and discredited pattern of the past—a return to 1914, as though that were good enough, and with the same guarantee of instability—yet made more dangerous, not less, by the ideological drive of the Soviet Union and the existence of nuclear weapons.

To move toward such a Europe is not the way to reach a settlement of the unfinished business of the last war. It is not a way to remove the Iron Curtain except on terms that would preserve and exacerbate discrimination and inequality and thus lay the groundwork for new disasters in the future.

Such a Europe would not secure a lasting peace nor would it bring fulfillment to the European peoples. For there is a new requirement of size in the world which makes it imperative that, if the peoples of Europe are to make their full contribution to world affairs, they must organize themselves on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the modern age. Let us not deceive ourselves; no matter how adroit diplomacy may be, it cannot achieve first-power status for a nation of limited size and resources.

The true course of Western Europe lies not in fragmentation but in unity—a solid unity that will bring not varying degrees of status and citizenship but equality for all. A united Europe will not need to seek first-power status; it will have it. And unity, moreover, will enable the gifted European peoples to play their major role in the large affairs of this turbulent world and make their rich and proper contribution to civilization.

If Europe unites, the world will no longer be faced with the dangers of middle-sized states trying to play a game of maneuver with one another and with the “hegemonies,” after the pattern of the past. There will be a third large center of power and purpose—capable, because it is strong, of bringing about a European settlement, competent to come to terms with the East on a basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain and reunify the German people as equal members of a great community.

As this develops, and only as it develops, will we Atlantic peoples be able to give full meaning to the concept of equal partnership. For no longer will the European nations have to fear, as some apparently do, the preponderance of American weight in our common political councils or the preponderance of American industrial strength in our economic affairs. There will be equality in a realistic sense—not something enacted by international law, not something the United States has conferred. It will be an equality founded on unassailable fact, since a united Europe will command vast resources of technology and production, brain power and material.

“We Want a Europe Strong, Not Enfeebled”

Americans join with Europeans in wanting this kind of Europe. We want a Europe strong, not enfeebled. We want a Europe independent in spirit as it is interdependent in fact. As President Kennedy once said,³ “It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually.” But what we look forward to, he said, is “a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.”

Perhaps there are some Americans who would like to see a fragmented Europe, but

³ *Ibid.*

they have not read history carefully—or if they have, they have not understood it. Certainly, it is not the policy of this administration any more than it was the policy of the Kennedy or the Eisenhower or the Truman administrations to see Europe dis-united.

For we are prepared to take our chances on a Western Europe united on principles of equality, a Europe with a common voice. To be sure, it will be an independent voice, not always agreeing with us—but then the United States has no monopoly of wisdom. What we can be sure of is that we and our Western European partners will agree on the broad outlines of the kind of world we want, a world of peace and freedom. For we draw from the deep well of Western civilization, cherish the same ideals of liberty, seek together the dignity of the individual and not the tyranny of the mass.

A Europe so united was the bright hope and the high accomplishment of the fifties. It remains the real hope of Europeans and Americans today. For, as President Johnson said more than a year ago:⁴

“The unknown tide of future change is already beating about the rock of the West. These fruitful lands washed by the Atlantic, this half-billion people unmatched in arms and industry, this measureless storehouse of wisdom and genius can be a fortress against any foe, a force that will enrich the

life of an entire planet. It is not a question of arms or wealth alone. It is a question of moving ahead with the times, and it is a question of vision and persistence and the willingness to surmount the barriers of national rivalry against which our ancestors have always collided.”

U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

The United States regards the problem of nuclear sharing as major unfinished business. The development of an arrangement to provide participation for NATO non-nuclear nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in the management of nuclear power is under the most serious discussion among interested governments.

The United States Government has made no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic nuclear force or any other collective approach to the problem. The position of the United States remains as stated in the communique of President Johnson and Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard December 21, 1965.²

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Apr. 27.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 50.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

"Leadership today requires understanding of the problems we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we seek. It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead and inspire others—to lead and inspire in a sense of common enterprise."

The Responsibilities of World Leadership

*Address by Vice President Humphrey*¹

It is always a risk to speak to the press: They are likely to report what you say. Today I will take that risk, for I have some thoughts I am quite willing to have repeated.

Today our America stands as the most powerful, the most prosperous, and the freest nation in the history of the earth. And in our power, wealth, and freedom we stand as leader of the Western World.

As a nation cautioned from the first against entangling alliances, this role is not an easy one. And, indeed, to many other nations of the world we remain a relatively unknown quantity. For it has been only in recent years that we have ventured into the world with any real seriousness.

And thus we hear questions asked: Are we overreaching ourselves? Will we tire of our tasks? Will our economy be able to support the burdens we carry at home and abroad? Are we equal to the role of world leadership?

Fair enough questions they are. For the answers affect the great majority of nations and the great majority of the world's peoples—not only because of the weight of our power but because of the things we stand for. In Tom Paine's words: "The cause

of America is in great measure the cause of all mankind."

In the final analysis the questions asked about us can only be answered by how we measure up to the challenges before us.

Today we face three great and interrelated tasks in the world: the pursuit of peace, the effort to narrow the gap between the rich and poor nations, and the necessity of sustaining an American economy able to carry a thousand future burdens here and around the world.

The Search for Peace

Our search for peace finds its best expression in our support for the kind of world envisioned in the United Nations Charter—a world where large and small nations might live alike in harmony without threat of external coercion.

No nation has done more for peace than has ours since World War II. The U.N., the Marshall Plan, Point 4, the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Food for Peace, the nuclear test ban treaty—these have come from initiatives worthy of our position of leadership. These have come from our search for peace.

But other initiatives, too, have come from

¹ Made before the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 25; advance text.

our search for peace: firmness in Berlin; aid to Greece and Turkey; the founding of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; resistance to aggression in Korea; the determination that nuclear missiles should not be introduced into the hemisphere. For we have long since learned that peaceful development cannot exist in an environment of violence, aggression, and fear.

Today peace is at stake in Asia. Peace is at stake in a hundred thousand Asian villages, in the struggle of peasants against a millennium of poverty, disease, and despair.

Peace is at stake in a tortured South Viet-Nam, in the struggle against the classic power tactics of communism.

We must not lose the peace in either struggle. That is why we have committed once more—as we have had to do before—men, money, and resources to help the nations of Asia help themselves toward security and independence.

It won't be easy. It will be frustrating and at times heartbreaking. But if we are not to deny our leadership, if we are not to deny the principles in which we believe, we must stay and see it through. And the free nations of the world need to know that we have the vision and the endurance to do so.

Those who threaten their neighbors in Asia should know it too. They should know that we will resist their aggression.

Narrowing the Gap Between Rich and Poor

But they should also know that we bear no consumptive hate against their people, that we have no design on their sovereignty. We look only toward the day when all nations may choose to live in harmony with their neighbors, when they may turn together their energies to building a better life for their peoples.

For this is, after all, the second great task before us—the desperate need to narrow the widening gap between the rich and poor nations of the world. I give you the words of Pope John XXIII in his encyclical *Mater et Magistra*:

The solidarity which binds all men and makes them members of the same family requires political communities enjoying an abundance of material goods not to remain indifferent to those political communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elementary rights of the human person.

This is particularly true since, given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist. . . .

We are all equally responsible for the undernourished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to educate one's conscience to the sense of responsibility which weighs upon each and every one, especially upon those who are more blessed with this world's goods.

We sit here today comfortably examining this situation. But for the disinherited and left out of this world, it is no matter for examination: It is a matter of day-to-day survival.

Today there are families spending their last day on earth because they haven't the strength or health to keep going.

But those who remain—and you can be sure of this—those who remain will take to the streets, they will turn to any master, they will tear the fabric of peace to shreds, unless they have some reason to believe that there is hope for life and hope for justice.

To put this on a more immediate and practical level, let me call to your attention the foreign aid request now before the Congress.²

The expenditure for the first year of the Marshall Plan was about 2 percent of our GNP, and 11½ percent of the Federal budget. Today, thanks to the growth of our American economy, our foreign aid request is for only 0.29 percent of our GNP and about 1.9 percent of the Federal budget—that is, about 2 cents out of every tax dollar. Yet we hear the same doubts and complaints today that we heard 20 years ago.

If someone has a substitute for foreign aid, I'd like to hear about it. The investment we make in foreign aid—in preventive med-

² For text of President Johnson's message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

icine, if you will—is certainly less than that necessary to treat the symptoms of massive economic crisis and disorder and, yes, of war.

The Marshall Plan saved Western Europe and the peace. It created a great new economic market for us. But there is more: The revived nations of Western Europe have not only repaid their Marshall Plan debts; they have already provided more aid to the developing countries than they ever received from us. The rewards can be just as great tomorrow in other continents.

If there are questions asked about our ability to meet this task, I think they must be answered affirmatively and without equivocation.

We do not seek to do this task alone nor should we. But how can we expect others to follow if we do not lead?

Fashioning an America Able To Lead

President Eisenhower described the third great task we face today: “. . . the firm base for the problem of leading the world toward the achievement of human aspirations—toward peace with justice in freedom—must be the United States.”

We must fashion an America so strong, so free, so able to lead, that there may be no question about our purposes or our endurance. Basic to this is the necessity of building an economy of growth and opportunity, yet stable in time when it is tested.

I need not remind this audience of the Communist belief—I suppose some of them still hold it—that the United States was teetering on the brink of economic chaos, that it was just a matter of time until our production lines would grind to a halt, until an army of unemployed would seize the state, until economic warfare among the Western nations would open the door to communism.

I think by now some of the Communist doctrinists have come to realize that Lord Keynes was speaking to them as well as others when he wrote: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from

intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”

The American economic miracle is the world's greatest success story. Last year alone we increased our GNP by \$47 billion, increased our total personal income by \$39 billion, and increased our Federal cash receipts by \$8½ billion.

All this did not happen by accident. Part of it is certainly due to the influence of Mr. Keynes and the so-called New Economics. But I believe the basic, underlying reason behind our economic success is this: There is today a creative partnership for prosperity among those in our society who used to think of themselves as natural antagonists.

We are dispelling old myths. How long has it been since we've heard old empty labels such as “labor boss” and “economic royalist.”

The fact is that American Government, business, and labor are increasingly united in the premise that a stronger and better America will be to the common benefit of all. Among other things, we are united in our determination to accomplish something that no nation has previously dared to try: to make every citizen *in* our society a full and productive member *of* our society.

And so today we make national investments in our country and in our people—investments in productivity, in opportunity, in enterprise, in greater social justice, in self-help. That is what our Great Society programs are all about.

Education, medical care, war against poverty, programs of retraining and redevelopment, better cities and transportation, an even more productive agriculture, yes, equality at the ballot box and before the law—these are the most basic investments of all in an America able to keep its commitments both at home and abroad.

As the President has said so often, it is not a matter of a Great Society or fulfillment of our international responsibilities. It is not a matter of guns or butter, foreign aid or domestic education. They are tied together, and you cannot separate them.

If we can build a society operating on all its cylinders, others in the world may have some hope of doing the same. If we cannot, what hope may others have?

To make our free system work, to sustain it, to keep our pledges all the while—this indeed is the way to erase any doubts the world may have about our ability to fulfill the responsibility of leadership.

In closing, may I say a word about the nature of that responsibility.

Leadership in today's world requires far more than a large stock of gunboats and a hard fist at the conference table.

Leadership today requires more than the ability to go it alone—although we must not be afraid to do so when necessary.

Leadership today requires understanding of the problems we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we seek.

It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead and inspire others—to lead and inspire in a sense of common enterprise. For as strong and rich as we may become, our goal of a just and peaceful world will never be achieved by America alone.

It will be achieved only when the resources of strong and weak, rich and poor alike, are allocated, in the most efficient manner possible, to challenges that are far too great for any one nation or group of nations to attempt to overcome.

This, then, is the test of ourselves: not to march alone but to march in such a way that others will wish to join us.

I will add one caveat: In none of this should we expect either friendship or gratitude. We have already eaten breakfast to the accompaniment, in our morning newspapers, of too many "Yankee Go Home" signs, too many riots, too many denunciations of ourselves, to believe that leadership can reward us with international laurel wreaths.

I think the most we can expect is this: that those who question us will one day find no reason to question; that in the world there may be no doubt that Americans have the vision, the endurance, and the courage to stand and see it through for what we believe in.

Secretary Comments on Peiping's Militancy in Southeast Asia

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by John Scali for the American Broadcasting Company's hour-long television program, "Red China: Year of the Gun?" on April 27.

Press release 100 dated April 27

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, who is to blame for the isolation of China from the free world? Is our policy at fault?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this goes back for many years. I think that undoubtedly there have been problems on both sides. But in these more recent years I think that it is clear that the attitudes in Peiping have isolated them from most of the rest of the world. For example, they are having great difficulties inside the Communist world. They refused to attend the 23d Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow. They have had similar difficulties in the Afro-Asian world. They had a debacle last year in attempting to work out arrangements for a second Bandung conference. Their policies have caused deep divisions between themselves and almost everyone else.

Now, as far as the United States is concerned, we have been engaged in conversations with them for more than 10 years. We have had our 129th bilateral talk with them—talks that were carried on in Geneva and in Warsaw. We will be having another one with them next month. We have been in closer touch with them, I suppose, than almost any government that has diplomatic relations with them, with the exception possibly of Moscow.

This is not a deliberate attempt by everyone else to forget Peiping or to freeze them out of the total situation. We know they are there. We know that they ought to be drawn into the major questions, such as peace in Southeast Asia, such as disarmament. And many efforts have been made to bring them into those discussions. But their own attitude has made it very difficult to get them

into a position of real discussion with those with whom they bitterly disagree.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how can we be sure that the Chinese won't miscalculate the depth of our determination, for example, in Viet-Nam, unless we have regular systemized discussions with them, perhaps through diplomatic recognition?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe that formal diplomatic recognition is required for discussions. I have already indicated we have had 129 talks with them ourselves and we will soon have another one. Formal relationships with them run into a very serious and central obstacle.

You will recall that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had a series of hearings about China, and in connection with that and in other discussions it has been indicated that we have tried to exchange newsmen and scholars and doctors and we have tried to establish some sort of better contact with Peiping.¹

Well, in a very important article in the People's Daily, signed by "Observer"—which is the pen name for some very high official—they said once again publicly that:

So long as the United States Government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, the normalization of Sino-American relations is entirely out of the question. And so is the solution of such a concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries.

Now, there they said publicly only last month what we have been saying privately for 10 years. In effect, that there is nothing to discuss until we are prepared to surrender Formosa, and when we indicate that we can't surrender these 13 million people on Formosa as far as we are concerned, then the conversation gets to be very difficult and very strained, very formal, very unproductive.

Mr. Scali: In fighting the war in Viet-

Nam, do we seek to avoid military moves which the Chinese might regard as a prelude to an American invasion of the China mainland?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it's only on the basis of an ideological bias that they would have any idea that we have an interest in attacking mainland China. There have been many occasions when we might have done so, had that been our desire. The Korean war was such an occasion. The off-shore islands crisis was another one. South-east Asia is another one.

Now, the United States is not interested in war with mainland China. We are not interested in expanding these operations in Southeast Asia. The escalation of that war has been a responsibility of Hanoi, encouraged and backed by Peiping. It had moved, for example, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Regular Army from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam, before we started bombing North Viet-Nam.

What we are after there is to stop that infiltration of men and arms from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. We are not interested in getting into a war with anybody, and there would not have been any shooting there had North Viet-Nam elected to leave its two neighbors, Laos and South Viet-Nam, alone. And if they should stop doing what they are doing, peace could come very quickly and our troops could come home.

Mr. Scali: Have the hearings before Senator Fulbright's committee, Mr. Secretary, helped you in deciding what next to do in confronting China?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that the hearings have been very useful in having extensive and thoughtful and far-ranging discussions of the total problem of China. I think they have brought out the fact that the policies pursued by Peiping have been pretty widely rejected throughout the world. Militancy of Peiping's attitude has caused very deep divisions inside the Communist world, quite apart from the problems that it has caused in the free world. And we have seen in the past 15 months that Pei-

¹ For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see BULLETIN of May 2, 1966, p. 686.

ping's policy, by and large, has been rejected right around the globe. They have been thrown out of five or six African countries. They have had a major setback in Indonesia. They objected strenuously to the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan and the treaty between Japan and Formosa. So that they have made it very clear that their policy is harsh and militant, and they are finding that the rest of the world just can't adjust itself to that kind of policy and attitude.

Mr. Scali: Senator Fulbright, in scheduling his congressional hearings on China, said he did so because there are some administration officials who felt that war with China is inevitable. Do you know any of these people?

Secretary Rusk: I haven't heard anyone, senior or junior, say to me they consider war inevitable. Certainly from our point of view we have no interest in a war with mainland China. One does hear out of Peiping itself a discussion of the inevitability of war, and they have on occasions said that they would hope that the revisionists—meaning the Soviets—would not take such a gloomy view of war. Well, I think most of the world takes a pretty gloomy view of war, and ought to.

But I must say that I don't believe that the leaders in Peiping are imprudent enough to act as though they consider war inevitable. They have been somewhat more cautious and prudent in their actions than they have been in their words. So I think there is a prospect that the situation can be stabilized on a basis of the security of the smaller countries in Asia and that over time prudence will make itself felt in Peiping.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in trying to decide what China will do, how much room do we leave for moves which we would regard as irrational, such as the Russian decision, for example, to move offensive missiles into Cuba or, indeed, the Chinese decision to intervene in Korea?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there is always a danger of miscalculation, and it is always difficult for democracies to get across the

right signals to totalitarian regimes. We have had a number of instances in the past where totalitarian leaders have assumed that somehow at the end of the day democracies would not do what is required to defend their security and to maintain freedom.

I suppose that it's easy for a regime in Peiping to misunderstand our own domestic debates here at home. They may not be sophisticated enough to know that the United States is going to meet its commitments and that some of the things they hear are not really relevant to the basic decision of the country in such matters.

But, again, I do believe that there is in fact a prudence in Peiping. I do believe their leaders are rational. I don't expect completely irrational action from them. I think it is possible that they may underestimate our determination, that they may make some miscalculation on the assumption that somehow we would not follow through to the end of the day. But I think, little by little, they must be getting the impression that we are serious in Southeast Asia and that there can be peace just as soon as the infiltration of men and arms from the North stops.

Mr. Scali: As you look ahead, Mr. Secretary, in the years to come, what do you see in Asia—any real prospect that the Chinese will somehow moderate their harsh policies and change their rather primitive view of the world?

Secretary Rusk: I think there is some prospect of that over time. I don't think that it's a matter that depends upon United States military action. I think we have certain specific commitments—Korea, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, with whom we have defense agreements—where we act jointly with our allies to insure the safety of those countries.

But I have great faith in the ordinary common people in these matters. After all, people just don't like to be pushed around too much. And we have seen the reactions in India when Peiping attacked India. We

have seen the reactions in Indonesia. We have seen many demonstrations of the fact that people don't want what Peiping is trying to offer or impose upon them.

So I think that over time there will be a blunting of the revolutionary militancy that

is being preached these days from Peiping, simply because the world won't have it. The world won't have it, and they will come to recognize it.

Mr. Scali: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara

The 14th session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Ankara, Turkey, April 20 and 21. Following are texts of an opening statement made by Secretary Rusk on April 20 and a final communique issued at the close of the meeting, together with remarks made by Secretary Rusk at the dedication of the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications System on April 20 and the transcript of a press conference he held at Esenboga Airport, Ankara, on April 22.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. Prime Minister, esteemed colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: Five years ago, here in Ankara, I had my first opportunity to attend a Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization as chairman of the United States observer delegation.¹ It is a great personal pleasure to be again in this impressive capital city of the Turkish Republic, to review with you the work of the organization, and to reaffirm the intention of my Government to continue its association with the high purposes of the CENTO alliance.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for the cordial welcome and the thoughtful hospitality which the Turkish Government and the Turkish people have extended to the

visiting delegations. I also want to express the thanks of my delegation for the very gracious message of welcome from the President of the Republic of Turkey, which Mr. Alpan [Cihat Alpan, Secretary General of the Office of the President of Turkey] has conveyed to us this morning. In a sense, Turkey is year-round host to CENTO, for Ankara is the site of the headquarters of the alliance and of the biweekly meetings of the Council Deputies. The special debt of gratitude all of us connected with CENTO owe to Turkey is never far from our thoughts.

Our plenary sessions later today are to be held in the historic edifice of the former Turkish Grand National Assembly, now the home of the CENTO International Secretariat. That building is filled with memories of the beginning of the Turkish Republic under the incomparable Kemal Ataturk. I am sure that our distinguished Secretary General and his dedicated staff of the secretariat draw special inspiration from their daily association with this great shrine of modern Turkey.

In the 11 years since this organization was formed, the adversaries who threatened the region in 1955 have come to understand that this defensive shield was forged by CENTO not to threaten anyone but to warn that efforts to molest or subvert the independence of the CENTO countries will be met with resolution and strength—and with growing confidence.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 22, 1961, p. 778.

The need for this defensive shield continues. Although they may differ among themselves, our adversaries have not renounced the Communist world revolution; they are bent on destroying the type of world community framed in the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, some Communist leaders continue openly to advocate the use of force for this purpose, as we have learned through bitter experience in Southeast Asia. Nations which value their independence and freedom therefore, as my other colleagues have pointed out, dare not let down their vigilance. If there is, or seems to be, less danger of war in some parts of the world, it is because those who would coerce their neighbors have a healthy respect for the strength and determination of those whose dedication is to freedom.

Free men everywhere can find much to admire and to emulate in the record of progress registered by the peoples of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan over the past decade.

In Turkey the gross national product in real terms has grown almost 50 percent; per capita income has increased about 20 percent. Important gains also have been made in industrial productivity—the index now is about 150 percent of the base year of 1958. The Turkish educational system is teaching and training more than twice as many students as it did 10 years ago.

In Iran the budget for education has grown by some 93 percent since 1955, and the number of students has grown accordingly. Since Iran's Literacy Corps was organized in 1962, more than 30,000 young Iranian men have met their obligations of national service by teaching rural people to read and write. The successful work of the corps in the campaign for literacy is now being mirrored in the companion Health Corps and the Development Corps. Fundamental changes are also being wrought in the agricultural economy of Iran. One manifestation is the total of nearly 50,000 villages which have been distributed in whole or in part to more than 1 million farmers, through the land reform program.

In Pakistan agricultural productivity has

increased 30 percent since 1954. The manufacturing index shows an increase of nearly 100 percent. Per capita production of electricity for public use has increased nearly 2½ times since 1960. In a decade the number of elementary schools has increased by 50 percent, and total enrollment has approximately doubled.

No one will profess that CENTO itself, as an organization, is directly responsible for these various gains. What is relevant here is that, behind the protective shield of CENTO, the peoples of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have been able to register very substantial progress.

This record of progress and the self-reliance it engenders have a direct significance for CENTO as an organization. During the first decade of CENTO's economic programs, major attention was directed to regional capital projects requiring large elements of assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States. Today most of those projects are completed or are so near completion that we, in this Council, shall be planning the inauguration of many of these projects over the next few months.

It may be that CENTO will design still other plans for additional capital projects, but it is perhaps wise to acknowledge that the CENTO organization is not now at this moment drafting new projects on the scale of the microwave system, which we are dedicating this afternoon, or the railroad link, which will be in operation some 18 months hence. I do not cite this prospect in any spirit of finality but rather with pride in cooperative accomplishment.

Cooperation has become a habit among the regional governments—Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. It has found fruition in many fields. It owes much to the shared experience provided through the undramatic but very intimate personal interchange afforded by CENTO's technical assistance program.

It is gratifying that this habit of cooperation has reached out beyond CENTO, too. The Regional Cooperation for Development Organization, now nearly 2 years old, is demonstrating that many fields for mutual

planning and interchange are open to governments in the region, without help or advice from the outside. The United States congratulates the architects of RCD and looks for valuable accomplishments to flow from this new association. We have every reason to believe that the activities of RCD and CENTO, separately but with complementary objectives, can play important and distinct roles in the economic and commercial progress of the region.

President Johnson has expressed our support for the concept of regional solidarity in these terms: "Regional cooperation," he said, "is the best means of economic progress as well as the best guarantor of political independence."² We are ready to continue and enlarge our support of institutions which create and preserve a regional unity of effort in economic and social development.

President Johnson also spoke recently of our "continuity of purpose in a generation of change."³ Here, among old friends and allies, I do not think that I need to dwell at length on our continuity of purpose. What engages the interest of CENTO most, perhaps, is the quality and character of the changes in the work of this alliance. In speaking of this "generation of change" in which we live and work together, it is natural that we think of the younger generation. It would be hard to find a more universally accepted precept for planning for our young people than the familiar goal of a "sound mind in a sound body." Within the United States Government, our President, in his recent messages to the Congress, has proposed a sober and searching review of our targets in the foreign aid program, taking account of the basic changes the times demand. The President has highlighted our new tasks by calling for special attention to assisting international efforts in education, health, and food supply.⁴

Education, health, and food programs already claim major attention of the regional member governments. Educators, agriculturalists, and health experts, through CENTO's Multilateral Technical Coopera-

tion Fund, are continuously discovering new ways in which we can assist one another in coordinating efforts in these essential fields. Here is the opportunity, and the need, to refine and focus our efforts.

Of particular interest to CENTO, I believe, will be the emphasis that we, in the United States, seek to give to progress in teacher training, vocational and scientific education, and publishing of badly needed textbooks. In the field of public health, CENTO's experience in regional cooperation suggests that the organization could have a special role in a concerted attack on communicable diseases. The war on hunger and malnutrition demands enormous resources and ingenuity from every government and every person who can find a role to play. Here CENTO has not been laggard. Indeed, the organization has given high priority to agriculture, from the first beginnings of this alliance. Now we should draw on that experience to enhance the effectiveness of national campaigns to improve and modernize production and distribution of food.

While considering new opportunities in these fields, let us pay well-deserved attention to such sustaining CENTO programs as the professional military development program, the military training exercises, the countersubversion program, the technical programs in agriculture, communications, and the other CENTO activities which contribute to so many solid accomplishments in the region.

We cannot sketch out a blueprint here this week which will meet all our needs for an entire decade. When we meet again next year, I am certain that we shall consider then new opportunities and new challenges. But let us draw strength from our continuity

² For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

³ For text of President Johnson's address before the Foreign Service Institute, see *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1966, p. 554.

⁴ For texts of President Johnson's messages to Congress on international education and health and on food for freedom, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, pp. 328 and 336.

of purpose amid these changes. As for the United States, I am proud to reaffirm the determination of my Government to continue its contribution to the purposes for which the CENTO organization is dedicated.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Press release 93 dated April 22

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held their fourteenth session in Ankara on April 20 and 21, 1966. Leaders of the five delegations were:

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran
H.E. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey

The Right Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, United States of America

A message of welcome from the President of Turkey was read at the opening of the meeting. The leaders of the national delegations expressed their appreciation for the message and of the warm hospitality extended by the Turkish Government.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey, as host, was in the chair. He welcomed the delegations on behalf of the Turkish Government. Mr. Caglayangil was in turn welcomed by the other members to his first meeting of the Council since he became Foreign Minister.

The Council expressed its deep regret at the continued illness of the former President of Turkey, General Cemal Gursel, and paid tribute to his distinguished services to Turkey, as a soldier and as a statesman.

Engaging in a wide-ranging exchange of views on international developments since its last meeting in Tehran,⁵ the Council agreed that the need for collective security is imperative in present world circumstances. They reaffirmed their determination to maintain the defensive strength of CENTO. The Council recognized that threats of subversion and aggression against the countries of the region still remained. In this regard the Foreign Minister of Iran drew the Council's attention to subversive activities in the Persian Gulf area. The Ministers reaffirmed their sincere desire to contribute to the utmost to the reduction of international tensions and to measures of disarmament and the strengthening of peace.

The Council reviewed the report of the Military Committee which included a report on CENTO's joint military exercises. They discussed suggestions for further strengthening of the mutual defense potential of the Alliance.

Taking into consideration existing treaties, the Ministers expressed their deep concern over the continuation of the Cyprus conflict with all its inherent dangers. They also expressed their earnest desire for an agreed settlement which would preserve peace in the Island in accordance with the legitimate interest of all its peoples.

The Ministers deplored the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. The agreement to a cease-fire was welcomed as a step towards the "peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters", contemplated in the Security Council's resolution of September 20, 1965,⁶ and the Tashkent Declaration.

The United States Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary gave the Council full accounts of recent developments in Viet-Nam and Rhodesia respectively.

Pleasure was expressed at the accelerated economic development of the regional countries through their own efforts, and the Council was pleased to note the extent to which CENTO had been able to contribute to the strengthening of the region through sponsorship of joint economic projects, its cultural programme and the opportunities it was able to provide for people of the CENTO countries to meet, confer and work together on productive joint enterprises.

In approving the report of the Economic Committee, the Council noted that a number of major joint communications projects have been completed and are already in operation. The significant contribution they are making to the CENTO area was symbolized during the meeting when members of the Council participated in the formal dedication of the CENTO microwave system. The Ministers expressed pleasure at the very great increase in the telephonic communication that has taken place since the 3,060-mile system was opened to traffic in June last. The Council also noted the completion of the CENTO road linking Turkey with Iran, and that both the CENTO airway and the CENTO high frequency telecommunications link joining London with key regional cities would be completed this year.

The Ministers approved new directions to guide CENTO's economic activities in the years ahead as submitted by the Economic Committee and congratulated the Committee on their constructive and realistic recommendations.

The Ministers approved priority for public health measures which have been or will be selected for

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, May 3, 1965, p. 685.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 608.

attention by CENTO in coordination with other international organizations including measures for the control of epidemic diseases in the area.

The Council agreed that the proposal to expand and intensify CENTO's multilateral technical co-operation programme should advance the basic CENTO economic objective of increasing the technical self-sufficiency of the region.

The Council decided that their next meeting would be held in London in April, 1967.

MICROWAVE SYSTEM DEDICATION

Remarks by Secretary Rusk

Mr. Secretary General, esteemed colleagues, and distinguished guests: The successful completion of the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications System is not merely a triumph of technology and engineering. That in itself would be impressive enough even in this era of breathtaking scientific achievement. The CENTO microwave system is also a triumph of cooperation.

This new system could never have been erected without sharing—sharing of talents, sharing of resources, and sharing a sense of dedication to the cause of a better life for all men. This microwave system clearly was not built by dollars alone but by dollars working with rials, and rupees, and liras. The American engineers alone could not have achieved it.

A host of technicians in Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey devoted their talents and energies to achieving this important advance in our capacity to communicate with one another. I understand that, at the height of construction activity, about 7,000 men were at work on the hundreds of interrelated jobs required.

The implications of this new tool of communication are truly thrilling, but we dare not regard it as an unmixed blessing. As ideas and information flow now almost instantaneously from one nation to another, the minds of our peoples will be stirred to reach for still greater horizons, and they will be less patient with delays in fulfillment of their hopes for a better life. In

that sense, our work has only just begun.

With these things in mind, may I now convey to you a message from the President of the United States.

Message From President Johnson

It gives me particular pleasure today to send to you, the representatives of the governments and peoples of the CENTO alliance, and through you to His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah, to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, to His Excellency President Ayub, and to His Excellency President Sunay, my personal greetings and those of the American people. Through the CENTO Microwave Telecommunications System that we are now inaugurating, we are all drawn closer together; closer in time and closer in bonds of friendship.

Only with communication can we have understanding, and we must have understanding in order to have peace. Only with communication can we share knowledge, and we must share a great deal of knowledge in order to foster the trade and economic development in which all our peoples are so deeply interested. By building together this vital new communications link, we have built an important instrument for the preservation of peace and for the promotion of prosperity. We can all be proud of this, our cooperative accomplishment.

PRESS CONFERENCE, APRIL 22

Secretary Rusk: I wish to express to the Foreign Minister and to the Mayor and the Governor my very warm appreciation for their hospitality during this meeting.

We have had a very good meeting of CENTO, and, in addition, I have had a chance to have bilateral discussions with my colleagues. I want to express also our good fortune in having such beautiful weather here during this meeting. It has been spectacular and it is with some regret that we leave. I will be happy to take some of your questions before we depart.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you describe your talks that you had last night with Mr. Bhutto [Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan], please?

A. Well, we talked for about 2 hours last evening and covered a wide range of subjects, not only those of international importance such as the situation in Southeast Asia and some of our recent contacts on both sides with China but also on our bilateral relations. I found the talks very useful, and I think we made some progress in achieving a better understanding of some of the points on which we had minor differences in the past, but I am sure this conversation will go on through our regular diplomatic channels and I will be seeing Mr. Bhutto again in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] in June.

Q. But could you say anything—are you able to say anything at the moment about military and economic aid to Pakistan?

A. We did not actually get into that subject very much because the Minister of Finance of Pakistan, Mr. [Mohammed] Shoaib, is now in Washington having discussions with the International Bank and with the United States Government; so that is the forum through which we will discuss those matters. Mr. Bhutto and I did not spend much time on that.

Mr. Lincoln [Robert Lincoln, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Ankara]: Mrs. Salus has seven or eight questions on behalf of the Turkish journalists here. They got together questions.

Secretary Rusk: All right.

Q. Has CENTO become an organ for defense—regional defense? If it has established itself as an organ, then why does the United States feel it necessary to have bilateral agreements with the regional countries?

A. Well, first, I would like to express my own respect for the role which CENTO has played here these past 10 years. I think when one looks at the region one can see that the threats against the region are

somewhat less than they were and the countries in the region have made some substantial progress in their own development during the 10-year period. The United States, of course, has close, strong bilateral relations with all of our allies and all of those with whom we are closely associated, as we are with CENTO.

As you know, we are not in a technical sense a formal member of CENTO. We are associated with it very closely. I'm, in a technical sense, here as the head of an observer delegation. But we work very closely with CENTO and participate actively in all of its programs and activities, but we do have strong bilateral relations with the three regional members of CENTO.

Q. Is there a danger besides communism in this region that CENTO should take up? But if there is such a thing—such danger of another threat rather than communism—would the United States be taking measures to prevent it?

A. Well, as far as the United States is concerned—and I will speak only for us, because the formal members of the CENTO can speak for themselves—as far as the United States is concerned, our association with CENTO is for the purpose of assisting in deterring Communist aggression. Now, we are aware that there are other problems, and we try to work closely and cooperatively with our CENTO partners on those other problems, but those are not strictly on the basis of our own association with CENTO, which is limited in character to Communist aggression.

For example—if I might just illustrate this last point and perhaps anticipate another one of your later questions—your distinguished Foreign Minister presented Turkish views on Cyprus with a very great ability during our CENTO meeting and, of course, this question was a major topic of conversation in our bilateral discussions this morning.

As you know, the United States is very much interested in the position of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, and we hope very

much that much more can be done to improve their position with respect to the common needs of ordinary life and their sense of safety.

We also work with this problem in the United Nations. We are the major contributor to the United Nations Force on the island and, during the last meeting of the General Assembly, I think you will recall Turkey and the United States found themselves voting together on the resolutions on Cyprus.

I think I have time for about two more questions; then I will have to take off.

Q. Did you—during any of your discussions with the Secretary General this morning—did you come to agreement of principle to the review of the bilateral agreement between the two countries? If such agreement has been reached, when may discussions be started?

A. I am happy to say that we did come to complete agreement on that point, and those discussions can start here in Ankara for the convenience of the Turkish Government as soon as possible. Both sides are ready, and I would suppose that could be in a few days as far as we are concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your talks with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, do you feel that Pakistan might be able to play a role in settling the Viet-Nam war?

A. Well, we are very much interested in any opportunity anyone has to maintain contact with the other side to explore the possibility of peace. This would include Pakistan. There are a number of other governments who have regular contact with Hanoi and Peiping who are also aware of our interest in this matter.

But the problem is not really one of a channel of communication. The problem is not the diplomatic problem of establishing contact. The problem is that, despite all of the contacts that have occurred thus far, we have not yet seen any intention on the part of Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over South Viet-Nam by force. So that is the key

point. There are many contacts. But what is needed here is a readiness to come to the conference table and take this problem into discussion and away from the battlefield. We do not see, at the present, any readiness on the part of the other side to come. I would be at Geneva tomorrow afternoon if there was anyone there to talk to, literally.

Q. Thank you.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Minister, I hope that you will take to your distinguished President and your Prime Minister our great thanks for your hospitality here. We have enjoyed it very much.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on April 15 (press release 87) that Secretary Rusk would head the U.S. observer delegation to the 14th Ministerial Council session of the Central Treaty Organization, held at Ankara April 20-21. Parker T. Hart, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and U.S. observer in the Council of Deputies, served as alternate U.S. observer.

Advisers of the delegation included:

Senior Adviser:

Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Advisers:

Scott L. Behoteguy, Economic Coordinator for CENTO, U.S. AID Mission, Ankara

C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Col. Stanley P. Hidalgo, CENTO Action Officer, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Charles W. Naas, Second Secretary, American Embassy, Ankara

Daniel O. Newberry, Officer-in-Charge, CENTO Affairs, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Ashton H. Manhart, U.S. Permanent Military Deputy, Central Treaty Organization

Christopher Van Hollen, Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Ankara

John Patrick Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire Safety of Ships

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 95 dated April 25

Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, will visit London, Paris, Rome, Hamburg, and Athens this week [April 25-30] to discuss with government officials the problem of fire safety of passenger ships and to make clear the importance the Government of the United States attaches to a satisfactory resolution of this problem. Mr. Solomon will be accompanied by Rear Adm. Charles P. Murphy, Chief of the Office of Merchant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard.

These discussions will precede a meeting, requested by the United States as an outgrowth of the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster last December, of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization's Maritime Safety Committee in London May 3-10 to consider the fire-safety problem.

The United States has proposed amendment with respect to fire safety of passenger vessels of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 1960,¹ to which the United States and 44 other countries are parties. After the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster, the United States informed the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the parent organization of the convention, that the United States wished to add the subject of fire safety of passenger vessels to the agenda of the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee's meeting scheduled for January 31-February 4, 1966. Fire safety was discussed by the Committee, and it was agreed, at the request of the United States, to devote an extraordinary session of the Committee beginning May 3 exclusively to the problem of fire safety of passenger vessels.

The U.S. representative at the February meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee

set forth the following U.S. objectives in seeking a solution to the fire-safety problem:

1. To obtain the agreement of all governments parties to the SOLAS Convention of 1960 that future passenger ships should conform to the Method I construction standards of the convention (that is, the use of noncombustible materials).

2. To revise the "grandfather" provisions, which exempt old ships from meeting the standards of the convention for new ships.

3. To require certain improvements in the standards of the convention for all passenger ships and particularly for those that do not conform to Method I.

The United States believes that the proposals it has made in more detail in a paper on fire protection which was circulated through IMCO to the interested governments last month would meet the problem. It is, of course, also prepared to consider other proposals to accomplish the same results. However, especially in view of the latest cruise ship fire—that of the *Viking Princess* on April 8—the United States attaches the greatest importance to providing at the earliest date improved safety standards for passengers embarking at U.S. ports.

U.S. DELEGATION TO IMCO MEETING

The Department of State announced on April 30 (press release 102) that Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman would present the views of the U.S. Government on the problem of fire safety of passenger ships at the opening of an extraordinary session of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization at London on May 3. The United States requested the special meeting of the Committee earlier this year as a result of the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster last December.

Ambassador Harriman's presence and his statement will emphasize further the great

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5780.

importance the U.S. Government attaches to a satisfactory solution of the fire-safety problem as soon as possible.

Adm. Edwin J. Roland, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, will head the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming Maritime Safety Committee meeting, as he did at the Committee's previous meeting January 31-February 4, 1966.

U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends

Press release 103 dated April 30

The emergency mission of the United States petroleum airlift to aid Zambia has been accomplished and therefore is being terminated, as is the Canadian airlift. The other supply routes—through Tanzania, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola—by road, rail, river, lake, and sea, as well as continuing British air transport, are now regarded as sufficiently well developed to meet Zambia's current petroleum consumption levels and to continue to build up Zambia's petroleum reserves.

Farewell ceremonies to commemorate the American-Canadian contribution to this multinational effort were held by the Zambian Government April 30.

The Vice President of Zambia, Mr. Reuben Kamanga, expressed his country's appreciation of the United States and Canadian airlifts in a broadcast April 21 over Zambian radio and television. He said in part:

We have now assured our supplies of petroleum products and have built up our stocks to the highest levels there have ever been in this country. The American and Canadian airlifts have made a great contribution to meeting our needs and to building up our stockpiles. I would like to bid them farewell and place on record our great appreciation of the work that they have done and of the vital contribution that they have made to the solution of our petroleum problems.

Both the Pan American and Trans World Airlines jets commenced service in the airlift in early January of this year, carrying

petroleum products from Léopoldville to Elisabethville. The products were then transported from Elisabethville to Zambia by rail and road. The Congolese Government as well as many commercial enterprises in the Congo cooperated actively in carrying on the airlift. The two United States airlines have carried more than 3.6 million gallons of petroleum products in this airlift.

The United States Agency for International Development in late 1965 and early 1966 signed the airlift agreements with Pan American Airways and TWA.¹ The multinational transport effort to Zambia was initiated in order to minimize the impact upon Zambia of the cessation of petroleum supplies normally received from and through Southern Rhodesia.

May 21 Deadline Set for Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses

Press release 99 dated April 26

The American Embassy at Santo Domingo has informed the Department of State that on April 7, 1966, the Government of the Dominican Republic established, in accordance with Law Number 172 of April 6, 1966, a special Commission for receiving, investigating, and processing all claims for losses resulting from the damage and destruction of property in the National District of Santo Domingo as a result of the civil strife which began on April 24, 1965.

American nationals who desire to file such claims should write with the least possible delay to: Comisión Depuradora de Reclamaciones por Daños de Guerra, Calle Las Damas esq. El Conde (Altos de Rentas Internas), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

The Department of State is informed that claims are required to be filed with the Commission by May 21, 1966.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 85, and Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters

*Statement by Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

It is a pleasure for me to appear here to discuss with you the position of the Department of State on the population growth aspects of economic and social development programs abroad.

The Department of State, together with the Agency for International Development, has been giving increasing attention to these problems over the past 5 years. It has participated in numerous meetings, both in the international field and here at home, with private organizations concerned with population growth. Its senior officers have spoken publicly on this subject and have met with many private groups to exchange views on the problem.

In some areas the population threatens to double itself in a generation. The long-term implications of such increases in population are sobering. They are a serious challenge to us if we are to succeed in the long efforts we have been making to assist a large part of the world in its orderly economic and social development.

The problem is summarized very well in the bill [S. 1676] introduced by the chairman of this subcommittee and other Members of the Senate:

. . . (1) the application of public health measures and the introduction of modern medical life-saving and life-prolonging techniques have contributed to a doubling of the annual rate of world population growth within the past eighteen years, and may

be expected to continue to increase rates of such growth in the future;

(2) population growth is a vital factor in determining the extent to which economic development and political stability will prevail in any country, especially in countries which are in the early stages of economic and political development;

(3) at present, because of the rapid and continued growth in population, hundreds of millions of parents are unable to provide adequately for themselves and their children;

(4) those nations in which population growth is most extreme and where the problems arising from such growth are most acute are, because of economic, technical, and other considerations, also the nations least able independently to cope with such growth and the problems connected therewith. . . .

So much for the problem. What are we doing about it?

First, we have been active in the formulation and expression of international policies and programs on population matters. In 1962, for example, we supported a resolution in the General Assembly which endorsed United Nations encouragement and assistance to governments "in obtaining basic data and carrying out essential studies of the demographic aspects, as well as other aspects, of their economic and social development problems."² We have consistently en-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on Apr. 11 (press release 84 dated Apr. 14).

² For U.S. statements and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

couraged and supported United Nations activities devoted to the study of the nature and scope of population problems and their possible solutions. We have, in the United Nations and on the international scene, underlined our concern about the social consequences of our own population trends and our interest in learning more—and helping others to learn more—about population trends in the developing countries.

We have, however, also been keenly aware of the many complexities involved in the population problem and its possible solution. To the extent we can help other countries in this field we are ready to do so, but it is essential to our foreign policy goals that there be no misunderstanding about the dimensions of our activities and intentions. Therefore, as far back as 1962, the Department of State made it clear that the United States did not—and will not—advocate any specific policy that another country might follow in approaching its population growth problems. We stated that the United States was prepared to help other countries—but only upon their request—to find possible sources of information and assistance on ways to deal with the problem.

Ambassador Stevenson set forth additional aspects of our policy in the field of international cooperation when, in a public speech in 1963, he called upon the United Nations to be prepared to extend to member countries technical assistance for surveys on attitudes toward marriage, child rearing, and family size. Ambassador Stevenson also stated that the United Nations, together with UNESCO and the World Health Organization, could advise other countries, at their request, on how best to inform their nationals about family planning consistent with the cultural and religious values of the country concerned. We have supported the World Health Organization in a research program on fertility and human reproduction.

Second, we have continued to expand our own activities abroad. The guideline for the greater concentration of resources, both by the Department of State and the Agency for

International Development, in our international programs is to be found in the President's statement in January 1965, when he said, "I will seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources."³

Shortly after the President's statement—early in March 1965—the Department sent an instruction to our embassies around the world to insure the closest cooperation between our embassy staffs and those of the Agency for International Development in each country in working on population matters. We stressed to our embassies the continuing responsible concern of our Government in this field. This is consistent with the proposal in S. 1676 concerning the transmission of data to United States diplomatic personnel and other mission officers so that they may be advised with respect to the problems and their duties.

We also informed them in this circular that our AID missions abroad were being supplied with general reference materials and technical publications dealing with a wide range of subjects, from demographic studies to family planning booklets. In each AID mission abroad there is not only a small library of reference material and technical publications but, in virtually all, an officer who has been designated to coordinate mission activities in this field. This is consistent with the suggestion concerning demographic attachés in S. 1676.

Here at home, the Agency for International Development has organized a Population Reference and Research Branch. This branch serves as the focal point for coordinating all AID operations around the world in this field. I am informed that AID already has good files on programs in other countries. This is consistent with the suggestion made in S. 1676 for the collection of data on all foreign population programs whether or not instituted or assisted by the United States.

³ For text of President Johnson's state of the Union message, see *ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

Working within this AID framework are a number of consultants. They advise us on the demographic, economic, medical, and public health aspects of the population problem. But more than that, they maintain contact and coordinate with interested United States and foreign private institutions and groups concerned with the population problem. Dr. [Edgar F.] Berman, for example, traveled extensively in Latin America when I was in charge of the Inter-American Bureau, where he sought out and talked with all those in the public and private sectors interested in the problem. These consultants are performing a number of the functions suggested in S. 1676.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which has merged into one organization the functions and staffs of the Department and AID with respect to Latin America, has created a Population Unit in its Institutional Development Office. The AID geographic Bureaus for the other regions also have population officers in their health units.

The Department's Office of Research and Analysis has undertaken several population research projects. We should be alert to the possibilities of using this office on additional research projects.

An increasing amount of AID funds has been used in support of population programs in those developing countries which have asked for our assistance, and AID programs in this field are scheduled to be increased substantially over the next few years. Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency for International Development] informed this subcommittee on April 8 of some of the principal programs AID has undertaken abroad: in the Republic of China, Turkey, Honduras, Pakistan, and in other countries. Many countries are becoming more aware of the need for action on their population problems, and a growing number are seeking advice and assistance.

We agree with this subcommittee on the need for a focal point in the Department of State to undertake policy coordination in all our programs abroad; to insure full consideration of our foreign policy objectives, par-

ticularly those of a political nature, in the carrying out of these programs; to keep our embassies fully informed of our thoughts and plans and, where necessary, to make sure our posts abroad are giving this serious problem all the attention it deserves; and, finally, to maintain close liaison with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, all other United States Government agencies, and private institutions and organizations concerned with this problem, as well as with this subcommittee.

To this end, my own office—that of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs—will serve as the needed focal point for policy matters and coordination. Working under me will be a Special Assistant for Population Matters, a position comparable with that of the special assistants who are now in charge of such important fields in our international relationships as fisheries, food for peace, and labor. Working with me, through a Special Assistant for Population Matters, will be officers representing the bureaus in the Department, as well as the AID offices, which work on the various aspects of the problem—for example, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which is in charge of handling matters with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In addition, the geographic bureaus, particularly those which cover those areas of the world in which the population problem is a serious one—Latin America, the Near East and South Asia, and the Far East—will, as I have said, designate one of their senior officers to work with my office on this subject.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Department has done and will continue to do everything it can properly do to encourage other governments to give this problem the attention it deserves and to respond to such requests for assistance as we receive, subject only to the limitations which Mr. Bell has already described to this committee and which I will not repeat here. We have all the legislative authority we need at this time. Should the future demonstrate a need for additional legislation in this field, we shall not hesitate to ask for it.

Mr. Chairman, we have a vital national interest in this subject and are grateful for the thought you and your associates are giving it. I assure you that the Department of State fully shares your concern and that it hopes that its increasing efforts in this field, and those of all of our official and private institutions, may soon point the way to a solution of this worldwide problem.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

The Atlantic Alliance: Allied Comment. Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. January 1966. 82 pp. [Committee print.]

Regional and Other Documents Concerning United States Relations With Latin America. Prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January 28, 1966. 330 pp. [Committee print.]

Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966—Vietnam. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part I. January 28–February 18, 1966. 743 pp.

The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. February 1966. 14 pp. [Committee print.]

Visit to Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Israel. Report of Senate Delegation Named by the Vice President To Respond to Certain Official Invitations from Foreign Parliamentary Bodies and Governments. By Senator Wayne Morse. February 10, 1966. 27 pp. [Committee print.]

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II. February 15–March 10, 1966. 258 pp.

Third Special Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. H. Doc 386. February 22, 1966. 60 pp.

United States–South African Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I. March 1–17, 1966. 253 pp.

Refugee Problems in South Vietnam. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1058. March 4, 1966. 35 pp.

Twenty-First Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 403. March 7, 1966. 41 pp.

Amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Report (together with supplemental views) to accompany H.R. 12169. S. Rept. 1060. March 9, 1966. 12 pp.

International Health Act of 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 12453. H. Rept. 1317. March 11, 1966. 27 pp.

Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 13546. H. Rept. 1316. March 11, 1966. 24 pp.

Interim Trade Agreement Between the United States and Canada. Message from the President transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 411. March 15, 1966. 32 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Spain Conclude Agreements on Space Cooperation

Press release 82 dated April 14

Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Castiella and United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk on April 14 exchanged notes confirming two agreements involving cooperation between Spain and the United States in space. Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., represented the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The first agreement provides for continued use by NASA of its manned space flight station on Grand Canary Island, while the second agreement provides for a cooperative Spain–United States scientific sounding-rocket program to measure winds and temperatures at high altitudes.

The Canary Islands agreement outlines expansion of facilities at the station to support the Apollo lunar landing project and other space exploration programs. The original agreement of March 1960¹ established the station for one-man Mercury missions, and it has continued in service for the two-man Gemini flights. The new agreement for the three-man Apollo missions and more advanced programs runs until January 29, 1974.

The Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aero-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4463 and 5393.

spacial (INTA) representing the Comisión Nacional de Investigación del Espacio (CONIE) will continue to be responsible for the participation of Spanish personnel in the operation of the station.

The initial function of the Canary Islands station during Gemini is to support the astronauts' first orbit. The station picks up the spacecraft as it goes beyond the range of tracking from Bermuda, continuing coverage as the flight passes over Africa toward Kano, Nigeria.

One of the seven primary stations supporting Gemini, the Canary Islands site is essential to the entire mission for its real-time voice communications and telemetry between the spacecraft and Mission Control at Cape Kennedy and Houston.

The Apollo assignment will be equally vital. Following insertion into orbit over an Apollo ship in mid-Atlantic, the first data from the spacecraft will be received by the Canary Islands station or, if the launch angle is farther south, by the NASA station at Ascension Island.

The second agreement, part of a continuing Spanish-U.S. program of cooperation in space investigation, was confirmed by an exchange of notes between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State. It provides that four Nike-boosted rockets carrying small acoustic grenades will be launched in Spain.

Acoustic grenades will be ejected and detonated at regular intervals during the ascent of the rocket to approximately 56 miles. Average temperature and winds in the area between grenade detonations will be determined by measuring the exact time of detonation of each grenade, the time of arrival of each sound wave at ground microphones, and the exact position of each grenade detonation. Thus, the speed of sound in the area between two detonations is measured and the wind speed and direction can be derived from the horizontal drift.

The agreement is in the form of a memorandum of understanding² concluded be-

tween INTA and NASA. The memorandum provides that INTA will establish a sounding-rocket range, construct grenade-type payloads, provide two Nike-boosted rockets, conduct launchings, and analyze and publish the data obtained. NASA will lend range-tracking and telemetry equipment and a launcher, provide two Nike-boosted rockets, provide a prototype payload, and train Spanish personnel as needed. INTA and NASA will each bear the cost of discharging their respective responsibilities.

The results of the experiments will be made available to the world scientific community.

United States and Romania Agree on 1966 Program of Exchanges

Press release 94 dated April 25

The U.S.-Romanian program of exchanges for 1966 was agreed upon in an exchange of letters between Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., the Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Petre Bălăceanu, the Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Romania, at the Department of State on April 25.

Most of the specified exchanges are in the field of education and cultural affairs. Provisions are also made for exchanges in public health, science and technology, exhibits, publishing, radio and television, and performing arts.

Since 1960, U.S.-Romanian exchanges have been carried out in accordance with diplomatic notes exchanged every 2 years. The 1966 program is covered by notes exchanged on December 23, 1964.¹

The new program includes provisions for each country to send to the other 10 graduate students and researchers, 2 professors of language and literature, 2 public health specialists, and 10 cultural specialists.

² Not printed here.

¹ For a Department announcement and text of the U.S. note, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1965, p. 87.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Commodities—Wheat

Agricultural commodities agreement between the United States and Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731—1736), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Dar es Salaam February 18, 1966, and at Nairobi February 19 and 22 and March 4, 1966. Entered into force March 4, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Signature: Korea, April 18, 1966.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Done at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹

Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, March 29, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.¹

Acceptance received: United Arab Republic, March 11, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.

Ratification deposited: Italy, April 29, 1966.

Entered into force: April 29, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Denunciation received: Belgium, March 22, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹

Signature: National Telecommunications Council of Brazil, April 25, 1966.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the international sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London November 1 through December 23, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5933.

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, February 17, 1966.

Accessions deposited: Ghana, January 24, 1966; Guatemala, February 9, 1966;² Panama, March 8, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).

Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Signatures: Argentina, April 26, 1966; Austria, April 27, 1966; Brazil, April 25, 1966; Canada, April 28, 1966; Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; El Salvador, April 26, 1966; France, April 25, 1966; Iceland, April 25, 1966; India, April 28, 1966; Ireland, April 25, 1966; Italy, April 27, 1966; Japan, April 25, 1966; Mexico, April 26, 1966; Netherlands, April 28, 1966; New Zealand, April 26, 1966; Norway, April 26, 1966; Peru, April 28, 1966; Philippines, April 25, 1966; Sierra Leone, April 28, 1966; Spain, April 27, 1966; Sweden, April 25, 1966;³ Vatican City State, April 27, 1966; Venezuela; April 28, 1966; Western Samoa, April 26, 1966.

Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance: Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; Japan, April 25, 1966.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, April 25, 1966.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul April 2 and 4, 1966. Entered into force April 4, 1966.

China

Agreement amending the agreement of October 19, 1963, concerning trade in cotton textiles, as amended (TIAS 5482, 5549, 5754, 5820). Exchange of notes at Washington April 22, 1966. Entered into force April 22, 1966.

Spain

Amendment to the agreement of August 16, 1957 (TIAS 3988) for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington November 29, 1965.

Entered into force: April 1, 1966.

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701—1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Khartoum April 13, 1966. Entered into force April 13, 1966.

Turkey

Agreement extending the agreement of February 16 and July 1, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3042, 4309), and the agreement of October 14, 1958 (TIAS 4117), relating to the loan of certain naval vessels to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 14, 1965, and February 28, 1966. Entered into force February 28, 1966.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731—1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Belgrade April 11, 1966. Entered into force April 11, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² With a declaration.

³ Subject to ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Military Bases in the Philippines—Relinquishment of Certain Base Lands; Use by the United States of Certain Other Areas. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965. TIAS 5924. 6 pp. 5¢.

Corregidor—Bataan Memorial. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965. TIAS 5925. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with the Ryukyu Islands—Signed at Washington October 26 and at Naha December 23, 1965. Entered into force December 23, 1965. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5927. 7 pp. 10¢.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxembourg, amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Luxembourg December 21 and 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. TIAS 5928. 3 pp. 5¢.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Amendment to the articles of agreement of December 27, 1945 with Other Governments—Done at Washington December 16, 1965. Entered into force December 17, 1965. TIAS 5929. 2 pp. 5¢.

Maritime Matters—Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Italy. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome December 23 and 27, 1965. Entered into force December 27, 1965. TIAS 5930. 4 pp. 5¢.

Desalting. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Jidda November 11 and 19, 1965. Entered into force November 19, 1965. TIAS 5932. 9 pp. 10¢.

Health and Sanitation—United States Naval Medical Research Unit. Agreement with Ethiopia—Signed at Addis Ababa December 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. TIAS 5936. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon December 20, 1965. Entered into force December 20, 1965. TIAS 5944. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5950. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5951. 8 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—Greece Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with Greece and the International Atomic Energy Agency—Signed at Vienna June 15, 1964. Entered into force January 13, 1966. TIAS 5952. 10 pp. 10¢.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention—Signed at Washington December 2, 1946. Adopted at the seventeenth meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, July 2, 1965. Entered into force October 6, 1965, and January 4, 1966. TIAS 5953. 9 pp. 10¢.

Telecommunications—Television Broadcasting in Viet-Nam. Agreement with Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. TIAS 5954. 4 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1403 PUBLICATION 8079 MAY 16, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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95	4/25	Solomon to discuss fire safety of passenger ships with European officials.
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†97	4/26	U.S.-China cotton textiles agreement.
†98	4/26	MacArthur: "Your Stake in the Balance-of-Payments Problem."
99	4/26	Claims for property losses in National District of Santo Domingo.
100	4/27	Rusk: television interview on Red China.
101	4/29	Ball: "The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis."
102	4/30	Harriman to present U.S. views at IMCO meeting (rewrite).
103	4/30	End of U.S. airlift to Zambia.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1405



May 30, 1966

WORLD TRADE

EAST-WEST TRADE RELATIONS ACT OF 1966

Letter of Transmittal and Text of Bill 838

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BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Statement by Secretary Rusk 830

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Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

Mr. Chairman, I do have some observations to make on two points, if I may. They will be relatively brief and I think informal.

Toward the close of our last hearing on April 18, I believe you, Mr. Chairman, raised a question about the background of our policy in Southeast Asia. I referred to a policy conclusion on the part of the United States, beginning with the Truman administration, that the security of Southeast Asia was vital to the security of the United States, and that various actions taken by us, such as our economic and military assistance programs and the formation of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] treaty, were applications of that underlying policy.

I was myself in Government during the Truman administration and well recall the discussions which were held at the highest levels of Government in the National Security Council as well as the strategic problems considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the committee will search its own and the public records on this matter during that period and since, they could surely have no doubt that it was the judgment that the security of Southeast Asia was extremely important to the security interests of the United States. This was because of the more than 200 million people in Southeast Asia, the geography of that area, the important natural resources of the countries involved, the relationship of Southeast Asia to the total world situation, and the effect upon the prospects of a durable peace.

I emphasize the last point because the

overriding security interest of the United States is in organizing a stable peace. The sacrifices of World War II and the almost unimaginable losses of a world war III underline this central objective of American policy.

There was also involved the problem of the phenomenon of aggression. We had found ourselves in the catastrophe of World War II because aggressions in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe had demonstrated that the aggressor would not stop until compelled to do so. It was the determination of the United States to learn the lessons of that experience by moving in the U.N. and otherwise to try to build an enduring international peace.

This primary concern in peace and freedom was at the heart of President Truman's message to the Congress on March 12, 1947, in which he said:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

That was in connection with the Greek problem.

In recognizing the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1950, the State Department declared that "this recognition is consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and demo-

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 9.

cratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.”²

At the time of the attack by North Korea on South Korea in June 1950, President Truman stated:³

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance for the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

In January 1951, in connection with a visit by Prime Minister Pleven of France, their joint statement said:⁴

The President and the Prime Minister found themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their security and assure their independence.

Again, in April 1951 President Truman stated that:⁵

We believe . . . that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East and peace everywhere else.

This is the theme which, as a matter of general policy, has been central to the attitude of the United States in the postwar period insofar as Southeast Asia is concerned. It is reflected in many public declarations by Presidents and Secretaries of State and in the annual hearings before this and other committees of the Congress. You will find this theme in the report of your own committee and in declarations of members of your committee on the floor of the Senate.

In your committee's report, for example, on the Mutual Security Act of 1952, your committee stated that “the U.S. military assistance for the past three years has been critically important to the continued survival of the Associated States as a nation free from Communist control. Continued assistance is essential if the Communist threat is

to be met successfully and eventually liquidated.”

Again, in 1953 your committee's report stated:

The free world cannot afford to lose the war in Indochina. But so far neither has the free world been able to win it. It is of the utmost importance that the stalemate be ended. Pacification of the country must be the first objective of our policy.

The Geneva Accords

This underlying policy was given expression in a variety of ways. We strongly assisted the French and the non-Communist forces of the Associated States of Indochina with large economic and military assistance. Following the Geneva accords of 1954 you will recall that Under Secretary Bedell Smith, in speaking for the United States, said that the United States would refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb these accords, “in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force,” and, second, that it “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.”⁶

Again, following those Geneva accords, the Eisenhower administration negotiated and presented to the Senate the Southeast Asia treaty, in which is contained a very important provision, article 4, paragraph 1:⁷

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate (that means the protocol states), would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Aid to the states which emerged from Indochina and the Southeast Asia treaty

² For a Department statement of Feb. 7, 1950, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1950, p. 291.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 12, 1951, p. 243.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1951, p. 603.

⁶ For text of the U.S. declaration on Indochina of July 21, 1954, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 394.

itself were rooted in the underlying conviction that the freedom and safety of these countries in Southeast Asia were necessary to the organization of a reliable peace and other security interests of the United States. / In 1959 President Eisenhower in an address at Gettysburg College said:⁸

Strategically South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

It would not be correct to put the cart before the horse and say that economic and military assistance programs themselves carried with them undisclosed or unanticipated military commitments. We have given assistance to allies, but the commitment is in the alliance. We have given assistance to those with whom we are not allied, and we have not given assistance in some situations, which have resulted in situations such as, for example, Hungary and Tibet.

Congressional Support of U.S. Policy

The simple fact is that we considered throughout the postwar period that we have an important stake in the security and independence of the nations in Southeast Asia and we have given effect to that attitude through assistance programs and, in some cases, through alliance arrangements. There has been no mystery about these matters. They have been fully and exhaustively discussed with the leadership and the committees of Congress over the years, and the Congress has taken action to support that prevailing policy.

Apart from authorization and appropriations for specific needs, the Congress in August 1964 voted overwhelmingly for a resolution on Southeast Asia⁹ which stated that:

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

The resolution further stated that:

... the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

That resolution can be rescinded by concurrent resolution of the Congress not subject to the veto of the President. An attempt was made in the Senate during the present session of the Congress to rescind that resolution, but the effort was refused by the overwhelming majority of the Senate.

Legality of U.S. Efforts in South Viet-Nam

Very briefly, on the second question, Mr. Chairman, the matter was raised with respect to the legal issues surrounding our efforts in South Viet-Nam. We have made available to the committee an extensive legal memorandum on these matters,¹⁰ and the law officers of the Government are available to discuss this in whatever detail the committee may wish.

In this brief statement today I shall merely outline the essence of our view.

Military actions of the United States in support of South Viet-Nam, including air attacks on military targets in North Viet-Nam, are authorized under international law by the well-established right of collective self-defense against armed attack.

South Viet-Nam is the victim of armed attack from the North through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular combat units. This armed attack preceded our strikes at military targets in North Viet-Nam.

The fact that South Viet-Nam is not a member of the United Nations, because of the Soviet Union's veto, does not affect the lawfulness of collective self-defense of South

⁸ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1959, p. 579.

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 28, 1966, p. 474.

Viet-Nam. The United Nations Charter was not designed to, and does not, limit the right of self-defense to United Nations members.

Nor does South Viet-Nam's status under the Geneva accords of 1954, as one zone of a temporarily divided state, impair the lawfulness of the defense against attack from the other zone.

As in Germany and Korea, the demarcation line is established by an international agreement, and international law requires that it be respected by each zone. Moreover, South Viet-Nam has been recognized as an independent entity by more than 60 governments around the world and admitted to membership in a number of the specialized agencies of the U.N.

Nothing in the U.N. Charter purports to restrict the exercise of the right of collective self-defense to regional organizations such as the OAS [Organization of American States].

As required by the U.N. Charter, the United States has reported to the Security Council the actions it has taken in exercising the right of collective self-defense in Viet-Nam. It has indeed requested the Council to seek a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords, but the Council has not been able to act.¹¹

There is no requirement in international law for a declaration of war before the right of individual or collective self-defense can be exercised.

South Viet-Nam did not violate the Geneva accords of 1954 by refusing to engage in consultations with the North Vietnamese in 1955 with a view to holding general elections in 1956, as provided for in those accords. Even assuming that the election provisions were binding on South Viet-Nam, which did not agree to them, conditions in the North clearly made impossible the free expression of the national will contemplated by the accords. In these circumstances, at least, South Viet-Nam was justified in declining to par-

ticipate in planning for a nationwide election.

The introduction of U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet-Nam is not a violation of the accords. Until late 1961 U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet-Nam were restricted to replacements for French military personnel and equipment in 1954. Such replacement was expressly permitted by the accords.

North Viet-Nam, however, had from the beginning violated the accords by leaving forces and supplies in the South and using its zone for aggression against the South. In response to mounting armed infiltration from the North, the United States, beginning in late 1961, substantially increased its contribution to the South's defense. This was fully justified by the established principle of international law that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles another party at least to withhold compliance with a related provision.

The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression: In the SEATO treaty—which I have already mentioned and which is similar in form to our defense commitments to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of China—and even earlier in the Geneva conference we had declared that we would regard a renewal of Communist aggression in Viet-Nam with “grave concern.”

Since 1954 three Presidents have reaffirmed our commitments to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

Finally, the President of the United States has full authority to commit U.S. forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, with responsibilities as well for the conduct of foreign relations. However, it is not necessary to rely upon the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority. The SEATO treaty, which forms part of the law of the

¹¹ For text of U.S. statements, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

land, sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet-Nam against armed attack, and the Congress, in a joint resolution of August 1964 and in authorization and appropriation acts in support of the military effort in Viet-Nam, has given its approval and support to the President's action.

The Constitution does not require a declaration of war for U.S. actions in Viet-Nam taken by the President and approved by the Congress. A long line of precedents, beginning with the undeclared war with France in 1798-1800 and including actions in Korea and Lebanon, supports the use of U.S. armed forces abroad in the absence of a congressional declaration of war.

Mr. Chairman, these were two questions on which comments have come up before, and I am sure the committee will pursue them.

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems

Following is the text of President Johnson's remarks to news correspondents at the conclusion of the National Security Council meeting on Viet-Nam on May 10.

We are delighted to welcome back one of our most dedicated public servants and one of our most valuable counselors, Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

Earlier this afternoon he reported to me privately in some detail about the events in his area of the world and his evaluation of the situation there.

He brought back information that we do not always get from the written cable. I had a very profitable visit with him. We had a thorough exchange of viewpoints.

I asked him to join me in the Cabinet Room and make available to my other counselors here his impressions and judgments and conclusions, as well as a general review.

This is the first time that he has been back in almost 9 months. He will be here through the week. He will spend some time with Mr. Komer and Mr. Rostow [Robert

Komer and W. W. Rostow, Special Assistants to the President] and some time with the various people at the table. They will divide into various groups.

This afternoon we had an agenda that included a rather full report from General Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] on the military situation in Viet-Nam. We had a discussion of the political and economic situation, the issues as he sees them—a general report from Ambassador Lodge.

He was followed by a discussion led by Secretary Rusk on the key political issues, at the conclusion of which Secretary McNamara supplemented some of General Wheeler's statements on the military situation there and the issues involved on his part.

I reviewed with them some of my views on Viet-Nam from the day I took over the Presidency: on education, health, agriculture; the economy of South Viet-Nam; my Baltimore speech;¹ the Honolulu conference;² our desire to get the Government of South Viet-Nam, General Westmoreland [Gen. William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Commander in Viet-Nam], and others to cooperate with Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Porter [William J. Porter, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam] in the efforts that we were making in this field.

We not only have military problems here, as everyone knows, but we have political problems and economic problems.

I have asked one of my most trusted and able advisers, Mr. Komer, to take command of this operation and head the post here, with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and others, in an attempt to make this economic and political program effective.

Mr. Komer discussed, at some length, the key economic issues there. We reviewed generally the effects of the Honolulu conference; Secretary Freeman's visit with 15

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

of the outstanding people from our universities and our colleges, who made a thorough study; and Secretary Gardner's report.

Mr. Komer will arrange to have certain task forces meeting throughout the week while Ambassador Lodge is here.

That is the essence of what took place this afternoon. I have explained to these wise men, all of whom I rely on for advice, to supply me with all the information and knowledge they had.

I have it now and I have passed as much of it on to you as I could.

The Obligations of Power

Following is the foreign policy portion of an address made by President Johnson at the dedication of Woodrow Wilson Hall, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., on May 11 (White House press release; advance text).

As we enter the final third of this century, we are engaged once again with the question of whether democracy can do the job.

Many fears of former years no longer seem so relevant. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court shows signs of becoming rubber stamps to the Executive. Moreover the Executive shows no symptoms of callous indifference to the ills we must cure if we are to preserve our vitality. State and local governments are more alive and more involved than 30 years ago. And our nation's private enterprise has grown many times over in size and vitality.

The issue for this generation is a different kind. It has to do with the obligations of power in the world for a society that strives, despite its worst flaws, to be just and humane. Like almost every issue we face, this is one in which scholars and public officials alike have an irrevocable stake.

Abroad we can best measure America's involvement, whatever our successes and failures, by a simple proposition: Not one single country where we have helped mount a major effort to resist aggression—from France to Greece to Korea to Viet-Nam—today has a government servile to outside interests.

There is a reason for this which I believe goes to the very heart of our society: The exercise of power in this century has meant for the United States not arrogance but agony. We have used our power not willingly and recklessly but reluctantly and with restraint.

Unlike nations in the past with vast power at their disposal, the United States has not sought to crush the autonomy of her neighbors. We have not been driven by blind militarism down courses of devastating aggression. Nor have we followed the ancient and conceited philosophy of the "noble lie" that some men are by nature meant to be slaves to others.

As I look upon America this morning from the platform of one of her great universities, I see, instead, a nation whose might is not her master but her servant. I see a nation conscious of lessons so recently learned:

—that security and aggression, as well as peace and war, must be the concerns of her foreign policy;

—that a great power influences the world just as surely when it withdraws its strength as when it exercises it;

—that aggression must be deterred where possible and met early when undertaken;

—that the application of military force, when it becomes necessary, must be for limited purposes and tightly controlled.

Surely it is not a paranoid vision of America's place in the world to recognize that freedom is still indivisible—still has adversaries whose challenge must be answered.

Today, of course, that challenge is sternest in Southeast Asia. Yet there, as else-

where, our great power is tempered by great restraint. What nation has announced such limited objectives or such willingness to remove its military presence once those objectives are achieved? What nation has spent the lives of its sons and vast sums of its fortune to provide the people of a small, striving nation the chance to elect a course we might not ourselves choose?

The aims for which we struggle are aims which, in the ordinary course of affairs, men of the intellectual world applaud and serve: the principle of choice over coercion, the defense of the weak against the strong and aggressive, the right of a young and frail nation to develop free from the interference of her neighbors, the ability of a people—however inexperienced, however different, however diverse—to fashion a society consistent with their own traditions and values and aspirations.

These are all at stake in that conflict. It is the consequences of the cost of their abandonment that men of learning must examine dispassionately. For to wear the scholar's gown is to assume an obligation to seek truth without prejudice and without cliché, even when the results of the search are at variance with one's own opinions.

That is all we expect of those who are troubled, even as we are, by the obligations of power the United States did not seek but from which she cannot escape.

Twenty-six years ago Archibald MacLeish asked of all scholars and writers and students of his generation what history would say of those who failed to oppose the forces of disorder at loose in Europe.

We must ask of this generation the same question concerning Asia.

MacLeish reminded that generation of the answer given by Leonardo when Michelangelo indicted him for indifference to the misfortunes of the Florentines. "Indeed," said Leonardo, "indeed, the study of beauty has occupied my whole heart."

Other studies, no matter how important, must not distract the man of learning from the misfortunes of freedom in Southeast Asia.

While men may talk of the "search for peace" and the "pursuit of peace," we know that peace is not something to be discovered suddenly, not a thing to be caught and contained. Peace must be built, step by painful, patient step. And the building will take the best work of the world's best men and women.

It will take men whose cause is not the cause of one nation but of all nations, men whose enemies are not other men but the historic foes of mankind. I hope that many of you will serve in this public service for the world.

Woodrow Wilson knew that learning is essential to the leadership our world so desperately needs. Before he came to Princeton, he attended a small college in North Carolina and went to classes every day beneath a portal which bore the Latin inscription: "Let learning be cherished where liberty has arisen."

Today this motto which served a President must serve all mankind. Where liberty has arisen, learning must be cherished—or liberty itself becomes a fragile thing.

We dedicate this building not only to the man, not only to the Nation's service, but to learning in the service of mankind. There can be no higher mission.

World Trade Week, 1966

A PROCLAMATION¹

Expansion of world trade is the principal objective of the liberal foreign trade policies our Nation has followed for more than thirty years.

This two-way trade between the United States and other nations has resulted in many benefits for our country:

—It has advanced the peaceful progress of our Nation and the well-being of all Americans by strengthening the growth of private enterprise and employment.

—It has provided the American businessman with increased opportunities to export more United States products and services.

—It has given the American consumer a wider choice of products at competitive prices.

—It has promoted the cause of peace by broadening the scope of our cooperation with other nations.

—It has been of great importance in helping the developing nations modernize their economies.

Much remains to be done if we are to achieve a balanced international economy where all nations, developed and developing, can share the fruits of freer trade:


—We must continue to work diligently this year to bring the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations to a timely conclusion in a manner that assures the realization of the hopes and expectations with which this great effort at trade liberalization was launched.

—We must intensify our efforts to reduce the United States balance-of-payments deficit and reach our goal of equilibrium in our international accounts.

Progress towards accomplishing these objectives is the aim of World Trade Week.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 22, 1966, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, professional, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities



ties designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 29th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.

By the President:
DEAN RUSK,

Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3719; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 6607.

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966

Press release 107 dated May 11

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary Rusk on May 11 transmitted to the Congress proposed legislation to provide the President with the authority necessary to negotiate commercial agreements with the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe to increase United States trade in peaceful goods with these countries.

The proposed East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 was sent with identical letters from the Secretary to Speaker of the House John W. McCormack and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate.

Secretary Rusk's action today was taken pursuant to instructions of President Johnson on May 3.¹ At that time, the President recalled that he had promised in his state of the Union message to request the proposed authority. The President added:

The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period of time, can influence Eastern European societies to develop along paths that are favorable to world peace.

After years of careful study, the time has now come for us to act, and act we should and act we must.

With these steps, we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust, and a community of effort. Thus will the tide of human hope rise again.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ²

MAY 11, 1966

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: At the direction of the President, I am sending to the Congress proposed legislation to provide the President with the authority necessary to negotiate commercial agreements with the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern

Europe to widen our trade in peaceful goods, when such agreements will serve the interests of the United States.

This authority is needed so that we may grasp opportunities that are opening up to us in our relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is needed, at a time when we are opposing Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, in order to carry forward the balanced strategy for peace which, under four Presidents, our country has been pursuing toward the Communist nations. It is needed to play our part with the NATO nations in reducing tensions and establishing normal and lasting peaceful relations between the West and East in Europe.

New Opportunities

It is the normal and traditional practice of the United States to encourage peaceful trade with other countries—even those with which we have serious differences. Yet for nearly two decades, we have put major restrictions on our trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We applied these restrictions only when the Soviet Union extended control over its Eastern European neighbors and embarked on a course of aggressive expansionism. They properly signified our moral protest against the subjugation of half a continent and gave our protest practical economic effect. Now, however, the hopes that guided our policy have begun to be realized.

In recent years, there have been substantial changes among the Communist na-

¹ BULLETIN of May 23, 1966, p. 794.

² An identical letter was sent to the President of the Senate.

tions, within themselves, and in their relations to the nations of Western Europe. Windows in Eastern Europe are being gradually opened to the winds of change. Most of the countries of Eastern Europe have shown signs of increasing independence in guiding their own economic and political courses. They have shown greater concern for the needs of their citizens as consumers. A growing trade in peaceful goods has sprung up between Eastern Europe and the Western world. The Soviet Union itself has recognized this need for more responsive action in its own country as well as in Eastern Europe.

This process of change is continuing. It presents growing opportunities for the United States and for the cause of freedom. But we are not now able to take full advantage of these opportunities. Our trade policies which once served our national interest no longer do so adequately.

What then is needed?

The weakness in our position is the outdated, inflexible requirement of law that we impose discriminatory tariffs on the import of goods from Communist countries. All imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, excepting Poland and Yugoslavia, are subject to the original rates of duty in the United States Tariff Act of 1930. The President has no authority to negotiate with any of these countries for the advantages that we can gain from offering them the more favorable rates that have been negotiated under reciprocal trade agreements over the last thirty years and that now apply to imports from all other nations with whom we trade. We alone of all the major Free World countries have so tied our hands.

The inability of the President to negotiate on this matter sharply reduces his power to use the great economic power of our trade as a bargaining instrument.

In the light of this situation, the President said in his 1965 State of the Union Message:³

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly beginning to assert their identity. Your government, assisted by leaders in labor and business, is exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with these countries and with the Soviet Union. I will report our conclusions to the Congress.

Accordingly, to supplement the studies being made in the Government, on February 16, 1965, the President appointed a Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Irwin Miller. Each member was a widely respected and experienced leader from business, labor or the academic world.

The Special Committee made its report to the President on April 29, 1965.⁴ That report provides a searching and balanced analysis of this complex and important subject. It deserves careful study by all citizens and members of the Congress interested in this subject and in this proposed legislation.

The Special Committee concluded that to accomplish our purposes in Eastern Europe we must be able to use our trade policies flexibly and purposefully. The Committee recommended, specifically, that the President should be given discretionary authority to negotiate commercial agreements with individual Communist countries when he determines any such agreement to be in the national interest and to grant them in such agreements the tariff treatment we apply to all our other trading partners.

The Administration agrees with this recommendation of the Special Committee and this is the principal authority asked in the proposed legislation.

Benefits of the Legislation

We must consider the potential benefits and liabilities that may flow from enacting or failing to enact the proposed legislation.

There is abundant evidence that without the authority this legislation would provide, we are losing and will continue to lose significant opportunities to influence the course

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

⁴ See p. 845.

of events in Eastern Europe. By denying ourselves the ability to enter into meaningful commercial agreements with these nations, we deprive ourselves of the economic benefits that will come to us from increasing trade. More important, we deprive ourselves of a bargaining tool of considerable strength and utility. We unnecessarily limit our influence in Eastern Europe relative to the influence of other nations engaged in or opening wider trade there.

The enactment of the proposed legislation would not weaken or injure the position of the United States in any way. The legislation does not in itself make any grant or concession of any kind to the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country. It would not weaken our legislation, our policy or our controls on exports of strategic goods to Communist countries. Its sole effect would be to give the President added strength to negotiate with these Communist countries to obtain concessions and benefits that will serve the national interest of our country in return for granting the same tariff arrangements already available to other countries.

The benefits of the legislation could be numerous and valuable.

First, improving our trade relations with these countries would be profitable in itself. As their national economies turn more and more toward consumer needs and desires, they will become more attractive markets for our exports. We lead the world in the efficient production of goods which enrich the quality of everyday life. We can expect that new and increasing export opportunities will open up for American industry, American agriculture and American labor. While this trade potential may be modest for the foreseeable future in relation to total United States exports, it could, nevertheless, be significant over the years and of particular importance to American agriculture and to certain American industries.

Although any agreement with any individual nation will necessarily and properly open the way for increased sales of that nation's products to Americans who want

to buy them, we have no reason to fear such trade. American industry is the most competitive in the world and thrives on the stimulus of competition.

Second, authority to relax tariff restrictions will give the President the ability to negotiate more effectively for any of several objectives important to the United States. These might include, for example, provisions for the settlement of commercial disputes, the facilitation of travel by United States citizens, the protection of United States copyrights, patents and other industrial property rights, assurances to prevent trade practices injurious to United States labor and industry, settlement of financial claims and lend-lease obligations, more satisfactory arrangements in cultural and information programs—and others of our economic, political and cultural objectives. These possibilities are of course only illustrative and it is improbable that all of them could be dealt with in a single agreement. We will need to test each negotiation for the gains to be made in it.

The Congress may be confident that no agreement will be made under this authority except in return for benefits of equal importance to the United States. Moreover, each agreement will include a provision for suspension or termination upon reasonable notice, so that the President may—and the Congress may be certain he would—suspend or end the obligations of the United States if he determined the other party were not carrying out its commitments.

Third, the most important benefits from any such agreements would develop more slowly. We cannot expect trade alone to change the basic nature of the Communist system in any Eastern European country nor to settle fundamental differences between us. We can, however, expect that the many close relationships normally growing out of trade will provide opportunities for influencing the development of their societies toward more internal freedom and peaceful relations with the free world.

A healthy growth of trade will help to reduce the present dependence of these East-

ern European countries on each other and the Soviet Union. They will be encouraged to rebuild the friendly ties they have historically had with the West. Independent action will become more attractive and more feasible. The conclusion of an agreement with any of these countries will be an inducement to others to seek the same benefits.

The very nature of trade, the necessity to follow established rules of behavior, the increased contact with the West, the increasing use of Western goods, the growing appreciation of their quality and of the efficient methods of their manufacture, the growing understanding of the skills, opportunities and earnings of free labor in the United States and other Western nations, the greater exposure to the miracles of American agriculture—all these things could encourage increasing liberalization of the internal economies of the Eastern European nations.

The Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe are increasingly conscious of their stake in stability and in improving peaceful relations with the outside world. Progress toward normal trade relations will increase that stake.

Under the terms of the proposed legislation, each agreement would be only one step in the process of reducing tensions. Agreements would not be of indefinite duration but would be subject to periodic review and to renewal at regular intervals. Each review could become a new opportunity for a useful dialogue with a Communist country. Each renewal could be adapted to encourage the further peaceful evolution of that individual country and the improvement of our relations with it.

There is wide and growing understanding throughout the country that improved conditions for peaceful trade with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe would be in the national interest and should be a proper subject of negotiation with those countries. Many business, industrial and agricultural leaders and other expert witnesses who testified in the extensive hear-

ings held on this subject by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that the United States could benefit from the possibility of wider peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries under proper safeguards. So too have a number of leading private organizations that have studied the problem.

To fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy in this complex era, the President must have available to him every appropriate bargaining tool. Nowhere is this need more critical than in our relations with the Communist countries. Granting this flexible authority to the President would not be a concession to the Communist world. Rather, it would give him a valuable instrument of foreign policy to be used where and when it will advance the interests of the United States.

Conducting a Balanced Strategy

In addition to the gains already stated which the proposed legislation can help to realize, it can be an important element in our balanced strategy for peace.

We are reaffirming in Viet-Nam—as we have on many earlier battlefields—our determination to aid free and independent nations to defend themselves from destruction by Communist aggression or subversion. But determined resistance to such force is only a part of our strategy to maintain a peaceful world.

It has equally been our purpose to demonstrate to the Communist countries that their best interests lie in seeking the well-being of their peoples through peaceful relations with the nations of the free world. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to understand that we will go step by step with them as far as they are willing to go in exploring every path toward enduring peace. We require only that our willingness and our actions be genuinely matched by theirs.

We are confident that this policy is sound even when we are fighting against Com-

munist weapons in Viet-Nam. Indeed, it is when we are resisting force with force that it is most important to hold open every possible avenue to peace. We need to make unmistakably clear to all the Communist nations of Eastern Europe that their best interests lie in economic development and peaceful trade, not in support of futile attempts to gain advantage through the use of force.

The Legislation

The proposed legislation contains five principal provisions.

The first states the purpose of the Act, particularly to use peaceful trade and related contacts with Communist countries to advance the long-range interests of the United States.

The second authorizes the President to enter into a commercial agreement with a Communist country when he determines it will promote the purposes of the Act, will be in the national interest and will result in benefits to the United States equivalent to those provided by the agreement to the other party.

The third states some of the benefits we may hope to gain in such agreements.

The fourth limits each agreement to an initial period of three years, renewable for three-year periods. It requires that each agreement provide for regular consultations on its operations and on relevant aspects of United States relations with the other country. It also requires that each agreement be subject to suspension or termination at any time on reasonable notice.

The fifth is the central provision recommended by the responsible groups studying this matter: the President would have authority to proclaim most-favored-nation treatment for the goods of Communist nations with which a commercial agreement is made under the Act. Such MFN treatment would continue only so long as the agreement is in effect.

The President would have the authority to suspend or terminate any proclamation made pursuant to this Act. The President

should do so whenever he determines that the other party to the agreement is no longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement, or that suspension or termination is in the national interest.

As part of his negotiating power with respect to a commercial agreement with the Soviet Union, the President would have authority to terminate the existing provisions of law excluding certain furs of Soviet origin.

The authority of the Act would not extend to Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Cuba or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The bill expressly provides that it does not modify or amend the Export Control Act or the Battle Act which together control the export of military articles and strategic goods and technology which would adversely affect the national security and welfare of the United States.

The bill does not change in any way existing laws and regulations prohibiting aid and limiting credit to Communist countries.

All agreements will be promptly transmitted to both Houses of Congress.

Conclusion

In 1958 President Eisenhower made it clear that "the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union"⁵ and spoke of the importance of trade as a means of strengthening the possibilities for independent actions by the countries of Eastern Europe.

President Kennedy in his first State of the Union Message⁶ declared his determination that "we must never forget our hopes for the ultimate freedom and welfare of the peoples of Eastern Europe."

In December, 1964, President Johnson expressed our wish "to build new bridges to Eastern Europe—bridges of ideas, education, culture, trade, technical cooperation and mutual understanding for world peace and

⁵ For text of President Eisenhower's letter of July 14, 1958, to Soviet Premier Khrushchev, see BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 200.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1961, p. 207.

prosperity.”⁷ In May of this year, the President again referred to the way in which “the intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period of time, can influence Eastern European societies to develop along paths that are favorable to world peace.”

The authority asked in this legislation will help attain these goals.

In Greece, Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and, now, Viet-Nam we have tried to convince the Communist countries that the road of aggression and subversion has a dead end. This legislation will help us provide the positive counterpart to that lesson. It will give the President a vital instrument of negotiation to maintain essential balance in our relations with the Soviet Union and with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and to respond to their growing desire and opportunity for wider contacts with the West. It will thereby serve our own interests and the cause of peace and stability.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and security of the United States by providing authority to negotiate commercial agreements with Communist countries, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966”.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are—

(a) to use peaceful trade and related contacts with Communist countries as a means of advancing the long-range interest of the United States in peace and freedom;

(b) to promote constructive relations with Communist countries, to contribute to international stability, and to provide a framework helpful to private United States firms conducting business relations with Communist state trading agencies by institut-

ing regular government-to-government negotiations with individual Communist countries concerning commercial and other matters of mutual interest; and

(c) to increase peaceful trade and related contacts between the United States and Communist countries, and to expand markets for products of the United States in these countries by creating similar opportunities for the products of Communist countries to compete in United States markets on a non-discriminatory basis.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

The President may make a commercial agreement with a Communist country providing most-favored-nation treatment to the products of that country whenever he determines that such agreement—

(a) will promote the purposes of this Act,

(b) is in the national interest, and

(c) will result in benefits to the United States equivalent to those provided by the agreement to the other party.

SEC. 4. BENEFITS TO BE PROVIDED BY COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

The benefits to the United States to be obtained in or in conjunction with a commercial agreement made under this Act may be of the following kind, but need not be restricted thereto:

(a) satisfactory arrangements for the protection of industrial rights and processes;

(b) satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of commercial differences and disputes;

(c) arrangements for establishment or expansion of United States trade and tourist promotion offices, for facilitation of such efforts as the trade promotion activities of United States commercial officers, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, the sending of trade missions, and for facilitation of entry and travel of commercial representatives as necessary;

(d) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to duties or other restrictions on the imports of the products of the United States, and other arrangements that may secure market access and assure fair treatment for products of the United States; or

(e) satisfactory arrangements covering other matters affecting relations between the United States and the country concerned, such as the settlement of financial and property claims and the improvement of consular relations.

SEC. 5. PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

A commercial agreement made under this Act shall—

(a) be limited to an initial period specified in the agreement which shall be no more than three years

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.

from the time the agreement becomes effective;

(b) be subject to suspension or termination at any time upon reasonable notice;

(c) provide for consultations at regular intervals for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the agreement and relevant aspects of relations between the United States and the other party; and

(d) be renewable for additional periods, each not to exceed three years.

SEC. 6. EXTENSION OF BENEFITS OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT.

(a) In order to carry out a commercial agreement made under this Act and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may by proclamation extend most-favored-nation treatment to the products of the foreign country entering into such commercial agreement: *Provided, That* the application of most-favored-nation treatment shall be limited to the period of effectiveness of such commercial agreement.

(b) The President may at any time suspend or terminate any proclamation issued under subsection (a). The President shall suspend or terminate such proclamation whenever he determines that—

(1) the other party to a commercial agreement made under this Act is no longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement; or

(2) the suspension or termination of the agreement is in the national interest.

SEC. 7. ADVICE FROM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER SOURCES.

Before making a commercial agreement under this Act, the President shall seek information and advice with respect to such agreement from the interested Departments and agencies of the United States Government, from interested private persons, and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate.

SEC. 8. TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

The President shall submit to the Congress an annual report on the commercial agreements program instituted under this Act. Such report shall include information regarding negotiations, benefits obtained as a result of commercial agreements, the texts of any such agreements, and other information relating to the program.

SEC. 9. LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY.

The authority conferred by this Act shall not be used to extend most-favored-nation treatment to the products of areas dominated or controlled by the Communist regimes of China, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, Cuba, or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

SEC. 10. RELATION TO OTHER LAWS.

(a) This Act shall not apply to any agreement made with a country whose products are receiving, when such agreement is made, the benefits of trade agreement concessions extended in accordance with section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. sec. 1861(b)).

(b) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to modify or amend the Export Control Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. App. sec. 2021 *et seq.*) or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. sec. 1611 *et seq.*).

(c) The President may by proclamation terminate headnote 4 to schedule 1, part 5, subpart B of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 32, 19 U.S.C. sec. 1202) with respect to the products of any country to which it is applicable upon the entry into force of a commercial agreement made under this Act with such country.

(d) Any commercial agreement made under this Act shall be deemed a trade agreement for the purposes of title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. sec. 1901 *et seq.*).

(e) The portion of general headnote 3(e) to the Tariff Schedules of the United States that precedes the list of countries and areas (77A Stat. 11; 70 Stat. 1022) is amended to read as follows:

“(e) *Products of Communist Countries.* Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of this headnote, the rates of duty shown in column numbered 2 shall apply to products, whether imported directly or indirectly, of the countries and areas that have been specified in section 401 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, in sections 231 and 257 (e) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or in actions taken by the President thereunder and as to which there is not in effect a proclamation under section 6(a) of the East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966. These countries and areas are:”

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade With East European Countries and the Soviet Union

The Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union was created by the President on February 16, 1965. Its task was to explore all aspects of expanding peaceful trade in support of the President's policy of widening constructive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. That policy was reaffirmed by the President in his State of the Union message when he said, "Your government, assisted by leaders of labor and business, is now exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."

The members of the Committee are:

J. IRWIN MILLER (Chairman)

Chairman of the Board, Cummins Engine Co., Inc.;
Member, Executive Committee, World Council of Churches

EUGENE R. BLACK

Chairman, Brookings Institution; Past President,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

WILLIAM BLACKIE

President, Caterpillar Tractor Co.; Director and
Chairman of the Foreign Commerce Committee,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

GEORGE R. BROWN

Chairman of the Board, Brown & Root, Inc.;
Chairman, Board of Trustees, Rice University

CHARLES W. ENGELHARD, JR.

Chairman, Engelhard Industries; Director, Foreign
Policy Association

JAMES B. FISK

President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Past Member,
President's Science Advisory Committee

NATHANIEL GOLDFINGER

Director of Research, AFL-CIO; Trustee, Joint
Council on Economic Education

CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT

Chairman of the Board, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
and Co.; Chairman, Radio Free Europe Fund

WILLIAM A. HEWITT

Chairman of the Board, Deere and Co.; Trustee,
U.S. Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce

MAX F. MILLIKAN

Professor of Economics and Director, Center for

● *This report was submitted to President Johnson on April 29, 1965. It is printed in the Bulletin at this time because of interest in this subject resulting from the Department's proposals to the Congress on East-West trade.*

International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; President, World Peace Foundation
CHARLES G. MORTIMER

Chairman, General Foods Corp.; Trustee, Stevens
Institute of Technology

HERMAN B. WELLS

Chancellor, Indiana University; Former U.S.
Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly

Edward R. Fried served as Executive Secretary
to the Committee and James A. Henderson as
Deputy Executive Secretary.

Introduction

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., April 29, 1965.

THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You have asked us "to explore all aspects of the question of expanding peaceful trade" in support of your policy of "widening our relations" with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.¹

Any useful consideration of the desirable degree and pattern of peaceful trade relations between ourselves and these countries must begin with the Soviet Union itself.

The Government of the Soviet Union has steadily.

¹ It is understood that policies with respect to trade with Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba are outside the terms of reference of this Committee. Our findings and recommendations do not apply to trade with these countries. The terms "Communist countries" and "European Communist countries" as used in this report refer to the nations of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. [Footnote in original.]

over many years, by words and deeds, declared its hostility to our own country. The U.S. Government and the American people support the most powerful defense system the world has ever seen in recognition of this fact.

Without this preponderant military power, it would be idle and even dangerous to explore the possibilities of expanding peaceful trade, or for that matter, of any peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. For the same reason, we rule out from these considerations any kind of strategic trade that could significantly enhance Soviet military capabilities and weaken our own position of comparative military strength.

With a secure defense, on the other hand, we can prudently seek practical means of reducing areas of conflict between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, we assume the United States has an obligation in today's nuclear world to pursue such possibilities as part of its long-term commitment to strengthen the prospects for peace in the world.

While the Communist threat remains, its nature constantly changes, because the conditions of men and nations everywhere are changing. Thus, our Government must be forever reexamining its policies, programs, and methods to make certain that they are appropriate to the times and to the national purpose.

It is now clear that the ties between the East European nations and the Soviet Union are neither quite so numerous nor so strong as they have been in the past; the forces of nationalism are growing. Between the Soviet Union and Communist China, sharp differences have arisen. There is also a ferment in all of the European Communist countries as they try to cope with the awakening demands of their people for a better life within the confines of a system geared more for military power than for human welfare.

It is an essential part of U.S. strategy to resist Communist efforts to expand through aggression. At the same time, we know that the danger of aggression will never be overcome until the Communists change their view of the world and the goals they ought to seek. Through our attitudes and actions, therefore, we must aim to influence these countries toward decisions that stress the attainment of prosperity through peaceful means. To appear hostile toward all of their objectives deprives us of the opportunity to influence the choices they make as to kinds of objectives or as to means of achieving them.

The possibilities of "peaceful coexistence" and mutually advantageous trade do not sound convincing coming from those who speak of "burying us." We know very well that coexistence means something different to Soviet leaders from what it means to us. Within the framework of a policy so labeled, they believe they can still pursue hostile actions against the free world so long as major war does

not result. But they have found it necessary to change their view of coexistence over the past decade and the conditions of the modern world will cause it to change further over the next decade. Much the same may be said of Soviet motivation and desire, and that of most of the East European nations, for increased trade with the United States. This Committee, therefore, has come to believe that in a longer time perspective the possibilities of "peaceful coexistence"—in the genuine meaning of that expression—can be made to grow. We conclude this in spite of Soviet professions and not because of them.

We are aware that the Communists have their conviction as to how the forces of history will operate and that they profess to be convinced that time is on their side. We also have our own conviction. We believe that men and nations function best in an open society. There are signs that pressures for greater openness within Soviet society are mounting. The reasons may be pragmatic rather than ideological, but they are nonetheless real. The Soviets want a modern and technically advanced society. Their own experience shows that the building of such a society can be severely handicapped by a closed and tyrannical political order and a rigid, centrally directed economic system.

We desire to encourage the growth of forces in the European Communist countries that will improve the prospects for peace. Within these countries we seek to encourage independence from Soviet domination and a rebuilding of historical ties with the West. In each of these countries, including the U.S.S.R., we seek an opening up of the society and a continuing decentralization of power. It is in our interest to promote a concern with internal standards of living rather than with external adventure.

We must look at our trade policies toward European Communist countries in that broad context. Trade is a tactical tool to be used with other policy instruments for pursuing our national objectives.

Trade cannot settle the major outstanding issues between ourselves and the Communists, nor can it, by itself, accomplish a basic change in the Communist system. Over time, however, trade negotiations and trade relations can provide us with useful opportunities to influence attitudes in these countries in directions favorable to our national interest. Trade involves contact of peoples and exchange of ideas and customs as well as of goods and services. It requires the building of mutual trust, and good faith, and confidence. An expansion of trade would require from the Communists a growing commitment to international rules and adherence to international standards for responsible behavior; it cannot be based on Soviet-imposed conditions or usual Communist trading practices.

Trade and government-to-government negotiations which set the framework for trade can be means of reducing animosities between ourselves and individ-

ual Communist countries and can provide a basis for working out mutually acceptable solutions to common problems. A constructive attitude toward trade can serve as a counterpart to our national determination to convince these countries through our deterrent military power that they cannot gain their objectives through aggression. Properly conceived and wisely administered, a growing trade with East European nations and the Soviet Union could become a significant and useful device in the pursuit of our national security and welfare and of world peace.

In sum, trade with the European Communist countries is politics in the broadest sense—holding open the possibility of careful negotiation, firm bargaining, and constructive competition. In this intimate engagement men and nations will in time be altered by the engagement itself. We do not fear this. We welcome it. We believe we are more nearly right than they about how to achieve the welfare of nations in this century. If we do our part, time and change will work for us and not against us.

These are the general propositions which underlie the specific findings and recommendations which we now submit. They are based on excellent briefings and supporting papers prepared by government agencies in answer to questions the Committee raised, on materials submitted to the Committee by interested private organizations, and on a careful review of some of the most pertinent published material on this subject. The members of the Committee have found that exposure to this source material and thorough discussion of the issues brought new perspectives and fresh judgments. We would emphasize, on the basis of our experience, that public understanding of how trade can best fit into our national strategy is essential to the effective use of trade as an instrument of national policy.

Findings

Review of Our Position

1. The United States has a long tradition that trade is a normal element of relations between countries. We have departed from that principle rarely and only for compelling reasons. Indeed, we began the period following the close of World War II by treating trade with the U.S.S.R. no differently from trade with other countries. We did not impose security controls on this trade until 1948 and then did so purposefully in response to aggressive Soviet expansion in Eastern and Central Europe. In the atmosphere of the Berlin blockade and the Korean war, we expanded these controls and gained the cooperation of other principal trading nations in an international embargo of strategic commodities.

2. When we first applied these controls we were the predominant source of capital, of advanced industrial technology, and of exportable resources in

the West. The U.S.S.R. while pursuing an aggressive external policy, operated internally from a relatively weak and backward industrial base. At that time, we had both strong cooperation from other Western nations and a considerable unilateral capacity to insure that Western resources would not contribute to the growth of Soviet military power.

3. The underlying situation changed rapidly, particularly over the past decade, and the process continues today. The ability of the Western Europeans to trade, in terms of exportable resources and technology, grew rapidly in the wake of their dramatic economic recovery. Moreover, they saw the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean war as marking sufficient change in the political climate to justify resumption of their historic trade with Communist Europe.

The capacity of Communist countries to trade across the Iron Curtain also increased, following a marked growth in the strength of their economies. They saw in this trade a means of hastening economic growth and meeting planned goals. The interest of the East European countries in this trade was further heightened by the failure of Soviet attempts to impose a system of integration on their economies.

4. These developments created pressure on the part of our allies to ease the internationally agreed Western restrictions on exports to the East. As a result, the International Embargo List was gradually reduced. The West European nations reduced their controls accordingly; the United States did not do so to the same degree. A growing disparity arose between the United States and its major industrial allies in regard to respective attitudes toward the trade, controls on the trade, and participation in the trade. This disparity exists today and poses basic questions about our trade policy. The United States has three alternatives. It can leave things as they are. It can eliminate this disparity through action across the board that would bring U.S. trading practices into line with those of our allies. Or it can modify its practices selectively and on a country-by-country basis. Only the third alternative could offer new negotiating leverage with individual Communist countries.

5. The mere existence of these differences in trade restrictions is sometimes cited as sufficient cause for changing U.S. export licensing controls to conform to those of Western Europe and Japan. In the Committee's view, this reasoning misses the essential point. The effectiveness of the U.S. denial of machinery and equipment to Communist countries is, of course, diminished by the availability of comparable advance technology from Western Europe and Japan. It is also true that our business firms are at a disadvantage in Communist markets in competing with West European firms. Commercial considerations, however, have not been the determining factor in framing U.S. policy on this subject

and should not be now. It is not the amount of trade that is important but the politics of offering trade or of withholding trade.

6. The United States initiated its controls for political reasons and should be ready to revise them when it is in the national interest to do so. This requires careful judgments on the significance of events, trends, and opportunities in individual European Communist countries and on how our relations with such countries fit into our overall strategy. It is on these grounds that we must be concerned to keep our policies under constant review—and not simply because we and our European allies may at a given moment be somewhat out of step.

7. As East European countries have shown signs of moving toward more independent positions, the United States has made greater use of trade inducement and less use of trade denial as an instrument of national policy. We have differentiated our trade policies toward individual Communist countries in accordance with the political opportunities they present. We responded promptly and effectively in 1948 when Yugoslavia adopted a more independent position toward the Soviet Union. We took action in the trade field when Poland, in 1956–57, gave signs of moving toward somewhat greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. And we took a modest step through trade talks in 1964 toward more promising relations with Rumania in response to an initiative from the Government of that country.

8. In these terms, the circumstances under which we would be willing to expand peaceful trade and the process of negotiating such trade take on considerable significance. Our Government should be properly equipped and oriented to negotiate aggressively and confidently with European Communist countries in the trade field as in all other fields whenever favorable opportunities and circumstances present themselves or can be created.

The Character of the Trade

9. Trade between the European Communist countries and free world industrial countries was close to \$3.5 billion each way in 1964. It grew at an average rate of nearly 10 percent a year over the past decade, or somewhat more than the rate of growth in the overall trade of Western industrial countries. The U.S. share in this trade was small—about one-tenth of total Western exports to these countries in 1964—and even this figure is abnormally high because it includes large wheat sales which are not likely to be a normal feature of this trade. For Western Europe, trade with Eastern Europe has ranged between 3 and 4 percent of total trade. For the United States, the proportion, even in 1964, was barely 1 percent.

10. The aggregate economic significance of this trade is small for all the countries concerned. For example, total imports from the West are for the Soviet Union only one-half of 1 percent of its gross national product and for East European countries

2 percent of their combined national product. For Western Europe, the aggregate significance of this trade is even less, and for the United States, it is negligible. U.S. exports to all European Communist countries this year probably will not reach \$200 million, or less than we sell to Switzerland.

11. The trade is of somewhat greater significance for particular industries in the European Communist countries. The U.S.S.R. and the East European countries are interested primarily in buying advanced or specialized types of machinery, industrial plants, and industrial processes and technology from the West to meet specific economic planning goals or to become self-sufficient in certain industrial sectors. They also buy metal manufactures and small quantities of consumer goods. To finance their purchases they sell to the West mainly industrial raw materials, minerals including gold, foodstuffs, steel products, and particularly oil. They also sell relatively small quantities of manufactured goods.

The trading methods of the European Communist countries reflect the rigidities of their State-controlled systems. Decisions regarding the level and composition of both imports and exports are made in accordance with a national plan and are carried out by State trading organizations. Bilateral agreements are negotiated on a country-by-country basis. These agreements specify the categories of goods to be exchanged and set targets for the volume of that exchange. They provide for a balance between imports and exports in order to conserve foreign exchange. Deficits are met by the sale of gold or credits.

12. There is little doubt that the European Communist countries are interested in purchasing more from the United States than they do now—principally machinery, equipment, complete plants, and technical data. This advanced technology could provide the United States with some of its most effective bargaining leverage for trade negotiations with Communist countries.

13. If we relaxed some of our restrictions, purchases of European Communist countries from the United States would probably rise in the short term. But their lack of foreign exchange would soon limit this trade. In this sense, foreign exchange, rather than present U.S. export controls, is the major limitation on the potential for this trade.

If the European Communist countries are to develop a growing trade with the United States, they will either have to sell more to the United States or earn more convertible foreign exchange through favorable trade balances with Western Europe. It would be more difficult for these countries to expand exports to the United States than for them to increase sales to Western Europe, since the United States is not a good market for their primary materials and, in particular, would not in the foreseeable future be a buyer of oil—the largest single Soviet export.

The U.S.S.R. is likely over the future to seek to expand its sales of oil in Western Europe and elsewhere as one means of earning more foreign exchange. Its success will depend on its ability to produce increasing quantities of oil above its domestic needs and on the willingness of importing countries to buy more Soviet oil. In the case of Western Europe, increased purchases of Soviet oil would probably be tied to increased Soviet purchases of West European products. Whether through the sale of oil or other commodities, it is not likely that the U.S.S.R. and the East European countries will be able to develop and rely on a large excess of exports over imports in their trade with Western Europe to help finance purchases in the United States.

For this reason, long-term growth in the trade of the European Communist countries with the United States is more up to them than up to us. They would have to be prepared to invest in new export industries, to learn new marketing methods, to build dealer and service organizations abroad, and to develop relations of confidence with U.S. business firms. Such positive actions move a country to participate in the world economy and to abide by generally accepted international practices. They are intimately related to a nation's world outlook and are evolutionary in nature. If made, they would move these countries in directions favorable to our national security and welfare.

14. The Committee has seen various estimates of our possible exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe over the next decade; none suggest that this trade would constitute a significant part of our total trade. There is no convincing case for any specific figure, but it is clear that our commercial stake in this trade is very small. It could grow modestly over time, but only as our overall relations with these countries change. In any event, it is dwarfed by political considerations.

The Two Sides of the Argument

15. With these facts in mind, it is useful to lay out the main arguments on either side of the issue of national policy toward expanding peaceful trade with these countries. Reasonable and thoughtful people can differ on this question. We have tried to probe carefully all sides.

16. *The case against expanding peaceful trade* with the European Communist countries comes down to the proposition that these countries are hostile toward us and we should not strengthen them through trade. By selling to them goods and services of any nature, whether wheat or our technologically advanced machinery and equipment, it is argued that we help them to solve some of their pressing internal problems and make it easier for them to use their limited resources for building up their military power and strengthening their potential for subversion abroad. Moreover, this argument states that by expanding trade with these countries

we bestow upon them a kind of respectability and prestige which will enhance their position in the developing countries of the world and which they will use to our ultimate disadvantage. In sum, this argument holds that the risks of expanding trade are significant and the gains negligible.

17. *The case for expanding peaceful trade* comes down to the proposition that we can use trade to influence the internal evolution and external behavior of Communist countries. Trade provides us with a policy instrument to encourage the movement toward greater national independence in Eastern Europe and the trend toward greater concern for consumer needs in all the European Communist countries. By refusing to trade we put ourselves in a posture of hostility that could be at odds with these developments as well as with other elements of our overall strategy toward these countries. Our refusal to trade cannot importantly limit Soviet military power but it can help to reinforce their doctrinal belief in the need for self-sufficiency. A willingness to trade, on the other hand, would be concrete evidence of our belief in constructive and peaceful relations. The benefit done our relations with the underdeveloped world by evidence that we genuinely believe in the efficacy and ultimate triumph of open societies far outweighs the disadvantages of any enhancement of Soviet legitimacy. In sum, this argument holds that the gains are significant and the risks are negligible.

18. There are persuasive elements in each of these cases. No one policy is wholly right or wholly wrong, and any course chosen has its risks. Taking into account both gains and risks, the Committee feels that the national interest clearly lies on the side of a more active use of trade as an instrument of foreign policy.

Trade as an Instrument of Policy

19. Before the United States can consider using trade with Communist countries to advance our political ends, however, we must be sure it will not weaken our military security. Expert opinion on this subject shows the following:

First, exports of commodities that are closely or directly related to military use or could significantly enhance Communist military capabilities are strictly controlled. The Committee believes these controls should continue.

Second, gains from nonmilitary trade with the United States are unlikely to release additional resources for Soviet military expenditures. The U.S.S.R. accords overriding priority to military expenditures. Any change in total resource availability in the U.S.S.R. through trade would, under present policies, affect its civilian economy, not its military budget.

Third, the U.S.S.R. has an advanced weapons technology and a military production capability that is virtually independent of its external economic relations.

In sum, total Western nonstrategic trade, let alone U.S. trade, could not be expected to alter the fundamental relationship between East-West military capabilities.

20. It is easy to exaggerate many aspects of the trade question: On the one hand, the possible military and economic gains to Communist countries, and the risk of irremediable security losses; and on the other hand, the economic gains for U.S. business from such trade and, in some respects, the political consequences. Trade is not a one-way grant of benefits to either party. It involves costs as well as gains, and it is an exchange from which both parties must benefit or it will not take place. The unmatched industrial power of the United States puts it in a position to use this area of relations with Communist countries with authority and confidence.

In turn, the Soviet leaders have their own special prejudices regarding this trade. They tend to exaggerate its importance to the United States and the interest it holds for U.S. business. They have long believed we would be forced to seek markets in Communist countries to cope with depressions. And this belief is related to their standard assumption that "orders from Wall Street" must bring U.S. policy around. The fact is that peaceful trade cannot grow without an improvement in the underlying conditions that form the foundation for trade.

21. In the Committee's view, the time is ripe to make more active use of trade arrangements as political instruments in relations with Communist countries. Trade should be brought into the policy arena. It should be offered or withheld, purposefully and systematically, as opportunities and circumstances warrant. This requires that the President be in a position to remove trade restrictions on a selective and discretionary basis or to reimpose them, as justified by our relations with individual Communist countries.

Trade moves should be adapted to circumstances in individual Communist countries and used to gain improvements in, and to build a better foundation for our relations with these countries. As opportunities arise, the United States should enter into Government-to-Government negotiations with individual Communist countries on this front, bargaining as "Yankee traders" for reciprocal advantages.

22. Specifically, if individual Communist countries are interested in expanding peaceful trade with us, the United States should be prepared and able to negotiate the terms under which such trade could grow. These negotiations would set the framework for trade and should be designed to strengthen the U.S. political and commercial position. The trade itself would be carried out by private U.S. firms dealing directly with Communist State trading agencies.

To deal with problems arising from differences in our economic systems, the United States should use

its leverage to obtain, among other things, these concessions in matters related to trade: Satisfactory assurances regarding the arbitration of commercial disputes in third countries; appropriate arrangements for the protection of patents and other industrial property; agreement on procedures to avoid dumping and other forms of market disruption; and the settlement of financial claims. In the case of the U.S.S.R., such financial claims negotiations would have to include an arrangement for a satisfactory settlement of lend-lease obligations. The United States should also seek: The establishment or expansion of trade and tourist promotion offices; the facilitation of entry, travel, and accommodation of commercial representatives; the improvement of consular relations; and agreement on copyrights.

Whenever possible, we should use such negotiations to gain agreement or understandings on such matters as library and informational facilities, embassy quarters, the establishment of consulates, the jamming of broadcasts, the distribution of Government and other publications, and the initiation or expansion of cultural and technical exchanges.

In these ways, we could use trade negotiations to open up new avenues of peaceful engagement with Communist countries and create new opportunities to influence their development. This would not be a once and for all proposition—but a regular process in which we could make trade an asset that could be used over and over again.

23. As its part of the negotiating bargain, the United States must be prepared to remove trade restrictions on a selective basis. Within security limitations, the U.S. Government should adopt a flexible export licensing policy. It should use its discretionary authority in the field of commercial credits, and it should be in a position to offer individual Communist countries the opportunity to sell on normal competitive terms in the U.S. market.

24. In its trade negotiations with the Communist countries, the United States should strive to free the trade itself as much as possible from rigidities and Government intervention and make it increasingly responsive to market forces. The United States should insist that payments be made in convertible currencies and should oppose any governmental linkage of exports and imports. Termination and cancellation provisions in our trade agreements would give us adequate leverage to police the trade.

Trade with the United States should put pressure on Communist countries to move away from the rigid bilateralism that characterizes their usual trade arrangements. It should encourage them to become more heavily engaged in the network of world trade and committed to the Western practices that govern most of this trade.

25. U.S. aims in these negotiations must be political; we seek to encourage moves toward the external independence and internal liberalization of individual Communist nations. We are not inter-

ested in fostering animosities among European Communist nations. Our long-term purpose in our dealings with these countries must be to create an atmosphere in which they will inevitably find that their interests are more and more linked to peaceful relations with the Free World. We must hold to these kinds of purposes in our trade negotiations with European Communist countries. They are not only necessary to make the effort worthwhile, but they form the only base on which our trade can, in fact, grow.

26. The major specific issues involve our policies on export licenses, on the sale of technology, on credits, and on the granting of most-favored-nation tariff treatment. Before discussing them, the Committee would emphasize that these issues are part of an interrelated whole and that U.S. policies on each should be formulated and applied with this in mind. For example, the United States cannot expect political advantages from the isolated use of export licensing controls on a case-by-case basis. Trying to negotiate in this way would be a waste of U.S. bargaining power. On the other hand, the coordinated use of all the potential assets—export licensing, MFN and guarantees of commercial credit—in periodic Government-to-Government trade negotiations with individual Communist countries would put the United States in the best possible position to get the most advantageous results from such negotiations.

Export Licensing

27. Issues in export licensing arise mainly in regard to commodities and technology which the United States restricts for export to Communist countries but which are not included in the International Embargo List. Many of these products and industrial plants are freely exported from Western Europe and Japan. They are not closely related to military production or use and therefore are in the area of peaceful trade. As a group, they are of interest to the European Communist countries and would make a contribution to their economies insofar as they could be purchased only from the United States, or purchased from the United States in more advanced design, better quality, or lower cost than from other Western countries.

28. The United States should adopt a flexible and selective policy in respect to licensing the export of commodities and technology. We should be prepared to relax our controls, country by country in support of negotiations to obtain concessions and achieve better relations. Conversely, we should tighten our controls, should relations deteriorate.

29. The language of the Export Control Act and the declaration of policy expressed by the Congress in that Act is consistent with this approach. As stated in the Act, "it is the policy of the United States to use its economic resources and advantages in trade with Communist-dominated nations to fur-

ther the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States." The Act gives the President full discretion to apply controls on trade with Communist nations to carry out this policy. The criteria for applying controls were rephrased in a 1962 amendment, but the effect of this amendment is by no means clear. Given this ambiguity, there has been a tendency among those charged with the administration of trade controls to give more emphasis to the restrictive rather than to the discretionary provisions of the statute.

30. The Committee believes this is unwise and not required by the law. The Act comes up for renewal this year. It should be renewed with emphasis placed on the possibilities for using trade and export licensing for constructive as well as for restrictive purposes. In light of the new and changing political circumstances in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., more regard should be given to the use of this tool to influence our future relations with these countries.

The Question of Technology

31. Communist countries are mainly interested in buying our best machinery, our advanced industrial plants, and our latest technical data.

It can be argued that sales or licenses in these categories should not be permitted because they would permit the Soviet bloc nations to allocate more of their scarce research and development talent to the military, and would thus harm the relative position of the United States.

Insofar as a reasonable equivalent can be obtained from other Western nations or Japan, this argument has little force. In the smaller number of cases, where a nonstrategic technical advantage is obtainable only from the United States, the possible effect on Soviet military capabilities, as pointed out above, is negligible. On the other hand, the power to release for trade items of nonstrategic but advanced technology can be used by the President as an effective trade tool for accomplishing foreign policy objectives.

For reasons which follow, however, we doubt that the Communist countries will be successful in buying a large amount of advanced technology from the United States. This may lead to some irritation and disillusionment on their part. But in the end, bargaining in this field may force the Communist nations to face up to meeting the conditions that a genuine trade in technology requires.

32. The Committee does not believe that many U.S. firms would be interested in selling their most advanced technology to European Communist countries. In the normal course of trade, business firms protect their most advanced technology and bargain hard for satisfactory terms for such technology as they are willing to sell. These practices would hold all the more for trade with Communist countries.

Some U.S. industries and firms that support heavy

research and development programs refuse to sell their industrial processes or to build complete plants for sale to others. Money alone will not buy their know-how. They are willing to exchange their processes for what they consider equivalent technology from other firms. Such an exchange of technology between a U.S. firm and a Soviet State organization would be feasible in only a very few instances. Or such firms are sometimes willing to build their own plants abroad embodying their technology. The possibility of a private U.S. firm's establishing a subsidiary or entering into a joint venture in the U.S.S.R. is beyond our present vision; it may not be so farfetched in some East European countries.

Many U.S. firms are prepared to license their technology in Western Europe and elsewhere in the free world. Most are reluctant to do so in the U.S.S.R. since they do not have confidence in the licensing arrangement or in the protection of their technology afforded by Soviet law. As in the case of the trade in goods, the flow of technology will inevitably depend on development of common ground rules and of relationships of trust. The recent Soviet expression of interest in joining the International Patent Convention is of significance in this connection.

In some cases Western managerial methods and organization are integral to Western technology. It would not be enough for the Communists to import the plant itself; they probably would need Western technicians to install the equipment and supervise initial operation. They might even have to adapt their operating methods to its design to use it efficiently.

In other cases the use of Western plants or processes is limited for lack of a wide range of supporting industries to supply components and a serious shortage of managerial and technical talent. Modern plants cannot easily be operated or maintained, let alone duplicated, outside the industrial milieu for which they were designed.

Where U.S. firms are willing to sell technology, it is frequently their second best or in the process of becoming so. For the importing country, gearing up for a new type of production takes time. In a fast-moving field where technology is perishable, this method of operation can become a way of importing obsolescence.

In essence, the importation of technology involves much the same calculation as the decision to import anything else. Whether technology seems worth purchasing depends on the price. Whether it turns out to be advantageous depends on the efficiency with which it is injected into the system. In today's world no country can continue to rely heavily on the pirating of importation of technology to improve its relative industrial position. To do so may appear to be cheap in the short run, but could turn out to be a sure way of perpetuating second-class industrial status.

33. In view of all these considerations, the Committee believes the United States should treat the trade in nonstrategic technology in the same way as other trade. The President should use his authority to permit the sale of nonstrategic technology in support of U.S. trade negotiations with individual Communist countries. The decision to *permit* the sale is a Government decision to be made on foreign policy grounds. The decision to *sell* and the terms of sale of such machinery and equipment should be left to the individual U.S. business firm.

Credits

34. Credits can become an issue if U.S. trade with Communist countries expands. Most U.S. firms would not extend credits to Communist countries without Government guarantees. As matters stand now, the President can authorize the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to a Communist country when he determines that guarantees to such a country are in the national interest. The terms of such credits must be within the range of common-commercial practices, but in any event, it is U.S. Government policy to limit such credits to 5 years. This limit is also consistent with the Berne Union—a long-standing, though informal agreement, reached by leading insuring and guaranteeing institutions in the field of international credit. The Committee believes we should hold to this position. It is recommended further that the President make appropriate use of his powers in this area to secure recognition of the validity of any financial claims outstanding and to obtain reasonable settlements of such claims.² These claims are considerable in amount and consist largely of expropriated American properties and defaulted bond issues, and in the case of the U.S.S.R., of course, of lend-lease obligations.

35. It is sometimes argued, particularly in Western European countries, that credits in excess of 5 years should be extended to the East for industrial plants that are normally amortized over a lengthy period. Some of these countries are guaranteeing such credits. As further justification for this position, the point is made that Communist governments have proven to be excellent credit risks and thereby are justified in asking for long-credit terms.

36. The Committee sees considerable danger in this line of reasoning. Among other things, it could easily lead to a credit race among Western suppliers and already shows some signs of doing so. There is no necessary relationship between the decision of Communist countries to purchase capital equipment and their future ability to earn foreign exchange to pay for such purchases. Medium- and short-term

² Mr. Black believes that reasonable settlements of these claims should be obtained prior to extension of any Government-guaranteed commercial credit. [Footnote in original.]

credits can be justified to meet temporary payment imbalances. But permitting these countries to pile up long-term debt could enable them to put their creditors under substantial pressure to accept unwanted commodities in lieu of defaults and could amount to a subsidy for their economies.

Apart from the commercial risks, it is important to recognize that long-term credits could run counter to the central purpose of this trade and reduce its potential political benefits. If Communist countries are strongly interested in purchasing United States or any other Western capital equipment on a scale substantially beyond their near-term capacity to finance, they should be obliged to face up to the implications of that position. The appropriate course for them to follow would be to divert resources to their export industries and to devote greater effort to design and marketing activities for sales in the West. Long-term credits enable these countries to postpone such decisions and transfer the burden of adjustment to Western capital markets, rather than to accept the responsibilities of growing interdependence with the free world.

We should not be concerned if a more restricted policy on credit would put U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to those of some other Western countries in negotiating with Communist authorities. The United States should set an example; it should not be party to a practice that enables the Communists to play off one Western country against another.

Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment

37. Most-favored-nation tariff treatment is normally granted by the United States to all countries. Exports from countries not granted MFN tariff treatment are subject to the high duties of the United States Tariff Act of 1930. Present legislation prohibits granting MFN tariff treatment to all Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Poland. This prohibition places a serious barrier in the way of expanding peaceful trade with the other European Communist countries because it denies them normal competitive terms in their attempts to sell to us.

38. The prohibition against granting MFN deprives the President of a valuable bargaining tool. Vesting discretionary authority in the President to grant as well as withdraw such tariff treatment would be the single most important step in permitting the Government to use trade more effectively as an instrument for shaping our relations with these countries. Without this tool any initial moves we might make in this direction would soon come to a halt. With it we could hope to maintain the momentum of change in a direction favorable to our interests.

39. The principal arguments *against* affording MFN treatment to these countries are: (a) We would get no tariff concessions in return. Tariff rates in Communist countries have only nominal

significance since foreign trade is dependent on the decisions of State trading authorities and not on market forces; (b) Communist countries should not receive MFN since they are not prepared to open their markets to world competition on the basis of established trading rules; (c) MFN would make it easier for them to dump their products in our markets; and (d) MFN is not so important to them because they export mainly primary products and the tariff discrimination they face for these products is not nearly so great as it is for industrial products.

40. These arguments in the Committee's view are outweighed by the advantages we would gain from a discretionary policy on this issue. The concessions the United States would seek for MFN would not be simply in tariff rates but in the overall conditions we could negotiate for expanded trade. The problem of Communist dumping is the kind of problem that can be handled in the course of Government-to-Government trade negotiations. If these countries are to make a serious effort to market their products in the United States, they will have to be assured of being able to compete on normal terms in the U.S. market.

41. MFN should not be granted to Communist countries automatically, or as a matter of right, or for an indefinite period. In these respects there should be a basic distinction between the MFN we grant by statute to free world countries and the MFN we would grant to Communist countries as part of specific trade understandings. It would be granted only for the duration of such agreements and subject to periodic review. As a bargaining asset, it is uniquely well adapted to U.S. policy objectives. Discretionary authority to grant MFN would allow the President to go much farther in differentiating among Communist countries. It would also symbolize our interest in encouraging these countries to move toward more open trading systems on an evolutionary basis. And it would demonstrate to these countries the advantages of better relations with the United States and the disadvantages of a deterioration in this relationship.

Trade and Strategy

42. Our trade policies are but a small part of our overall strategy toward European Communist countries. One aspect of this strategy, as we mentioned earlier, is to make clear that we will oppose and frustrate any actions that menace the peace of the world. Another aspect is to demonstrate that both sides can benefit from peaceful exchange, and in so doing, to influence and encourage those Communist leaders who are moving away from the view that military confrontation is inevitable. At the very time we must pursue the first aspect of our strategy even to the point of crisis, such as in Vietnam, we should also be willing to pursue the second as concrete evidence of the United States

Reprints of the Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With East European Countries and the Soviet Union (Department of State publication 8061, 22 pp.) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 20402, for 15 cents each.

dedication to the cause of peace.

Trade relations and trade negotiations can be a highly effective means of communicating this point. The United States can use trade to convey its true image and intentions: That it favors mutually beneficial relations; and that it is willing to go as far as Communist nations are willing to go in establishing a set of intergovernmental relations that conform to international standards. But the United States is justified in insisting on evidence as it moves step by step along this road. Along with such activities as cooperation in water desalinization, the exchange of visits of Heads of State, and technical and cultural exchanges, trade negotiations can give us a way of testing Communist intentions and can give them a way of testing U.S. intentions.

Recommendations

1. The Committee believes that peaceful trade in nonstrategic items can be an important instrument of national policy in our country's relations with individual Communist nations of Europe. Political, not commercial or economic considerations, should determine the formulation and execution of our trade policies.

2. The United States should in no case drop its controls on strategic items that could significantly enhance Communist military capabilities.

3. In respect to nonstrategic trade, the United States should use trade negotiations with individual Communist countries more actively, aggressively, and confidently in the pursuit of our national welfare and world peace.

4. We should not, however, remove our present restrictions on this trade either automatically or across the board. Communist countries are changing, in varying degrees and in different ways. We should adapt our trade policies to the political circumstances and opportunities that present themselves from time to time in the individual countries. At present significantly greater trade opportunities exist in certain East European countries than in the Soviet Union.

5. Negotiations with each of these countries should involve hard bargaining, from which the U.S. Government should expect to receive satisfactory assurances regarding the removal of commercial obstacles arising from differences in our economic systems. We should bargain for agreements on matters related to trade, such as reasonable settlements of out-

standing financial claims and procedures to avoid dumping, and, as appropriate, understandings on a variety of cultural, informational, and other matters at issue between us.

6. Provision should be made in trade agreements with Communist countries for frequent review at specific intervals. This would provide the opportunity to negotiate for new gains and to settle additional matters of disagreement.

7. An aim of American policy in trade negotiations with Communist countries should be to bring their trade practices into line with normal world trade practices.

8. To accomplish these purposes, we must be able to use our trade policies flexibly and purposefully in support of such negotiations. The President should have the authority to remove or, if necessary, impose trade restrictions as required for the achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

9. In administering export controls, the determination of what is strategic should be made primarily by the Department of Defense. The power to withhold or release nonstrategic goods or advanced technology for trade should be exercised by the President as an instrument for accomplishing foreign policy objectives.

10. The President should be given discretionary authority to grant or withdraw most-favored-nation tariff treatment to and from individual Communist countries when he determines it to be in the national interest. There should be a distinction between this MFN tariff treatment and the MFN tariff treatment we grant by statute to free world countries. It should be granted to Communist countries only for the duration of the trade agreement of which it is a part, and it should be subject to periodic review.

11. The President should continue to exercise his authority to allow Government-guaranteed commercial credits up to 5 years duration, if such terms are normal to the trade and if they are considered to further the national interest.

12. Trade with Communist countries should not be subsidized, nor should it receive artificial encouragement. The U.S. Government should decide the permitted scope of the trade in terms of security considerations. Within these limits, the amount of trade that takes place should be left to U.S. business and the U.S. consumer to decide. In terms of foreign policy considerations, however, it should be recognized that trade with European Communist nations can be as much in the national interest as any other trade.

13. In view of the changes now taking place and of changes that will continue to take place in the Communist societies, the United States should, at regular intervals, review its total trade policies toward the whole Communist world to ensure that they remain consistent with, and effective in support of, foreign policy objectives.

14. If trade with Communist countries is to be used for these objectives, the U.S. public, the Congress and the executive branch must have a thorough understanding of the problem, the opportunities that trade affords, and U.S. national objectives in this field. The U.S. Government should take every opportunity to make explicit what it intends to do and what it seeks to accomplish. It should act to remove any stigma from trade with Communist countries where such trade is determined to be in the national interest. The foreign policy advantages of such trade to the United States are not widely enough appreciated. With greater public awareness of both facts and objectives, the United States will be in a stronger position to use this trade as it must be used—for national purposes and to support national policy.

In conclusion, we emphasize that these findings and recommendations constitute a long-term strategy.

The intimate engagement of trade, over a considerable period of time, when taken with the process of change already under way, can influence the internal development and the external policies of European Communist societies along paths favor-

able to our purpose and to world peace. Trade is one of the few channels available to us for constructive contacts with nations with whom we find frequent hostility. In the long run, selected trade, intelligently negotiated and wisely administered, may turn out to have been one of our most powerful tools of national policy.

The members of your Committee have found this assignment difficult, challenging, and important. We hope this report will be useful to you and to the Nation.

Respectfully submitted, (signed)

J. IRWIN MILLER, *Chairman*
EUGENE R. BLACK
WILLIAM BLACKIE
GEORGE R. BROWN
CHARLES W. ENGELHARD, JR.
JAMES B. FISK
NATHANIEL GOLDFINGER^{*}
CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT
WILLIAM A. HEWITT
MAX F. MILLIKAN
CHARLES G. MORTIMER
HERMAN B. WELLS

^{*} *Statement of Comment by Mr. Goldfinger*

I have reservations about several issues in the Report and respectfully submit the following comments.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that I am not opposed to the expansion of economic and financial relations with the Soviet bloc under all conditions. However, I am concerned about the conditions.

Trade relations with the Soviet Union and its European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our Nation's foreign policy. Therefore, the Report should have placed greater emphasis on the political aspect of this issue.

There is also inadequate caution in the Report about the risk of exporting American technology—particularly advanced technology—to those countries. In centrally planned, totalitarian states, military and economic factors are closely related. There is no reason to believe that the export of American machinery and equipment to those countries will necessarily redound to the benefit of their peoples.

Moreover, in our readiness to engage in bilateral trade negotiations with individual countries of the

Soviet bloc, we should have no illusions about the ability of trade, in itself, to alter Communist attitudes and policies. Neither is trade, as such, a sure force for peace, as indicated by the two World Wars between trading nations.

Recognition of these realities should result in greater emphasis on the principle of quid pro quo concessions than is contained in the Report. In my opinion, there should be no expansion of trade, extension of Government-guaranteed credit or most-favored-nation tariff treatment without political quid pro quo concessions from them.

The Report's discussion of most-favored-nation tariff treatment omits or only briefly deals with several thorny problems concerning potential imports from those countries—such as goods produced by slave labor, dumping, market disruption, international fair labor standards and the need for an adequate trade adjustment assistance mechanism at home.

In conclusion, I believe that considerations of national security and international policy objectives should have top priority in evaluating trade relations with the Soviet bloc—over any temporary or marginal commercial advantages that may exist.

"... an impressive demonstration of a dynamic trade policy in action—at the bargaining table, in administrative decisions, in legislation." This is how William M. Roth, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in this article based on a recent speech he made, describes U.S. trade policy under President Johnson's leadership.

The Johnson Trade Policy

by William M. Roth

What is the trade posture of the Johnson administration?

Both the words and deeds indicate a record of quiet, steady accomplishment in the liberalization of world trade—whether calculated in volume, dollars, or in the progressive dismantling of protective barriers.

President Johnson's attitude on trade policy is perhaps best summed up in his letter to the Congress last October transmitting the ninth annual report on the trade agreements program.¹ He said:

The policy of two-way trade expansion and liberalization, initiated with the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and continued by every Administration since that time, has brought great benefits to this country. In general, U.S. goods have enjoyed progressively easier access to foreign markets. Low-cost, high-quality U.S. exports, sold and used in every corner of the world, have provided immediate evidence of the vitality of our free enterprise system. Our processors have gained ready access to essential raw materials, and have profited from the stimulus of keener competition. Consumers have enjoyed the wide range of choice which the world market provides.

But we have only begun. We must build on past success to achieve greater well-being for America, and for all the world's peoples. In particular, we must make every effort to assure the success of the current Geneva negotiations, known as the Kennedy Round.

The sixth round of tariff negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade—the Kennedy Round—is of great significance both economically and politically.

European rumors that the United States may have lost its enthusiasm for these important trade negotiations are wide of the mark. They are contradicted time and time again—by the words of the President and by those of his principal economic advisers. More than anything, however, they are contradicted by the record of this country's leadership in pressing for meaningful negotiations in Geneva and by the offers, in both industry and agriculture, that the United States has made. We suspect, therefore, that such rumors are tactical moves in a negotiation of great complexity and of tremendous economic and political importance. Certainly, most of our negotiating partners are well aware of the deep and urgent commitment of this country to the successful outcome of the Kennedy Round.

In his state of the Union message² President Johnson reemphasized this commitment. "We will work," he said, "to strengthen economic cooperation, to reduce barriers to trade . . ." And in his Economic Report³ the President said:

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 761.

² For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

³ For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1966, p. 290.

The year 1966 is the year when the world can take a giant step forward in liberalizing international trade by successfully concluding the Kennedy Round of negotiations to reduce trade barriers on all classes of products. The resulting growth of world trade and world income will benefit all countries, developing as well as industrial. The United States will bend every effort to get meaningful negotiations back on the track. This great venture in international cooperation must not fail.

These words clearly indicate a commitment to the principle of freedom of international competition and express the fundamental trade policy of President Johnson and of his administration. They also reaffirm the mandate of our negotiators in Geneva. This ambitious effort, the greatest in the 20-year history of GATT trade negotiations, will not fail because of any lack of will or determination on the part of the United States.

Although the six member states of the European Economic Community reached an impasse in their internal negotiations last June and the Geneva negotiations had come to a virtual standstill at the turn of the year, the Six have now resumed their internal dialog. Differences remain, but it seems reasonable to assume that they will achieve agreement to resume the development of their dynamic Common Market and to restore momentum to the trade negotiations.

The sixth round of trade negotiations must be concluded under our present authority, with a significant and balanced reduction in world trade barriers on a fully reciprocal basis. There are no practical alternatives if global trade expansion is to be achieved. The Kennedy Round is multilateral in the truest sense, involving all the world's principal trading nations.

Failure in these negotiations will invite a reversion to divisive trade practices among nations, with protectionism given strong encouragement and economic nationalism and regionalism new impetus. We must maintain and accelerate the momentum of trade liberalization and expansion which has contributed so greatly to the buoyant economies of the postwar industrialized world and

which holds the greatest potential for rapid development of the emerging nations. That is what the Kennedy Round is about.

Other Trade Initiatives

It is not only in the Geneva negotiations that the Johnson administration has given compelling evidence of its trade posture. A number of recent actions and proposals expose a consistent intent to see that American markets are open and remain open to fair competition from abroad.

First, the President has recently acted to end special escape-clause protection on lead and zinc, clinical thermometers, and safety pins, judging that this extra protection can no longer be justified. In a fourth case he ordered a substantial modification of the extra protection afforded stainless steel table flatware.

These actions are based on investigations, ordered by President Johnson, of the necessity of continuing special protection for these industries. Although an industry may need a temporary shield in some instances, the administration believes special protective measures should be employed only when imports are clearly causing serious disruption. Such cases should be under constant review and the protection removed when no longer necessary.

On the legislative side the Johnson administration has shown its dedication to a policy of liberal world trade. Over administration opposition the 88th Congress passed a bill establishing stringent marking requirements on imported wood products. President Johnson vetoed it in December 1963, stating in his veto message⁴ that the "bill would raise new barriers to foreign trade and invite retaliation against our exports. . . ." It was his first major decision on an issue of national trade policy and his first use of the veto.

In line with this policy the Johnson administration has continued to resist successfully the enactment of protectionist measures. In the last session of the Congress it

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 129.

made known its opposition to the so-called Orderly Marketing Act of 1965, which would have required the imposition of quotas when imports reached certain levels, and to a bill to amend the Anti-Dumping Act, which would have rendered that act a highly protectionist instrument. These bills did not receive even preliminary consideration by the committees concerned. This was also true of three other bills: One which would have provided for an increase in tariffs on imports of salmon, another which would have required the labeling of labels, and a third which would have required the marking of containers manufactured in the United States in part with foreign steel.

On the positive side, the 89th Congress in its first session took several significant actions at the request of the administration. The President sought and obtained repeal of the so-called Saylor amendment to the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1965, which imposed a complete prohibition on the use of any foreign articles in the construction of highways and railroads under the act. The Congress also met the President's request for legislation to implement the U.S.-Canadian agreement⁵ providing duty-free treatment of automotive products traded between the two countries, which previously had had serious trade problems in these products.

This same Congress also passed legislation enabling the United States to carry out its obligations under the International Coffee Agreement of 1962,⁶ an agreement designed to bring more stability to coffee prices. The development programs of cof-

fee-producing countries have suffered serious setbacks from the wildly fluctuating prices of this vital export commodity.

In January 1966 the Senate passed a previously approved House bill to suspend duties on certain tropical hardwoods pending completion of the Kennedy Round action on them, as another step toward assisting developing countries.

New Legislation

Significantly, this year President Johnson announced in his state of the Union message that, in keeping with our policy of building bridges to Eastern Europe, he would request that Congress grant him discretionary authority to remove special tariff restrictions against goods from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union when such action is in the national interest.

The President also will shortly request an amendment to the Trade Expansion Act to liberalize the tests which a firm or group of workers must satisfy in order to become eligible for adjustment assistance. To date, all petitions for adjustment assistance have been denied because of what we now realize to be unnecessarily demanding tests written into the law. The amendment will substantially relax these tests while still requiring a demonstration that tariff concessions have played a role in causing increased imports and have, in turn, led to economic injury.

We hope that this year the Congress will approve legislation to permit the United States to implement the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, commonly known as the Florence Agreement.⁷ Purpose of the agreement, as President Johnson noted in his letter⁸ requesting congressional considera-

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191; for statements made by President Johnson after signing the Automotive Trade Products Act of 1965 and texts of a proclamation and Executive order pursuant thereto, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 793.

⁶ For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5505*; for a statement made by President Johnson on May 24, 1965, see *BULLETIN* of June 14, 1965, p. 975.

⁷ For background and text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, June 21, 1965, p. 1015.

tion of the measure, is "to promote the growth of international understanding by reducing trade barriers to the flow of knowledge in all directions across all frontiers."

This record adds up to an impressive demonstration of a dynamic trade policy in action—at the bargaining table, in administrative decisions, in legislation.

In summary, there are three elements of President Johnson's trade policy.

First, while it is acknowledged that import competition can be disruptive and that Government assistance to help industries adjust to this kind of competition is warranted, such assistance should restrain imports only as a last resort and restraints should be ended as soon as they have served their purpose.

Second, the United States seeks and supports, in and beyond the current negotiations, measures that will expand world trade, including trade with the developing countries and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Third, the Johnson trade policy commits the United States to the vigorous use of the full powers of the Trade Expansion Act to achieve a successful outcome of the GATT negotiations at Geneva. Its negotiators will bargain hard to conclude, on a fully reciprocal basis, a significant and balanced reduction in world trade barriers. The result, in both industry and in agriculture, will be mutually beneficial to all participants.

These three elements serve the common objective of expanding trade. The Johnson trade policy thus continues the liberal world trade orientation that has characterized United States policies since the early 1930's—policies that have had since that time the consistent support of the leaders of both major political parties.

U.S. Shipowners Formally Notified of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments

Following is the text of a letter from Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann to Maritime Administrator Nicholas Johnson.

MAY 4, 1966

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I am writing with regard to a Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations adopted on April 9, 1966.¹ That Resolution, No. 221, relates to shipments of oil to Southern Rhodesia and provides in part:

"Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

"Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia."

The Government of the United States voted for Resolution No. 221 in the Security Council and supports the efforts of the United Kingdom to end the illegal, unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, we wish to advise all owners of United States flag ships to take all necessary steps to prevent their ships of United States registry from carrying oil to Beira destined for Rhodesia.

We should appreciate your having this letter and any other notice you believe appropriate published in the Federal Register.²

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS C. MANN

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 2, 1966, p. 718.

² 31 Fed. Reg. 6878.

"I asked an old gentleman what he thought of all the changes which were taking place, and I shall never forget his answer: 'I cannot understand why we have been sleeping so long.' " That phrase, Mr. Berger says, "eloquently sums up the great changes now going on in Korea."

Korea—Progress and Prospects

by Samuel D. Berger

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am well acquainted with Chung-Ang University, but this is my introduction to Long Island University. I am very pleased to be here, and especially pleased to take part in this symposium. A unique relationship has developed between the United States and Korea in these last 20 years, and this conference is, in a sense, a recognition of and a tribute to that relationship.

Although we have had diplomatic relations with Korea since 1883, Korea was hardly known to Americans as recently as 20 years ago. Missionary work, which dates from the 1880's, had brought Korea into the homes and thinking of a limited circle. A handful of Koreans who had come to the United States during the Japanese occupation nurtured a dream that Korea might one day be free, but they were little known in the American community. A few scholars had made some studies of Korean history, culture, and life, usually in conjunction with general studies of the Orient. An occasional tourist would visit Korea and write his impressions. This was almost the sum total of our acquaintance.

The Korean people knew as little of us as we of them. A self-imposed isolation, fol-

lowed by an enforced isolation, had cut Korea off from most other countries and especially from the West. Historically, Korean contacts with the world were limited to China and to Japan, or to the marauders from beyond the Yalu who threatened Korea during much of its long history.

War and the accidents of history have brought our two countries together in ways that no one could have foreseen 20 years ago. Korea is now a part of our history, as we are of Korea's. The chain of events that brought us together were:

The Second World War.

The fateful decision made during that war to divide Korea at the 38th parallel as a matter of convenience to provide for the surrender of Japanese prisoners of war.

The even more fateful decision of the Soviet leaders not to cooperate with the Western Allies to build a durable peace but to follow Lenin's doctrine of exploiting the chaos, confusion, and disorder after the war in order to extend communism. In Korea a Communist regime was installed by the Soviet Army.

The American decision to withdraw our military forces from the Republic of Korea in 1949, leaving only a few military advisers and instructors.

The subsequent invasion from the north

¹ Address made before the Conference and Symposium of Korean Culture at the Brooklyn Center of Long Island University, Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 7.

on June 25, 1950, which led to our return, to the United Nations action, and to our presence in Korea ever since.

In the perspective of history, two decisions, more than any other, dramatize the revolution in American foreign policy from our traditional isolation to an acceptance of international responsibilities. And curiously, both of these involve peninsulas which have been fought over for centuries as invading nations vied to extend their domains. The first was the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, in which we took over from our exhausted British allies their commitment to support the independence of Greece against Communist aggression. This was the forerunner of NATO and our deep involvement in Europe. The other was President Truman's decision to come to the support of the Republic of Korea in June 1950, which set the basis for our subsequent policies in the general area of Asia.

Interchange of People, Experience, Ideas

If we knew little about Korea and they little about us 20 years ago, that is no longer the case today. Over a million Americans have fought or stood guard on Korean soil, along with Koreans, to defend the independence of that nation. Tens of thousands of Korean soldiers, sailors, and airmen have been brought to the United States for military training. Thousands of American civilians have visited or worked in every conceivable capacity in Korea, and tens of thousands of Korean civilians have come to America for study and training.

These figures and numbers do not begin to convey the width and depth of the interchange which has taken place—of people, of experience, and of ideas. English has become the compulsory second language in Korean education, and wherever I traveled in Korea, even on the most remote island, I was invariably accosted by one or more young students anxious to try out their English. Koreans are good linguists, and even now I receive letters from students I have met all over Korea.

Our military relations have done far more

than produce one of the most highly trained and effective military forces in the free world. For a modern military force consists not only of fighting men but requires a great range and variety of professions, vocations, and skills. Doctors, surgeons, and nurses are needed, as are lawyers and engineers, experts in communication, transport, procurement, supply, budget and fiscal matters, and disbursement. Men must be trained in organization, management, and planning. Men must be trained as pilots and navigators, as drivers, motor and airplane mechanics, welders, crane and bulldozer operators, metalworkers, and radio and telephone repairmen, and in scores of other occupations.

This military training has made the Korean Armed Forces a vast reservoir of supply of skills and talents which were transferable to civilian life and which are now contributing so much to the building of a modern Korea.

Nor have the civilians been neglected. Through the exchange program and through technical assistance to Korean education, thousands of Koreans have been trained in economics, banking, government, journalism, political science, engineering, medicine, law, public health, agriculture, business administration, and other fields.

A "Developed" People

The thirst of Koreans for education and training is one of the happiest memories I have of my 3 years' stay in Korea. Korea may be an undeveloped nation in an economic and industrial sense, but the Koreans are not an undeveloped people.

The separate kingdoms and tribes of Korea were unified into a nation about 1,300 years ago, and they have successfully maintained a national tradition ever since. They withstood Chinese and Japanese incursions or invasions, and they absorbed and survived a Mongolian occupation. Their long history as a nation testifies to their hardiness and their great inner resources of will, independence, and spirit.

I have an old map of Korea dating from

an exploration by Ortelius in 1540. It is perhaps the first map ever made of Korea by a European. It shows Korea as an island, and the inscription reads: "Not much is known about the people of this island, known as Koreans, except that they are very tall and superb soldiers."

The 18th and 19th centuries were tragic ones in Korean history, as the Yi Dynasty, energetic and progressive in its early years, went into decline. The feudal system showed no ability to adjust and change. By the end of the 19th century, corruption, a persistent tendency toward factionalism, and an inability to produce effective government had so weakened this proud and capable people that Korea was no longer able to withstand the pressures of her stronger imperial neighbors. The stirrings toward change and democracy in the late 19th century were snuffed out by the Japanese occupation.

But the essential characteristics of the people could not be obliterated. They are an energetic people, hard working, with ambition, and quick to learn. The literacy rate is one of the highest in the world—93 percent. Education is universal, and parents of every class will make every sacrifice to put their children into university.

Problems Confronting Korea After 1945

There are nations with vast natural resources, but they seem unable to do much with them. Other nations with few natural resources make astonishing progress. The answer, of course, lies with the people, and the problems which confronted the Korean people after 1945 were enormous.

The tragic division of Korea deprived the people of the South of the great natural resources of water power and minerals which lie north of the 38th parallel. The South has traditionally been agricultural. Three million refugees fled south after 1946.

The savage North Korean invasion in 1950 which carried the Communists to the perimeter around Pusan in the southeast,

and the retreat to the north, destroyed much of Korea and a great part of Seoul. Transport, bridges, communications, houses, and shops were destroyed on wholesale scale.

In the early years after the Korean war our aid had of necessity to be concentrated on the repair of the basic structure, as well as helping to feed and clothe the people. Of \$2 billion in economic aid, \$300 million went into railways, another \$700 million into power, communications, fertilizer, mining.

By 1960 the basic infrastructure had been restored, and some 200 new factories had been built.

But there was a missing element in Korea. There was no effective government. The government of Syngman Rhee seemed incapable of dealing with the massive problems of inflation, corruption, smuggling, tax evasion, or the black market. Many of the new factories remained idle because they lacked capital or competent management. Commercial exports totaled about \$30 million a year, and Korea relied on United States grants for 90 percent of its foreign exchange requirements.

Dissatisfaction with the Rhee government's ineffectiveness and authoritarian ways grew rapidly in the late fifties, and when that government resorted to a rigged election in 1960 to stay in power, the students and then the people moved into the streets in protest.

The next government—properly and fairly elected—seemed incapable of grasping the nettle of power and dealing with the basic ills. In May 1961 a military coup took power. It announced at the outset its determination to reform and modernize Korea and to restore constitutional processes and hold elections. It has made much progress on the first pledge and fulfilled the second pledge in the fall of 1963.

The transformation of Korea in the last 5 years has been astonishing. Korea, for the first time in many centuries, has a driving and effective government. It has made mistakes, and it has yet to resolve many prob-

lems, but the progress in every direction has been such that there is now hope and confidence in Korea's future.

Korea's Domestic Achievements

I want to describe some of the main achievements of the last 4 years:

—Serious inflation has been a plague in Korea, as elsewhere. Serious inflation undermines economic and political stability. The military government tried to do too much in too short a time, and the result was more inflation. In May 1964 Korea went through still another devaluation, but by then the leaders of Korea had learned a basic lesson. An austere credit and financial policy was instituted, and for the past 2 years price inflation has been held within reasonable bounds. The price increase last year was about 6½ percent.

—A sophisticated exchange rate system, with a floating exchange rate, is being operated with a great measure of success. Foreign exchange reserves, which were dangerously depleted, have been built back to a safe level.

—Vigorous campaigns against tax evasion and smuggling, which deprive the state of revenue, have been pressed. Tax collections are increasing.

—A sensible interest rate policy on time deposits has brought a flood of savings into the commercial banks and drastically reduced the scope of operations for the moneylenders.

—Most of the factories built with American loans are now functioning and many of them flourishing. New factories for fertilizer, cement, plywood, and pharmaceuticals are coming into production. In 1965 industrial production rose by 19 percent.

—Electric power production totaled 40,000 kilowatts when the Communists cut the transmission lines from North Korea in 1948. It has increased manyfold since that time and doubled since 1960 to nearly 800,000 kilowatts. Plans are in train to

raise it to 1½ million kilowatts in the next 4 years. Forty-five thousand rural households were tied into the power system last year. The target this year is an additional 60,000.

—Crop production has increased by 60 percent since 1960. Land reclamation and bench terracing have made astonishing progress. Arable land will be increased by about 20 percent by 1970, and the time is not far off when Korea will grow enough food for its own needs. At the same time reforestation is moving ahead, and energetic action is being taken against illegal timber cutting.

—Mining production has increased by 60 percent since 1960.

The progress made in economic growth and exports has put Korea well to the front compared with other less developed nations. The annual economic growth rate has averaged 8 percent in each of the last 3 years. Commercial exports rose from \$33 million in 1960 to \$180 million last year and are expected to approach \$270 million in 1966. In contrast with 1961 Korea now furnishes more than half of her foreign exchange requirements through her own efforts. Koreans themselves now speak of economic independence in 5 years.

With these achievements, our grant aid has come down from \$173 million in 1961 to \$70 million last year and will continue to fall. More and more of our help is taking the form of loans to build factories and industries, and development loans have risen from \$6.5 million in 1961 to about \$49 million in 1965. In keeping with this policy President Johnson, during the state visit last year of President Park Chung Hee, pledged to make \$150 million available in development loan funds.²

In still another important area there has been progress. Korea has a very high rate of population growth, 2.9 percent a year. In 1963 the Government for the first time made provision for family planning in its

² BULLETIN of June 14, 1965, p. 950.

budget and has each year increased its appropriations for clinics, advisory services, contraceptive devices, and publicity. The aim is to bring the population growth rate down to 1.5 percent by 1980, if not earlier.

Three years ago the Government, inspired by Dr. Paul Crane of the Presbyterian Medical Center in Chongju, at last began to deal with hookworm, a widespread and debilitating parasite that can easily be overcome by proper composting. The Ministries of Agriculture, Education, and Public Health are pressing this campaign, and Korea should be freed of this disease in a decade. It will have the most important physical and psychological effects in terms of energy and a sense of well-being.

Progress in Foreign Affairs

These are some of the main achievements on the domestic side. But there has been much progress in foreign affairs as well:

—Five years ago Korea had diplomatic relations with 15 countries. The number is now 78. A new and flourishing Foreign Service Institute, which the Asia Foundation helped finance, is now training Korean diplomats. It takes its place alongside a new Administrative Staff College, where civil servants are being trained in administration.

—Last December relations between Korea and Japan were normalized after 15 years of off-again, on-again negotiations. Under the terms of the settlement the troublesome controversy over fishing rights has been resolved. On the financial side, the long-standing claims problem has been settled through the Japanese agreement to provide \$300 million in grant assistance; \$200 million in long-term government-to-government loans; and \$300 million in commercial credits, for a total of \$800 million over 10 years.

—Korea has joined the just-organized Asian Development Bank with a subscription of \$30 million.

—In 1963 France and Italy provided a

large loan for the creation of a deep-sea fishing fleet, and Germany has provided credits for industrial development.

—Private foreign companies are beginning to look with interest on investment in Korea, and some have already begun to provide equity capital.

In June, at Korean initiative, there will be an Asian ministerial conference in Seoul, evidence of the growing interest in discussing Asian problems in a regional context and of Korea's growing stature in the international community.

The most notable demonstration of Korea's willingness and ability to play a role in international affairs was the decision taken last year in response to a request from the Government of South Viet-Nam for combat troops: 21,000 were sent, and a further decision was taken this year to send an additional 22,000. Even before these historic decisions, Korea had provided a 130-man military hospital unit and karate instructors to South Viet-Nam.

These actions were a reflection of Korea's deep sense of obligation to those who had come to her assistance in her hour of need, of her willingness to take part in collective action against Communist aggression, and of her recognition that there will be no peace or stability in Asia unless Communist aggression is checked. Few Koreans have not been seared in one way or another by the Communists, and the Korean response to South Viet-Nam's call comes from burning personal memories of what communism means.

Emergence of Effective Government

In the political realm, the Korean constitution and election laws have come to grips with what has been a persistent problem in Korean political life—the multiplication of political parties and the tendency toward division. Three principles were incorporated in the political system in the 1963 elections to produce greater cohesion and discipline:

1. No candidate may run for the national

legislature as an independent. Each must be a member of a political party.

2. If an elected member of the legislature resigns from his party, he forfeits his seat. This has restrained individual resignations and shifts.

3. However, if a party expels a member, he does not lose his seat. This imposes a discipline on the party.

These were purely Korean institutional inventions, and they have produced more stability and discipline in political party life than Korea has ever known.

I do not want to leave you with the impression that all problems have been solved or are on the way to solution in Korea. There is still too much unemployment and underemployment. The need for housing is very great. Agriculture is still at the mercy of the weather, and there is need for more irrigation. The decision to restore elections for local government has yet to be made. The standard of living is rising, but it is still low for too many families. (I would point out here that North Korean defectors who come to South Korea are astonished at the high standard compared with the North.)

What we are seeing in Korea in these last few years is the emergence of effective government—something which Korea has not known for many generations—a government with the capacity to make plans and develop programs and carry them out. Literate, energetic, and hard-working people can do much for themselves, but it takes effective, forward-looking government to produce an environment that encourages rapid progress, offers hope for the future, and liberates the creative energies of the people for constructive purposes.

Many Koreans have contributed to this achievement—men from the armed forces and from civilian life, working together to convert Korea into a modern nation. Among

them the man who stands out is President Park Chung Hee, who led the military coup in 1961 and then in 1963 fulfilled his pledge to hold elections. He is providing purposeful, courageous, and imaginative leadership to a long-suffering people, bringing organization and direction to bear on the problems of Korea. And the results are promising. The foundations of economic and political stability and growth are being laid.

I can best describe what is happening by telling the story of a visit I made to a small village of about a hundred families. The Korean Government has been making a valiant effort in the rural areas to introduce new concepts and ways of doing things. This village was being taught to work together, to develop diversified crops, to plant fruit trees, to re-lay paddy fields for more efficient cultivation, to use commercial fertilizer and better seed, to raise rabbits, pigs, chickens, and mushrooms. A young man from the village, who had been a junior officer in the armed forces, was elected village chief. He had plans and programs, charts and records, and enthusiasm. And the village was responding.

I asked an old gentleman what he thought of all the changes which were taking place, and I shall never forget his answer: "I cannot understand why we have been sleeping so long."

That phrase eloquently sums up the great changes now going on in Korea. There is a growing faith in the ability of Koreans to solve their problems. There is a growing excitement that Korea is now on the way to a new and more hopeful life. There is a growing confidence in the future.

By the strange workings of history we have played a part in that awakening, and we will continue to play a part—by supporting the Koreans in their defense and by supporting their efforts to build a new modern society in Korea.

A Call for Release of American Prisoners Held by Communist China

by William P. Bundy

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am deeply honored this evening to be able to participate in this testimonial dinner to Bishop James E. Walsh. Bishop Walsh was 75 years old a week ago today. Thirty-seven of those years he has spent in China, during a period when the Chinese people have endured virtually unceasing struggle, revolution, and war.

Bishop Walsh arrived in China while the warlords were still vying for power and pillaging China for their personal profit. He was there before the Chinese Communist Party was founded and was a witness to the years during which the Republic of China waged its desperate battle against an internal enemy in the form of the Communist insurgency and the external Japanese invader.

After the Communists seized power on the mainland, they effectively halted all the work of the Catholic Church. Bishop Walsh could well have left any time during these early years. The Communists, recognizing the symbol that he represented for many Chinese Catholics, repeatedly attempted to persuade the Bishop to abandon his post. But Bishop Walsh insisted that his duty lay with his parishioners, whom he was unwilling to desert.

Finally the Chinese Communists arrested the Bishop, and, after 2 years of interrogation, he was sentenced in March 1960 to 20

years' imprisonment on the palpably unjustified charges of "espionage and subversion."

Bishop Walsh has been in prison now for 6 years, displaying personal courage and faith in God and man. His behavior has been an inspiration to all of us. The Chinese Communists have been repeatedly approached not only by the United States Government but by other governments and private individuals with pleas and requests that Bishop Walsh be allowed to go free. I regret that so far Peking has coldly rebuffed these approaches, as well as parallel efforts made on behalf of the four other Americans it holds prisoner on similar charges.²

The United States Government deeply regrets that despite the agreement³ reached between ourselves and Peking in 1955 for the exchange of citizens who wished to return home—including those in prison—there are still Americans held in Chinese prisons. The United States has repeatedly offered to facilitate the return to Communist China of any Chinese in the U.S.—including convicted criminals in prison—who wishes to leave. We will continue this policy, and we will continue to press Peking to carry out the 1955 agreement. Until it does, we have no alternative but to exercise patience and mobilize our vigilance. For nothing is eternal

¹ Address made at the Bishop James E. Walsh testimonial dinner at Baltimore, Md., on May 7 (press release 106).

² The four other American prisoners are: John Thomas Downey, Richard Fecteau, H. F. Redmond, and Capt. Philip Smith, USAF.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

about the policies and attitudes of any country, including Communist China.

Doctrine of World Revolution

Today we find the Chinese Communists dedicated to a fanatical and bellicose doctrine of world revolution, committed to bring China onto the world stage as a great power. Communist Chinese ambitions envisage not merely the restoration of influence in the neighboring areas of Asia but ultimately Communist totalitarian regimes throughout the area. In pursuing its objectives Peking has not refrained from the use of force, although recently it has drawn back when a major conflict appeared likely.

More critical than any direct and overt use of force has been the Chinese Communist encouragement, training, financing, and equipping of revolutionaries and insurrectionaries in a whole series of countries under the slogan of supporting "wars of national liberation." They have followed this course in Africa, Latin America, and in Asia. The fact that their efforts have failed more often than they have succeeded and that Peking has increasingly isolated itself in the world by these policies is no reason for indifference or complacency.

Although the war in Viet-Nam is basically a North Vietnamese ambition and operation, the Chinese Communists, in their propaganda, in their direct material support for North Viet-Nam, and in their fervent opposition to any efforts at a peaceful settlement, have attempted to make Communist success in Viet-Nam the key to the victory of the "Mao Tse-tung road to revolution." As we assist the South Vietnamese to preserve their right to determine their own future without external interference, we at the same time act to prevent the success of the expansionist designs of Communist China.

It is in the vital interest of the free nations of Asia themselves and of all those who value peace and self-determination in the area to resist Peking's attempts to impose its system and influence on its neigh-

bors. The United States would welcome the opportunity to live at peace with all countries in Asia. We have repeatedly indicated to Peking, both by word and by caution in our actions, that we want no war with the Chinese Communists. But we shall never be expelled by force from this area. Nor shall we desist for one moment from our efforts to assist in every useful way—economic, social, and political, as well as military—the free nations of Asia to work out their own destinies without having an alien system imposed on them by force.

Hostility Toward United States

The Chinese Communist hostility toward the United States, which has lain at the core of their foreign policy for 17 years, now rests on two beliefs: that the U.S. is, in Marxist terms, the "enemy of all the people in the world" and consequently of the Chinese Communist authorities, who today consider themselves the ideological preceptors of "all the people of the world"; and that the U.S., in terms of Chinese Communist national interests, is blocking the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia. These attitudes and ambitions are held tenaciously by the present leaders of Communist China. They seem unable to understand that independent nations in Asia and Africa are unwilling to adopt the "Chinese" model or succumb to Chinese Communist influence. They have not yet realized the true implications of the series of major setbacks for Peking's foreign policy over the last year.

The present leaders in Peking fear that their heirs will not pursue zealously the goals of Chinese communism. They are worried that the tedium of daily life and the cynicism about the soundness of the regime's policies, which have increasingly become apparent on the mainland in recent years, will ultimately cause a significant shift in the policies of a new generation of leaders.

Bishop Walsh once wrote that "future events are uncertain and it is best always to wait until they actually occur—the only time we can be sure—especially in China."

I am in full agreement with this wise maxim, and I would be the last to predict quick changes in Communist China. We can be under no illusions that, for the present, Peking is anything but hostile toward the United States or wishes us anything but ill. Nor can we expect that major concessions to Chinese Communist demands for power and influence at the present time will reap anything but further and more insistent demands. Our opposition to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations is based not merely on the impossible conditions it has stated for its participation in the United Nations but on the basic conflict between its policies and actions and the purposes of the U.N. Charter as well as the obligations of constructive participation in U.N. deliberations.

Channels of Communication With Peking

Nevertheless we must continue to keep firmly in our minds the need to work toward a time when the historic ties of friendship between ourselves and the people of mainland China can be restored, when Americans and Chinese can freely travel between each other's countries, when trade and cultural relations can develop, and when China is willing to live at peace with the United States, its neighbors, and other countries of the world.

We have ourselves taken a series of unilateral steps which offer Peking the opportunity to escape from its present isolation and to live at peace with the world. We have gradually expanded the categories of American citizens who may travel to Communist China and indicated our willingness to permit American academic institutions to invite Chinese Communist scholars and scientists to visit their campuses. We have in the past indicated that, if the Communist Chinese were interested in purchasing grain, we would consider such sales. We have agreed to allow Chinese Communist newspapermen to come to the United States and have allowed Chinese Communist publications to be purchased freely by American libraries.

Peking has given only negative reactions to our offers; indeed, it has made it abundantly clear that it will not accept them. But we do want to keep open channels of contact and communication for a time when the Chinese Communists may be more willing to respond. This, in part, is the reason for our desire to maintain our direct diplomatic contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and for our expressed willingness to sit down and discuss the critical problems of disarmament with Peking.

We remain absolutely firm in our determination to defend our allies, including the Republic of China on Taiwan, from the use of force, direct or indirect, against their territory by Peking, to preserve the position of the Republic of China in the U.N., and to assist those countries of Asia that seek our help to strengthen their political, economic, and social foundations. Our effort to join with the free nations of Asia in containing and preventing the expansion of Communist China is not only a struggle against aggression and subversion in the Western Pacific but part and parcel of our continuing efforts to achieve a world order in which all nations can enjoy peace and well-being without fear of domination by others.

But we have made it abundantly clear that we do not intend to attack Communist China, that we do not want war, and, as Secretary Rusk said recently,⁴ that we do not believe either in the "fatal inevitability of war with Communist China" or "the existence of an unending and inevitable state of hostility between ourselves and the rulers of mainland China."

There are many ways in which Peking could at some point indicate that it recognizes our sincerity in seeking peace. The freeing of Bishop Walsh and the other four American citizens now held in Communist China to return to their families and friends, for instance, would be most gratifying to all Americans and would be regarded as evidence of Peking's desire for friendlier rela-

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 2, 1966, p. 686.

tions with the American people. I know that all of you join with me in hoping that at some point the leaders in Peking will see more clearly that the best interests of the mainland Chinese lie in pursuing peace and a course of friendship and amity with all countries and peoples.

Communist China Conducts Third Nuclear Test

*Department Statement*¹

Nearly a year has passed since Communist China exploded its second nuclear device. The third test occurred today [May 9] in Sinkiang and comes as no surprise. As you know, a Department of State spokesman noted on April 28 that such a test should be expected soon.

Today's test was an atmospheric test, with a yield in the same general range as previous Chinese tests. Further evaluation must await collection and analyses of the debris in the atmosphere.

This test, of course, is part of the deliberate and costly Chinese Communist program to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The United States Government continues to deplore the disregard of the Chinese Communist leaders for the desires and well-being of people throughout the world who may suffer from the ill effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, which most of the world has banned by adherence to the limited test ban treaty.²

The United States reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia and the assurances given by President Johnson on October 18, 1964,³ of our strong support to nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons if they need our support against any threat of nuclear blackmail.

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on May 9.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

State, Justice Improve Procedures on Visas for Conference Guests

The Departments of State and Justice have agreed on improved administrative machinery to expedite granting visas to guests of international conferences held in the United States, it was announced on May 3 (Department of State press release 104).

The change in procedure is in accord with the wishes of the President. On February 2, he called on the Secretary of State and the Attorney General "to explore ways to remove unnecessary hindrances in granting visas to guests invited from abroad" to attend international conferences.

At present almost all persons invited from non-Communist countries are allowed to attend international conferences held in the United States. However, those who are or have at any time been members of a Communist or Communist-front organization are first denied visas and then subjected to delays of up to 6 weeks while the Departments of State and Justice process an application for an individual waiver of the provision of law excluding all past or present Communists. The delays and embarrassment involved in obtaining permission to enter the United States for even 5 days under the present procedure have caused some guests to abandon plans to attend conferences, have made the United States a less attractive location for international conferences, and have marred this country's image as a free and open society.

Under the new procedure, upon receipt of the description of a proposed international conference, the Secretary of State may recommend to the Attorney General that the national interest requires a group waiver of the provision of law which would otherwise automatically exclude all persons invited to the conference who had at any time been associated with a Communist party. If the Attorney General grants a group waiver, our embassies and consulates abroad will then be able to issue a visa promptly to any invitee who is otherwise eligible.

Visas will, of course, continue to be denied

in any individual case in which there is reason to believe that a particular invitee's visit to the United States would be contrary to our national interest, or might endanger the national security, or might be inconsistent with existing international agreements.

Additional Foreign Passports Valid Beyond Expiration Date

SUDAN AND VIET NAM¹

Validity of Foreign Passports

Sudan and Viet Nam are added to the list of countries which have entered into agreements with the Government of the United States whereby their passports are recognized as valid for the return of the bearer to the country of the foreign issuing authority for a period of at least six months beyond the expiration date specified in the passport.

This notice amends Public Notice 238 of November 17, 1964 (29 F.R. 16097).²

PHILIP B. HEYMANN,
*Acting Administrator, Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs.*

APRIL 27, 1966.

¹ Public Notice 244; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 6794.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 890.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29, 1965; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1966.

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29, 1965; Luxembourg, October 3, 1963; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881).

Ratifications deposited: Finland, December 17, 1965; Mali, December 18, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1405 PUBLICATION 8086 MAY 30, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 9–15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 9 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 104 of May 3 and 106 of May 7.

No.	Date	Subject
107	5/11	Rusk: East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966.
†108	5/12	ITU seminar on earth-station technology (rewrite).
*109	5/13	Personnel assignments in research and analysis of Vietnamese and Chinese affairs.
†110	5/13	Warsaw Convention: announcement of U.S. withdrawal of denunciation.
†111	5/14	Warsaw Convention: text of U.S. note.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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May 23, 1966

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President Marks Poland's National Millennium; Calls for Wider East-West Contacts

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ¹

Senator Muskie, members of the Cabinet, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests and friends: Senator Muskie, I enjoyed hearing so much what you had to say, and I am deeply honored by this gesture of the Polish-American Committee.

I am well aware of the historical significance of this beautiful work of art. For hundreds of years the Black Madonna has brought strength to the brave citizens of Poland. It has been a symbol both of greatness and of hope. As much as I treasure the gift, I feel that others will treasure it with me. So I am asking Archbishop Krol to put it on permanent display at the Catholic Church in Panna Maria, Texas, the first Polish church in the United States.

I accept it with great gratitude and with much pleasure because, I might add incidentally—and it hasn't always been incidentally—those who attend that church and I have always had something in common every election year.

I accept it with this pledge that so long as I am allowed to serve as your President, I will never cease to work for closer ties,

for closer friendship, and for closer cooperation between the United States of America and Poland.

Today as we meet here at the 1,000th anniversary of Polish Christianity and nationhood, it is also the 175th anniversary of a document that holds a place of honor among the noble statements of human rights, the Polish Constitution of 1791.

All men who revere liberty acknowledge their indebtedness to those landmarks in the struggle for individual freedom.

That is why I have asked you to come here to the Rose Garden today.

Life has never been easy for the people of Poland. Time and again she has endured the unwelcome intrusion of her larger and her more powerful neighbors. Time and again she has endured suffering and sacrifice, only to recover and to rebuild. In all of this her proud and resourceful people left an indelible mark on Western civilization.

We, in America, owe a very special debt to Poland, for almost two centuries ago her sons joined our own Revolution and Polish patriots fought under the American flag.

Nor can we forget the millions of Polish immigrants whose personal faith and whose tenacious labor helped to tame this continent. Our national heritage is rich with the gifts of Polish people.

Our debt and our long ties with the peo-

¹ Made in the White House Rose Garden on May 3 (White House press release; as-delivered text). Senator Edmund S. Muskie, on behalf of Americans of Polish descent, presented to President Johnson a replica of the Polish Black Madonna, a symbol of Polish independence and patriotism.

ple of Poland give us a very special interest in their problems and in their future.

Twice in this century Poland has been devastated by war, yet her people have remained loyal to the ancient faith and to the human values that it represents. Even as we meet today, they are meeting by the hundreds of thousands at the historic monastery of Jasna Gora. Led by a great Polish Cardinal, they are offering prayers of hope and thanksgiving which reflect their enduring belief in God and in their national destiny.

In Poland, and in other countries in Eastern Europe, new ideas are winning friends. Windows are opening to the world—only slightly in many places, but they are opening.

And despite the severe limitations on its national freedom, limitations that prevent many Polish-Americans from celebrating this day on Polish soil, the ancient spirit of Poland is not dead. Her people still yearn for a lively future in Europe and among the community of nations.

We see this, for one thing, in economic policy.

Poland, and some of her neighbors in Eastern Europe, are sensing the vigor of individual enterprise. Men are coming to understand that decentralized decisionmaking is proving more efficient than highly centralized state control.

Profits are coming to be understood as a better measure of productivity and personal incentive as a better spur to effective action on behalf of the national economy.

How hopeful these signs are, we cannot yet say.

I will be meeting with our distinguished Ambassador very shortly, and we will be reviewing all the problems and concerns in that part of the world. There is no greater American today, no one performing a more valuable service than our own distinguished Ambassador John Gronouski, who is returning home.

We can only trust that they foreshadow a new reliance upon, if not a new understanding of, the individual as the most important element of society.

If they reflect the willingness to respond to reality, if they signal a readiness to sift ideas for their own worth rather than to dismiss them as politically impure, if they reflect a gradual rebirth of reason and open discourse among men, then seeds exist for genuine confidence that things, indeed, may yet change.

For this reason, it is not vain, on this day of great memories, for us to also think of great dreams and to speak of great hopes.

Hopes for the Future of Europe

Chief among them is the future of Europe.

So vast are the resources of that continent, so important its policies to the rest of the world, so vital its prosperity to the entire world economy that Americans ignore the future of Europe only at the expense of peace and progress on both continents.

Men and nations must labor long to bring to reality a Europe free of artificial political barriers that block the free movement of people, of ideas, and of commerce; a Europe that is secured by international inspected arms control arrangements that remove the age-old fears of East and West alike; a Europe of interdependent friends in which the strength of each adds to the strength of all; a Europe in which the people of every nation know again the responsibilities and the rewards of free political choices.

Not because we have treasure to gain or territory that we desire to acquire but because we have common roots and common interest, the United States of America today seeks to help build that kind of Europe.

It was in that spirit that the Marshall Plan was offered 19 years ago, and it is still the spirit of American policy.

Our guiding principles are these:

First, our alliance with Western Europe, we believe, is in the common interest of all who seek peace. It is a charter for changing needs and not a relic of past requirements.

It was and it continues to be a basis for

security, solidarity, and advance in Europe. It remains our conviction that an integrated Atlantic defense is the first necessity and not the last result of the building of unity in Western Europe, for expanding partnership across the Atlantic, and for reconciling differences with the East.

As we revise the structure of NATO to meet today's realities, we must make sure that these forward-looking purposes are served and are served well.

Second, we believe that the drive for unity in Western Europe is not only desirable but necessary. Every lesson of the past and every prospect for the future argue that the nations of Western Europe can only fulfill their proper role in the world community, if increasingly they act together. From this base of collaboration, fruitful ties to the East can best be built.

Third, we will encourage every constructive enrichment of the human, cultural, and commercial ties between Eastern Europe and the West.

Fourth, we will continue to seek ways to improve relations between the people of Germany and their fellow Europeans to the East and to move toward a peaceful settlement of the division of Germany on the principle of self-determination.

Fifth, we welcome growing participation by the nations of Eastern Europe in common efforts to accelerate economic growth in the developing areas of the world and to share in the worldwide war on poverty, hunger, and disease among the peoples of the world.

Bridging the Gulf Between East and West

It was almost 2 years ago at the George Marshall Memorial Library in nearby Lexington, Virginia, when I said that we must continue to build bridges across the gulf which has separated us from Eastern Europe.² Since that time, we have taken limited steps forward along what will no doubt be a very long road.

In Poland alone, we have dedicated an

American-financed children's research hospital in Krakow; increased support for CARE, Church World Services, and American Relief for Poland in their food and medical programs for hospitals and needy individuals. We have reached an understanding between our National Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Science on an important exchange program similar to the ones that we have reached with Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

We have invited Poland to cooperate in our satellite program.

We have increased by 44 percent in the second half of 1965 the number of Polish visitors who come to the United States for academic, scientific, and technical purposes. We have increased by more than \$200,000 the sale in Poland of American books, newspapers, plays, motion pictures, and television programs. Our international media guarantee program with Poland is the largest in the world.

These have all been taken under the direction of one of our greatest Americans, as I mentioned a few moments ago, who will report back to the President and the Cabinet in the next few days, John Gronouski.

These are all small steps. But, as Cicero once said, "The beginnings of all things are small." From these, we will take other steps to help revive the intellectual, commercial, and cultural currents which once crisscrossed Europe, from London to Budapest, from Warsaw to Paris, from Frankfurt to Krakow, from Prague to Brussels.

As one additional step, and as I pledged in my state of the Union message,³ I am today instructing the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, to send to the Congress legislation making it possible to expand trade between the United States of America and Eastern Europe. The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period of time, can influence Eastern European societies to develop along paths that are favorable to world peace.

After years of careful study, the time has now come for us to act, and act we should and act we must.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1964, p. 922.

³ For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

With these steps, we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust, and a community of effort. Thus will the tide of human hope rise again.

It is a good occasion that has brought us together here today.

In issuing this proclamation, I am asking all of the American people to join in the observance of historic events which have inspired man's long walk on this earth.

May we draw new resolve, even now, from the Polish Millennium and Constitution Day.

PROCLAMATION 3720⁴

COMMEMORATION OF POLAND'S NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN MILLENNIUM

May 3 marks an important anniversary for freedom-loving people the world over. It was on this date, 175 years ago, that the patriots of Poland adopted a Constitution that stirred the hopes of the Polish people.

But this year, May 3 takes on a significance that is truly unique. It marks the 1000th anniversary of Polish Christianity and Polish nationhood.

Ten centuries ago today, Poland became a part of the community of Western nations. Ten centuries ago today, Poland entered the mainstream of Western thought and Western culture.

It was this tradition that gave birth to the Polish Constitution of 1791. The Christian expression of the dignity of man found its ultimate expression in the cause of freedom and national independence.

It was no accident that this great political document came into being just four years after the American Constitution—or that the two were so similar in content and spirit. The same spark of freedom that flared into the American Revolution also burned in the hearts of the Polish people. Our Revolution

was theirs, and to these shores, to help in our struggle, came two great champions of liberty: Tadeusz Kosciuszko and Kazimierz Pulaski.

The rest is history: a triumph for America—for the most part tragedy for Poland. Today, after nearly two centuries of struggle, of invasion, of foreign domination, of partition—and always of bravery—love for national independence and for the basic rights of man still lies deep in the hearts of the Polish people.


The spark of freedom has never been extinguished.

And through it all, the historic ties between our two great nations have remained as a symbol of friendship and hope. Today, on this anniversary, we reaffirm that friendship and pledge ourselves to that hope.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim this day, May 3, 1966, as Poland's National and Christian Millennium Day on which we spiritually unite ourselves with the people of Poland and those gathered today at Jasna Gora and wherever they might be observing this historical event. I invite the American people to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities and particularly to join with Americans of Polish heritage in their continued celebrations throughout this memorable year, both in America and in Poland.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this third day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

⁴ 31 *Fed. Reg.* 6679.

Peace and Justice Among Nations: The Agenda of the International Community

by *Arthur J. Goldberg*

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

It is a great source of satisfaction to me to have this opportunity once again to address the Economic Club of Detroit. At the United Nations I feel a closer link with Detroit than you might suppose. It is my job to speak at the U.N. for all the American people: management and labor, white and Negro, farmer and city dweller—a united America, bearing, as you know, a very heavy responsibility in the community of nations.

We could not bear that responsibility if our ideals and our purposes were not backed by the material might and engineering mastery of the great midwestern cities that I know so well, among them Detroit, Pittsburgh, and my native Chicago. It can truly be said that our country's voice in the councils of the world—and at the United Nations—is great because our universal principles of human freedom are wedded to the most brilliant technology and the mightiest industrial plant in human history.

I am conscious, too, of a more somber fact. With all our ideals, our good will, and our technical wizardry, we have yet to find the answer to one overriding problem: how to build a framework of peace in this changing, turbulent, very imperfect world. This goal of a secure peace is, I am con-

vinced, the deep desire of the American people. It has the highest priority of all the problems on the President's desk, and at the United Nations it is the purpose of my most concentrated efforts.

America's industrial might is of course militarily essential, but this is far from saying that its importance in world affairs is primarily military. It is not. I believe the far greater destiny of American industry is to serve the arts of peace, abroad as well as at home. Indeed it already does so in every continent of the world and can do so in still greater measure the more we can dissolve the barriers of misunderstanding and political conflict. No segment of American society has a greater stake than does American industry in the creation of a peaceful, reliable framework of law and order for the community of nations.

I may add that we who speak for the United States in the U.N. insist that this international framework must be made reliable not only for relations between governments but also for private enterprise. Last fall in the General Assembly's economic committee the opportunity arose for the United States to express its views on the role of private enterprise in international development.² Although our delega-

¹ Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit, Mich., on May 2, 1966 (U.S./U.N. press release 4845 dated Apr. 30).

² For a statement by U.S. Representative James Roosevelt in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Oct. 15, 1965, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1965, p. 798.

tion was already very ably represented on that committee, I thought the subject was important enough to warrant my speaking on it as head of the delegation.

In my statement³ I pointed out that the Assembly has been on record for years as holding that the sovereignty of nations over their own territory and resources does not impair the rights and duties of states under international law—nor does it diminish the importance of international cooperation in economic development, or of parties to agreements respecting such agreements.

I then went on to emphasize the sometimes neglected facts of life about the indispensable part that private enterprise plays in the development of nations. I pointed out that affiliates of American companies abroad produced over \$37 billion in goods in the year 1964 and that in the process they were a major source of wages, tax revenues, export earnings, import savings, and all-important technical and managerial skills which represent enormous benefits to the host countries. I pointed out that their earnings were about the same percentage of invested capital as in the United States and that a great part of these earnings were reinvested abroad. I ended by saying:

The United States has two hands available for cooperation with the developing countries. One is the hand of public assistance and public policy; the other is private enterprise. We want to help—and with both hands.

These propositions, of course, are as familiar to you as they are to me. But I can assure you they are not as well understood by some members of the United Nations as they are by the members of the Economic Club of Detroit. The United Nations is not a club of like-minded nations; it is more like a frontier where many different opinions and doctrines clash. And the fact that in our society we are accustomed to

free and open debate gives us something of an advantage at the U.N. over those who do not have the same tradition. Now and then we get a chance to change a few minds, and that is one of the reasons why I find my work exciting.

"Chronic" International Quarrels

Of course, it is because of this very inclusiveness that the United Nations progress toward peace often seems painfully slow. Among the U.N.'s 117 members are nearly all the major competing centers of power and doctrine in the world. And we have on our agenda, as a consequence, most of the world's difficult and dangerous international quarrels.

Some of these are "chronic" cases like the Korean and Israeli-Arab disputes, which came to the U.N. in the acute stage long ago and have yet to be finally settled. Another such case flared up again last fall: the long-smoldering dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Security Council was the main center of world diplomacy that brought about a cease-fire and a withdrawal of the very formidable armed forces that were engaged on both sides.

That Kashmir emergency—which, incidentally, was my own baptism of fire in the Security Council—was significant for several reasons. For one thing, it illustrates how very stubborn and slow to subside some international conflicts are. I used to think labor-management issues were stubborn, but at least strikes do come to an end and contracts are signed sooner or later. Some conflicts at the U.N., including Kashmir, have been on the books almost from its founding. There is no miracle that can end them quickly, any more than a doctor can cause a broken bone to knit overnight.

A second fact worth noting is that the Soviet Union joined with the rest of the Security Council in calling for a cease-fire and then invited the two sides to Tashkent to agree on the withdrawal of forces. The fact

³ For text, see U.S. delegation press release 4750 dated Dec. 14, 1965.

that Moscow, whatever its reasons, saw its interest in a step toward peace in South Asia running parallel to the interest of the community of nations, is something of a new development—and one which, without exaggerating its magnitude, we should certainly welcome. I wonder how many of us 10 years ago would have predicted that Russia, whose foreign policy had so long consisted largely of stirring up disputes in the outside world, would start extending its good offices to settle them.

Third and last, Kashmir illustrates the close connection that I mentioned between peace and economic progress. Nowhere is rapid economic development, especially in agriculture, more urgently needed than in the subcontinent of South Asia. American private enterprise, as many of you know, already plays a big part in this development effort and can do much more. One of the main dangers is that the limited energies and resources of Pakistan and India might again be diverted from this first-priority task into warlike channels. Thus what we are trying to achieve at the U.N. in war prevention is directly related to America's hope for the peaceful economic development of that very important and populous region of the world.

U.N. Action on Southern Rhodesia

Most recently our peace efforts at the U.N. have been focused on the crisis in Rhodesia, which Secretary-General U Thant the other day called "one of the most difficult and dangerous situations in which the United Nations has been asked to intervene in recent times."

The trouble has been long in the making, but it reached the crisis stage last November when the minority government broke away prematurely from Britain, the lawful sovereign, in order to set up a state founded on the rule of 220,000 whites over 4 million blacks. This was a highly dangerous step, taken in the face of the strong anticolonial "winds of change," to use the phrase of

former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, that have been blowing through Africa in the past decade.

We strongly supported the Security Council in its successive resolutions to bring this danger to an end, including the resolution of April 9⁴ authorizing Britain to intercept oil tankers attempting to break the U.N. embargo. The British, as you know, made use of this authority promptly and effectively.

This was a historic step for the United Nations and an entirely legal one. Article 39 of the charter gives the Security Council the duty to determine, among other things, when there is a threat to peace and the further duty of deciding what to do about it. Pursuant to this article the Council wisely and properly found that the imminent and flagrant arrival of tankers in defiance of the embargo and in support of the rebel regime constituted a provocation which was a threat to peace.

Some people disagree with this finding. But when 94 percent of the people of Rhodesia are denied their rights because of their race, when their aspirations are inextricably interwoven with those of the entire continent, and when this situation has aroused the strongest emotions on every side—such a situation cannot under the plain provisions of the U.N. Charter be dismissed as an internal matter. I don't think anybody conversant with Africa can deny for a moment the incendiary nature of this situation. Article 39 does not require the Security Council to hold its hand until the fire has broken into open flames.

Legally, then, the United Nations action on Rhodesia was justifiable. But a further question arises, not of law but of policy: namely, whether American support of the United Nations action, and indeed our vigorous stand on the whole Rhodesian question, serves the United States national interest. It is important to think out this

⁴ For background and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of May 2, 1966, p. 713.

question, because we have had plenty of criticism from both sides: those who would have the Rhodesian regime brought down at a single stroke and those who counsel a complete hands-off policy.

U.S. Stake in Rhodesian Crisis

What is the United States stake in this Rhodesian crisis? Why do we feel it so important to take a strong stand on it?

First, the basic issue in Rhodesia is a moral one: to restore the constitutional authority in order that all of the people of Rhodesia may be enabled to join in determining their national future. Our country, founded on the proposition that all men are created equal and currently engaged in a vigorous nationwide program to make that equality real for our own Negro citizens, cannot honorably adopt a double standard on what is happening in Rhodesia.

Second, our history also gives us a strong anticolonial tradition. This is the teaching of our own Revolution. In recent times we have supported decolonization and self-determination in the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and indeed throughout the world; and it is this same principle of self-determination which we are upholding in South Viet-Nam. We cannot stand aside and see these same principles turned into a mockery in Rhodesia.

Third, as a founder of the United Nations and a principal architect of the U.N. Charter, we have a special obligation to see that the charter's provisions concerning human rights and self-determination are upheld. These provisions are not merely exhortations; they are solemn treaty obligations.

Fourth, we have a practical interest in maintaining friendly relations with the newly independent countries of Africa, for whom this Rhodesian issue is of the highest importance.

Fifth and last, but not least, the success of a rebellion aimed at creating a new white minority state in southern Africa would inevitably harden the lines of politi-

cal conflict and would tend to stir interracial violence on that continent.

A failure to resolve the Rhodesian crisis with justice to the African majority would inevitably strengthen the hand of extremism, violence, and racism in the heart of Africa. Moderate African leaders, who have recently gained ground in several countries, might lose ground again. Such a prospect is not in the interest of African development and progress nor of world peace and security, nor is it in the interest of the United States.

For all these reasons the United States, in dealing with the Rhodesian question, intends to remain true to its best traditions—knowing that in so doing we also most effectively uphold our national interests. We shall continue to proceed step by step, weighing both the legality and the wisdom of each step as we go in the light of the situation and of the United Nations Charter.

Now we seem to be approaching a new round of talks between Britain and the Rhodesian authorities. We hope these discussions will bring closer a peaceful solution which will protect the rights of all the people of Rhodesia—indeed, no other kind of solution has a chance to endure.

The U.N. and Viet-Nam

Now let me comment briefly on the conflict in Viet-Nam.

Our pursuit of a just and honorable peace in Viet-Nam is just as energetic and unrelenting as our military effort to help South Viet-Nam repel aggression and infiltration. In that pursuit of peace we have taken repeated initiatives in the U.N. We have persuaded the Security Council to put the matter on its agenda and to help us explore all possible avenues toward a just peace.⁵ We have informed all the other 116 members of the U.N. of the 14 points in our peace proposals,⁶ including our will-

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

ingness to negotiate without preconditions or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962. Our position is firm in substance but flexible in method—and that flexibility contrasts clearly with the negative stand of Hanoi and Peking.

All these steps in the United Nations have been valuable to us in making our peaceful intentions clear to the governments and peoples of the world. The United Nations is thus an important world center of diplomatic communication which may yet help us find a settlement in Viet-Nam that is honorable and just.

But we should have no illusions about the limits on what the United Nations can be expected to undertake in the Vietnamese situation. In particular, we must candidly face the fact that the United Nations is not going to join, as it did in Korea, in the military defense of Viet-Nam against aggression. The Soviet Union has made clear that it will not repeat its famous blunder of 1950 when its boycott of the Security Council left the Council free to act in defense of South Korea. Moreover, many of the new members of the U.N., rightly or wrongly, are unwilling to take a position on a matter in dispute between the great powers.

Some people have asked the question: Why does the United States take a stand on Rhodesia when so many U.N. members seem unwilling to take a stand on Viet-Nam? I will say in candor that we would of course have welcomed United Nations support in Viet-Nam. But if we were to refuse to make use of the United Nations in cases where action is possible and is manifestly in the interest of the United States—as in Kashmir and in Rhodesia—simply because such action is not possible in another part of the world, I submit that such a course would be self-defeating. The United Nations cannot be expected to achieve all

its aims—no institution has ever done that. Let us use it for all it is worth and strengthen it whenever we can—not forgo its help because that help is less than we hoped.

It is my impression that most of us in America are long on idealism and short on patience. That may be partly a virtue, because we are used to getting things done faster than most other nations. But, as the old saying goes, “the impossible takes a little longer”—and the agenda of the international community has plenty of problems in the “impossible” category.

Let us therefore avoid the roller-coaster view of world affairs, plunging from highest hopes one day to deep despair the next. It is said that the Communists pride themselves on their long-term thinking and their patience and persistence. If they can be patient and persistent for their cause, how much more ought we to be for ours, which holds so much more promise for humanity!

In pursuing that cause I believe we have found, and will continue to find, incalculable value in the United Nations. But we should not look on it as a miracle worker or as some sort of international babysitter to free us from our responsibilities. Sir Winston Churchill once said the U.N. was designed “not to take us to heaven but to keep us from going to the other place.” I believe it is designed to do that and far more—if its loyal members, including ourselves, live up to the highest purposes of its charter.

It is an institution in which nations gradually learn, through painstaking efforts, to minimize their disputes and maximize the aims and interests they hold in common. There is no other or easier way to build the framework of peace and justice among nations which the American business community, the working man, and, indeed, Americans in all walks of life so earnestly and prayerfully desire.

"He is one of the most original thinkers that I know of," President Johnson said on March 31 when he announced that Mr. Rostow would come to the White House as his Special Assistant. "I shall look to him," the President added, "as a catalyst for ideas and programs on the various continents of the world." This article is based on an address Mr. Rostow made February 15 at Moravian College, Bethlehem, Pa., when he was Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council.

The Sharing of the Good Life

by W. W. Rostow

Among the many themes on which one might base a discussion of the impact of economic growth, there is one which was expressed with some elegance by Aristotle. He wrote:

It is plain that the state is not determined merely by community of place and by the exchange of mutual protection from harm and of good offices. These things must, indeed, exist, if there is to be a city, yet the existence of all of them does not at once constitute a state; there must be, both in households and families, a sharing of the good life, in a form at once complete and self-sufficient.

The sharing of the good life, I have concluded, is the most fundamental clue to a civilized society and to the quality of the environment in a regime of self-sustained growth.

But what is the good life? And what is sharing?

Evidently the good life is a relative notion, varying with a society's values and stage of development; and sharing itself is not a simple concept.

There are, in fact, three distinct meanings that can be attached to the notion of sharing in the life of a society: One is a material meaning, another is psychological, the third is political.

First, there is the sharing of the goods

and services which a society is capable of producing. Given the technology, natural resources, and capacity for organization of a society—and the material possibilities they generate—does the individual enjoy what he regards as fair access to the good life in this material sense? What are the criteria by which goods and services are distributed? Are these criteria themselves judged to be fair?

In the classic traditional societies the share granted each individual (or family) was generally controlled by two related rigidities: one technical, the other social.

Traditional societies developed within relatively static technological possibilities. Looked at closely, their economic history was not, in fact, as static as we sometimes suppose; but, nevertheless, there was a ceiling on technology. And this was instinctively and widely understood. Such societies were suffused with the notion that the life of the grandchildren was not likely to differ greatly from that of the grandparents. There would be good and bad harvest years, times of war and of plague, times of good and corrupt administration. Man had to make the most of the good times, suffer through the bad—occasionally reflecting his desperation

in the blind anguish of peasant revolts. But there was a kind of fatalism about the long-run prospects for material well-being, taking the society as a whole.

Within that framework there tended to develop in the more complex traditional societies fairly rigid social classes associated with fixed functions in the society, fixed duties, and relatively fixed levels of income. And these hierarchies of status and income were given a certain legitimacy—often an imputed divine legitimacy—by the character of the political system as a whole, whether it was a Middle Eastern empire, a Greek city-state, or a barony in medieval Western Europe. Whatever the particular form, these societies assumed that some were born to rule, others to serve—even in the ancient Greek democracies which assumed slavery as a requirement.

Once again, looked at closely, the systems of social status and income in traditional societies were not nearly as static as they sometimes appear in contemporary doctrines or modern textbooks. There was almost always one form or another of what we would call upward social mobility; that is, the opportunity for the relatively poor but capable person to move up to a higher level of power and income, whether through intellectual capacity, the church, military life, or commerce.

Nevertheless, there is truth in the classical view that traditional societies were pervaded, for the vast majority of the human beings involved, by a sense that social hierarchies were static and legitimate. It was within them that men struggled to do the best they could for themselves and their children.

Both the static horizons of welfare and the legitimacy of fixed social and material status were, of course, permanently violated by the Newtonian revolution and the industrial revolution which followed and was derived from it.

Starting slowly in a relatively small portion of the world in the 17th and 18th centuries, but spreading out now to embrace foreseeably every corner of the globe, are

two revolutionary assumptions: the assumption that man has the capacity to manipulate nature in such a way as to raise his own and his society's level of income and welfare and that it is legitimate as well as possible for man to envisage higher social status and income for his children than for himself, without depriving others of higher status and income.

These dynamic revolutionary assumptions have required a new concept of social legitimacy. It centers around the simple but powerful notion of equality of opportunity; namely, that all men deserve, within the law, an equal chance to develop their talents in ways which will permit them the highest level of income and the highest social stature which their capacities permit and their interests and tastes would entertain.

Standards of Aspiration

Societies which have been touched and moved by the scientific revolution and the related process of growth stand, of course, at different stages. The process of absorption of modern technology takes time. At any particular moment, the degree of absorption—the degree of modernization—will differ as among nations and even, regionally and sectorally, within nations.

But whether one is dealing with human beings fresh in from the tribal countryside on the edge of an expanding African coastal city, or the northeast of Brazil, or Watts, the power and reality of these standards of expectation and legitimacy can be perceived.

As this revolutionary standard of expectations spreads, how do men set their targets? How do they define feasible goals for themselves and their children?

On the whole, what is remarkable is the good sense of human beings in setting what might be called their operational standards of aspiration. I do not believe, for example, that the peoples in developing nations are mainly moved by an urgent desire to be as rich as Americans. Of course, moving pictures and the level of life of the wealthiest sector of the population have their effect. But, on balance, the citizens in developing

nations act as if they instinctively understood something of the stages of economic growth. They want a better life for themselves—in terms of the realistic opportunities of their own society at its existing and foreseeable level of development—and, especially, they want a better life for their children. Whether in relatively sophisticated Mexico or the mountain regions of Viet-Nam or among Negroes of the contemporary United States, that is why education exercises such attraction: Education is the indispensable foundation for the individual's economic and social forward movement in an environment of economic growth.

Sharing the good life in a material sense comes, then, to creating an environment in which men increasingly feel that material progress is the society's normal condition and that a reasonable opportunity for sharing that progress will be open to them and their children, within their inherent individual capacities.

Progress from where they stand, rather than a convulsive reaching for material standards beyond their foreseeable reach, is the critical aspect of this dimension of sharing the good life.

Psychological Problems of Development

But more is involved in the good life than an environment of shared material progress.

In all the circumstances of which we know, men have felt a need to be participants in the social fabric and institutions of their common life. They need to belong.

In traditional societies a sense of psychological participation derived from a known and stable role in the institutions of a structured social and cultural life: the family, the clan or tribe, the guild, the religious and other rituals of the community.

But, with the coming of growth, the problem of participation becomes more complex and acquires a new psychological dimension.

The introduction into a traditional society of enclaves of growth—for that is how it always begins—sets in motion a complex process at every level: political, social, economic, and psychological. Traditional in-

stitutions are strained, distorted, transformed, or supplanted as the imperatives of modernization assert themselves. Developing societies are, by definition, divided societies. And, indeed, as Lucian Pye dramatized in his study of contemporary Burma, men's minds are divided by the transition to modernization between the shaken, but still comforting, canons of the traditional past and the exciting but uncertain imperatives of modern life and organization.

The most fundamental problem in the contemporary world is not the gap between rich and poor nations; it is the gap between the rich and poor parts of developing nations.

That division is real, but in a dynamic transitional society it is not clean cut. In fact, some of the greatest problems arise among those who straddle, as it were, the two worlds, who are close to but not yet fully incorporated in the modernized part of the developing nation, or who are still mainly caught up in the relatively traditional part of a developing nation but are tempted, bedeviled, and frustrated by the presence around them of elements of modernization.

Some of the most difficult social and psychological problems of development arise, for example, in the slums of the great cities of developing nations; for, from 18th-century Manchester to 20th-century São Paulo, the cities have exercised a magnetic attraction. And in the countryside it is often not the wholly untouched regions which are uneasy: It is the rural areas where some elements of modernization have taken hold—where the roads and Coca Cola trucks and transistor radios have come through—but where these harbingers of modernization have not been matched by a solid and satisfactory modernization of the essentials of rural life.

There is a rich literature which describes the problems of social and psychological disorientation which can afflict those who are somewhere between the traditional and the modern life.

One of the most vivid examples is that of

a brilliant young African economist, D. K. Chisiza, who died in a tragic accident in 1962. In his classic little monograph *Africa—What Lies Ahead* he analyzes the reasons why Africans oscillate between urban jobs and their villages. He suggests six reasons: because they feel lonely in urban areas; because towns subject them to a sense of insecurity; because they have obligations to their people “back home” which can be filled only in person; because they find it difficult to adjust themselves to the mode of life of the urban areas; because a good many of them feel that one cannot bring up children properly in towns; because their goals are realized quickly.

Obviously what is lacking for such transitional people is a framework of modern institutions in which they can find a dignified and reasonably ordered place in an inherently dynamic life.

Writing about Latin America in the January 1966 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, George Lodge evoked well in a different setting what is involved in the transition from a traditional to a modern society. First, he quotes Bishop McGrath, the leader of a remarkable exercise in rural modernization in Panama:

Imagine the Church in the paternal framework, (writes Bishop McGrath) in which everything was in its place; God in Heaven, the King in Spain, the governor in the province, the patron on the farm, each farmhand in his house with his woman and children, and the priest who came and attended spiritually to the needs of the people.

And Lodge adds: “Except for the King in Spain this is still a true picture of life in many areas of Latin America.” But he then goes on to detail the types of new organizations emerging—or which must emerge—to make modernization a working reality: a modernized church, workers’ organizations, managerial organizations, rural cooperatives, and all the rest.

I shall have something more to say about the role of such institutions in creating a sense of belonging in a modern setting. But something even more basic than institutions is missing.

The more we examine the records of the

past and the experience of the present in the adjustment to modernity, the more it becomes clear that the critical moment is not when men begin to share the material benefits of modernization. The critical moment is when men feel that they have become active agents in fashioning their own destiny.

I have seen Andean villages where income per head could not have much exceeded \$75 a year but where, for the first time, their citizens had become engaged, with their own labor and at their own choice, in building a feeder road, a school, a church, or an irrigation ditch. Those people were, in a true sense, sharing a critical dimension of the good life. They knew that with their own hands and wills they were reshaping their own environment.

On the other hand, I have seen men at much higher levels of income, semiemployed, living in urban slums, trapped by a lack of training or the inadequate pace of industrialization, with no way of shaping their future other than to be mobilized from time to time by cynical politicians in some mass demonstration.

Closer to home, I know that many of my colleagues at work in our poverty program are convinced that the key to its success lies in creating a situation in which those we seek to help feel that at last they can take hold of their own destiny and move forward: The institutions designed to offer equality of opportunity in our highly dynamic society have failed to grip and support a significant margin of Americans.

As President Johnson said in his address at Howard University in June 1965:

In far too many ways American Negroes have been another nation: deprived of freedom. . . . Freedom is the right to share, share fully and equally, in American society—to vote, to hold a job, to enter a public place, to go to school. It is the right to be treated in every part of our national life as a person equal in dignity and promise to all others.

It was out of such insights throughout the hemisphere and on the world scene as a whole that the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, on which I have the privilege to serve as the United

States member, quoted in a letter to the Presidents of the American Republics the following passage from the encyclical letter of Pope John XXIII:

Special effort . . . must be made to see to it that workers in underdeveloped areas are conscious of playing a key role in the promotion of their personal socioeconomic and cultural betterment. For it is a mark of good citizenship to shoulder a major share of the burden connected with one's own development.

And, the CIAP letter added, this meant we must focus our policies of assistance in the Alliance for Progress not merely on building houses or other physical installations but that "we should seek out, stimulate and expand local institutions capable of carrying forward" enterprises in the fields of housing, rural modernization, education, and health.

It should not, of course, surprise us that this sense of fashioning one's own destiny should prove of critical significance in reconciling the imperatives of modernization with the canons of the good life. It is the essence of modernization, reaching back to the Newtonian revolution, that it is rooted in man's belief that his environment can be at least partially controlled, that he is no longer the passive or reactive victim of blind forces beyond his control. It follows directly that men will not feel modern—they will not be truly modern men—if they are simply granted by benign governments or other institutions some of the material benefits of a more abundant life.

The conclusions, then, to this second observation on the conditions for a good life are simple. They are two. First, man must feel he is participating personally in the transformation and modernization of his way of life. But, second, this means that an institutional framework must be provided within which he can exert these new possibilities—whether it is a farm cooperative, a village public works program, a self-help housing development in the slums, a building and loan association, a school, or a labor union.

In short, in an environment of growth, as in a traditional society, men must be-

long. Loneliness remains the greatest vulnerability of the human condition. But men must belong to institutions which are so designed as to permit them to be active agents in the modernization of their own lives.

The Political Dimension of Sharing

I turn now to the third dimension of sharing which the fact of growth poses for a society: its political dimension.

Politics is the exercise of power through government. Whether one considers an ancient Chinese dynasty or an advanced society in the contemporary world, governments must exercise power in three major directions:

1. To protect the society's territorial integrity or, more generally, to secure or advance the nation's interests in the international arena of power as those interests are defined by those who wield effective power.

2. To provide for the general welfare as welfare and the government's responsibility for welfare are generally defined within the society.

3. To preserve the constitutional order; that is, to maintain public order, orderly change, and legitimate succession by some enforceable balance between public constraint and individual freedom of action and expression of opinion.

The tasks of national security, the norms of welfare, the character and solidity of the constitutional order, and the balances struck between the maintenance of public order and the freedom of the citizenry have varied over the centuries in particular societies and among societies in particular periods.

But the heart of politics and of political debate lies in these three fundamental tasks, from ancient times down to the election issues of nations in the contemporary Atlantic world, from simple tribes to elaborate industrial societies, from advanced democracies to totalitarian dictatorships.

The issue here is: How shall the voice of the people be heard in deciding these fundamental questions? How shall the peo-

ple participate? How shall the people share in the benefits and responsibilities of government as growth transforms the political process?

The degree and character of popular participation in the political process in traditional societies have varied, of course, with their complexity and the cultures from which they arose. Some societies developed at the village or tribal level, for example, a local political life with quite widespread participation. But, as I suggested earlier, such societies tended to locate ultimate authority in a central figure to whom often a divine origin was imputed, which established the legitimacy required for a smooth and acceptable transfer of power.

Power, in fact, was exercised in such societies by many more than the king or emperor. Complex traditional societies developed elaborate bureaucratic structures; and, as we all know, significant experiments in political democracy conducted in Greece and Rome have left a permanent mark on our civilization. But those actively engaged in exercising power were, in traditional societies, almost always an exceedingly narrow group compared to the total population.

This did not mean that the views of the population at large were wholly irrelevant to the political process. Virtually all systems of government in the past and at present claim the consent of the governed; but the registering of consent in traditional societies tended to be, except at moments of mass upheaval, relatively passive, and mass upheaval occurred only when the narrow political elite lost its unity and grip on effective power.

In the classic dynastic cycle of China, for example, a dynasty's performance in offering the peasantry peace, land, reduced taxes, and public works was an accepted criterion of its health and legitimacy. But the discontent of the peasantry was not the active agent of its overthrow when it failed to perform. It was a new group of leaders, backed, perhaps, by the literate critics and administrators, who started the

regional revolts which yielded the new dynasty, mobilizing the people along the way to overthrow their predecessors.

With traditional societies, then, we start in a world of limited and essentially passive participation in the political process.

Consequences of Modernization

Modernization has three major consequences, all of which tend to force a widening of the active political arena.

First, the old political institutions, usually rooted in rural life, tend to be strained, diluted, or broken by the gathering power of the cities and the drive for participation and authority of those who gain wealth and stature in urban life, a drive backed by doctrines which explicitly challenge the stabilizing rules and beliefs of the traditional dispensation.

Second, by expanding the range of communications and raising the average level of education, modernization expands the circle of those technically capable of participating in the political process and determined to assert their prerogatives.

Third, the technical activities which go with modernization—industrial, commercial, agricultural, and administrative—bring new issues into political life which make more of the life of the society directly dependent on the decisions of government and which also focus the interests and attention of the new groups on government as the source of important advantages or constraints.

Taken together, these three inherent characteristics of modernization produce the kind of widened but unstable transitional politics which we can see, with many variations, in developing nations around the world; and it is not difficult to find parallel transitional stages in the political history of the presently more advanced industrial states.

One cannot too strongly emphasize the variety of political experiences through which nations have passed in the transition from traditional to modern politics. But there is one characteristic which is almost

universally shared, from the United States of the 1780's down to the contemporary developing world: that is, the problem of reconciling the rise of factionalism that accompanies enlarged participation in politics with the imperatives of orderly and effective government.

The concern with faction rooted in regional, economic, class, and other interests was the central anxiety of our Founding Fathers, reflected, for example, in the debates of the Philadelphia Convention, in Madison's *Federalist Paper No. 10*, and, indeed, in Washington's farewell address.

In the contemporary developing world a first approximation of what might be called participational politics also involves the grouping of men around regional, economic, religious, class, and other narrow interests. These often yield multiple, shallowly rooted, but highly assertive, parties. These tend to press—one in competition with the other—against an inherently overburdened and fragile central government, seeking advantage without assuming responsibility for an effective national policy.

It is this disorderly factional tendency which tends to create the conditions of chaos which open the way to military coups and dictatorships; for they prevent governments from performing acceptably the three abiding tasks of national authority, those of security, welfare, and the preservation of constitutional order.

Role of National Political Parties

There is, evidently, no single, simple formula for striking a proper balance between the inevitably widened participation that comes with the process of growth and effective government. But it is worth noting that one aspect of our own political experience may prove highly relevant to the resolution of this dilemma in the contemporary world; that is, the emergence of large national political parties.

It is a famous irony that the Founding Fathers greatly feared political parties. They believed parties would strengthen and perpetuate factionalism. But it was

the emergence of the Federalist and the Republican Parties in the first decades of our national life that, in fact, overcame factionalism to an important degree, and our two-party system has subsequently provided a major underpinning for the political stability we have enjoyed, except for the Civil War, for some 175 years.

Why should this be so? What functions do large parties perform?

The emergence of large national parties as voluntary, private institutions formally—at least, outside the formal constitutional process—forces men with different, narrow interests to negotiate with one another and to come to minimum compromise agreements as a condition for seeking the advantages of political office on a national level. They provide, therefore, an initial foundation on which an elected president can carry forward a national policy. And once in office, the existence of the party tie helps maintain a certain minimum discipline over the members of his party, since they have to face foreseeably an election together.

It is precisely these two functions—the negotiation of compromises on a national basis and the maintenance of minimum restraint and self-discipline in the face of national needs—which are most weakly performed in the transitional politics of contemporary developing nations. And it is interesting that some of the most stable developing nations are those which have created large, but not monopolistic, political parties. (I am not considering here the case of one-party systems, Communist or otherwise.)

Many factors deep in Indian history and culture, as well as in the experience of British rule, have shaped the contemporary political life of that nation; but I believe it is the existence of the Congress Party, now almost a century old, which explains more than any other single element the extraordinary *tour de force* of continued democratic politics in an impoverished continental nation of 450 million. Such national parties are also the key to the stability of Mexico in the past quarter century and to the rela-

tively hopeful evolution of Tunisia, Tanzania, and Korea.

What is involved here is a translation into politics of the same two principles required to create a sense of sharing in the modernization of the individual's social and economic life. As I have suggested, a sense of belonging for the individual involved institutions which both permitted participation in modernization and the assumption of some personal responsibility for the modernization of one's own life. In politics, what is required is the emergence of institutions which permit a sense of effective representation in the political process, but this demands also the assumption of responsibility by those institutions and ultimately by the citizen himself for the emergence of a viable national policy.

There are quite concrete and technical reasons in an environment of growth why participation requires responsibility as well as the right to press special interests. Government, even in the most free enterprise of societies, has played in the past and plays in the present a critical role in economic growth: in building the physical infrastructure for a modern society, notably transport facilities; in developing modern educational institutions; in maintaining the stability of the currency; in mounting policies that will insure a viable balance of payments; in generating the tax resources necessary for the conduct of modern government.

All these activities involve difficult choices: the setting of priorities in an environment of scarce resources. All legitimate demands cannot be immediately met. The politics of modernization is, therefore, inevitably a challenge to the wisdom, sense of community, and sense of responsibility of all who would share more widely in the political process. It is only when a sense of both responsibility and participation in the modernization process is widespread—from the cabinet minister to the private businessman, from the civil servant in a government office to the farmer, from the banker to the industrial worker—that the process

moves forward with its full potential and in tolerable balance.

For the fundamental fact about modernization is that it is a great national adventure. It is not a job for any one group. It is not carried forward successfully by unrestrained class struggle but by restraining compromises in terms of perceived larger national interests.

The art of politics in a growing society is, therefore, the art of suffusing simultaneously both a sense of participation and a sense of responsibility. It is a many-faceted art; but the emergence of large national political parties, large enough to embrace a majority but still required to compete in free elections, may be an important device for its successful practice in the world of contemporary developing nations.

These imperatives, as nearly as we can perceive, hold for all stages of growth. The balancing of liberty and order, freedom and responsibility, is as external and universal a problem as one can pose. The task of getting that effective consensus among industry, government, and labor required to bring Latin American inflation under control is not essentially different from the kind of subtle exercise we have had to conduct in our society at income levels 6 to 10 times higher in order to achieve and maintain the wage guidelines policy launched 5 years ago. That policy—the most basic protection of both our price level and our balance-of-payments position—requires, in fact, the attentive making (and remaking) of consensus in our national life at a most sensitive point.

Responsibility of the Individual

What, then, can we conclude about the quality of life in an environment of economic growth?

By adopting the attitudes and developing the techniques of modern science, man broke up the framework, the institutions, and the canons of traditional societies. He broke through the fatalistic ceilings and expectations about what life might offer; and, in this environment of unlimited

horizons of his own creation, he substituted the criteria of equality of opportunity (including universal suffrage) for fixed social and economic status, economic growth for fixed levels of welfare, and political participation for authoritarian government.

To share the good life in this new dynamic and egalitarian environment requires that man share not merely in the widened material possibilities that growth provides but that he share also the responsibility of unfolding those possibilities in his own time and place in a reasonably orderly sequence, while maintaining a political life capable of meeting the three inescapable functions of government. This in turn demands, as growth proceeds and new technologies are incorporated into the society, an endless creation and modification of institutions; for the complex and inherently specialized functions of a growing society cannot be carried out either by the institutions of the traditional society or by men acting alone.

But at the heart of the matter is the new role of the individual, the role of responsibility he assumed with the Newtonian revolution. In all its technological and industrial consequences, that revolution widened—and goes on widening—the range of possibilities for men to give effect to their talents. Man asserted his primacy over a physical world which over all previous centuries had limited narrowly the physical and intellectual possibilities of most human beings on earth. But he took on himself simultaneously the burden of endless inno-

vation and adaptation to innovation; and innovation is painful as well as creative.

President Kennedy used to recall often—it was perhaps his most fundamental judgment about life—the old Greek definition of happiness as the maximum exercise of a man's capacities against standards of excellence.

In ancient Greece, and in all premodern societies, that was a definition that could be relevant to the life of only a small minority. The vast majority were destined to struggle defensively for life itself against man's most primitive and persistent enemies—hunger, disease, and ignorance.

What growth has done is ultimately to make that exalted, burdensome, challenging definition of happiness accessible to all men; but it laid on man simultaneously the need to work through institutions with his fellow men—locally, nationally, regionally, and ultimately on a world basis.

The technology which underlies the process of growth has, thus, simultaneously lifted from man many traditional burdens, imposed on him the endless creative burdens of innovation and an environment of innovation, and challenged him as never before to learn to live at peace with his fellow men. President Johnson recently has noted that if man is not yet prepared to regard all his fellow men as brothers, he must, for his own safety, come to regard them as fellow citizens of a world community which modern weapons and modern means of communication have rendered smaller than our nations used to be, only a little while ago.

Your Stake in the Balance-of-Payments Problem

by Douglas MacArthur II

*Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations*¹

It is a great privilege and pleasure to participate in the annual convention of the Young Presidents. It is a privilege because the Young Presidents are known in many countries as a vigorous, progressive, and forward-looking group of young business leaders—leaders who are contributing substantially to an expansion of economic activity which should bring with it rising levels of well-being for many peoples. It is a pleasure to be here because it gives me the opportunity to see again many old friends from your distinguished group with whom I have had the good fortune to meet and discuss common problems in many different parts of the world since my first formal meeting with the YPO in Tokyo in 1958.

When I was invited to address this luncheon gathering it was suggested that I talk about "Your Stake in the Balance-of-Payments Problem" and how business, labor, and government can cooperate to expand our exports. This subject seems most appropriate, not only because of the unique contribution American business and industry can make through increased exports and restraint in investment abroad but also because of the stake every single American has in the successful solution of our balance-of-payments problem. And find a solution we must, for not only is our economic well-being involved but also our ability to meet

certain essential commitments on which our security and indeed our survival so heavily depend.

For we live in a turbulent, dangerous, and changing world in which, unhappily, there are certain nations which preach a militant doctrine of world revolution and are trying to impose their system on free peoples by threats, subversion, and the use of force.

How is this challenge to free societies to be met? How is peace to be maintained?

We and certain other nations have learned from sad experience in two world wars that nations do not survive the onslaught of a powerful aggressor nor is peace maintained just because people want it that way. We have learned the hard way that if aggression is to be deterred and peace maintained, the collective approach to security by free peoples holds the best chance of success. And so we have joined with about 40 other like-minded nations in collective security arrangements which involve the stationing of substantial numbers of our armed forces abroad. These vitally important arrangements for our own security are essential but necessarily involve considerable drain on our foreign exchange and hence contribute to our balance-of-payments problem.

But collective military security arrangements by themselves are not enough. Even if aggression is deterred, we and other industrially developed nations with high living standards also realize that we cannot exist as individual islands of prosperity and plenty in a world of hunger, poverty, misery, and

¹ Address made before the annual meeting of the Young Presidents Organization at Phoenix, Ariz., on Apr. 26 (press release 98).

disease—a world in which vacuums of chaos would soon be filled by aggressive and dangerous systems. Indeed, economic and military foreign aid is basic to U.S. security, for without it many countries would have been subverted or overrun.

And so we and a number of other developed countries have foreign aid programs to help lesser developed nations help themselves to stabilize their economies. For without economic stabilization and progress there can be little hope for political and social stability.

These economic aid programs by which we work to bring stability, peace, and progress to vitally important areas of the world are, like our contributions to collective defense, an integral part of our overall program to insure the security and well-being of our country, but they also necessarily involve a relatively modest but nonetheless additional foreign exchange increment.

Some people ask why, even with our necessary security and aid programs, we should have an adverse balance of payments when we have such a substantial surplus of exports over imports. The answer is that our deficit stems from our dollar outflows not only to meet our essential overseas defense and foreign aid commitments but also to pay for our steadily expanding imports, the travel abroad of U.S. citizens, and American investments and loans overseas. We unquestionably have our work cut out for us to close the adverse dollar gap, and the demands of the Viet-Nam conflict will not make the problem any easier.

And finally, in discussing the need to increase our exports, I think everyone agrees that the American economy has reached that state of development where increased exports are absolutely essential to the long-term growth and prosperity of our United States economy. Without it we will inevitably face economic stagnation and withering, with all the implications which that implies for our future prosperity and well-being.

How then do we expand our access to world markets? There is no quick answer,

no easy gimmick, for expanded exports depend not on any single factor but on the attitudes and actions of three principal sectors of our national life—Government, labor, and business and industry. And so I would like to outline my own personal views of the interrelated responsibilities and roles of American Government, labor, and industry in expanding our exports.

Government Aid to U.S. Exporters

The first responsibility of the United States Government in helping American business in foreign markets is to make it possible for our businessmen to do business. You can have the best product in the world, but if a country won't let it come in, you obviously have no market for that product—until the barrier is removed. So we in Government are working, with the help of our friends in business and industry, to remove or reduce the barriers to trade. They include both tariff and nontariff barriers.

Our greatest effort to lower or eliminate these barriers is being concentrated at Geneva in the so-called Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations. The recent European Common Market crisis regrettably delayed the negotiating schedule. However, we remain prudently hopeful that the negotiations will reach a successful conclusion that will result in both a substantial lowering of tariffs and an expansion of international trade.

In addition to this multilateral effort, we are constantly attempting to reduce barriers on a bilateral basis. But to do this effectively, we need your help. We need to pinpoint the problems. Therefore, American businessmen should present their trade and investment problems to us here at home or to our Foreign Service posts overseas as soon as they arise so that we can help. While we can't promise solutions to all of them, we have had considerable success in many instances.

I must frankly state that some years ago not all of our Government services always did as much as they perhaps could to help American business abroad. However, there

has been a great change in attitude and outlook in the last few years, and a series of steps have been taken to strengthen Government support for American business abroad.

There is a new and much-needed emphasis on assisting American businessmen. We are encouraging closer relationships between business and Government so that we can bring Government's views to the business community and business views more directly into the foreign economic policymaking process. By our knowing your views—and you ours—we feel we can better arrive at policies which will further our commercial interests. These views, incidentally, are important to us not only in our own intragovernmental discussions but also in our participation in the many international organizations which deal with matters affecting business. And these cover virtually everything including tariffs, nontariff discriminations, labeling, patents, and the movement of commercial samples from one country to another.

Your Government also assists American business in its promotional activities. We provide specific aids to the U.S. businessman in his effort to enter and stay competitive in foreign markets. For example, the Department of Commerce, utilizing information from the Foreign Service and other sources, offers a number of services to help you find overseas markets. These include a wide variety of overseas business reports, trade lists, and other reports to help you establish contact with agents.

There are also other facilities offered by your Government which exporters may find useful. One of these is our trade-fair program. In the last 6 months of 1965 alone the Commerce Department operated 12 full-scale exhibits abroad, and projected sales for the American firms that participated should run over \$40 million.

In addition, we have permanent U.S. trade centers in six major commercial cities overseas which reported sales of almost \$36 million for the last 6 months of 1965. The Government also helps maintain sales display centers in smaller markets abroad, in

which small manufactured items are exhibited on a rotating basis for the purpose of obtaining agents for American manufacturers.

Mobile trade fairs provide another technique where Government and business cooperate together to promote sales of U.S. products abroad. And for sometime we have also been sending or encouraging Government-sponsored or private trade missions to other countries.

The President and Secretary Rusk have personally given much time and thought to improve the backstopping that the State Department, our embassies, and Foreign Service give to American businessmen. I thought you might be interested in the following extract from one of Secretary Rusk's recent personal letters to our ambassadors abroad, dealing with our responsibility to give the American public the best possible service:

One especially significant aspect of this responsibility is our need to maintain a close and continuing relationship with the American business community. International business operations are essential to the achievement of our foreign policy goals. We want to bring U.S. foreign policy views and issues to the business community—encouraging support at home and abroad. We also want to bring business views more directly into the foreign economic policy-making process.

You are also well aware of the intensive commercial competition we face from other industrialized nations. Even with an over-all increase in our exports, there has been a gradual reduction in our share of foreign markets. Our trade surplus diminished this past year. We must do more to expand our exports. Fulfillment of some of our most critical international responsibilities will depend on this.

Responsibility of Labor

So much then for our Government's basic responsibilities to develop a sound national and international trade policy, to assist American business abroad, and to negotiate downward the tariff and nontariff barriers that hinder our exports. But even if trade barriers were negotiated down to zero, American goods would still not sell in world markets (1) unless they are competitive with

European, Japanese, and other foreign products in terms of price and quality, and (2) unless a truly imaginative and effective effort is made to sell our wares abroad. This is where the role and responsibility of American labor and business come into the picture.

Insofar as labor is concerned, it seems evident that, if we are to continue to sell our products, we cannot afford wage-price spirals that price our goods out of world markets. As industries in Europe and Japan merge or in other ways expand their production to supply the great world market, including the Common Market, their unit-production costs will fall, making price competition tougher than ever for us. Therefore, if we are to continue to sell our products at competitive prices, our wage increases will, in general, have to be absorbed by increased productivity rather than by higher prices.

And, of course, the entire increase in productivity cannot be devoted solely to wage increases. A fair share must be reserved to business and industry for both profit and research and plant modernization that are such essential elements in our ability to compete in world markets.

The workmanship that American labor puts into our fine products must, of course, continue to be of the highest caliber. For shoddy workmanship will result in either products that cannot compete quality-wise or in increased production costs because of too large a percentage of rejections by American industry's fine quality-control programs.

And both labor and business working together have an inescapable obligation and indeed a vital self-interest to put an end to the periodic strikes that tie up our ports and waterfronts and strangle our foreign trade. For each time our ports are struck we lose thousands of customers abroad—foreign customers who frankly tell us they will no longer go on depending on such an undependable source of supply as ours because they have their own contracts and deadlines to meet.

American Business Has a Key Role

Finally, what is the contribution that American business and industry can make to our balance-of-payments problem? The answer is, I think, that American business has a key role. For direct exports and American sales abroad will in large measure decide whether our long-term balance-of-payments problem can be brought into manageable proportions or whether more severe measures that we have hoped to avoid will be required.

Today the hard fact of life is that we are not doing as well with our exports as we can or we should. Although as a nation we are the world's largest exporter—and indeed our exports have been increasing—we are not holding our share of world exports. Last year, through September, our percentage share of world exports dropped as other countries' foreign sales expanded faster than our own.

To put it another way, U.S. firms generally now export a smaller proportion of the total percentage of their goods and services than producers in any other industrialized country in the world. And our failure to enlarge—indeed even to maintain—our share of world exports occurs at a time when there are greater opportunities to sell in foreign markets than ever before.

There has been a tremendous expansion of economic and industrial activity abroad, including Europe and Japan, accompanied by a very substantial increase in consumer spending—in some cases amounting to almost 50 percent in the last few years. The old basic wages and salaries in such countries often left little margin for much additional consumer spending after the three basic imperatives of life—food, shelter, and clothing—were met. Now, however, greatly increased consumer spending is going into a wide variety of consumer goods and gadgetry—goods that make life more pleasant, the home more attractive, leisure time more fun to spend; more and better clothing; and an improved diet with substantially higher protein content.

The overseas market for consumer goods

holds especially rich promise, particularly for a wide variety of items that are produced by medium- or small-sized American industries. Trained in a competitive, consumer-oriented economy at home, U.S. business is uniquely equipped to do more business in the growing consumer market abroad. However, to exploit this great new foreign market, American business will have to be much more imaginative and active. It will require American business to devote the same imagination, boldness, and skill to foreign markets that it does to our own great domestic common market of our 50 States.

We cannot—and must not—regard this great new foreign market as simply a place to get rid of surplus production for the American market. One of the keys to success in selling abroad is to offer what our foreign friends want and to present it in a way that appeals, rather than just trying to sell them what the American people want. We must pay greater attention to tailoring our products for the taste of our foreign consumers. And we must present them in ways that will increase their sales appeal, such as labeling them in the language of the country where they are to be sold.

And while you are exploring the potentialities of foreign markets, don't overlook the opportunities for peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern Europe. President Johnson last year asked a distinguished group of business, labor, and academic leaders to explore all aspects of expanding peaceful trade with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In its report to the President,² this committee expressed the belief that "peaceful trade in nonstrategic items can be an important instrument of national policy in our country's relations with individual Communist nations of Europe."

In his state of the Union message this year,³ the President said he would ask Congress "for authority to remove the special tariff restrictions which are a barrier to increasing trade" between our country and these countries of Eastern Europe. Bridges

of trade to Eastern Europe could influence the evolution of Eastern European Communist countries and encourage the movement toward greater national independence.

In sum, every American businessman, whether working for a large or small company, should understand that his own future and that of his company depends on a steady expansion of our exports. For exports bring profit to companies in addition to helping solve our balance-of-payments problem. The businessman who says he is not interested in the export market because his order book is full with American orders is blind. He does not realize that if we do not expand our exports, if we do not solve our balance-of-payments problem, our entire economy is threatened and he will not be spared when the time of accounting arrives. Even if there is not an immediate overseas market for his product, he nonetheless has the most vital interest in encouraging exports; he has the obligation to keep looking to see whether a market abroad can be found for his product.

Penetrating Foreign Markets

In closing, I would like to say a brief word about different ways to penetrate foreign markets. These include selling products abroad through import-export houses; establishing foreign sales branches with full-time personnel, warehouses, and service staffs; setting up manufacturing facilities abroad through an entirely U.S.-owned subsidiary branch or in partnership with local businessmen; or by licensing arrangements which provide a steady income from royalties with little capital outlay. Which method to choose must be carefully studied and selected on a case-by-case basis.

American industries operating abroad face many corporate and other complex local problems. They require not only the best corporate planning available but also the very best men they can get to live and work

² Text of the report, dated Apr. 29 and released by the White House on May 6, 1965, is scheduled to be reprinted in the BULLETIN of May 30, 1966.

³ For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

abroad. It is no longer sufficient for an American business representative abroad to have only mastery of his product or its production. He must be sensitive to the political, social, and psychological environment in which he is operating. He must be tactful as well as firm. He must understand that the method of approach and of doing business is often different abroad than in the United States.

To succeed today an American businessman abroad must be an understanding and respected member of the community in which he works, without losing his integrity as an American. He must be able to pass Dale Carnegie's course with a good mark.

American business also has a unique role in seeing to it that American products are competitive, quality-wise, in world markets. Your research and development programs are more important than ever because our principal industrial competitors—Western Europe and Japan—have a larger pool of technically and scientifically skilled talent that in the future will make an increasing contribution to industrial products and techniques.

In conclusion, let me say again that, while the balance-of-payments challenge we face is immense, I am not pessimistic. We will, of course, be up against much stronger industrial competition, particularly from our European and Japanese friends. However, I for one believe that competition brings advantages, not disadvantages. Certainly our country has grown strong as our industries have vied with each other in the keenest kind of competitive effort within our free enterprise system.

I am convinced that we have the capability of continuing not only to compete but to expand our share of world markets if there is the will and energy and if we all do our part. Therefore, let each of us—Government, labor, and business—face up to the challenge and attack our problems with the same resolution and the same imagination as our forebears who made this country the great country that it is today.

U.S. and China Amend Cotton Textile Agreement

Press release 97 dated April 26

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The amendment of the bilateral agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles of October 19, 1963,¹ between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of China was announced on April 26.

The amendment was accomplished by an exchange of notes between Assistant Secretary of State Anthony M. Solomon and Ambassador Chow Shu-Kai of the Republic of China.

The amendment provides for the following modifications applicable to trade during the last 2 years of the agreement beginning on October 1, 1965:

1. Certain adjustments in specific category ceilings.
2. Provision for 5 percent flexibility among certain categories, subject to the aggregate and applicable group limits of the agreement.
3. Establishment of joint ceilings for certain categories.
4. The notes effecting the amendment also include certain other technical revisions in the provisions of the agreement.

TEXT OF U. S. NOTE

APRIL 22, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Washington, D.C. between representatives of our two governments concerning the cotton textile agreement between our two governments effected by exchange of notes at Taipei on October 19, 1963, as amended. In accordance with these discussions, the Government of the United States of America understands that the agreement, as amended, shall, insofar as concerns the third and fourth agreement years, be revised retroactively to October 1, 1965, to read as follows:

(1) The Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports to the United States in all categories of cotton textiles for the third agreement year beginning October 1, 1965 to an aggregate limit of 58,432,500 square yards equivalent.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5482.

(2) Within this overall ceiling, the following group ceilings shall apply for the third agreement year:

- (a) Apparel categories
(Categories 39-63) 21,719,250 syds.
- (b) All other categories
(Categories 1-38 and 64) 36,713,250 syds.

(3) Within the applicable group ceilings the following specific ceilings shall apply for the third agreement year.

(a) Apparel categories

Categories	41-42	85,664 doz.
Category	44	16,538 doz.
"	45	9,923 doz.
"	46	248,063 doz.
"	47	27,563 doz.
"	50	134,505 doz.
"	51	216,090 doz.
"	52	137,813 doz.
"	53	11,025 doz.
"	54	23,153 doz.
"	57	110,250 doz.
"	59	27,563 doz.
"	60	20,837 doz.
"	62	25,900 lbs.
"	63	137,813 lbs.

(b) All other categories

Category	5	994,510 syds ^a
"	6	630,000 syds
"	9	18,742,500 syds
"	15	551,250 syds
"	18 & 19	1,033,594 syds
"	22 & 23	2,050,000 syds
"	24 & 25	2,000,000 syds
"	26	3,373,650 of which not more than 2,000,000 syds shall be in duck
"	28	937,125 pcs
"	30	1,653,750 pcs
"	32	246,500 doz.
"	34	111,750 pcs
"	35	74,350 pcs
"	64	130,400 lbs.

(4) During the third and fourth agreement years and within the applicable group ceilings, the specific ceilings specified in paragraph 3, other than those for duck and for categories 5, 6, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, and 60, may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent.

(5) Within the group ceilings for each group the

^a Except that exports in Category 5 may amount to 75 percent of the total amounts permitted to be exported in Categories 5 and 6 provided the total exports in these two categories do not exceed the total limits provided for these two categories. [Footnote in original.]

square yard equivalent of any shortfalls occurring in exports in the categories given specific ceilings may be used in any category not given a specific ceiling. In the event the Government of the Republic of China desires to export during the third agreement year more than 385,875 square yards equivalent in any category not given a specific ceiling, it shall request consultations with the Government of the United States on this question. The United States Government shall agree to enter into such consultations and, during the course thereof, shall provide the Government of the Republic of China with information on the condition of the United States market in the category in question. Until agreement is reached, the Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports in the category in question during the third agreement year at an annual level not in excess of 385,875 square yards equivalent.

(6) The limitations on exports established in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8 shall, for the fourth agreement year, be increased by five percent over the corresponding limitations for the preceding year.

(7) During the third and fourth agreement years, annual exports from the Republic of China to the United States shall be spaced as evenly as practicable, taking into account seasonal factors.

(8) The Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports of items made of corduroy in categories 46, 50 and 51, to a total annual ceiling of no more than 4,410,000 square yards for the third agreement year. In the event concentration in exports from the Republic of China to the United States of America of items of apparel made up of corduroy in categories other than 46, 50 and 51 or items of apparel made up of other cotton fabrics causes or threatens to cause market disruption in the United States, the Government of the United States may call for consultations with the Government of the Republic of China in order to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem. The Government of the Republic of China shall agree to enter into such consultation and, during the course thereof, the Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports of the items in question at an annual level of 105 percent of its exports during the twelve-month period immediately preceding the month in which consultations are requested.

(9) Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In particular, the Governments agree to exchange monthly data on exports and imports of cotton textiles from the Republic of China to the United States. In the implementation of this agreement, the system of categories and the factors for conversion into square yard equivalents set forth in the annex to the agreement of October 19, 1963, shall apply.

(10) During the term of this agreement, the United States Government shall not invoke the pro-

cedures of Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 to limit importation of cotton textiles from the Republic of China into the United States.

(11) The Governments agree to consult on any question arising in the implementation of this agreement. In particular, in the event that, because of a return to normalcy of market conditions in the United States, the Government of the United States relaxes measures it has taken under the Long-Term Arrangements for any of the categories, consultation may be requested by the Government of the Republic of China to remove or modify ceilings established for such categories by this agreement.

(12) If the Government of the Republic of China considers that as a result of limits and ceilings specified in this agreement the Republic of China is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the Government of the Republic of China may request consultations with the United States Government with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as a reasonable modification of this agreement.

(13) The various adjustments to the export limitations agreed to in the agreement of October 19, 1963 and subsequent amendments together with the adjustments agreed to as a result of the overshipment of certain cotton textiles during the second agreement year based on statistics available as of January 14, 1966, are combined as follows:

(a) The export limitations specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 6 as may be modified pursuant to paragraph 4 shall be reduced as follows:

	<i>3rd Agreement Year</i>	<i>4th Agreement Year</i>
5 (syds)	431,716	59,531
6 (syds)	630,000	6,935
9 (syds)	376,596	322,796
15 (syds)	11,039	9,462
18/19 (syds)	49,683	32,229
22/23 (syds)	31,669	27,146
26 (syds)	67,785	58,101
Duck (syds)	725,189	NONE
41/42 (doz)	2,800	1,300
43 (doz) ^a	1,400	700
45 (doz)	300	200
46 (doz)	44,464	1,200
50 (doz)	19,006	500
51 (doz)	200	100
54 (doz)	1,962	
60 (doz)	6,395	1,800
62 (lbs)	3,900	2,900
63 (lbs)	11,900	5,900
64 (syds) ⁴	91,300	45,700

(b) During the third agreement year only, up to 100,000 lbs. of sweatshirts may be exported, within the applicable group ceiling, in excess of the applicable limitation for category 62.

(14) In addition to the adjustments indicated in

paragraph 13, and based on the statistics available as of January 14, 1966, the Government of the United States of America charged against the levels of exports permitted under the agreement for the third agreement year the following quantities in the categories indicated:

Category	9	1,880,189 syds.
"	15	162,699 syds.
"	19	179 syds.
"	26 (excluding duck)	166,000 syds.
"	41/42	1,368 doz.
"	43	6,138 doz.
"	44	66 doz.
"	49	1,911 doz.
"	55	3,473 doz.
"	62	772 lbs.
"	63	34,089 lbs.

These amounts are attributable to exports before October 1, 1965 which were in excess of the levels permitted for the second agreement year. When the control of trade is shifted to an export control basis exercised by the Government of the Republic of China, the Government of the Republic of China need not count these quantities as exports during the third agreement year.

(15) The details of shifting the implementation of this agreement to an export control basis, including the timing of such a shift, and any additional adjustments in the export limitations which may accompany this shift will be the subject of mutually satisfactory administrative adjustments.

(16) This agreement shall continue in force through September 30, 1967; provided that either Government may propose revisions in the terms of the agreement no later than 90 days prior to the beginning of a new agreement year; and provided further that either Government may terminate this agreement effective at the beginning of a new agreement year by written notice to the other Government given at least 90 days prior to the beginning of such new agreement year.

I shall appreciate receiving your Excellency's confirmation of the above understanding. This note and your Excellency's note of confirmation on behalf of the Government of the Republic of China^a shall constitute, insofar as concerns the third and fourth agreement years, a revision of the agreement between our two governments.

Accept, your Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considerations.

ANTHONY M. SOLOMON

^a To be deducted from group ceiling for apparel. [Footnote in original.]

⁴ To be deducted from group ceiling for "all other categories." [Footnote in original.]

^a Not printed here.

Problems Resulting From the Internationalization of Business

*Statement by Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

It is a pleasure for me to appear here this morning and to participate in the first phase of the subcommittee hearings on international antitrust issues. In accordance with your wishes, I will not discuss antitrust problems as such but will review in a general way developments in international trade and foreign trade policy with the purpose of providing a framework within which antitrust issues can be examined.

Let me begin by stating briefly the main elements of our foreign trade policy. We believe in competition. We see it as a powerful spur to productivity, to research, development, and innovation, to the introduction and dissemination of new technology and new ideas. We believe accordingly that foreign, like domestic, trade should be conducted on a competitive basis, in a free and open world trading system with minimum restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and capital across national boundaries. We know from experience that the wider the area of trade freedom, the larger the possibilities for specialization and growth.

Consistent with this belief, we have directed our efforts in the postwar period to the progressive reduction of barriers to trade and payments; and we are now en-

gaged in negotiations for the most ambitious liberalization of international trade in history, the Kennedy Round. The Kennedy Round is the culmination of trade negotiations we began 30 years ago when economic growth was throttled by high trade barriers, high unemployment, and a restrictive international monetary system.

Our efforts in the postwar period have borne fruit. The response of world trade to the progressive reduction of barriers has been spectacular. Since 1948 its value has tripled, increasing faster than world income. The industrial countries have been the main beneficiaries. The growth in the trade of the low-income countries has unfortunately lagged.

I would like to note briefly certain innovations in the Kennedy Round and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962² that authorizes it. In the Kennedy Round we recognize the special problems of the less developed countries; the industrial countries will not ask for reciprocity from them inconsistent with their development needs. We recognize that the problem of injury to domestic producers from foreign competition should be met insofar as possible by helping domestic producers to become more competitive. The provisions in the Trade Expansion Act for trade adjustment assist-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Apr. 21 (press release 92).

² For a summary of the act, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 656.

ance in the event of injury are a significant new element in our foreign trade policy, and we would hope to see these provisions broadened and strengthened. Finally, we hope through the Kennedy Round to reduce non-tariff as well as tariff barriers to international trade. In short, our foreign trade policy is fully consistent with the objectives of our antitrust laws. These laws seek to prevent private restraints on our commerce. They are a logical corollary to our foreign trade policy, which seeks to reduce both governmental and private restraints on commerce.

Growth of Regional Trade Groupings

The question arises, however, whether our liberal trade policy, which had its origin in the thirties, is really appropriate to the world of the sixties or whether certain new developments call the policy into question. I refer to the growth of regional trade groupings not only in Europe but also throughout the developing world and Oceania.

In Central and South America, in various parts of Africa, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Asia, developing countries are moving toward special trade arrangements among themselves, including full or partial free-trade areas, customs unions, and common markets. The movement is slow and painful, but the direction is clear. Australia and New Zealand are contemplating special trade arrangements. In Western Europe, where the integration movement had its initial impetus, two major groupings have come into being: the Common Market of the Six³ and the European Free Trade Association comprising the so-called "Outer Seven."⁴

All these trade groupings are inherently discriminatory. That is, they provide for the dismantling of barriers to trade within

the grouping but maintain tariff barriers against third countries. How do we reconcile our policy of open nondiscriminatory trade with developments that appear to move in a contrary direction?

First, let me note that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the GATT, which establishes a code of conduct for international trade among its more than 60 members and which embodies the principle of equality of treatment, does, nevertheless, provide exceptions from this principle for customs unions and free-trade areas. The exceptions reflect the widespread view that the trade-creating effects of regional groupings offset the disadvantages to third countries of the commercial discrimination they suffer. In other words, a successful regional economic grouping would benefit the trade of nonmembers as well as members, although in different degree. Moreover, regional economic integration can have a politically unifying force of significance.

U.S. Attitude Toward EEC and EFTA

Our attitude toward these regional groupings reflects both economic and political considerations. As to Europe, political considerations are dominant in our thinking. Over the past 15 years, the United States has supported the concept of a united Western Europe as an integral part of our Atlantic and NATO policies. We believe that a united Europe is necessary for an Atlantic partnership in which the United States and Europe share common responsibilities as equals.

The European Common Market of the Six is the core and principal expression of the European unity movement. The crisis to which it was subjected in June of last year was surmounted in January. While it is too early to be certain, we believe that the idea of European integration which the Common Market symbolizes is too powerful to be abandoned. We have, of course, always recognized an element of trade discrimination inherent in the Common Market idea, but we have believed strongly that

³ The six members of the European Economic Community (the Common Market) are: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

⁴ Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

the political advantages of a united Europe, able to play a full and equal role in strengthening the free world and keeping it free, far outweighed the trade disadvantages to us.

The European Free Trade Association does not have the same ambitious goals of economic integration and political unity as the European Economic Community. We would hope that it would be possible for members of the European Free Trade Association in the years ahead to accept the goals of political unity and the full integration of their economies into the European Economic Community. One of EFTA's members, Austria, is currently engaged in negotiations that could result in close association with the European Economic Community. The possibility of British entry into the Common Market has been revived, and, should negotiations be resumed, other nations such as Ireland, Denmark, and Norway would almost surely follow.

We believe that the internal trade liberalization that has taken place within the EFTA can facilitate the entry of these countries into the EEC in due course and end the artificial separation among partners in the Atlantic alliance. For our part, we do not favor discriminatory trade blocs within the Atlantic community that are purely commercial in purpose and have no broader political goal. We would be opposed, therefore, to a merger of the EEC and EFTA having only a commercial character. We do believe that the participation of the United Kingdom and other European states in a fully integrated Western Europe is essential.

Problems of Developing Countries

Our attitude toward regional groupings among less developed countries is based on different and predominantly economic considerations. We believe that regional integration among neighboring less developed countries that are at roughly the same level of development can be a positive force for economic growth and stability. It can also be a force for political cohesion.

The developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia depend overwhelmingly on the export of raw materials for the earnings they need for development, and in each of these countries one or two commodities play a dominant role. This overdependence on commodity trade makes the developing countries peculiarly vulnerable. Their earnings are slow growing and subject to wide fluctuations, with destabilizing effects on their economies and their development efforts. The answer to their vulnerability is to diversify their agriculture and develop their industry. But industry, if it is to be efficient and not of the overprotected, hot-house variety, requires markets of economic size, large enough to permit the scale of operations and intraindustry specialization on which growth and efficiency depend.

The developing countries have tried to develop industry on a national basis, each country shielding its infant enterprises behind protective walls. The result, by and large, has been high-cost, inefficient industry with little growth potential. However, by joining together with their neighbors and dismantling the trade barriers among them, they can produce for a wider regional or subregional market. In the larger market their industry would not be limited as it is today to light consumer goods. They could move in time to more complex intermediate and capital goods. Shielded for a time by their outer tariff walls from the export competition of the advanced countries, enterprises would be exposed to more tolerable competition within the broader regional market and would reach a competitive position in international markets much earlier and much more effectively. And, not unimportantly, foreign investment would be stimulated to locate within the grouping.

We must recognize, of course, that competition is not the life style of many developing countries. We in the United States view regional integration of developing countries as a force for growth, not only because it permits economies of scale and specialization but equally because it would increase competition.

In a large market, there is room for many firms of economic size to produce the same product competitively. But in many low-income countries competition is not part of the ideology of the business community nor of government leaders, and integration is not regarded as an opportunity for competitive exploitation of larger markets. Planned complementarity is the objective—planning to avoid competition rather than to encourage it. This antipathy to competition reflects in part the desire to avoid creating redundant capacity on the simplistic view that competition is wasteful of capital, the scarcest resource in developing countries, and in part the need to insure that each country in the trade bloc gets its share of new enterprises.

We can hope that over time experience will lead to a better appreciation of the contribution of competition to economic growth, but we should not expect early results. We would also hope that the external barriers to shield the regional enterprises would be gradually reduced to expose these enterprises slowly but systematically to external competition. But here, too, we should not be sanguine of early results. Infant industries getting special protection do not like to grow up.

Corporate Mergers in Europe

In Western Europe there is growing business and also governmental interest in the creation of larger European firms. Mergers seem to be increasing considerably, including mergers with American firms. These developments reflect adjustment to the opportunities of the EEC-wide market as well as a feeling that larger European firms are needed to compete more effectively with American firms in world markets. While the EEC wants to facilitate the development of "European-sized" firms, it is also anxious to see mergers stop short of monopolization in the Common Market. The same desire for larger firms, and concern at the same time to prevent monopoly, are discernible in the United Kingdom Government.

I think it is fair to say that in Western Europe there has been increasing appreciation of the value of competition and recognition of the inhibiting effects of restrictive business practices on economic growth. Major pieces of legislation have been enacted in Europe in the past 15 years to curb private restraints on trade. Particularly important, the Treaty of Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community has very explicit antitrust features, as does the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Common Market. On balance, regionalism in Europe has called greater attention to the problem of private restraints and the desirability of associating the removal of government obstacles to trade with the removal of private restraints.

European Regionalism and U.S. Trade

It might be of interest at this point to consider what effect the trend toward regional groupings has had, and can be expected to have, on our export sales and investment flows. Because regional groupings among the developing countries are still in a formative stage in the main, an examination of sales and investment in these areas would not be especially revealing. We can, however, look at our experience in Western Europe.

Our export trade with the European Common Market has expanded even beyond our best expectations. The economic growth rate of the EEC has exceeded 5 percent a year since its inception, and United States sales to the EEC have more than doubled in the 7 years since its founding. By contrast, United States exports worldwide increased a little more than 50 percent in the same period. In 1965 United States sales to the EEC reached a new high of almost \$5 billion, exceeding by more than \$1.5 billion our imports from the Community. United States agricultural exports to the Community were about \$1.5 billion in 1965, an increase of 80 percent since the EEC was founded in 1958.

The upsurge of trade and business activity among the EFTA nations has benefited

us through a significant rise of United States exports to the seven members, averaging over 10 percent a year since 1959. However, in 1965 United States exports rose more slowly than imports from EFTA. This was probably attributable in large measure to the booming United States economy. It may be, however, that the discrimination against outside competition as the free-trade area nears completion is beginning to make itself felt.

While our exports have done well, it is in our interest and that of other trading nations to encourage the European Community to follow liberal, outward-looking trade policies so as to reduce to a minimum the discrimination inherent in European integration. Some of the EFTA countries find their chief markets in the EEC, and for them, too, it is a matter of primary importance that the EEC external tariff come down. The Kennedy Round can play a major role in this respect. It is primarily the power of the idea of European integration rather than the outer tariff wall that holds the Six together. We can hope, therefore, that these external barriers will be gradually reduced as world trade barriers are reduced.

Given the nature and proliferation of regional groupings today, it is by the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers that we can reduce the discrimination we would otherwise face. Thus, our liberal trade policy serves our commercial interests as well in the sixties as it has for the past three decades.

The development of regional trade blocs in Western Europe was a powerful incentive to the establishment of United States affiliates there. The book value of United States direct investments in the EEC rose from \$1.9 billion in 1958 to \$5.4 billion in 1964. In the other countries of Western Europe, the United Kingdom in particular, the book value of our direct investments rose from \$2.7 to \$6.7 billion in the same period.

The reasons for this major outflow of

capital and reinvestment of earnings in Europe are many, and research would be needed to assess the relative weights of the factors involved. Among the factors that influenced United States companies to establish affiliates to produce abroad rather than to export directly must certainly have been the desire to move inside the tariff walls. But other factors were doubtless operative, including importantly the booming growth rate in these Communities and the higher rates of return on manufacturing enterprises that prevailed in Europe at least through 1961. Let me note parenthetically that rates of return on manufacturing investments in Europe and the United States appear now to be quite similar and both have turned sharply upward. The desire to be close to the market so as to be able to respond more effectively to local tastes and specifications and the logistics of transport will no doubt continue to be major influences in the decision to locate abroad.

It would not be legitimate, therefore, to conclude that regional groupings as such, because of their stimulus to internal market growth and their outer tariff walls, are the sole factor or even the primary factor influencing direct investment flows. But they are doubtless an important element.

Multinational Corporations

In addition to these factors, I think we all realize that the requirements of economic efficiency are leading over time to firms of increasingly larger size, frequently with international connections. The world has shrunk, not only in political but also in economic terms. It is becoming more and more the case that few countries can support through their own markets alone the large-scale and technically advanced industrial units capable of meeting modern world competition. Both marketing and production internationally are increasingly necessary, and economic interdependence is growing correspondingly. Thus more and more United States firms are engaging in overseas operations, though the bulk of direct in-

vestment abroad is still accounted for by a limited number of United States companies.

American corporations today are "multinational" entities. This is the term of art that some are using to describe the growing internationalization of business. The multinational corporation looks to the world as its market, regards its funds as a pool for use anywhere in the world, exports to some countries, establishes affiliates in others, exports from its affiliates to yet other countries and back to the United States as well. The forward plans of these companies are global. It is no longer a question whether to locate in Illinois or in Kansas. Although American owned and based, the multinational United States company sees the world as its oyster.

As our firms and foreign firms do more and more business outside of their own borders, antitrust problems and policies that have purely domestic effects become fewer and fewer. Our firms are affected in their foreign operations not only by United States antitrust laws but also by the laws and procedures of the countries in which they locate. It becomes increasingly important to consider how these varying laws and procedures interact, what their effects are on the operations of our businessmen, and how effective they are in preventing restraints on commerce.

In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD, there is a Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices. This Committee is the successor to an earlier "Group" of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices created in 1953 as a "project" of the European Productivity Agency. The OECD Committee, with broader terms of reference than its predecessor, is considering, among other things, the question of restrictive business arrangements adversely affecting international trade—how serious the problem is and what methods of cooperation to deal with it may be appropriate. We hope it will become increasingly active and productive. As a result of the deliberations of

the OECD Committee, it may be possible for member countries to develop coordinated policies and procedures.

Your subcommittee has already contributed materially to public understanding of international developments and issues in the antitrust field. The hearings you are now initiating should be most helpful in increasing the ability of our Government to deal with the complex problems created by the increasing internationalization of business in the world today.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

Vietnam—Shipping Policy Review. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Part 1, February 8–March 10, 1966, 266 pp.; Part 2, March 16–30, 1966, 260 pp.

World War on Hunger. Hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture. February 14–18, 1966. 172 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I. March 16–24, 1966. 228 pp.

Atlantic Union Resolutions. Hearings before the International Organizations Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Con. Res. 64 and S. Res. 128, March 23–24, 1966. 210 pp.

Indian Food Problem. Message from the President. H. Doc. 417. March 30, 1966. 4 pp.

Safety of Life at Sea. Report on the *Yarmouth Castle* Disaster. House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H. Rept. 1445. April 20, 1966. 28 pp.

Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 13103. H. Rept. 1450. April 26, 1966. 179 pp.

Plugging the Dollar Drain: Cutting Federal Expenditures for Research and Related Activities Abroad. Twenty-Sixth Report by the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 1453. April 27, 1966. 23 pp.

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Report to accompany S. Res. 179. S. Rept. 1141. April 28, 1966. 3 pp.

The Use of Excess Property by the U.S. Foreign Aid Program in Latin America. Twenty-Eighth Report by the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 1466. April 29, 1966. 37 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms of Copper. Report to accompany H.R. 12676. H. Rept. 1472. May 4, 1966. 10 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.¹
Acceptance received: Tunisia, March 28, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Signatures: Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg,² Greece, Nigeria, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, United Kingdom, April 29, 1966.

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: Greece, April 29, 1966.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La Paz April 22, 1966. Entered into force April 22, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² Signature is given in the name of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

Congo (Leopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 19, 1965. Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville April 22 and 25, 1966. Entered into force April 25, 1966.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Djakarta April 18, 1966. Entered into force April 18, 1966.

Morocco

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Effected by exchange of notes April 21, 1966. Entered into force April 21, 1966.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 23, 1965. Effected by exchange of notes April 21, 1966. Entered into force April 21, 1966.

Paraguay

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Asunción April 27, 1966. Entered into force April 27, 1966.

Spain

Agreement relating to the loan of one helicopter carrier to Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid April 21, 1966. Entered into force April 21, 1966.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 17, 1965, as amended (TIAS 5767, 5908). Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis April 29, 1966. Entered into force April 29, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1404 PUBLICATION 8082 MAY 23, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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No.	Date	Subject
†104	5/3	Visa procedures for international conference participants.
†105	5/3	Harriman: IMCO Maritime Safety Committee.
†106	5/7	Bundy: Bishop James E. Walsh testimonial dinner, Baltimore, Md.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1405



May 30, 1966

WORLD TRADE

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BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

Mr. Chairman, I do have some observations to make on two points, if I may. They will be relatively brief and I think informal.

Toward the close of our last hearing on April 18, I believe you, Mr. Chairman, raised a question about the background of our policy in Southeast Asia. I referred to a policy conclusion on the part of the United States, beginning with the Truman administration, that the security of Southeast Asia was vital to the security of the United States, and that various actions taken by us, such as our economic and military assistance programs and the formation of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] treaty, were applications of that underlying policy.

I was myself in Government during the Truman administration and well recall the discussions which were held at the highest levels of Government in the National Security Council as well as the strategic problems considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the committee will search its own and the public records on this matter during that period and since, they could surely have no doubt that it was the judgment that the security of Southeast Asia was extremely important to the security interests of the United States. This was because of the more than 200 million people in Southeast Asia, the geography of that area, the important natural resources of the countries involved, the relationship of Southeast Asia to the total world situation, and the effect upon the prospects of a durable peace.

I emphasize the last point because the

overriding security interest of the United States is in organizing a stable peace. The sacrifices of World War II and the almost unimaginable losses of a world war III underline this central objective of American policy.

There was also involved the problem of the phenomenon of aggression. We had found ourselves in the catastrophe of World War II because aggressions in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe had demonstrated that the aggressor would not stop until compelled to do so. It was the determination of the United States to learn the lessons of that experience by moving in the U.N. and otherwise to try to build an enduring international peace.

This primary concern in peace and freedom was at the heart of President Truman's message to the Congress on March 12, 1947, in which he said:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

That was in connection with the Greek problem.

In recognizing the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1950, the State Department declared that "this recognition is consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and demo-

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 9.

cratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.”²

At the time of the attack by North Korea on South Korea in June 1950, President Truman stated:³

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance for the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

In January 1951, in connection with a visit by Prime Minister Plevén of France, their joint statement said:⁴

The President and the Prime Minister found themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their security and assure their independence.

Again, in April 1951 President Truman stated that:⁵

We believe . . . that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East and peace everywhere else.

This is the theme which, as a matter of general policy, has been central to the attitude of the United States in the postwar period insofar as Southeast Asia is concerned. It is reflected in many public declarations by Presidents and Secretaries of State and in the annual hearings before this and other committees of the Congress. You will find this theme in the report of your own committee and in declarations of members of your committee on the floor of the Senate.

In your committee’s report, for example, on the Mutual Security Act of 1952, your committee stated that “the U.S. military assistance for the past three years has been critically important to the continued survival of the Associated States as a nation free from Communist control. Continued assistance is essential if the Communist threat is

to be met successfully and eventually liquidated.”

Again, in 1953 your committee’s report stated:

The free world cannot afford to lose the war in Indochina. But so far neither has the free world been able to win it. It is of the utmost importance that the stalemate be ended. Pacification of the country must be the first objective of our policy.

The Geneva Accords

This underlying policy was given expression in a variety of ways. We strongly assisted the French and the non-Communist forces of the Associated States of Indochina with large economic and military assistance. Following the Geneva accords of 1954 you will recall that Under Secretary Bedell Smith, in speaking for the United States, said that the United States would refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb these accords, “in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force,” and, second, that it “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.”⁶

Again, following those Geneva accords, the Eisenhower administration negotiated and presented to the Senate the Southeast Asia treaty, in which is contained a very important provision, article 4, paragraph 1:⁷

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate (that means the protocol states), would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Aid to the states which emerged from Indochina and the Southeast Asia treaty

² For a Department statement of Feb. 7, 1950, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1950, p. 291.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 12, 1951, p. 243.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1951, p. 603.

⁶ For text of the U.S. declaration on Indochina of July 21, 1954, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 394.

itself were rooted in the underlying conviction that the freedom and safety of these countries in Southeast Asia were necessary to the organization of a reliable peace and other security interests of the United States.

In 1959 President Eisenhower in an address at Gettysburg College said:⁸

Strategically South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

It would not be correct to put the cart before the horse and say that economic and military assistance programs themselves carried with them undisclosed or unanticipated military commitments. We have given assistance to allies, but the commitment is in the alliance. We have given assistance to those with whom we are not allied, and we have not given assistance in some situations, which have resulted in situations such as, for example, Hungary and Tibet.

Congressional Support of U.S. Policy

The simple fact is that we considered throughout the postwar period that we have an important stake in the security and independence of the nations in Southeast Asia and we have given effect to that attitude through assistance programs and, in some cases, through alliance arrangements. There has been no mystery about these matters. They have been fully and exhaustively discussed with the leadership and the committees of Congress over the years, and the Congress has taken action to support that prevailing policy.

Apart from authorization and appropriations for specific needs, the Congress in August 1964 voted overwhelmingly for a resolution on Southeast Asia⁹ which stated that:

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

The resolution further stated that:

... the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

That resolution can be rescinded by concurrent resolution of the Congress not subject to the veto of the President. An attempt was made in the Senate during the present session of the Congress to rescind that resolution, but the effort was refused by the overwhelming majority of the Senate.

Legality of U.S. Efforts in South Viet-Nam

Very briefly, on the second question, Mr. Chairman, the matter was raised with respect to the legal issues surrounding our efforts in South Viet-Nam. We have made available to the committee an extensive legal memorandum on these matters,¹⁰ and the law officers of the Government are available to discuss this in whatever detail the committee may wish.

In this brief statement today I shall merely outline the essence of our view.

Military actions of the United States in support of South Viet-Nam, including air attacks on military targets in North Viet-Nam, are authorized under international law by the well-established right of collective self-defense against armed attack.

South Viet-Nam is the victim of armed attack from the North through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular combat units. This armed attack preceded our strikes at military targets in North Viet-Nam.

The fact that South Viet-Nam is not a member of the United Nations, because of the Soviet Union's veto, does not affect the lawfulness of collective self-defense of South

⁸ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1959, p. 579.

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 28, 1966, p. 474.

Viet-Nam. The United Nations Charter was not designed to, and does not, limit the right of self-defense to United Nations members.

Nor does South Viet-Nam's status under the Geneva accords of 1954, as one zone of a temporarily divided state, impair the lawfulness of the defense against attack from the other zone.

As in Germany and Korea, the demarcation line is established by an international agreement, and international law requires that it be respected by each zone. Moreover, South Viet-Nam has been recognized as an independent entity by more than 60 governments around the world and admitted to membership in a number of the specialized agencies of the U.N.

Nothing in the U.N. Charter purports to restrict the exercise of the right of collective self-defense to regional organizations such as the OAS [Organization of American States].

As required by the U.N. Charter, the United States has reported to the Security Council the actions it has taken in exercising the right of collective self-defense in Viet-Nam. It has indeed requested the Council to seek a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords, but the Council has not been able to act.¹¹

There is no requirement in international law for a declaration of war before the right of individual or collective self-defense can be exercised.

South Viet-Nam did not violate the Geneva accords of 1954 by refusing to engage in consultations with the North Vietnamese in 1955 with a view to holding general elections in 1956, as provided for in those accords. Even assuming that the election provisions were binding on South Viet-Nam, which did not agree to them, conditions in the North clearly made impossible the free expression of the national will contemplated by the accords. In these circumstances, at least, South Viet-Nam was justified in declining to par-

ticipate in planning for a nationwide election.

The introduction of U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet-Nam is not a violation of the accords. Until late 1961 U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet-Nam were restricted to replacements for French military personnel and equipment in 1954. Such replacement was expressly permitted by the accords.

North Viet-Nam, however, had from the beginning violated the accords by leaving forces and supplies in the South and using its zone for aggression against the South. In response to mounting armed infiltration from the North, the United States, beginning in late 1961, substantially increased its contribution to the South's defense. This was fully justified by the established principle of international law that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles another party at least to withhold compliance with a related provision.

The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression: In the SEATO treaty—which I have already mentioned and which is similar in form to our defense commitments to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of China—and even earlier in the Geneva conference we had declared that we would regard a renewal of Communist aggression in Viet-Nam with “grave concern.”

Since 1954 three Presidents have reaffirmed our commitments to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

Finally, the President of the United States has full authority to commit U.S. forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, with responsibilities as well for the conduct of foreign relations. However, it is not necessary to rely upon the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority. The SEATO treaty, which forms part of the law of the

¹¹ For text of U.S. statements, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

land, sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet-Nam against armed attack, and the Congress, in a joint resolution of August 1964 and in authorization and appropriation acts in support of the military effort in Viet-Nam, has given its approval and support to the President's action.

The Constitution does not require a declaration of war for U.S. actions in Viet-Nam taken by the President and approved by the Congress. A long line of precedents, beginning with the undeclared war with France in 1798-1800 and including actions in Korea and Lebanon, supports the use of U.S. armed forces abroad in the absence of a congressional declaration of war.

Mr. Chairman, these were two questions on which comments have come up before, and I am sure the committee will pursue them.

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems

Following is the text of President Johnson's remarks to news correspondents at the conclusion of the National Security Council meeting on Viet-Nam on May 10.

We are delighted to welcome back one of our most dedicated public servants and one of our most valuable counselors, Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

Earlier this afternoon he reported to me privately in some detail about the events in his area of the world and his evaluation of the situation there.

He brought back information that we do not always get from the written cable. I had a very profitable visit with him. We had a thorough exchange of viewpoints.

I asked him to join me in the Cabinet Room and make available to my other counselors here his impressions and judgments and conclusions, as well as a general review.

This is the first time that he has been back in almost 9 months. He will be here through the week. He will spend some time with Mr. Komer and Mr. Rostow [Robert

Komer and W. W. Rostow, Special Assistants to the President] and some time with the various people at the table. They will divide into various groups.

This afternoon we had an agenda that included a rather full report from General Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] on the military situation in Viet-Nam. We had a discussion of the political and economic situation, the issues as he sees them—a general report from Ambassador Lodge.

He was followed by a discussion led by Secretary Rusk on the key political issues, at the conclusion of which Secretary McNamara supplemented some of General Wheeler's statements on the military situation there and the issues involved on his part.

I reviewed with them some of my views on Viet-Nam from the day I took over the Presidency: on education, health, agriculture; the economy of South Viet-Nam; my Baltimore speech;¹ the Honolulu conference;² our desire to get the Government of South Viet-Nam, General Westmoreland [Gen. William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Commander in Viet-Nam], and others to cooperate with Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Porter [William J. Porter, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam] in the efforts that we were making in this field.

We not only have military problems here, as everyone knows, but we have political problems and economic problems.

I have asked one of my most trusted and able advisers, Mr. Komer, to take command of this operation and head the post here, with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and others, in an attempt to make this economic and political program effective.

Mr. Komer discussed, at some length, the key economic issues there. We reviewed generally the effects of the Honolulu conference; Secretary Freeman's visit with 15

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

of the outstanding people from our universities and our colleges, who made a thorough study; and Secretary Gardner's report.

Mr. Komer will arrange to have certain task forces meeting throughout the week while Ambassador Lodge is here.

That is the essence of what took place this afternoon. I have explained to these wise men, all of whom I rely on for advice, to supply me with all the information and knowledge they had.

I have it now and I have passed as much of it on to you as I could.

The Obligations of Power

Following is the foreign policy portion of an address made by President Johnson at the dedication of Woodrow Wilson Hall, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., on May 11 (White House press release; advance text).

As we enter the final third of this century, we are engaged once again with the question of whether democracy can do the job.

Many fears of former years no longer seem so relevant. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court shows signs of becoming rubber stamps to the Executive. Moreover the Executive shows no symptoms of callous indifference to the ills we must cure if we are to preserve our vitality. State and local governments are more alive and more involved than 30 years ago. And our nation's private enterprise has grown many times over in size and vitality.

The issue for this generation is a different kind. It has to do with the obligations of power in the world for a society that strives, despite its worst flaws, to be just and humane. Like almost every issue we face, this is one in which scholars and public officials alike have an irrevocable stake.

Abroad we can best measure America's involvement, whatever our successes and failures, by a simple proposition: Not one single country where we have helped mount a major effort to resist aggression—from France to Greece to Korea to Viet-Nam—today has a government servile to outside interests.

There is a reason for this which I believe goes to the very heart of our society: The exercise of power in this century has meant for the United States not arrogance but agony. We have used our power not willingly and recklessly but reluctantly and with restraint.

Unlike nations in the past with vast power at their disposal, the United States has not sought to crush the autonomy of her neighbors. We have not been driven by blind militarism down courses of devastating aggression. Nor have we followed the ancient and conceited philosophy of the "noble lie" that some men are by nature meant to be slaves to others.

As I look upon America this morning from the platform of one of her great universities, I see, instead, a nation whose might is not her master but her servant. I see a nation conscious of lessons so recently learned:

- that security and aggression, as well as peace and war, must be the concerns of her foreign policy;

- that a great power influences the world just as surely when it withdraws its strength as when it exercises it;

- that aggression must be deterred where possible and met early when undertaken;

- that the application of military force, when it becomes necessary, must be for limited purposes and tightly controlled.

Surely it is not a paranoid vision of America's place in the world to recognize that freedom is still indivisible—still has adversaries whose challenge must be answered.

Today, of course, that challenge is sternest in Southeast Asia. Yet there, as else-

where, our great power is tempered by great restraint. What nation has announced such limited objectives or such willingness to remove its military presence once those objectives are achieved? What nation has spent the lives of its sons and vast sums of its fortune to provide the people of a small, striving nation the chance to elect a course we might not ourselves choose?

The aims for which we struggle are aims which, in the ordinary course of affairs, men of the intellectual world applaud and serve: the principle of choice over coercion, the defense of the weak against the strong and aggressive, the right of a young and frail nation to develop free from the interference of her neighbors, the ability of a people—however inexperienced, however different, however diverse—to fashion a society consistent with their own traditions and values and aspirations.

These are all at stake in that conflict. It is the consequences of the cost of their abandonment that men of learning must examine dispassionately. For to wear the scholar's gown is to assume an obligation to seek truth without prejudice and without cliché, even when the results of the search are at variance with one's own opinions.

That is all we expect of those who are troubled, even as we are, by the obligations of power the United States did not seek but from which she cannot escape.

Twenty-six years ago Archibald MacLeish asked of all scholars and writers and students of his generation what history would say of those who failed to oppose the forces of disorder at loose in Europe.

We must ask of this generation the same question concerning Asia.

MacLeish reminded that generation of the answer given by Leonardo when Michelangelo indicted him for indifference to the misfortunes of the Florentines. "Indeed," said Leonardo, "indeed, the study of beauty has occupied my whole heart."

Other studies, no matter how important, must not distract the man of learning from the misfortunes of freedom in Southeast Asia.

While men may talk of the "search for peace" and the "pursuit of peace," we know that peace is not something to be discovered suddenly, not a thing to be caught and contained. Peace must be built, step by painful, patient step. And the building will take the best work of the world's best men and women.

It will take men whose cause is not the cause of one nation but of all nations, men whose enemies are not other men but the historic foes of mankind. I hope that many of you will serve in this public service for the world.

Woodrow Wilson knew that learning is essential to the leadership our world so desperately needs. Before he came to Princeton, he attended a small college in North Carolina and went to classes every day beneath a portal which bore the Latin inscription: "Let learning be cherished where liberty has arisen."

Today this motto which served a President must serve all mankind. Where liberty has arisen, learning must be cherished—or liberty itself becomes a fragile thing.

We dedicate this building not only to the man, not only to the Nation's service, but to learning in the service of mankind. There can be no higher mission.

World Trade Week, 1966

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

Expansion of world trade is the principal objective of the liberal foreign trade policies our Nation has followed for more than thirty years.

This two-way trade between the United States and other nations has resulted in many benefits for our country:

—It has advanced the peaceful progress of our Nation and the well-being of all Americans by strengthening the growth of private enterprise and employment.

—It has provided the American businessman with increased opportunities to export more United States products and services.

—It has given the American consumer a wider choice of products at competitive prices.

—It has promoted the cause of peace by broadening the scope of our cooperation with other nations.

—It has been of great importance in helping the developing nations modernize their economies.

Much remains to be done if we are to achieve a balanced international economy where all nations, developed and developing, can share the fruits of freer trade:


—We must continue to work diligently this year to bring the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations to a timely conclusion in a manner that assures the realization of the hopes and expectations with which this great effort at trade liberalization was launched.

—We must intensify our efforts to reduce the United States balance-of-payments deficit and reach our goal of equilibrium in our international accounts.

Progress towards accomplishing these objectives is the aim of World Trade Week.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 22, 1966, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, professional, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities



ties designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 29th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetyeth.

By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3719; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 6607.

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966

Press release 107 dated May 11

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary Rusk on May 11 transmitted to the Congress proposed legislation to provide the President with the authority necessary to negotiate commercial agreements with the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe to increase United States trade in peaceful goods with these countries.

The proposed East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 was sent with identical letters from the Secretary to Speaker of the House John W. McCormack and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate.

Secretary Rusk's action today was taken pursuant to instructions of President Johnson on May 3.¹ At that time, the President recalled that he had promised in his state of the Union message to request the proposed authority. The President added:

The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period of time, can influence Eastern European societies to develop along paths that are favorable to world peace.

After years of careful study, the time has now come for us to act, and act we should and act we must.

With these steps, we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust, and a community of effort. Thus will the tide of human hope rise again.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ²

MAY 11, 1966

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: At the direction of the President, I am sending to the Congress proposed legislation to provide the President with the authority necessary to negotiate commercial agreements with the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern

Europe to widen our trade in peaceful goods, when such agreements will serve the interests of the United States.

This authority is needed so that we may grasp opportunities that are opening up to us in our relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is needed, at a time when we are opposing Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, in order to carry forward the balanced strategy for peace which, under four Presidents, our country has been pursuing toward the Communist nations. It is needed to play our part with the NATO nations in reducing tensions and establishing normal and lasting peaceful relations between the West and East in Europe.

New Opportunities

It is the normal and traditional practice of the United States to encourage peaceful trade with other countries—even those with which we have serious differences. Yet for nearly two decades, we have put major restrictions on our trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We applied these restrictions only when the Soviet Union extended control over its Eastern European neighbors and embarked on a course of aggressive expansionism. They properly signified our moral protest against the subjugation of half a continent and gave our protest practical economic effect. Now, however, the hopes that guided our policy have begun to be realized.

In recent years, there have been substantial changes among the Communist na-

¹ BULLETIN of May 23, 1966, p. 794.

² An identical letter was sent to the President of the Senate.

tions, within themselves, and in their relations to the nations of Western Europe. Windows in Eastern Europe are being gradually opened to the winds of change. Most of the countries of Eastern Europe have shown signs of increasing independence in guiding their own economic and political courses. They have shown greater concern for the needs of their citizens as consumers. A growing trade in peaceful goods has sprung up between Eastern Europe and the Western world. The Soviet Union itself has recognized this need for more responsive action in its own country as well as in Eastern Europe.

This process of change is continuing. It presents growing opportunities for the United States and for the cause of freedom. But we are not now able to take full advantage of these opportunities. Our trade policies which once served our national interest no longer do so adequately.

What then is needed?

The weakness in our position is the outdated, inflexible requirement of law that we impose discriminatory tariffs on the import of goods from Communist countries. All imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, excepting Poland and Yugoslavia, are subject to the original rates of duty in the United States Tariff Act of 1930. The President has no authority to negotiate with any of these countries for the advantages that we can gain from offering them the more favorable rates that have been negotiated under reciprocal trade agreements over the last thirty years and that now apply to imports from all other nations with whom we trade. We alone of all the major Free World countries have so tied our hands.

The inability of the President to negotiate on this matter sharply reduces his power to use the great economic power of our trade as a bargaining instrument.

In the light of this situation, the President said in his 1965 State of the Union Message:³

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly beginning to assert their identity. Your government, assisted by leaders in labor and business, is exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with these countries and with the Soviet Union. I will report our conclusions to the Congress.

Accordingly, to supplement the studies being made in the Government, on February 16, 1965, the President appointed a Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Irwin Miller. Each member was a widely respected and experienced leader from business, labor or the academic world.

The Special Committee made its report to the President on April 29, 1965.⁴ That report provides a searching and balanced analysis of this complex and important subject. It deserves careful study by all citizens and members of the Congress interested in this subject and in this proposed legislation.

The Special Committee concluded that to accomplish our purposes in Eastern Europe we must be able to use our trade policies flexibly and purposefully. The Committee recommended, specifically, that the President should be given discretionary authority to negotiate commercial agreements with individual Communist countries when he determines any such agreement to be in the national interest and to grant them in such agreements the tariff treatment we apply to all our other trading partners.

The Administration agrees with this recommendation of the Special Committee and this is the principal authority asked in the proposed legislation.

Benefits of the Legislation

We must consider the potential benefits and liabilities that may flow from enacting or failing to enact the proposed legislation.

There is abundant evidence that without the authority this legislation would provide, we are losing and will continue to lose significant opportunities to influence the course

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

⁴ See p. 845.

of events in Eastern Europe. By denying ourselves the ability to enter into meaningful commercial agreements with these nations, we deprive ourselves of the economic benefits that will come to us from increasing trade. More important, we deprive ourselves of a bargaining tool of considerable strength and utility. We unnecessarily limit our influence in Eastern Europe relative to the influence of other nations engaged in or opening wider trade there.

The enactment of the proposed legislation would not weaken or injure the position of the United States in any way. The legislation does not in itself make any grant or concession of any kind to the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country. It would not weaken our legislation, our policy or our controls on exports of strategic goods to Communist countries. Its sole effect would be to give the President added strength to negotiate with these Communist countries to obtain concessions and benefits that will serve the national interest of our country in return for granting the same tariff arrangements already available to other countries.

The benefits of the legislation could be numerous and valuable.

First, improving our trade relations with these countries would be profitable in itself. As their national economies turn more and more toward consumer needs and desires, they will become more attractive markets for our exports. We lead the world in the efficient production of goods which enrich the quality of everyday life. We can expect that new and increasing export opportunities will open up for American industry, American agriculture and American labor. While this trade potential may be modest for the foreseeable future in relation to total United States exports, it could, nevertheless, be significant over the years and of particular importance to American agriculture and to certain American industries.

Although any agreement with any individual nation will necessarily and properly open the way for increased sales of that nation's products to Americans who want

to buy them, we have no reason to fear such trade. American industry is the most competitive in the world and thrives on the stimulus of competition.

Second, authority to relax tariff restrictions will give the President the ability to negotiate more effectively for any of several objectives important to the United States. These might include, for example, provisions for the settlement of commercial disputes, the facilitation of travel by United States citizens, the protection of United States copyrights, patents and other industrial property rights, assurances to prevent trade practices injurious to United States labor and industry, settlement of financial claims and lend-lease obligations, more satisfactory arrangements in cultural and information programs—and others of our economic, political and cultural objectives. These possibilities are of course only illustrative and it is improbable that all of them could be dealt with in a single agreement. We will need to test each negotiation for the gains to be made in it.

The Congress may be confident that no agreement will be made under this authority except in return for benefits of equal importance to the United States. Moreover, each agreement will include a provision for suspension or termination upon reasonable notice, so that the President may—and the Congress may be certain he would—suspend or end the obligations of the United States if he determined the other party were not carrying out its commitments.

Third, the most important benefits from any such agreements would develop more slowly. We cannot expect trade alone to change the basic nature of the Communist system in any Eastern European country nor to settle fundamental differences between us. We can, however, expect that the many close relationships normally growing out of trade will provide opportunities for influencing the development of their societies toward more internal freedom and peaceful relations with the free world.

A healthy growth of trade will help to reduce the present dependence of these East-

ern European countries on each other and the Soviet Union. They will be encouraged to rebuild the friendly ties they have historically had with the West. Independent action will become more attractive and more feasible. The conclusion of an agreement with any of these countries will be an inducement to others to seek the same benefits.

The very nature of trade, the necessity to follow established rules of behavior, the increased contact with the West, the increasing use of Western goods, the growing appreciation of their quality and of the efficient methods of their manufacture, the growing understanding of the skills, opportunities and earnings of free labor in the United States and other Western nations, the greater exposure to the miracles of American agriculture—all these things could encourage increasing liberalization of the internal economies of the Eastern European nations.

The Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe are increasingly conscious of their stake in stability and in improving peaceful relations with the outside world. Progress toward normal trade relations will increase that stake.

Under the terms of the proposed legislation, each agreement would be only one step in the process of reducing tensions. Agreements would not be of indefinite duration but would be subject to periodic review and to renewal at regular intervals. Each review could become a new opportunity for a useful dialogue with a Communist country. Each renewal could be adapted to encourage the further peaceful evolution of that individual country and the improvement of our relations with it.

There is wide and growing understanding throughout the country that improved conditions for peaceful trade with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe would be in the national interest and should be a proper subject of negotiation with those countries. Many business, industrial and agricultural leaders and other expert witnesses who testified in the extensive hear-

ings held on this subject by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that the United States could benefit from the possibility of wider peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries under proper safeguards. So too have a number of leading private organizations that have studied the problem.

To fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy in this complex era, the President must have available to him every appropriate bargaining tool. Nowhere is this need more critical than in our relations with the Communist countries. Granting this flexible authority to the President would not be a concession to the Communist world. Rather, it would give him a valuable instrument of foreign policy to be used where and when it will advance the interests of the United States.

Conducting a Balanced Strategy

In addition to the gains already stated which the proposed legislation can help to realize, it can be an important element in our balanced strategy for peace.

We are reaffirming in Viet-Nam—as we have on many earlier battlefields—our determination to aid free and independent nations to defend themselves from destruction by Communist aggression or subversion. But determined resistance to such force is only a part of our strategy to maintain a peaceful world.

It has equally been our purpose to demonstrate to the Communist countries that their best interests lie in seeking the well-being of their peoples through peaceful relations with the nations of the free world. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to understand that we will go step by step with them as far as they are willing to go in exploring every path toward enduring peace. We require only that our willingness and our actions be genuinely matched by theirs.

We are confident that this policy is sound even when we are fighting against Com-

munist weapons in Viet-Nam. Indeed, it is when we are resisting force with force that it is most important to hold open every possible avenue to peace. We need to make unmistakably clear to all the Communist nations of Eastern Europe that their best interests lie in economic development and peaceful trade, not in support of futile attempts to gain advantage through the use of force.

The Legislation

The proposed legislation contains five principal provisions.

The first states the purpose of the Act, particularly to use peaceful trade and related contacts with Communist countries to advance the long-range interests of the United States.

The second authorizes the President to enter into a commercial agreement with a Communist country when he determines it will promote the purposes of the Act, will be in the national interest and will result in benefits to the United States equivalent to those provided by the agreement to the other party.

The third states some of the benefits we may hope to gain in such agreements.

The fourth limits each agreement to an initial period of three years, renewable for three-year periods. It requires that each agreement provide for regular consultations on its operations and on relevant aspects of United States relations with the other country. It also requires that each agreement be subject to suspension or termination at any time on reasonable notice.

The fifth is the central provision recommended by the responsible groups studying this matter: the President would have authority to proclaim most-favored-nation treatment for the goods of Communist nations with which a commercial agreement is made under the Act. Such MFN treatment would continue only so long as the agreement is in effect.

The President would have the authority to suspend or terminate any proclamation made pursuant to this Act. The President

should do so whenever he determines that the other party to the agreement is no longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement, or that suspension or termination is in the national interest.

As part of his negotiating power with respect to a commercial agreement with the Soviet Union, the President would have authority to terminate the existing provisions of law excluding certain furs of Soviet origin.

The authority of the Act would not extend to Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Cuba or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The bill expressly provides that it does not modify or amend the Export Control Act or the Battle Act which together control the export of military articles and strategic goods and technology which would adversely affect the national security and welfare of the United States.

The bill does not change in any way existing laws and regulations prohibiting aid and limiting credit to Communist countries.

All agreements will be promptly transmitted to both Houses of Congress.

Conclusion

In 1958 President Eisenhower made it clear that "the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union"⁵ and spoke of the importance of trade as a means of strengthening the possibilities for independent actions by the countries of Eastern Europe.

President Kennedy in his first State of the Union Message⁶ declared his determination that "we must never forget our hopes for the ultimate freedom and welfare of the peoples of Eastern Europe."

In December, 1964, President Johnson expressed our wish "to build new bridges to Eastern Europe—bridges of ideas, education, culture, trade, technical cooperation and mutual understanding for world peace and

⁵ For text of President Eisenhower's letter of July 14, 1958, to Soviet Premier Khrushchev, see BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 200.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1961, p. 207.

prosperity.”⁷ In May of this year, the President again referred to the way in which “the intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period of time, can influence Eastern European societies to develop along paths that are favorable to world peace.”

The authority asked in this legislation will help attain these goals.

In Greece, Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and, now, Viet-Nam we have tried to convince the Communist countries that the road of aggression and subversion has a dead end. This legislation will help us provide the positive counterpart to that lesson. It will give the President a vital instrument of negotiation to maintain essential balance in our relations with the Soviet Union and with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and to respond to their growing desire and opportunity for wider contacts with the West. It will thereby serve our own interests and the cause of peace and stability.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and security of the United States by providing authority to negotiate commercial agreements with Communist countries, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966”.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are—

(a) to use peaceful trade and related contacts with Communist countries as a means of advancing the long-range interest of the United States in peace and freedom;

(b) to promote constructive relations with Communist countries, to contribute to international stability, and to provide a framework helpful to private United States firms conducting business relations with Communist state trading agencies by institut-

ing regular government-to-government negotiations with individual Communist countries concerning commercial and other matters of mutual interest; and

(c) to increase peaceful trade and related contacts between the United States and Communist countries, and to expand markets for products of the United States in these countries by creating similar opportunities for the products of Communist countries to compete in United States markets on a non-discriminatory basis.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

The President may make a commercial agreement with a Communist country providing most-favored-nation treatment to the products of that country whenever he determines that such agreement—

(a) will promote the purposes of this Act,

(b) is in the national interest, and

(c) will result in benefits to the United States equivalent to those provided by the agreement to the other party.

SEC. 4. BENEFITS TO BE PROVIDED BY COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

The benefits to the United States to be obtained in or in conjunction with a commercial agreement made under this Act may be of the following kind, but need not be restricted thereto:

(a) satisfactory arrangements for the protection of industrial rights and processes;

(b) satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of commercial differences and disputes;

(c) arrangements for establishment or expansion of United States trade and tourist promotion offices, for facilitation of such efforts as the trade promotion activities of United States commercial officers, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, the sending of trade missions, and for facilitation of entry and travel of commercial representatives as necessary;

(d) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to duties or other restrictions on the imports of the products of the United States, and other arrangements that may secure market access and assure fair treatment for products of the United States; or

(e) satisfactory arrangements covering other matters affecting relations between the United States and the country concerned, such as the settlement of financial and property claims and the improvement of consular relations.

SEC. 5. PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.

A commercial agreement made under this Act shall—

(a) be limited to an initial period specified in the agreement which shall be no more than three years

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.

from the time the agreement becomes effective;

(b) be subject to suspension or termination at any time upon reasonable notice;

(c) provide for consultations at regular intervals for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the agreement and relevant aspects of relations between the United States and the other party; and

(d) be renewable for additional periods, each not to exceed three years.

SEC. 6. EXTENSION OF BENEFITS OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT.

(a) In order to carry out a commercial agreement made under this Act and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may by proclamation extend most-favored-nation treatment to the products of the foreign country entering into such commercial agreement: *Provided, That* the application of most-favored-nation treatment shall be limited to the period of effectiveness of such commercial agreement.

(b) The President may at any time suspend or terminate any proclamation issued under subsection (a). The President shall suspend or terminate such proclamation whenever he determines that—

(1) the other party to a commercial agreement made under this Act is no longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement; or

(2) the suspension or termination of the agreement is in the national interest.

SEC. 7. ADVICE FROM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER SOURCES.

Before making a commercial agreement under this Act, the President shall seek information and advice with respect to such agreement from the interested Departments and agencies of the United States Government, from interested private persons, and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate.

SEC. 8. TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

The President shall submit to the Congress an annual report on the commercial agreements program instituted under this Act. Such report shall include information regarding negotiations, benefits obtained as a result of commercial agreements, the texts of any such agreements, and other information relating to the program.

SEC. 9. LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY.

The authority conferred by this Act shall not be used to extend most-favored-nation treatment to the products of areas dominated or controlled by the Communist regimes of China, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, Cuba, or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

SEC. 10. RELATION TO OTHER LAWS.

(a) This Act shall not apply to any agreement made with a country whose products are receiving, when such agreement is made, the benefits of trade agreement concessions extended in accordance with section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. sec. 1861(b)).

(b) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to modify or amend the Export Control Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. App. sec. 2021 *et seq.*) or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. sec. 1611 *et seq.*).

(c) The President may by proclamation terminate headnote 4 to schedule 1, part 5, subpart B of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 32, 19 U.S.C. sec. 1202) with respect to the products of any country to which it is applicable upon the entry into force of a commercial agreement made under this Act with such country.

(d) Any commercial agreement made under this Act shall be deemed a trade agreement for the purposes of title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. sec. 1901 *et seq.*).

(e) The portion of general headnote 3(e) to the Tariff Schedules of the United States that precedes the list of countries and areas (77A Stat. 11; 70 Stat. 1022) is amended to read as follows:

“(e) *Products of Communist Countries.* Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of this headnote, the rates of duty shown in column numbered 2 shall apply to products, whether imported directly or indirectly, of the countries and areas that have been specified in section 401 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, in sections 231 and 257 (e) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or in actions taken by the President thereunder and as to which there is not in effect a proclamation under section 6(a) of the East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966. These countries and areas are:”

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade With East European Countries and the Soviet Union

The Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union was created by the President on February 16, 1965. Its task was to explore all aspects of expanding peaceful trade in support of the President's policy of widening constructive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. That policy was reaffirmed by the President in his State of the Union message when he said, "Your government, assisted by leaders of labor and business, is now exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."

The members of the Committee are:

J. IRWIN MILLER (Chairman)

Chairman of the Board, Cummins Engine Co., Inc.; Member, Executive Committee, World Council of Churches

EUGENE R. BLACK

Chairman, Brookings Institution; Past President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

WILLIAM BLACKIE

President, Caterpillar Tractor Co.; Director and Chairman of the Foreign Commerce Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

GEORGE R. BROWN

Chairman of the Board, Brown & Root, Inc.; Chairman, Board of Trustees, Rice University

CHARLES W. ENGELHARD, JR.

Chairman, Engelhard Industries; Director, Foreign Policy Association

JAMES B. FISK

President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Past Member, President's Science Advisory Committee

NATHANIEL GOLDFINGER

Director of Research, AFL-CIO; Trustee, Joint Council on Economic Education

CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT

Chairman of the Board, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.; Chairman, Radio Free Europe Fund

WILLIAM A. HEWITT

Chairman of the Board, Deere and Co.; Trustee, U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce

MAX F. MILLIKAN

Professor of Economics and Director, Center for

● *This report was submitted to President Johnson on April 29, 1965. It is printed in the Bulletin at this time because of interest in this subject resulting from the Department's proposals to the Congress on East-West trade.*

International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; President, World Peace Foundation
CHARLES G. MORTIMER

Chairman, General Foods Corp.; Trustee, Stevens Institute of Technology

HERMAN B. WELLS

Chancellor, Indiana University; Former U.S. Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly

Edward R. Fried served as Executive Secretary to the Committee and James A. Henderson as Deputy Executive Secretary.

Introduction

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., April 29, 1965.

THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You have asked us "to explore all aspects of the question of expanding peaceful trade" in support of your policy of "widening our relations" with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.¹

Any useful consideration of the desirable degree and pattern of peaceful trade relations between ourselves and these countries must begin with the Soviet Union itself.

The Government of the Soviet Union has steadily,

¹ It is understood that policies with respect to trade with Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba are outside the terms of reference of this Committee. Our findings and recommendations do not apply to trade with these countries. The terms "Communist countries" and "European Communist countries" as used in this report refer to the nations of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. [Footnote in original.]

over many years, by words and deeds, declared its hostility to our own country. The U.S. Government and the American people support the most powerful defense system the world has ever seen in recognition of this fact.

Without this preponderant military power, it would be idle and even dangerous to explore the possibilities of expanding peaceful trade, or for that matter, of any peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. For the same reason, we rule out from these considerations any kind of strategic trade that could significantly enhance Soviet military capabilities and weaken our own position of comparative military strength.

With a secure defense, on the other hand, we can prudently seek practical means of reducing areas of conflict between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, we assume the United States has an obligation in today's nuclear world to pursue such possibilities as part of its long-term commitment to strengthen the prospects for peace in the world.

While the Communist threat remains, its nature constantly changes, because the conditions of men and nations everywhere are changing. Thus, our Government must be forever reexamining its policies, programs, and methods to make certain that they are appropriate to the times and to the national purpose.

It is now clear that the ties between the East European nations and the Soviet Union are neither quite so numerous nor so strong as they have been in the past; the forces of nationalism are growing. Between the Soviet Union and Communist China, sharp differences have arisen. There is also a ferment in all of the European Communist countries as they try to cope with the awakening demands of their people for a better life within the confines of a system geared more for military power than for human welfare.

It is an essential part of U.S. strategy to resist Communist efforts to expand through aggression. At the same time, we know that the danger of aggression will never be overcome until the Communists change their view of the world and the goals they ought to seek. Through our attitudes and actions, therefore, we must aim to influence these countries toward decisions that stress the attainment of prosperity through peaceful means. To appear hostile toward all of their objectives deprives us of the opportunity to influence the choices they make as to kinds of objectives or as to means of achieving them.

The possibilities of "peaceful coexistence" and mutually advantageous trade do not sound convincing coming from those who speak of "burying us." We know very well that coexistence means something different to Soviet leaders from what it means to us. Within the framework of a policy so labeled, they believe they can still pursue hostile actions against the free world so long as major war does

not result. But they have found it necessary to change their view of coexistence over the past decade and the conditions of the modern world will cause it to change further over the next decade. Much the same may be said of Soviet motivation and desire, and that of most of the East European nations, for increased trade with the United States. This Committee, therefore, has come to believe that in a longer time perspective the possibilities of "peaceful coexistence"—in the genuine meaning of that expression—can be made to grow. We conclude this in spite of Soviet professions and not because of them.

We are aware that the Communists have their conviction as to how the forces of history will operate and that they profess to be convinced that time is on their side. We also have our own conviction. We believe that men and nations function best in an open society. There are signs that pressures for greater openness within Soviet society are mounting. The reasons may be pragmatic rather than ideological, but they are nonetheless real. The Soviets want a modern and technically advanced society. Their own experience shows that the building of such a society can be severely handicapped by a closed and tyrannical political order and a rigid, centrally directed economic system.

We desire to encourage the growth of forces in the European Communist countries that will improve the prospects for peace. Within these countries we seek to encourage independence from Soviet domination and a rebuilding of historical ties with the West. In each of these countries, including the U.S.S.R., we seek an opening up of the society and a continuing decentralization of power. It is in our interest to promote a concern with internal standards of living rather than with external adventure.

We must look at our trade policies toward European Communist countries in that broad context. Trade is a tactical tool to be used with other policy instruments for pursuing our national objectives.

Trade cannot settle the major outstanding issues between ourselves and the Communists, nor can it, by itself, accomplish a basic change in the Communist system. Over time, however, trade negotiations and trade relations can provide us with useful opportunities to influence attitudes in these countries in directions favorable to our national interest. Trade involves contact of peoples and exchange of ideas and customs as well as of goods and services. It requires the building of mutual trust, and good faith, and confidence. An expansion of trade would require from the Communists a growing commitment to international rules and adherence to international standards for responsible behavior; it cannot be based on Soviet-imposed conditions or usual Communist trading practices.

Trade and government-to-government negotiations which set the framework for trade can be means of reducing animosities between ourselves and individ-

ual Communist countries and can provide a basis for working out mutually acceptable solutions to common problems. A constructive attitude toward trade can serve as a counterpart to our national determination to convince these countries through our deterrent military power that they cannot gain their objectives through aggression. Properly conceived and wisely administered, a growing trade with East European nations and the Soviet Union could become a significant and useful device in the pursuit of our national security and welfare and of world peace.

In sum, trade with the European Communist countries is politics in the broadest sense—holding open the possibility of careful negotiation, firm bargaining, and constructive competition. In this intimate engagement men and nations will in time be altered by the engagement itself. We do not fear this. We welcome it. We believe we are more nearly right than they about how to achieve the welfare of nations in this century. If we do our part, time and change will work for us and not against us.

These are the general propositions which underlie the specific findings and recommendations which we now submit. They are based on excellent briefings and supporting papers prepared by government agencies in answer to questions the Committee raised, on materials submitted to the Committee by interested private organizations, and on a careful review of some of the most pertinent published material on this subject. The members of the Committee have found that exposure to this source material and thorough discussion of the issues brought new perspectives and fresh judgments. We would emphasize, on the basis of our experience, that public understanding of how trade can best fit into our national strategy is essential to the effective use of trade as an instrument of national policy.

Findings

Review of Our Position

1. The United States has a long tradition that trade is a normal element of relations between countries. We have departed from that principle rarely and only for compelling reasons. Indeed, we began the period following the close of World War II by treating trade with the U.S.S.R. no differently from trade with other countries. We did not impose security controls on this trade until 1948 and then did so purposefully in response to aggressive Soviet expansion in Eastern and Central Europe. In the atmosphere of the Berlin blockade and the Korean war, we expanded these controls and gained the cooperation of other principal trading nations in an international embargo of strategic commodities.

2. When we first applied these controls we were the predominant source of capital, of advanced industrial technology, and of exportable resources in

the West. The U.S.S.R. while pursuing an aggressive external policy, operated internally from a relatively weak and backward industrial base. At that time, we had both strong cooperation from other Western nations and a considerable unilateral capacity to insure that Western resources would not contribute to the growth of Soviet military power.

3. The underlying situation changed rapidly, particularly over the past decade, and the process continues today. The ability of the Western Europeans to trade, in terms of exportable resources and technology, grew rapidly in the wake of their dramatic economic recovery. Moreover, they saw the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean war as marking sufficient change in the political climate to justify resumption of their historic trade with Communist Europe.

The capacity of Communist countries to trade across the Iron Curtain also increased, following a marked growth in the strength of their economies. They saw in this trade a means of hastening economic growth and meeting planned goals. The interest of the East European countries in this trade was further heightened by the failure of Soviet attempts to impose a system of integration on their economies.

4. These developments created pressure on the part of our allies to ease the internationally agreed Western restrictions on exports to the East. As a result, the International Embargo List was gradually reduced. The West European nations reduced their controls accordingly; the United States did not do so to the same degree. A growing disparity arose between the United States and its major industrial allies in regard to respective attitudes toward the trade, controls on the trade, and participation in the trade. This disparity exists today and poses basic questions about our trade policy. The United States has three alternatives. It can leave things as they are. It can eliminate this disparity through action across the board that would bring U.S. trading practices into line with those of our allies. Or it can modify its practices selectively and on a country-by-country basis. Only the third alternative could offer new negotiating leverage with individual Communist countries.

5. The mere existence of these differences in trade restrictions is sometimes cited as sufficient cause for changing U.S. export licensing controls to conform to those of Western Europe and Japan. In the Committee's view, this reasoning misses the essential point. The effectiveness of the U.S. denial of machinery and equipment to Communist countries is, of course, diminished by the availability of comparable advance technology from Western Europe and Japan. It is also true that our business firms are at a disadvantage in Communist markets in competing with West European firms. Commercial considerations, however, have not been the determining factor in framing U.S. policy on this subject

and should not be now. It is not the amount of trade that is important but the politics of offering trade or of withholding trade.

6. The United States initiated its controls for political reasons and should be ready to revise them when it is in the national interest to do so. This requires careful judgments on the significance of events, trends, and opportunities in individual European Communist countries and on how our relations with such countries fit into our overall strategy. It is on these grounds that we must be concerned to keep our policies under constant review—and not simply because we and our European allies may at a given moment be somewhat out of step.

7. As East European countries have shown signs of moving toward more independent positions, the United States has made greater use of trade inducement and less use of trade denial as an instrument of national policy. We have differentiated our trade policies toward individual Communist countries in accordance with the political opportunities they present. We responded promptly and effectively in 1948 when Yugoslavia adopted a more independent position toward the Soviet Union. We took action in the trade field when Poland, in 1956–57, gave signs of moving toward somewhat greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. And we took a modest step through trade talks in 1964 toward more promising relations with Rumania in response to an initiative from the Government of that country.

8. In these terms, the circumstances under which we would be willing to expand peaceful trade and the process of negotiating such trade take on considerable significance. Our Government should be properly equipped and oriented to negotiate aggressively and confidently with European Communist countries in the trade field as in all other fields whenever favorable opportunities and circumstances present themselves or can be created.

The Character of the Trade

9. Trade between the European Communist countries and free world industrial countries was close to \$3.5 billion each way in 1964. It grew at an average rate of nearly 10 percent a year over the past decade, or somewhat more than the rate of growth in the overall trade of Western industrial countries. The U.S. share in this trade was small—about one-tenth of total Western exports to these countries in 1964—and even this figure is abnormally high because it includes large wheat sales which are not likely to be a normal feature of this trade. For Western Europe, trade with Eastern Europe has ranged between 3 and 4 percent of total trade. For the United States, the proportion, even in 1964, was barely 1 percent.

10. The aggregate economic significance of this trade is small for all the countries concerned. For example, total imports from the West are for the Soviet Union only one-half of 1 percent of its gross national product and for East European countries

2 percent of their combined national product. For Western Europe, the aggregate significance of this trade is even less, and for the United States, it is negligible. U.S. exports to all European Communist countries this year probably will not reach \$200 million, or less than we sell to Switzerland.

11. The trade is of somewhat greater significance for particular industries in the European Communist countries. The U.S.S.R. and the East European countries are interested primarily in buying advanced or specialized types of machinery, industrial plants, and industrial processes and technology from the West to meet specific economic planning goals or to become self-sufficient in certain industrial sectors. They also buy metal manufactures and small quantities of consumer goods. To finance their purchases they sell to the West mainly industrial raw materials, minerals including gold, foodstuffs, steel products, and particularly oil. They also sell relatively small quantities of manufactured goods.

The trading methods of the European Communist countries reflect the rigidities of their State-controlled systems. Decisions regarding the level and composition of both imports and exports are made in accordance with a national plan and are carried out by State trading organizations. Bilateral agreements are negotiated on a country-by-country basis. These agreements specify the categories of goods to be exchanged and set targets for the volume of that exchange. They provide for a balance between imports and exports in order to conserve foreign exchange. Deficits are met by the sale of gold or credits.

12. There is little doubt that the European Communist countries are interested in purchasing more from the United States than they do now—principally machinery, equipment, complete plants, and technical data. This advanced technology could provide the United States with some of its most effective bargaining leverage for trade negotiations with Communist countries.

13. If we relaxed some of our restrictions, purchases of European Communist countries from the United States would probably rise in the short term. But their lack of foreign exchange would soon limit this trade. In this sense, foreign exchange, rather than present U.S. export controls, is the major limitation on the potential for this trade.

If the European Communist countries are to develop a growing trade with the United States, they will either have to sell more to the United States or earn more convertible foreign exchange through favorable trade balances with Western Europe. It would be more difficult for these countries to expand exports to the United States than for them to increase sales to Western Europe, since the United States is not a good market for their primary materials and, in particular, would not in the foreseeable future be a buyer of oil—the largest single Soviet export.

The U.S.S.R. is likely over the future to seek to expand its sales of oil in Western Europe and elsewhere as one means of earning more foreign exchange. Its success will depend on its ability to produce increasing quantities of oil above its domestic needs and on the willingness of importing countries to buy more Soviet oil. In the case of Western Europe, increased purchases of Soviet oil would probably be tied to increased Soviet purchases of West European products. Whether through the sale of oil or other commodities, it is not likely that the U.S.S.R. and the East European countries will be able to develop and rely on a large excess of exports over imports in their trade with Western Europe to help finance purchases in the United States.

For this reason, long-term growth in the trade of the European Communist countries with the United States is more up to them than up to us. They would have to be prepared to invest in new export industries, to learn new marketing methods, to build dealer and service organizations abroad, and to develop relations of confidence with U.S. business firms. Such positive actions move a country to participate in the world economy and to abide by generally accepted international practices. They are intimately related to a nation's world outlook and are evolutionary in nature. If made, they would move these countries in directions favorable to our national security and welfare.

14. The Committee has seen various estimates of our possible exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe over the next decade; none suggest that this trade would constitute a significant part of our total trade. There is no convincing case for any specific figure, but it is clear that our commercial stake in this trade is very small. It could grow modestly over time, but only as our overall relations with these countries change. In any event, it is dwarfed by political considerations.

The Two Sides of the Argument

15. With these facts in mind, it is useful to lay out the main arguments on either side of the issue of national policy toward expanding peaceful trade with these countries. Reasonable and thoughtful people can differ on this question. We have tried to probe carefully all sides.

16. *The case against expanding peaceful trade* with the European Communist countries comes down to the proposition that these countries are hostile toward us and we should not strengthen them through trade. By selling to them goods and services of any nature, whether wheat or our technologically advanced machinery and equipment, it is argued that we help them to solve some of their pressing internal problems and make it easier for them to use their limited resources for building up their military power and strengthening their potential for subversion abroad. Moreover, this argument states that by expanding trade with these countries

we bestow upon them a kind of respectability and prestige which will enhance their position in the developing countries of the world and which they will use to our ultimate disadvantage. In sum, this argument holds that the risks of expanding trade are significant and the gains negligible.

17. *The case for expanding peaceful trade* comes down to the proposition that we can use trade to influence the internal evolution and external behavior of Communist countries. Trade provides us with a policy instrument to encourage the movement toward greater national independence in Eastern Europe and the trend toward greater concern for consumer needs in all the European Communist countries. By refusing to trade we put ourselves in a posture of hostility that could be at odds with these developments as well as with other elements of our overall strategy toward these countries. Our refusal to trade cannot importantly limit Soviet military power but it can help to reinforce their doctrinal belief in the need for self-sufficiency. A willingness to trade, on the other hand, would be concrete evidence of our belief in constructive and peaceful relations. The benefit done our relations with the underdeveloped world by evidence that we genuinely believe in the efficacy and ultimate triumph of open societies far outweighs the disadvantages of any enhancement of Soviet legitimacy. In sum, this argument holds that the gains are significant and the risks are negligible.

18. There are persuasive elements in each of these cases. No one policy is wholly right or wholly wrong, and any course chosen has its risks. Taking into account both gains and risks, the Committee feels that the national interest clearly lies on the side of a more active use of trade as an instrument of foreign policy.

Trade as an Instrument of Policy

19. Before the United States can consider using trade with Communist countries to advance our political ends, however, we must be sure it will not weaken our military security. Expert opinion on this subject shows the following:

First, exports of commodities that are closely or directly related to military use or could significantly enhance Communist military capabilities are strictly controlled. The Committee believes these controls should continue.

Second, gains from nonmilitary trade with the United States are unlikely to release additional resources for Soviet military expenditures. The U.S.S.R. accords overriding priority to military expenditures. Any change in total resource availability in the U.S.S.R. through trade would, under present policies, affect its civilian economy, not its military budget.

Third, the U.S.S.R. has an advanced weapons technology and a military production capability that is virtually independent of its external economic relations.

In sum, total Western nonstrategic trade, let alone U.S. trade, could not be expected to alter the fundamental relationship between East-West military capabilities.

20. It is easy to exaggerate many aspects of the trade question: On the one hand, the possible military and economic gains to Communist countries, and the risk of irremediable security losses; and on the other hand, the economic gains for U.S. business from such trade and, in some respects, the political consequences. Trade is not a one-way grant of benefits to either party. It involves costs as well as gains, and it is an exchange from which both parties must benefit or it will not take place. The unmatched industrial power of the United States puts it in a position to use this area of relations with Communist countries with authority and confidence.

In turn, the Soviet leaders have their own special prejudices regarding this trade. They tend to exaggerate its importance to the United States and the interest it holds for U.S. business. They have long believed we would be forced to seek markets in Communist countries to cope with depressions. And this belief is related to their standard assumption that "orders from Wall Street" must bring U.S. policy around. The fact is that peaceful trade cannot grow without an improvement in the underlying conditions that form the foundation for trade.

21. In the Committee's view, the time is ripe to make more active use of trade arrangements as political instruments in relations with Communist countries. Trade should be brought into the policy arena. It should be offered or withheld, purposefully and systematically, as opportunities and circumstances warrant. This requires that the President be in a position to remove trade restrictions on a selective and discretionary basis or to reimpose them, as justified by our relations with individual Communist countries.

Trade moves should be adapted to circumstances in individual Communist countries and used to gain improvements in, and to build a better foundation for our relations with these countries. As opportunities arise, the United States should enter into Government-to-Government negotiations with individual Communist countries on this front, bargaining as "Yankee traders" for reciprocal advantages.

22. Specifically, if individual Communist countries are interested in expanding peaceful trade with us, the United States should be prepared and able to negotiate the terms under which such trade could grow. These negotiations would set the framework for trade and should be designed to strengthen the U.S. political and commercial position. The trade itself would be carried out by private U.S. firms dealing directly with Communist State trading agencies.

To deal with problems arising from differences in our economic systems, the United States should use

its leverage to obtain, among other things, these concessions in matters related to trade: Satisfactory assurances regarding the arbitration of commercial disputes in third countries; appropriate arrangements for the protection of patents and other industrial property; agreement on procedures to avoid dumping and other forms of market disruption; and the settlement of financial claims. In the case of the U.S.S.R., such financial claims negotiations would have to include an arrangement for a satisfactory settlement of lend-lease obligations. The United States should also seek: The establishment or expansion of trade and tourist promotion offices; the facilitation of entry, travel, and accommodation of commercial representatives; the improvement of consular relations; and agreement on copyrights.

Whenever possible, we should use such negotiations to gain agreement or understandings on such matters as library and informational facilities, embassy quarters, the establishment of consulates, the jamming of broadcasts, the distribution of Government and other publications, and the initiation or expansion of cultural and technical exchanges.

In these ways, we could use trade negotiations to open up new avenues of peaceful engagement with Communist countries and create new opportunities to influence their development. This would not be a once and for all proposition—but a regular process in which we could make trade an asset that could be used over and over again.

23. As its part of the negotiating bargain, the United States must be prepared to remove trade restrictions on a selective basis. Within security limitations, the U.S. Government should adopt a flexible export licensing policy. It should use its discretionary authority in the field of commercial credits, and it should be in a position to offer individual Communist countries the opportunity to sell on normal competitive terms in the U.S. market.

24. In its trade negotiations with the Communist countries, the United States should strive to free the trade itself as much as possible from rigidities and Government intervention and make it increasingly responsive to market forces. The United States should insist that payments be made in convertible currencies and should oppose any governmental linkage of exports and imports. Termination and cancellation provisions in our trade agreements would give us adequate leverage to police the trade.

Trade with the United States should put pressure on Communist countries to move away from the rigid bilateralism that characterizes their usual trade arrangements. It should encourage them to become more heavily engaged in the network of world trade and committed to the Western practices that govern most of this trade.

25. U.S. aims in these negotiations must be political; we seek to encourage moves toward the external independence and internal liberalization of individual Communist nations. We are not inter-

ested in fostering animosities among European Communist nations. Our long-term purpose in our dealings with these countries must be to create an atmosphere in which they will inevitably find that their interests are more and more linked to peaceful relations with the Free World. We must hold to these kinds of purposes in our trade negotiations with European Communist countries. They are not only necessary to make the effort worthwhile, but they form the only base on which our trade can, in fact, grow.

26. The major specific issues involve our policies on export licenses, on the sale of technology, on credits, and on the granting of most-favored-nation tariff treatment. Before discussing them, the Committee would emphasize that these issues are part of an interrelated whole and that U.S. policies on each should be formulated and applied with this in mind. For example, the United States cannot expect political advantages from the isolated use of export licensing controls on a case-by-case basis. Trying to negotiate in this way would be a waste of U.S. bargaining power. On the other hand, the coordinated use of all the potential assets—export licensing, MFN and guarantees of commercial credit—in periodic Government-to-Government trade negotiations with individual Communist countries would put the United States in the best possible position to get the most advantageous results from such negotiations.

Export Licensing

27. Issues in export licensing arise mainly in regard to commodities and technology which the United States restricts for export to Communist countries but which are not included in the International Embargo List. Many of these products and industrial plants are freely exported from Western Europe and Japan. They are not closely related to military production or use and therefore are in the area of peaceful trade. As a group, they are of interest to the European Communist countries and would make a contribution to their economies insofar as they could be purchased only from the United States, or purchased from the United States in more advanced design, better quality, or lower cost than from other Western countries.

28. The United States should adopt a flexible and selective policy in respect to licensing the export of commodities and technology. We should be prepared to relax our controls, country by country in support of negotiations to obtain concessions and achieve better relations. Conversely, we should tighten our controls, should relations deteriorate.

29. The language of the Export Control Act and the declaration of policy expressed by the Congress in that Act is consistent with this approach. As stated in the Act, "it is the policy of the United States to use its economic resources and advantages in trade with Communist-dominated nations to fur-

ther the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States." The Act gives the President full discretion to apply controls on trade with Communist nations to carry out this policy. The criteria for applying controls were rephrased in a 1962 amendment, but the effect of this amendment is by no means clear. Given this ambiguity, there has been a tendency among those charged with the administration of trade controls to give more emphasis to the restrictive rather than to the discretionary provisions of the statute.

30. The Committee believes this is unwise and not required by the law. The Act comes up for renewal this year. It should be renewed with emphasis placed on the possibilities for using trade and export licensing for constructive as well as for restrictive purposes. In light of the new and changing political circumstances in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., more regard should be given to the use of this tool to influence our future relations with these countries.

The Question of Technology

31. Communist countries are mainly interested in buying our best machinery, our advanced industrial plants, and our latest technical data.

It can be argued that sales or licenses in these categories should not be permitted because they would permit the Soviet bloc nations to allocate more of their scarce research and development talent to the military, and would thus harm the relative position of the United States.

Insofar as a reasonable equivalent can be obtained from other Western nations or Japan, this argument has little force. In the smaller number of cases, where a nonstrategic technical advantage is obtainable only from the United States, the possible effect on Soviet military capabilities, as pointed out above, is negligible. On the other hand, the power to release for trade items of nonstrategic but advanced technology can be used by the President as an effective trade tool for accomplishing foreign policy objectives.

For reasons which follow, however, we doubt that the Communist countries will be successful in buying a large amount of advanced technology from the United States. This may lead to some irritation and disillusionment on their part. But in the end, bargaining in this field may force the Communist nations to face up to meeting the conditions that a genuine trade in technology requires.

32. The Committee does not believe that many U.S. firms would be interested in selling their most advanced technology to European Communist countries. In the normal course of trade, business firms protect their most advanced technology and bargain hard for satisfactory terms for such technology as they are willing to sell. These practices would hold all the more for trade with Communist countries.

Some U.S. industries and firms that support heavy

research and development programs refuse to sell their industrial processes or to build complete plants for sale to others. Money alone will not buy their know-how. They are willing to exchange their processes for what they consider equivalent technology from other firms. Such an exchange of technology between a U.S. firm and a Soviet State organization would be feasible in only a very few instances. Or such firms are sometimes willing to build their own plants abroad embodying their technology. The possibility of a private U.S. firm's establishing a subsidiary or entering into a joint venture in the U.S.S.R. is beyond our present vision; it may not be so farfetched in some East European countries.

Many U.S. firms are prepared to license their technology in Western Europe and elsewhere in the free world. Most are reluctant to do so in the U.S.S.R. since they do not have confidence in the licensing arrangement or in the protection of their technology afforded by Soviet law. As in the case of the trade in goods, the flow of technology will inevitably depend on development of common ground rules and of relationships of trust. The recent Soviet expression of interest in joining the International Patent Convention is of significance in this connection.

In some cases Western managerial methods and organization are integral to Western technology. It would not be enough for the Communists to import the plant itself; they probably would need Western technicians to install the equipment and supervise initial operation. They might even have to adapt their operating methods to its design to use it efficiently.

In other cases the use of Western plants or processes is limited for lack of a wide range of supporting industries to supply components and a serious shortage of managerial and technical talent. Modern plants cannot easily be operated or maintained, let alone duplicated, outside the industrial milieu for which they were designed.

Where U.S. firms are willing to sell technology, it is frequently their second best or in the process of becoming so. For the importing country, gearing up for a new type of production takes time. In a fast-moving field where technology is perishable, this method of operation can become a way of importing obsolescence.

In essence, the importation of technology involves much the same calculation as the decision to import anything else. Whether technology seems worth purchasing depends on the price. Whether it turns out to be advantageous depends on the efficiency with which it is injected into the system. In today's world no country can continue to rely heavily on the pirating of importation of technology to improve its relative industrial position. To do so may appear to be cheap in the short run, but could turn out to be a sure way of perpetuating second-class industrial status.

33. In view of all these considerations, the Committee believes the United States should treat the trade in nonstrategic technology in the same way as other trade. The President should use his authority to permit the sale of nonstrategic technology in support of U.S. trade negotiations with individual Communist countries. The decision to *permit* the sale is a Government decision to be made on foreign policy grounds. The decision to *sell* and the terms of sale of such machinery and equipment should be left to the individual U.S. business firm.

Credits

34. Credits can become an issue if U.S. trade with Communist countries expands. Most U.S. firms would not extend credits to Communist countries without Government guarantees. As matters stand now, the President can authorize the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to a Communist country when he determines that guarantees to such a country are in the national interest. The terms of such credits must be within the range of common-commercial practices, but in any event, it is U.S. Government policy to limit such credits to 5 years. This limit is also consistent with the Berne Union—a long-standing, though informal agreement, reached by leading insuring and guaranteeing institutions in the field of international credit. The Committee believes we should hold to this position. It is recommended further that the President make appropriate use of his powers in this area to secure recognition of the validity of any financial claims outstanding and to obtain reasonable settlements of such claims.² These claims are considerable in amount and consist largely of expropriated American properties and defaulted bond issues, and in the case of the U.S.S.R., of course, of lend-lease obligations.

35. It is sometimes argued, particularly in Western European countries, that credits in excess of 5 years should be extended to the East for industrial plants that are normally amortized over a lengthy period. Some of these countries are guaranteeing such credits. As further justification for this position, the point is made that Communist governments have proven to be excellent credit risks and thereby are justified in asking for long-credit terms.

36. The Committee sees considerable danger in this line of reasoning. Among other things, it could easily lead to a credit race among Western suppliers and already shows some signs of doing so. There is no necessary relationship between the decision of Communist countries to purchase capital equipment and their future ability to earn foreign exchange to pay for such purchases. Medium- and short-term

² Mr. Black believes that reasonable settlements of these claims should be obtained prior to extension of any Government-guaranteed commercial credit. [Footnote in original.]

credits can be justified to meet temporary payment imbalances. But permitting these countries to pile up long-term debt could enable them to put their creditors under substantial pressure to accept unwanted commodities in lieu of defaults and could amount to a subsidy for their economies.

Apart from the commercial risks, it is important to recognize that long-term credits could run counter to the central purpose of this trade and reduce its potential political benefits. If Communist countries are strongly interested in purchasing United States or any other Western capital equipment on a scale substantially beyond their near-term capacity to finance, they should be obliged to face up to the implications of that position. The appropriate course for them to follow would be to divert resources to their export industries and to devote greater effort to design and marketing activities for sales in the West. Long-term credits enable these countries to postpone such decisions and transfer the burden of adjustment to Western capital markets, rather than to accept the responsibilities of growing interdependence with the free world.

We should not be concerned if a more restricted policy on credit would put U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to those of some other Western countries in negotiating with Communist authorities. The United States should set an example; it should not be party to a practice that enables the Communists to play off one Western country against another.

Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment

37. Most-favored-nation tariff treatment is normally granted by the United States to all countries. Exports from countries not granted MFN tariff treatment are subject to the high duties of the United States Tariff Act of 1930. Present legislation prohibits granting MFN tariff treatment to all Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Poland. This prohibition places a serious barrier in the way of expanding peaceful trade with the other European Communist countries because it denies them normal competitive terms in their attempts to sell to us.

38. The prohibition against granting MFN deprives the President of a valuable bargaining tool. Vesting discretionary authority in the President to grant as well as withdraw such tariff treatment would be the single most important step in permitting the Government to use trade more effectively as an instrument for shaping our relations with these countries. Without this tool any initial moves we might make in this direction would soon come to a halt. With it we could hope to maintain the momentum of change in a direction favorable to our interests.

39. The principal arguments *against* affording MFN treatment to these countries are: (a) We would get no tariff concessions in return. Tariff rates in Communist countries have only nominal

significance since foreign trade is dependent on the decisions of State trading authorities and not on market forces; (b) Communist countries should not receive MFN since they are not prepared to open their markets to world competition on the basis of established trading rules; (c) MFN would make it easier for them to dump their products in our markets; and (d) MFN is not so important to them because they export mainly primary products and the tariff discrimination they face for these products is not nearly so great as it is for industrial products.

40. These arguments in the Committee's view are outweighed by the advantages we would gain from a discretionary policy on this issue. The concessions the United States would seek for MFN would not be simply in tariff rates but in the overall conditions we could negotiate for expanded trade. The problem of Communist dumping is the kind of problem that can be handled in the course of Government-to-Government trade negotiations. If these countries are to make a serious effort to market their products in the United States, they will have to be assured of being able to compete on normal terms in the U.S. market.

41. MFN should not be granted to Communist countries automatically, or as a matter of right, or for an indefinite period. In these respects there should be a basic distinction between the MFN we grant by statute to free world countries and the MFN we would grant to Communist countries as part of specific trade understandings. It would be granted only for the duration of such agreements and subject to periodic review. As a bargaining asset, it is uniquely well adapted to U.S. policy objectives. Discretionary authority to grant MFN would allow the President to go much farther in differentiating among Communist countries. It would also symbolize our interest in encouraging these countries to move toward more open trading systems on an evolutionary basis. And it would demonstrate to these countries the advantages of better relations with the United States and the disadvantages of a deterioration in this relationship.

Trade and Strategy

42. Our trade policies are but a small part of our overall strategy toward European Communist countries. One aspect of this strategy, as we mentioned earlier, is to make clear that we will oppose and frustrate any actions that menace the peace of the world. Another aspect is to demonstrate that both sides can benefit from peaceful exchange, and in so doing, to influence and encourage those Communist leaders who are moving away from the view that military confrontation is inevitable. At the very time we must pursue the first aspect of our strategy even to the point of crisis, such as in Vietnam, we should also be willing to pursue the second as concrete evidence of the United States

Reprints of the Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With East European Countries and the Soviet Union (Department of State publication 8061, 22 pp.) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 20402, for 15 cents each.

dedication to the cause of peace.

Trade relations and trade negotiations can be a highly effective means of communicating this point. The United States can use trade to convey its true image and intentions: That it favors mutually beneficial relations; and that it is willing to go as far as Communist nations are willing to go in establishing a set of intergovernmental relations that conform to international standards. But the United States is justified in insisting on evidence as it moves step by step along this road. Along with such activities as cooperation in water desalinization, the exchange of visits of Heads of State, and technical and cultural exchanges, trade negotiations can give us a way of testing Communist intentions and can give them a way of testing U.S. intentions.

Recommendations

1. The Committee believes that peaceful trade in nonstrategic items can be an important instrument of national policy in our country's relations with individual Communist nations of Europe. Political, not commercial or economic considerations, should determine the formulation and execution of our trade policies.

2. The United States should in no case drop its controls on strategic items that could significantly enhance Communist military capabilities.

3. In respect to nonstrategic trade, the United States should use trade negotiations with individual Communist countries more actively, aggressively, and confidently in the pursuit of our national welfare and world peace.

4. We should not, however, remove our present restrictions on this trade either automatically or across the board. Communist countries are changing, in varying degrees and in different ways. We should adapt our trade policies to the political circumstances and opportunities that present themselves from time to time in the individual countries. At present significantly greater trade opportunities exist in certain East European countries than in the Soviet Union.

5. Negotiations with each of these countries should involve hard bargaining, from which the U.S. Government should expect to receive satisfactory assurances regarding the removal of commercial obstacles arising from differences in our economic systems. We should bargain for agreements on matters related to trade, such as reasonable settlements of out-

standing financial claims and procedures to avoid dumping, and, as appropriate, understandings on a variety of cultural, informational, and other matters at issue between us.

6. Provision should be made in trade agreements with Communist countries for frequent review at specific intervals. This would provide the opportunity to negotiate for new gains and to settle additional matters of disagreement.

7. An aim of American policy in trade negotiations with Communist countries should be to bring their trade practices into line with normal world trade practices.

8. To accomplish these purposes, we must be able to use our trade policies flexibly and purposefully in support of such negotiations. The President should have the authority to remove or, if necessary, impose trade restrictions as required for the achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

9. In administering export controls, the determination of what is strategic should be made primarily by the Department of Defense. The power to withhold or release nonstrategic goods or advanced technology for trade should be exercised by the President as an instrument for accomplishing foreign policy objectives.

10. The President should be given discretionary authority to grant or withdraw most-favored-nation tariff treatment to and from individual Communist countries when he determines it to be in the national interest. There should be a distinction between this MFN tariff treatment and the MFN tariff treatment we grant by statute to free world countries. It should be granted to Communist countries only for the duration of the trade agreement of which it is a part, and it should be subject to periodic review.

11. The President should continue to exercise his authority to allow Government-guaranteed commercial credits up to 5 years duration, if such terms are normal to the trade and if they are considered to further the national interest.

12. Trade with Communist countries should not be subsidized, nor should it receive artificial encouragement. The U.S. Government should decide the permitted scope of the trade in terms of security considerations. Within these limits, the amount of trade that takes place should be left to U.S. business and the U.S. consumer to decide. In terms of foreign policy considerations, however, it should be recognized that trade with European Communist nations can be as much in the national interest as any other trade.

13. In view of the changes now taking place and of changes that will continue to take place in the Communist societies, the United States should, at regular intervals, review its total trade policies toward the whole Communist world to ensure that they remain consistent with, and effective in support of, foreign policy objectives.

14. If trade with Communist countries is to be used for these objectives, the U.S. public, the Congress and the executive branch must have a thorough understanding of the problem, the opportunities that trade affords, and U.S. national objectives in this field. The U.S. Government should take every opportunity to make explicit what it intends to do and what it seeks to accomplish. It should act to remove any stigma from trade with Communist countries where such trade is determined to be in the national interest. The foreign policy advantages of such trade to the United States are not widely enough appreciated. With greater public awareness of both facts and objectives, the United States will be in a stronger position to use this trade as it must be used—for national purposes and to support national policy.

In conclusion, we emphasize that these findings and recommendations constitute a long-term strategy.

The intimate engagement of trade, over a considerable period of time, when taken with the process of change already under way, can influence the internal development and the external policies of European Communist societies along paths favor-

able to our purpose and to world peace. Trade is one of the few channels available to us for constructive contacts with nations with whom we find frequent hostility. In the long run, selected trade, intelligently negotiated and wisely administered, may turn out to have been one of our most powerful tools of national policy.

The members of your Committee have found this assignment difficult, challenging, and important. We hope this report will be useful to you and to the Nation.

Respectfully submitted, (signed)

J. IRWIN MILLER, *Chairman*
EUGENE R. BLACK
WILLIAM BLACKIE
GEORGE R. BROWN
CHARLES W. ENGELHARD, JR.
JAMES B. FISK
NATHANIEL GOLDFINGER *
CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT
WILLIAM A. HEWITT
MAX F. MILLIKAN
CHARLES G. MORTIMER
HERMAN B. WELLS

** Statement of Comment by Mr. Goldfinger*

I have reservations about several issues in the Report and respectfully submit the following comments.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that I am not opposed to the expansion of economic and financial relations with the Soviet bloc under all conditions. However, I am concerned about the conditions.

Trade relations with the Soviet Union and its European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our Nation's foreign policy. Therefore, the Report should have placed greater emphasis on the political aspect of this issue.

There is also inadequate caution in the Report about the risk of exporting American technology—particularly advanced technology—to those countries. In centrally planned, totalitarian states, military and economic factors are closely related. There is no reason to believe that the export of American machinery and equipment to those countries will necessarily redound to the benefit of their peoples.

Moreover, in our readiness to engage in bilateral trade negotiations with individual countries of the

Soviet bloc, we should have no illusions about the ability of trade, in itself, to alter Communist attitudes and policies. Neither is trade, as such, a sure force for peace, as indicated by the two World Wars between trading nations.

Recognition of these realities should result in greater emphasis on the principle of quid pro quo concessions than is contained in the Report. In my opinion, there should be no expansion of trade, extension of Government-guaranteed credit or most-favored-nation tariff treatment without political quid pro quo concessions from them.

The Report's discussion of most-favored-nation tariff treatment omits or only briefly deals with several thorny problems concerning potential imports from those countries—such as goods produced by slave labor, dumping, market disruption, international fair labor standards and the need for an adequate trade adjustment assistance mechanism at home.

In conclusion, I believe that considerations of national security and international policy objectives should have top priority in evaluating trade relations with the Soviet bloc—over any temporary or marginal commercial advantages that may exist.

" . . . an impressive demonstration of a dynamic trade policy in action—at the bargaining table, in administrative decisions, in legislation." This is how William M. Roth, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in this article based on a recent speech he made, describes U.S. trade policy under President Johnson's leadership.

The Johnson Trade Policy

by William M. Roth

What is the trade posture of the Johnson administration?

Both the words and deeds indicate a record of quiet, steady accomplishment in the liberalization of world trade—whether calculated in volume, dollars, or in the progressive dismantling of protective barriers.

President Johnson's attitude on trade policy is perhaps best summed up in his letter to the Congress last October transmitting the ninth annual report on the trade agreements program.¹ He said:

The policy of two-way trade expansion and liberalization, initiated with the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and continued by every Administration since that time, has brought great benefits to this country. In general, U.S. goods have enjoyed progressively easier access to foreign markets. Low-cost, high-quality U.S. exports, sold and used in every corner of the world, have provided immediate evidence of the vitality of our free enterprise system. Our processors have gained ready access to essential raw materials, and have profited from the stimulus of keener competition. Consumers have enjoyed the wide range of choice which the world market provides.

But we have only begun. We must build on past success to achieve greater well-being for America, and for all the world's peoples. In particular, we must make every effort to assure the success of the current Geneva negotiations, known as the Kennedy Round.

The sixth round of tariff negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade—the Kennedy Round—is of great significance both economically and politically.

European rumors that the United States may have lost its enthusiasm for these important trade negotiations are wide of the mark. They are contradicted time and time again—by the words of the President and by those of his principal economic advisers. More than anything, however, they are contradicted by the record of this country's leadership in pressing for meaningful negotiations in Geneva and by the offers, in both industry and agriculture, that the United States has made. We suspect, therefore, that such rumors are tactical moves in a negotiation of great complexity and of tremendous economic and political importance. Certainly, most of our negotiating partners are well aware of the deep and urgent commitment of this country to the successful outcome of the Kennedy Round.

In his state of the Union message² President Johnson reemphasized this commitment. "We will work," he said, "to strengthen economic cooperation, to reduce barriers to trade . . ." And in his Economic Report³ the President said:

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 761.

² For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

³ For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1966, p. 290.

The year 1966 is the year when the world can take a giant step forward in liberalizing international trade by successfully concluding the Kennedy Round of negotiations to reduce trade barriers on all classes of products. The resulting growth of world trade and world income will benefit all countries, developing as well as industrial. The United States will bend every effort to get meaningful negotiations back on the track. This great venture in international cooperation must not fail.

These words clearly indicate a commitment to the principle of freedom of international competition and express the fundamental trade policy of President Johnson and of his administration. They also reaffirm the mandate of our negotiators in Geneva. This ambitious effort, the greatest in the 20-year history of GATT trade negotiations, will not fail because of any lack of will or determination on the part of the United States.

Although the six member states of the European Economic Community reached an impasse in their internal negotiations last June and the Geneva negotiations had come to a virtual standstill at the turn of the year, the Six have now resumed their internal dialog. Differences remain, but it seems reasonable to assume that they will achieve agreement to resume the development of their dynamic Common Market and to restore momentum to the trade negotiations.

The sixth round of trade negotiations must be concluded under our present authority, with a significant and balanced reduction in world trade barriers on a fully reciprocal basis. There are no practical alternatives if global trade expansion is to be achieved. The Kennedy Round is multilateral in the truest sense, involving all the world's principal trading nations.

Failure in these negotiations will invite a reversion to divisive trade practices among nations, with protectionism given strong encouragement and economic nationalism and regionalism new impetus. We must maintain and accelerate the momentum of trade liberalization and expansion which has contributed so greatly to the buoyant economies of the postwar industrialized world and

which holds the greatest potential for rapid development of the emerging nations. That is what the Kennedy Round is about.

Other Trade Initiatives

It is not only in the Geneva negotiations that the Johnson administration has given compelling evidence of its trade posture. A number of recent actions and proposals expose a consistent intent to see that American markets are open and remain open to fair competition from abroad.

First, the President has recently acted to end special escape-clause protection on lead and zinc, clinical thermometers, and safety pins, judging that this extra protection can no longer be justified. In a fourth case he ordered a substantial modification of the extra protection afforded stainless steel table flatware.

These actions are based on investigations, ordered by President Johnson, of the necessity of continuing special protection for these industries. Although an industry may need a temporary shield in some instances, the administration believes special protective measures should be employed only when imports are clearly causing serious disruption. Such cases should be under constant review and the protection removed when no longer necessary.

On the legislative side the Johnson administration has shown its dedication to a policy of liberal world trade. Over administration opposition the 88th Congress passed a bill establishing stringent marking requirements on imported wood products. President Johnson vetoed it in December 1963, stating in his veto message⁴ that the "bill would raise new barriers to foreign trade and invite retaliation against our exports. . . ." It was his first major decision on an issue of national trade policy and his first use of the veto.

In line with this policy the Johnson administration has continued to resist successfully the enactment of protectionist measures. In the last session of the Congress it

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 129.

made known its opposition to the so-called Orderly Marketing Act of 1965, which would have required the imposition of quotas when imports reached certain levels, and to a bill to amend the Anti-Dumping Act, which would have rendered that act a highly protectionist instrument. These bills did not receive even preliminary consideration by the committees concerned. This was also true of three other bills: One which would have provided for an increase in tariffs on imports of salmon, another which would have required the labeling of labels, and a third which would have required the marking of containers manufactured in the United States in part with foreign steel.

On the positive side, the 89th Congress in its first session took several significant actions at the request of the administration. The President sought and obtained repeal of the so-called Saylor amendment to the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1965, which imposed a complete prohibition on the use of any foreign articles in the construction of highways and railroads under the act. The Congress also met the President's request for legislation to implement the U.S.-Canadian agreement⁵ providing duty-free treatment of automotive products traded between the two countries, which previously had had serious trade problems in these products.

This same Congress also passed legislation enabling the United States to carry out its obligations under the International Coffee Agreement of 1962,⁶ an agreement designed to bring more stability to coffee prices. The development programs of cof-

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191; for statements made by President Johnson after signing the Automotive Trade Products Act of 1965 and texts of a proclamation and Executive order pursuant thereto, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 793.

⁶ For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5505*; for a statement made by President Johnson on May 24, 1965, see *BULLETIN* of June 14, 1965, p. 975.

fee-producing countries have suffered serious setbacks from the wildly fluctuating prices of this vital export commodity.

In January 1966 the Senate passed a previously approved House bill to suspend duties on certain tropical hardwoods pending completion of the Kennedy Round action on them, as another step toward assisting developing countries.

New Legislation

Significantly, this year President Johnson announced in his state of the Union message that, in keeping with our policy of building bridges to Eastern Europe, he would request that Congress grant him discretionary authority to remove special tariff restrictions against goods from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union when such action is in the national interest.

The President also will shortly request an amendment to the Trade Expansion Act to liberalize the tests which a firm or group of workers must satisfy in order to become eligible for adjustment assistance. To date, all petitions for adjustment assistance have been denied because of what we now realize to be unnecessarily demanding tests written into the law. The amendment will substantially relax these tests while still requiring a demonstration that tariff concessions have played a role in causing increased imports and have, in turn, led to economic injury.

We hope that this year the Congress will approve legislation to permit the United States to implement the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, commonly known as the Florence Agreement.⁷ Purpose of the agreement, as President Johnson noted in his letter⁸ requesting congressional considera-

⁷ For background and text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, June 21, 1965, p. 1015.

tion of the measure, is "to promote the growth of international understanding by reducing trade barriers to the flow of knowledge in all directions across all frontiers."

This record adds up to an impressive demonstration of a dynamic trade policy in action—at the bargaining table, in administrative decisions, in legislation.

In summary, there are three elements of President Johnson's trade policy.

First, while it is acknowledged that import competition can be disruptive and that Government assistance to help industries adjust to this kind of competition is warranted, such assistance should restrain imports only as a last resort and restraints should be ended as soon as they have served their purpose.

Second, the United States seeks and supports, in and beyond the current negotiations, measures that will expand world trade, including trade with the developing countries and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Third, the Johnson trade policy commits the United States to the vigorous use of the full powers of the Trade Expansion Act to achieve a successful outcome of the GATT negotiations at Geneva. Its negotiators will bargain hard to conclude, on a fully reciprocal basis, a significant and balanced reduction in world trade barriers. The result, in both industry and in agriculture, will be mutually beneficial to all participants.

These three elements serve the common objective of expanding trade. The Johnson trade policy thus continues the liberal world trade orientation that has characterized United States policies since the early 1930's—policies that have had since that time the consistent support of the leaders of both major political parties.

U.S. Shipowners Formally Notified of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments

Following is the text of a letter from Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann to Maritime Administrator Nicholas Johnson.

MAY 4, 1966

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I am writing with regard to a Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations adopted on April 9, 1966.¹ That Resolution, No. 221, relates to shipments of oil to Southern Rhodesia and provides in part:

"Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

"Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia."

The Government of the United States voted for Resolution No. 221 in the Security Council and supports the efforts of the United Kingdom to end the illegal, unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, we wish to advise all owners of United States flag ships to take all necessary steps to prevent their ships of United States registry from carrying oil to Beira destined for Rhodesia.

We should appreciate your having this letter and any other notice you believe appropriate published in the Federal Register.²

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS C. MANN

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 2, 1966, p. 718.

² 31 Fed. Reg. 6878.

"I asked an old gentleman what he thought of all the changes which were taking place, and I shall never forget his answer: 'I cannot understand why we have been sleeping so long.' That phrase, Mr. Berger says, 'eloquently sums up the great changes now going on in Korea.'"

Korea—Progress and Prospects

by Samuel D. Berger

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am well acquainted with Chung-Ang University, but this is my introduction to Long Island University. I am very pleased to be here, and especially pleased to take part in this symposium. A unique relationship has developed between the United States and Korea in these last 20 years, and this conference is, in a sense, a recognition of and a tribute to that relationship.

Although we have had diplomatic relations with Korea since 1883, Korea was hardly known to Americans as recently as 20 years ago. Missionary work, which dates from the 1880's, had brought Korea into the homes and thinking of a limited circle. A handful of Koreans who had come to the United States during the Japanese occupation nurtured a dream that Korea might one day be free, but they were little known in the American community. A few scholars had made some studies of Korean history, culture, and life, usually in conjunction with general studies of the Orient. An occasional tourist would visit Korea and write his impressions. This was almost the sum total of our acquaintance.

The Korean people knew as little of us as we of them. A self-imposed isolation, fol-

lowed by an enforced isolation, had cut Korea off from most other countries and especially from the West. Historically, Korean contacts with the world were limited to China and to Japan, or to the marauders from beyond the Yalu who threatened Korea during much of its long history.

War and the accidents of history have brought our two countries together in ways that no one could have foreseen 20 years ago. Korea is now a part of our history, as we are of Korea's. The chain of events that brought us together were:

The Second World War.

The fateful decision made during that war to divide Korea at the 38th parallel as a matter of convenience to provide for the surrender of Japanese prisoners of war.

The even more fateful decision of the Soviet leaders not to cooperate with the Western Allies to build a durable peace but to follow Lenin's doctrine of exploiting the chaos, confusion, and disorder after the war in order to extend communism. In Korea a Communist regime was installed by the Soviet Army.

The American decision to withdraw our military forces from the Republic of Korea in 1949, leaving only a few military advisers and instructors.

The subsequent invasion from the north

¹ Address made before the Conference and Symposium of Korean Culture at the Brooklyn Center of Long Island University, Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 7.

on June 25, 1950, which led to our return, to the United Nations action, and to our presence in Korea ever since.

In the perspective of history, two decisions, more than any other, dramatize the revolution in American foreign policy from our traditional isolation to an acceptance of international responsibilities. And curiously, both of these involve peninsulas which have been fought over for centuries as invading nations vied to extend their domains. The first was the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, in which we took over from our exhausted British allies their commitment to support the independence of Greece against Communist aggression. This was the forerunner of NATO and our deep involvement in Europe. The other was President Truman's decision to come to the support of the Republic of Korea in June 1950, which set the basis for our subsequent policies in the general area of Asia.

Interchange of People, Experience, Ideas

If we knew little about Korea and they little about us 20 years ago, that is no longer the case today. Over a million Americans have fought or stood guard on Korean soil, along with Koreans, to defend the independence of that nation. Tens of thousands of Korean soldiers, sailors, and airmen have been brought to the United States for military training. Thousands of American civilians have visited or worked in every conceivable capacity in Korea, and tens of thousands of Korean civilians have come to America for study and training.

These figures and numbers do not begin to convey the width and depth of the interchange which has taken place—of people, of experience, and of ideas. English has become the compulsory second language in Korean education, and wherever I traveled in Korea, even on the most remote island, I was invariably accosted by one or more young students anxious to try out their English. Koreans are good linguists, and even now I receive letters from students I have met all over Korea.

Our military relations have done far more

than produce one of the most highly trained and effective military forces in the free world. For a modern military force consists not only of fighting men but requires a great range and variety of professions, vocations, and skills. Doctors, surgeons, and nurses are needed, as are lawyers and engineers, experts in communication, transport, procurement, supply, budget and fiscal matters, and disbursement. Men must be trained in organization, management, and planning. Men must be trained as pilots and navigators, as drivers, motor and airplane mechanics, welders, crane and bulldozer operators, metalworkers, and radio and telephone repairmen, and in scores of other occupations.

This military training has made the Korean Armed Forces a vast reservoir of supply of skills and talents which were transferable to civilian life and which are now contributing so much to the building of a modern Korea.

Nor have the civilians been neglected. Through the exchange program and through technical assistance to Korean education, thousands of Koreans have been trained in economics, banking, government, journalism, political science, engineering, medicine, law, public health, agriculture, business administration, and other fields.

A "Developed" People

The thirst of Koreans for education and training is one of the happiest memories I have of my 3 years' stay in Korea. Korea may be an undeveloped nation in an economic and industrial sense, but the Koreans are not an undeveloped people.

The separate kingdoms and tribes of Korea were unified into a nation about 1,300 years ago, and they have successfully maintained a national tradition ever since. They withstood Chinese and Japanese incursions or invasions, and they absorbed and survived a Mongolian occupation. Their long history as a nation testifies to their hardiness and their great inner resources of will, independence, and spirit.

I have an old map of Korea dating from

an exploration by Ortelius in 1540. It is perhaps the first map ever made of Korea by a European. It shows Korea as an island, and the inscription reads: "Not much is known about the people of this island, known as Koreans, except that they are very tall and superb soldiers."

The 18th and 19th centuries were tragic ones in Korean history, as the Yi Dynasty, energetic and progressive in its early years, went into decline. The feudal system showed no ability to adjust and change. By the end of the 19th century, corruption, a persistent tendency toward factionalism, and an inability to produce effective government had so weakened this proud and capable people that Korea was no longer able to withstand the pressures of her stronger imperial neighbors. The stirrings toward change and democracy in the late 19th century were snuffed out by the Japanese occupation.

But the essential characteristics of the people could not be obliterated. They are an energetic people, hard working, with ambition, and quick to learn. The literacy rate is one of the highest in the world—93 percent. Education is universal, and parents of every class will make every sacrifice to put their children into university.

Problems Confronting Korea After 1945

There are nations with vast natural resources, but they seem unable to do much with them. Other nations with few natural resources make astonishing progress. The answer, of course, lies with the people, and the problems which confronted the Korean people after 1945 were enormous.

The tragic division of Korea deprived the people of the South of the great natural resources of water power and minerals which lie north of the 38th parallel. The South has traditionally been agricultural. Three million refugees fled south after 1946.

The savage North Korean invasion in 1950 which carried the Communists to the perimeter around Pusan in the southeast,

and the retreat to the north, destroyed much of Korea and a great part of Seoul. Transport, bridges, communications, houses, and shops were destroyed on wholesale scale.

In the early years after the Korean war our aid had of necessity to be concentrated on the repair of the basic structure, as well as helping to feed and clothe the people. Of \$2 billion in economic aid, \$300 million went into railways, another \$700 million into power, communications, fertilizer, mining.

By 1960 the basic infrastructure had been restored, and some 200 new factories had been built.

But there was a missing element in Korea. There was no effective government. The government of Syngman Rhee seemed incapable of dealing with the massive problems of inflation, corruption, smuggling, tax evasion, or the black market. Many of the new factories remained idle because they lacked capital or competent management. Commercial exports totaled about \$30 million a year, and Korea relied on United States grants for 90 percent of its foreign exchange requirements.

Dissatisfaction with the Rhee government's ineffectiveness and authoritarian ways grew rapidly in the late fifties, and when that government resorted to a rigged election in 1960 to stay in power, the students and then the people moved into the streets in protest.

The next government—properly and fairly elected—seemed incapable of grasping the nettle of power and dealing with the basic ills. In May 1961 a military coup took power. It announced at the outset its determination to reform and modernize Korea and to restore constitutional processes and hold elections. It has made much progress on the first pledge and fulfilled the second pledge in the fall of 1963.

The transformation of Korea in the last 5 years has been astonishing. Korea, for the first time in many centuries, has a driving and effective government. It has made mistakes, and it has yet to resolve many prob-

lems, but the progress in every direction has been such that there is now hope and confidence in Korea's future.

Korea's Domestic Achievements

I want to describe some of the main achievements of the last 4 years:

—Serious inflation has been a plague in Korea, as elsewhere. Serious inflation undermines economic and political stability. The military government tried to do too much in too short a time, and the result was more inflation. In May 1964 Korea went through still another devaluation, but by then the leaders of Korea had learned a basic lesson. An austere credit and financial policy was instituted, and for the past 2 years price inflation has been held within reasonable bounds. The price increase last year was about 6½ percent.

—A sophisticated exchange rate system, with a floating exchange rate, is being operated with a great measure of success. Foreign exchange reserves, which were dangerously depleted, have been built back to a safe level.

—Vigorous campaigns against tax evasion and smuggling, which deprive the state of revenue, have been pressed. Tax collections are increasing.

—A sensible interest rate policy on time deposits has brought a flood of savings into the commercial banks and drastically reduced the scope of operations for the moneylenders.

—Most of the factories built with American loans are now functioning and many of them flourishing. New factories for fertilizer, cement, plywood, and pharmaceuticals are coming into production. In 1965 industrial production rose by 19 percent.

—Electric power production totaled 40,000 kilowatts when the Communists cut the transmission lines from North Korea in 1948. It has increased manyfold since that time and doubled since 1960 to nearly 800,000 kilowatts. Plans are in train to

raise it to 1½ million kilowatts in the next 4 years. Forty-five thousand rural households were tied into the power system last year. The target this year is an additional 60,000.

—Crop production has increased by 60 percent since 1960. Land reclamation and bench terracing have made astonishing progress. Arable land will be increased by about 20 percent by 1970, and the time is not far off when Korea will grow enough food for its own needs. At the same time reforestation is moving ahead, and energetic action is being taken against illegal timber cutting.

—Mining production has increased by 60 percent since 1960.

The progress made in economic growth and exports has put Korea well to the front compared with other less developed nations. The annual economic growth rate has averaged 8 percent in each of the last 3 years. Commercial exports rose from \$33 million in 1960 to \$180 million last year and are expected to approach \$270 million in 1966. In contrast with 1961 Korea now furnishes more than half of her foreign exchange requirements through her own efforts. Koreans themselves now speak of economic independence in 5 years.

With these achievements, our grant aid has come down from \$173 million in 1961 to \$70 million last year and will continue to fall. More and more of our help is taking the form of loans to build factories and industries, and development loans have risen from \$6.5 million in 1961 to about \$49 million in 1965. In keeping with this policy President Johnson, during the state visit last year of President Park Chung Hee, pledged to make \$150 million available in development loan funds.²

In still another important area there has been progress. Korea has a very high rate of population growth, 2.9 percent a year. In 1963 the Government for the first time made provision for family planning in its

² BULLETIN of June 14, 1965, p. 950.

budget and has each year increased its appropriations for clinics, advisory services, contraceptive devices, and publicity. The aim is to bring the population growth rate down to 1.5 percent by 1980, if not earlier.

Three years ago the Government, inspired by Dr. Paul Crane of the Presbyterian Medical Center in Chongju, at last began to deal with hookworm, a widespread and debilitating parasite that can easily be overcome by proper composting. The Ministries of Agriculture, Education, and Public Health are pressing this campaign, and Korea should be freed of this disease in a decade. It will have the most important physical and psychological effects in terms of energy and a sense of well-being.

Progress in Foreign Affairs

These are some of the main achievements on the domestic side. But there has been much progress in foreign affairs as well:

—Five years ago Korea had diplomatic relations with 15 countries. The number is now 78. A new and flourishing Foreign Service Institute, which the Asia Foundation helped finance, is now training Korean diplomats. It takes its place alongside a new Administrative Staff College, where civil servants are being trained in administration.

—Last December relations between Korea and Japan were normalized after 15 years of off-again, on-again negotiations. Under the terms of the settlement the troublesome controversy over fishing rights has been resolved. On the financial side, the long-standing claims problem has been settled through the Japanese agreement to provide \$300 million in grant assistance; \$200 million in long-term government-to-government loans; and \$300 million in commercial credits, for a total of \$800 million over 10 years.

—Korea has joined the just-organized Asian Development Bank with a subscription of \$30 million.

—In 1963 France and Italy provided a

large loan for the creation of a deep-sea fishing fleet, and Germany has provided credits for industrial development.

—Private foreign companies are beginning to look with interest on investment in Korea, and some have already begun to provide equity capital.

In June, at Korean initiative, there will be an Asian ministerial conference in Seoul, evidence of the growing interest in discussing Asian problems in a regional context and of Korea's growing stature in the international community.

The most notable demonstration of Korea's willingness and ability to play a role in international affairs was the decision taken last year in response to a request from the Government of South Viet-Nam for combat troops: 21,000 were sent, and a further decision was taken this year to send an additional 22,000. Even before these historic decisions, Korea had provided a 130-man military hospital unit and karate instructors to South Viet-Nam.

These actions were a reflection of Korea's deep sense of obligation to those who had come to her assistance in her hour of need, of her willingness to take part in collective action against Communist aggression, and of her recognition that there will be no peace or stability in Asia unless Communist aggression is checked. Few Koreans have not been seared in one way or another by the Communists, and the Korean response to South Viet-Nam's call comes from burning personal memories of what communism means.

Emergence of Effective Government

In the political realm, the Korean constitution and election laws have come to grips with what has been a persistent problem in Korean political life—the multiplication of political parties and the tendency toward division. Three principles were incorporated in the political system in the 1963 elections to produce greater cohesion and discipline:

1. No candidate may run for the national

legislature as an independent. Each must be a member of a political party.

2. If an elected member of the legislature resigns from his party, he forfeits his seat. This has restrained individual resignations and shifts.

3. However, if a party expels a member, he does not lose his seat. This imposes a discipline on the party.

These were purely Korean institutional inventions, and they have produced more stability and discipline in political party life than Korea has ever known.

I do not want to leave you with the impression that all problems have been solved or are on the way to solution in Korea. There is still too much unemployment and underemployment. The need for housing is very great. Agriculture is still at the mercy of the weather, and there is need for more irrigation. The decision to restore elections for local government has yet to be made. The standard of living is rising, but it is still low for too many families. (I would point out here that North Korean defectors who come to South Korea are astonished at the high standard compared with the North.)

What we are seeing in Korea in these last few years is the emergence of effective government—something which Korea has not known for many generations—a government with the capacity to make plans and develop programs and carry them out. Literate, energetic, and hard-working people can do much for themselves, but it takes effective, forward-looking government to produce an environment that encourages rapid progress, offers hope for the future, and liberates the creative energies of the people for constructive purposes.

Many Koreans have contributed to this achievement—men from the armed forces and from civilian life, working together to convert Korea into a modern nation. Among

them the man who stands out is President Park Chung Hee, who led the military coup in 1961 and then in 1963 fulfilled his pledge to hold elections. He is providing purposeful, courageous, and imaginative leadership to a long-suffering people, bringing organization and direction to bear on the problems of Korea. And the results are promising. The foundations of economic and political stability and growth are being laid.

I can best describe what is happening by telling the story of a visit I made to a small village of about a hundred families. The Korean Government has been making a valiant effort in the rural areas to introduce new concepts and ways of doing things. This village was being taught to work together, to develop diversified crops, to plant fruit trees, to re-lay paddy fields for more efficient cultivation, to use commercial fertilizer and better seed, to raise rabbits, pigs, chickens, and mushrooms. A young man from the village, who had been a junior officer in the armed forces, was elected village chief. He had plans and programs, charts and records, and enthusiasm. And the village was responding.

I asked an old gentleman what he thought of all the changes which were taking place, and I shall never forget his answer: "I cannot understand why we have been sleeping so long."

That phrase eloquently sums up the great changes now going on in Korea. There is a growing faith in the ability of Koreans to solve their problems. There is a growing excitement that Korea is now on the way to a new and more hopeful life. There is a growing confidence in the future.

By the strange workings of history we have played a part in that awakening, and we will continue to play a part—by supporting the Koreans in their defense and by supporting their efforts to build a new modern society in Korea.

A Call for Release of American Prisoners Held by Communist China

by William P. Bundy

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am deeply honored this evening to be able to participate in this testimonial dinner to Bishop James E. Walsh. Bishop Walsh was 75 years old a week ago today. Thirty-seven of those years he has spent in China, during a period when the Chinese people have endured virtually unceasing struggle, revolution, and war.

Bishop Walsh arrived in China while the warlords were still vying for power and pillaging China for their personal profit. He was there before the Chinese Communist Party was founded and was a witness to the years during which the Republic of China waged its desperate battle against an internal enemy in the form of the Communist insurgency and the external Japanese invader.

After the Communists seized power on the mainland, they effectively halted all the work of the Catholic Church. Bishop Walsh could well have left any time during these early years. The Communists, recognizing the symbol that he represented for many Chinese Catholics, repeatedly attempted to persuade the Bishop to abandon his post. But Bishop Walsh insisted that his duty lay with his parishioners, whom he was unwilling to desert.

Finally the Chinese Communists arrested the Bishop, and, after 2 years of interrogation, he was sentenced in March 1960 to 20

years' imprisonment on the palpably unjustified charges of "espionage and subversion."

Bishop Walsh has been in prison now for 6 years, displaying personal courage and faith in God and man. His behavior has been an inspiration to all of us. The Chinese Communists have been repeatedly approached not only by the United States Government but by other governments and private individuals with pleas and requests that Bishop Walsh be allowed to go free. I regret that so far Peking has coldly rebuffed these approaches, as well as parallel efforts made on behalf of the four other Americans it holds prisoner on similar charges.²

The United States Government deeply regrets that despite the agreement³ reached between ourselves and Peking in 1955 for the exchange of citizens who wished to return home—including those in prison—there are still Americans held in Chinese prisons. The United States has repeatedly offered to facilitate the return to Communist China of any Chinese in the U.S.—including convicted criminals in prison—who wishes to leave. We will continue this policy, and we will continue to press Peking to carry out the 1955 agreement. Until it does, we have no alternative but to exercise patience and mobilize our vigilance. For nothing is eternal

¹ Address made at the Bishop James E. Walsh testimonial dinner at Baltimore, Md., on May 7 (press release 106).

² The four other American prisoners are: John Thomas Downey, Richard Fecteau, H. F. Redmond, and Capt. Philip Smith, USAF.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

about the policies and attitudes of any country, including Communist China.

Doctrine of World Revolution

Today we find the Chinese Communists dedicated to a fanatical and bellicose doctrine of world revolution, committed to bring China onto the world stage as a great power. Communist Chinese ambitions envisage not merely the restoration of influence in the neighboring areas of Asia but ultimately Communist totalitarian regimes throughout the area. In pursuing its objectives Peking has not refrained from the use of force, although recently it has drawn back when a major conflict appeared likely.

More critical than any direct and overt use of force has been the Chinese Communist encouragement, training, financing, and equipping of revolutionaries and insurrectionaries in a whole series of countries under the slogan of supporting "wars of national liberation." They have followed this course in Africa, Latin America, and in Asia. The fact that their efforts have failed more often than they have succeeded and that Peking has increasingly isolated itself in the world by these policies is no reason for indifference or complacency.

Although the war in Viet-Nam is basically a North Vietnamese ambition and operation, the Chinese Communists, in their propaganda, in their direct material support for North Viet-Nam, and in their fervent opposition to any efforts at a peaceful settlement, have attempted to make Communist success in Viet-Nam the key to the victory of the "Mao Tse-tung road to revolution." As we assist the South Vietnamese to preserve their right to determine their own future without external interference, we at the same time act to prevent the success of the expansionist designs of Communist China.

It is in the vital interest of the free nations of Asia themselves and of all those who value peace and self-determination in the area to resist Peking's attempts to impose its system and influence on its neigh-

bors. The United States would welcome the opportunity to live at peace with all countries in Asia. We have repeatedly indicated to Peking, both by word and by caution in our actions, that we want no war with the Chinese Communists. But we shall never be expelled by force from this area. Nor shall we desist for one moment from our efforts to assist in every useful way—economic, social, and political, as well as military—the free nations of Asia to work out their own destinies without having an alien system imposed on them by force.

Hostility Toward United States

The Chinese Communist hostility toward the United States, which has lain at the core of their foreign policy for 17 years, now rests on two beliefs: that the U.S. is, in Marxist terms, the "enemy of all the people in the world" and consequently of the Chinese Communist authorities, who today consider themselves the ideological preceptors of "all the people of the world"; and that the U.S., in terms of Chinese Communist national interests, is blocking the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia. These attitudes and ambitions are held tenaciously by the present leaders of Communist China. They seem unable to understand that independent nations in Asia and Africa are unwilling to adopt the "Chinese" model or succumb to Chinese Communist influence. They have not yet realized the true implications of the series of major setbacks for Peking's foreign policy over the last year.

The present leaders in Peking fear that their heirs will not pursue zealously the goals of Chinese communism. They are worried that the tedium of daily life and the cynicism about the soundness of the regime's policies, which have increasingly become apparent on the mainland in recent years, will ultimately cause a significant shift in the policies of a new generation of leaders.

Bishop Walsh once wrote that "future events are uncertain and it is best always to wait until they actually occur—the only time we can be sure—especially in China."

I am in full agreement with this wise maxim, and I would be the last to predict quick changes in Communist China. We can be under no illusions that, for the present, Peking is anything but hostile toward the United States or wishes us anything but ill. Nor can we expect that major concessions to Chinese Communist demands for power and influence at the present time will reap anything but further and more insistent demands. Our opposition to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations is based not merely on the impossible conditions it has stated for its participation in the United Nations but on the basic conflict between its policies and actions and the purposes of the U.N. Charter as well as the obligations of constructive participation in U.N. deliberations.

Channels of Communication With Peking

Nevertheless we must continue to keep firmly in our minds the need to work toward a time when the historic ties of friendship between ourselves and the people of mainland China can be restored, when Americans and Chinese can freely travel between each other's countries, when trade and cultural relations can develop, and when China is willing to live at peace with the United States, its neighbors, and other countries of the world.

We have ourselves taken a series of unilateral steps which offer Peking the opportunity to escape from its present isolation and to live at peace with the world. We have gradually expanded the categories of American citizens who may travel to Communist China and indicated our willingness to permit American academic institutions to invite Chinese Communist scholars and scientists to visit their campuses. We have in the past indicated that, if the Communist Chinese were interested in purchasing grain, we would consider such sales. We have agreed to allow Chinese Communist newspapermen to come to the United States and have allowed Chinese Communist publications to be purchased freely by American libraries.

Peking has given only negative reactions to our offers; indeed, it has made it abundantly clear that it will not accept them. But we do want to keep open channels of contact and communication for a time when the Chinese Communists may be more willing to respond. This, in part, is the reason for our desire to maintain our direct diplomatic contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and for our expressed willingness to sit down and discuss the critical problems of disarmament with Peking.

We remain absolutely firm in our determination to defend our allies, including the Republic of China on Taiwan, from the use of force, direct or indirect, against their territory by Peking, to preserve the position of the Republic of China in the U.N., and to assist those countries of Asia that seek our help to strengthen their political, economic, and social foundations. Our effort to join with the free nations of Asia in containing and preventing the expansion of Communist China is not only a struggle against aggression and subversion in the Western Pacific but part and parcel of our continuing efforts to achieve a world order in which all nations can enjoy peace and well-being without fear of domination by others.

But we have made it abundantly clear that we do not intend to attack Communist China, that we do not want war, and, as Secretary Rusk said recently,⁴ that we do not believe either in the "fatal inevitability of war with Communist China" or "the existence of an unending and inevitable state of hostility between ourselves and the rulers of mainland China."

There are many ways in which Peking could at some point indicate that it recognizes our sincerity in seeking peace. The freeing of Bishop Walsh and the other four American citizens now held in Communist China to return to their families and friends, for instance, would be most gratifying to all Americans and would be regarded as evidence of Peking's desire for friendlier rela-

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 2, 1966, p. 686.

tions with the American people. I know that all of you join with me in hoping that at some point the leaders in Peking will see more clearly that the best interests of the mainland Chinese lie in pursuing peace and a course of friendship and amity with all countries and peoples.

Communist China Conducts Third Nuclear Test

*Department Statement*¹

Nearly a year has passed since Communist China exploded its second nuclear device. The third test occurred today [May 9] in Sinkiang and comes as no surprise. As you know, a Department of State spokesman noted on April 28 that such a test should be expected soon.

Today's test was an atmospheric test, with a yield in the same general range as previous Chinese tests. Further evaluation must await collection and analyses of the debris in the atmosphere.

This test, of course, is part of the deliberate and costly Chinese Communist program to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The United States Government continues to deplore the disregard of the Chinese Communist leaders for the desires and well-being of people throughout the world who may suffer from the ill effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, which most of the world has banned by adherence to the limited test ban treaty.²

The United States reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia and the assurances given by President Johnson on October 18, 1964,³ of our strong support to nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons if they need our support against any threat of nuclear blackmail.

State, Justice Improve Procedures on Visas for Conference Guests

The Departments of State and Justice have agreed on improved administrative machinery to expedite granting visas to guests of international conferences held in the United States, it was announced on May 3 (Department of State press release 104).

The change in procedure is in accord with the wishes of the President. On February 2, he called on the Secretary of State and the Attorney General "to explore ways to remove unnecessary hindrances in granting visas to guests invited from abroad" to attend international conferences.

At present almost all persons invited from non-Communist countries are allowed to attend international conferences held in the United States. However, those who are or have at any time been members of a Communist or Communist-front organization are first denied visas and then subjected to delays of up to 6 weeks while the Departments of State and Justice process an application for an individual waiver of the provision of law excluding all past or present Communists. The delays and embarrassment involved in obtaining permission to enter the United States for even 5 days under the present procedure have caused some guests to abandon plans to attend conferences, have made the United States a less attractive location for international conferences, and have marred this country's image as a free and open society.

Under the new procedure, upon receipt of the description of a proposed international conference, the Secretary of State may recommend to the Attorney General that the national interest requires a group waiver of the provision of law which would otherwise automatically exclude all persons invited to the conference who had at any time been associated with a Communist party. If the Attorney General grants a group waiver, our embassies and consulates abroad will then be able to issue a visa promptly to any invitee who is otherwise eligible.

Visas will, of course, continue to be denied

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on May 9.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

in any individual case in which there is reason to believe that a particular invitee's visit to the United States would be contrary to our national interest, or might endanger the national security, or might be inconsistent with existing international agreements.

Additional Foreign Passports Valid Beyond Expiration Date

SUDAN AND VIET NAM¹

Validity of Foreign Passports

Sudan and Viet Nam are added to the list of countries which have entered into agreements with the Government of the United States whereby their passports are recognized as valid for the return of the bearer to the country of the foreign issuing authority for a period of at least six months beyond the expiration date specified in the passport.

This notice amends Public Notice 238 of November 17, 1964 (29 F.R. 16097).²

PHILIP B. HEYMANN,
*Acting Administrator, Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs.*

APRIL 27, 1966.

¹ Public Notice 244; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 6794.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 890.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29, 1965; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1966.

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29, 1965; Luxembourg, October 3, 1963; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881).

Ratifications deposited: Finland, December 17, 1965; Mali, December 18, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1405 PUBLICATION 8086 MAY 30, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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"The plain, blunt truth is that contemporary man still conceives of war and peace in much the same stereotyped terms that his ancestors did. The fact that these ancestors, both recent and remote, were conspicuously unsuccessful at avoiding war, and enlarging peace, doesn't seem to dampen our capacity for cliches."

Security in the Contemporary World

by Robert S. McNamara
*Secretary of Defense*¹

Any American would be fortunate to visit this lovely island city, in this hospitable land. But there is a special satisfaction for a Secretary of Defense to cross the longest border in the world and realize that it is also the least armed border in the world. It prompts one to reflect how negative and narrow a notion of defense still clouds our century.

There is still among us an almost eradicable tendency to think of our security problem as being exclusively a military problem—and to think of the military problem as being exclusively a weapons-system or hardware problem.

The plain, blunt truth is that contemporary man still conceives of war and peace in much the same stereotyped terms that his ancestors did. The fact that these ancestors, both recent and remote, were conspicuously unsuccessful at avoiding war, and enlarging peace, doesn't seem to dampen our capacity for cliches.

We still tend to conceive of national security almost solely as a state of armed readiness: a vast, awesome arsenal of weaponry.

We still tend to assume that it is primarily this purely military ingredient that creates security.

We are still haunted by this concept of military hardware.

But how limited a concept this actually is becomes apparent when one ponders the kind of peace that exists between the United States and Canada.

It is a very cogent example. Here we are, two modern nations, highly developed technologically, each with immense territory, both enriched with great reserves of natural resources, each militarily sophisticated; and yet we sit across from one another, divided by an unguarded frontier of thousands of miles, and there is not a remotest set of circumstances, in any imaginable time frame of the future, in which our two nations would wage war on one another.

It is so unthinkable an idea as to be totally absurd. But *why* is that so?

Is it because we are both ready in an instant to hurl our military hardware at one another? Is it because we are both zeroed in on one another's vital targets? Is it because we are both armed to our technological teeth that we do not go to war? The whole notion, as applied to our two countries, is ludicrous.

¹ Address made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Montreal, Canada, on May 18.

Canada and the United States are at peace for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with our mutual military readiness. We are at peace—truly at peace—because of the vast fund of compatible beliefs, common principles, and shared ideals. We have our differences and our diversity—and let us hope for the sake of a mutually rewarding relationship we never become sterile carbon copies of one another. But the whole point is that our basis of mutual peace has nothing whatever to do with our military hardware.

Now this is not to say, obviously enough, that the concept of military deterrence is no longer relevant in the contemporary world. Unhappily, it still is critically relevant with respect to our potential adversaries. But it has no relevance whatever between the United States and Canada.

We are not adversaries. We are not going to become adversaries. And it is not mutual military deterrence that keeps us from becoming adversaries. It is mutual respect for common principles.

Now I mention this—as obvious as it all is—simply as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of the concept that military hardware is the exclusive or even the primary ingredient of permanent peace in the mid-20th century.

In the United States over the past 5 years, we have achieved a considerably improved balance in our total military posture. That was the mandate I received from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and with their support, and that of the Congress, we have been able to create a strengthened force structure of land, sea, and air components—with a vast increase in mobility and materiel and with a massive superiority in nuclear retaliatory power over any combination of potential adversaries.

Our capabilities for nuclear, conventional, and countersubversive war have all been broadened and improved; and we have accomplished this through military budgets that were in fact lesser percentages of our gross national product than in the past.

From the point of view of combat readi-

ness, the United States has never been militarily stronger. We intend to maintain that readiness.

But if we think profoundly about the matter, it is clear that this purely military posture is not the central element in our security. A nation can reach the point at which it does not buy more security for itself simply by buying more military hardware. We are at that point.

The decisive factor for a powerful nation—already adequately armed—is the character of its relationships with the world.

In this respect, there are three broad groups of nations: first, those that are struggling to develop; secondly, those free nations that have reached a level of strength and prosperity that enables them to contribute to the peace of the world; and finally, those nations who might be tempted to make themselves our adversaries. For each of these groups, the United States, to preserve its own intrinsic security, has to have distinctive sets of relationships.

First, we have to help protect those developing countries which genuinely need and request our help and which, as an essential precondition, are willing and able to help themselves.

Second, we have to encourage and achieve a more effective partnership with those nations who can and should share international peacekeeping responsibilities.

Third, we must do all we realistically can to reduce the risk of conflict with those who might be tempted to take up arms against us.

Let us examine these three sets of relationships in detail.

The Developing Nations

First, the developing nations. Roughly 100 countries today are caught up in the difficult transition from traditional to modern societies. There is no uniform rate of progress among them, and they range from primitive mosaic societies—fractured by tribalism and held feebly together by the slenderest of political sinews—to relatively

sophisticated countries well on the road to agricultural sufficiency and industrial competence.

This sweeping surge of development, particularly across the whole southern half of the globe, has no parallel in history. It has turned traditionally listless areas of the world into seething cauldrons of change. On the whole, it has not been a very peaceful process.

In the last 8 years alone there have been no less than 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence, each of them specifically designed as a serious challenge to the authority, or the very existence, of the government in question. Eighty-two different governments have been directly involved.

What is striking is that only 15 of these 164 significant resorts to violence have been military conflicts between two states. And not a single one of the 164 conflicts has been a formally declared war. Indeed, there has not been a formal declaration of war—anywhere in the world—since World War II.

The planet is becoming a more dangerous place to live on, not merely because of a potential nuclear holocaust but also because of the large number of *de facto* conflicts and because the trend of such conflicts is growing rather than diminishing. At the beginning of 1958, there were 23 prolonged insurgencies going on about the world. As of February 1, 1966, there were 40. Further, the total number of outbreaks of violence has increased each year: In 1958, there were 34; in 1965, there were 58.

The Relationship of Violence and Economic Status

But what is most significant of all is that there is a direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries afflicted. The World Bank divides nations on the basis of per capita income into four categories: rich, middle-income, poor, and very poor.

The rich nations are those with a per capita income of \$750 per year or more.

The current U.S. level is more than \$2,700. There are 27 of these rich nations. They possess 75 percent of the world's wealth, though roughly only 25 percent of the world's population.

Since 1958, only one of these 27 nations has suffered a major internal upheaval on its own territory. But observe what happens at the other end of the economic scale. Among the 38 very poor nations—those with a per capita income of under \$100 a year—not less than 32 have suffered significant conflicts. Indeed, they have suffered an average of two major outbreaks of violence per country in the 8-year period. That is a great deal of conflict. What is worse, it has been predominantly conflict of a prolonged nature.

The trend holds predictably constant in the case of the two other categories: the poor and the middle-income nations. Since 1958, 87 percent of the very poor nations, 69 percent of the poor nations, and 48 percent of the middle-income nations have suffered serious violence.

There can, then, be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness. And the trend of such violence is up, not down.

Now, it would perhaps be somewhat reassuring if the gap between the rich nations and the poor nations were closing and economic backwardness were significantly receding. But it is not. The economic gap is widening.

By the year 1970 over one-half of the world's total population will live in the independent nations sweeping across the southern half of the planet. But this hungry half of the human race will by then command only one-sixth of the world's total of goods and services. By the year 1975 the dependent children of these nations alone—children under 15 years of age—will equal the total population of the developed nations to the north.

Even in our own abundant societies, we have reason enough to worry over the tensions that coil and tighten among underprivileged young people and finally flail

out in delinquency and crime. What are we to expect from a whole hemisphere of youth where mounting frustrations are likely to fester into eruptions of violence and extremism?

Annual per capita income in roughly half of the 80 underdeveloped nations that are members of the World Bank is rising by a paltry 1 percent a year or less. By the end of the century these nations, at their present rates of growth, will reach a per capita income of barely \$170 a year. The United States, by the same criterion, will attain a per capita income of \$4,500.

The conclusion to all of this is blunt and inescapable: Given the certain connection between economic stagnation and the incidence of violence, the years that lie ahead for the nations in the southern half of the globe are pregnant with violence.

U.S. Security and the Newly Developing World

This would be true even if no threat of Communist subversion existed—as it clearly does. Both Moscow and Peking, however harsh their internal differences, regard the whole modernization process as an ideal environment for the growth of communism. Their experience with subversive internal war is extensive, and they have developed a considerable array of both doctrine and practical measures in the art of political violence.

What is often misunderstood is that Communists are capable of subverting, manipulating, and finally directing for their own ends the wholly legitimate grievances of a developing society.

But it would be a gross oversimplification to regard communism as the central factor in every conflict throughout the underdeveloped world. Of the 149 serious internal insurgencies in the past 8 years, Communists have been involved in only 58 of them—38 percent of the total—and this includes seven instances in which a Communist regime itself was the target of the uprising.

Whether Communists are involved or not, violence anywhere in a taut world transmits

sharp signals through the complex ganglia of international relations; and the security of the United States is related to the security and stability of nations half a globe away.

But neither conscience nor sanity itself suggests that the United States is, should, or could be the global gendarme. Quite the contrary. Experience confirms what human nature suggests: that in most instances of internal violence the local people themselves are best able to deal directly with the situation within the framework of their own traditions.

The United States has no mandate from on high to police the world and no inclination to do so. There have been classic cases in which our deliberate nonaction was the wisest action of all. Where our help is not sought, it is seldom prudent to volunteer. Certainly we have no charter to rescue floundering regimes who have brought violence on themselves by deliberately refusing to meet the legitimate expectations of their citizenry.

Further, throughout the next decade advancing technology will reduce the requirements for bases and staging rights at particular locations abroad, and the whole pattern of forward deployment will gradually change.

But, though all these caveats are clear enough, the irreducible fact remains that our security is related directly to the security of the newly developing world. And our role must be precisely this: to help provide security to those developing nations which genuinely need and request our help and which demonstrably are willing and able to help themselves.

Security and Development

The rub comes in this: We do not always grasp the meaning of the word "security" in this context. In a modernizing society, security means development.

Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not military force, though it may involve it. Security is

not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it.

Security is development. Without development, there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain "secure." It cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature.

If security implies anything, it implies a minimal measure of order and stability. Without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are simply not possible. They are not possible because human nature cannot be frustrated beyond intrinsic limits. It reacts because it must.

Now, that is what we do not always understand, and that is also what governments of modernizing nations do not always understand. But by emphasizing that security arises from development, I do not say that an underdeveloped nation cannot be subverted from within, or be aggressed upon from without, or be the victim of a combination of the two. It can. And to prevent any or all of these conditions, a nation does require appropriate military capabilities to deal with the specific problem. But the specific military problem is only a narrow facet of the broader security problem.

Military force can help provide law and order but only to the degree that a basis for law and order already exists in the developing society: a basic willingness on the part of the people to cooperate. The law and order is a shield, behind which the central fact of security—development—can be achieved.

Now we are not playing a semantic game with these words. The trouble is that we have been lost in a semantic jungle for too long. We have come to identify "security" with exclusively military phenomena, and most particularly with military hardware. But it just isn't so. And we need to accommodate to the facts of the matter if we want to see security survive and grow in the southern half of the globe.

Development means economic, social, and

political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living, and the word "reasonable" in this context requires continual redefinition. What is "reasonable" in an earlier stage of development will become "unreasonable" in a later stage.

As development progresses, security progresses. And when the people of a nation have organized their own human and natural resources to provide themselves with what they need and expect out of life—and have learned to compromise peacefully among competing demands in the larger national interest—then their resistance to disorder and violence will be enormously increased.

Conversely, the tragic need of desperate men to resort to force to achieve the inner imperatives of human decency will diminish.

Military and Economic Spheres of U.S. Aid

Now, I have said that the role of the United States is to help provide security to these modernizing nations, providing they need and request our help and are clearly willing and able to help themselves. But what should our help be? Clearly, it should be help toward development.

In the military sphere, that involves two broad categories of assistance.

We should help the developing nation with such training and equipment as is necessary to maintain the protective shield behind which development can go forward. The dimensions of that shield vary from country to country, but what is essential is that it should be a shield and not a capacity for external aggression.

The second, and perhaps less understood category of military assistance in a modernizing nation, is training in civic action. Civic action is another one of those semantic puzzles. Too few Americans—and too few officials in developing nations—really comprehend what military civic action means.

Essentially, it means using indigenous military forces for nontraditional military projects, projects that are useful to the

local population in fields such as education, public works, health, sanitation, agriculture—indeed, anything connected with economic or social progress.

It has had some impressive results. In the past 4 years the U.S.-assisted civic action program, worldwide, has constructed or repaired more than 10,000 miles of roads, built over 1,000 schools, hundreds of hospitals and clinics, and has provided medical and dental care to approximately 4 million people.

What is important is that all this was done by indigenous men in uniform. Quite apart from the developmental projects themselves, the program powerfully alters the negative image of the military man as the oppressive preserver of the stagnant *status quo*.

But assistance in the purely military sphere is not enough. Economic assistance is also essential. The President is determined that our aid should be hardheaded and rigorously realistic, that it should deal directly with the roots of underdevelopment and not merely attempt to alleviate the symptoms. His bedrock principle is that U.S. economic aid—no matter what its magnitude—is futile unless the country in question is resolute in making the primary effort itself. That will be the criterion, and that will be the crucial condition for all our future assistance.

Only the developing nations themselves can take the fundamental measures that make outside assistance meaningful. These measures are often unpalatable—and frequently call for political courage and decisiveness. But to fail to undertake painful, but essential, reform inevitably leads to far more painful revolutionary violence. Our economic assistance is designed to offer a reasonable alternative to that violence. It is designed to help substitute peaceful progress for tragic internal conflict.

The United States intends to be compassionate and generous in this effort, but it is not an effort it can carry exclusively by itself. And thus it looks to those nations who have reached the point of self-sustaining prosperity to increase their contribution

to the development and, thus, to the security of the modernizing world.

Sharing Peacekeeping Responsibilities

And that brings me to the second set of relationships that I underscored at the outset; it is the policy of the United States to encourage and achieve a more effective partnership with those nations who can, and should, share international peacekeeping responsibilities.

America has devoted a higher proportion of its gross national product to its military establishment than any other major free-world nation. This was true even before our increased expenditures in Southeast Asia. We have had, over the last few years, as many men in uniform as all the nations of Western Europe combined, even though they have a population half again greater than our own.

Now, the American people are not going to shirk their obligations in any part of the world, but they clearly cannot be expected to bear a disproportionate share of the common burden indefinitely. If, for example, other nations genuinely believe—as they say they do—that it is in the common interest to deter the expansion of Red China's economic and political control beyond its national boundaries, then they must take a more active role in guarding the defense perimeter.

Let me be perfectly clear. This is not to question the policy of neutralism or non-alignment of any particular nation. But it is to emphasize that the independence of such nations can, in the end, be fully safeguarded only by collective agreements among themselves and their neighbors.

The plain truth is the day is coming when no single nation, however powerful, can undertake by itself to keep the peace outside its own borders. Regional and international organizations for peacekeeping purposes are as yet rudimentary, but they must grow in experience and be strengthened by deliberate and practical cooperative action.

In this matter, the example of Canada is a model for nations everywhere. As Prime Minister Pearson pointed out eloquently in New York just last week: Canada "is as deeply involved in the world's affairs as any country of its size. We accept this because we have learned over 50 years that isolation from the policies that determine war does not give us immunity from the bloody, sacrificial consequences of their failure. We learned that in 1914 and again in 1939. . . . That is why we have been proud to send our men to take part in every peacekeeping operation of the United Nations—in Korea, and Kashmir, and the Suez, and the Congo, and Cyprus."

The Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic, the more than 30 nations contributing troops or supplies to assist the Government of South Vietnam, indeed even the parallel efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pakistan-India conflict—these efforts, together with those of the U.N., are the first attempts to substitute multinational for unilateral policing of violence. They point to the peacekeeping patterns of the future.

We must not merely applaud the idea. We must dedicate talent, resources, and hard practical thinking to its implementation.

In Western Europe, an area whose burgeoning economic vitality stands as a monument to the wisdom of the Marshall Plan, the problems of security are neither static nor wholly new. Fundamental changes are under way, though certain inescapable realities remain. The conventional forces of NATO, for example, still require a nuclear backdrop far beyond the capability of any Western European nation to supply, and the United States is fully committed to provide that major nuclear deterrent.

However, the European members of the alliance have a natural desire to participate more actively in nuclear planning. A central task of the alliance today is, therefore, to work out the relationships and institutions through which shared nuclear planning can be effective. We have made a

practical and promising start in the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers.

Common planning and consultation are essential aspects of any sensible substitute to the unworkable and dangerous alternative of independent national nuclear forces within the alliance. And even beyond the alliance we must find the means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is a clear imperative.

There are, of course, risks in nonproliferation arrangements, but they cannot be compared with the infinitely greater risks that would arise out of the increase in national nuclear stockpiles. In the calculus of risk, to proliferate independent national nuclear forces is not a mere arithmetical addition of danger. We would not be merely adding up risks. We would be insanely multiplying them.

If we seriously intend to pass on a world to our children that is not threatened by nuclear holocaust, we must come to grips with the problem of proliferation. A reasonable nonproliferation agreement is feasible. For there is no adversary with whom we do not share a common interest in avoiding mutual destruction triggered by an irresponsible *n*th power.

Dealing With Potential Adversaries

That brings me to the third and last set of relationships the United States must deal with: those with nations who might be tempted to take up arms against us.

These relationships call for realism. But realism is not a hardened, inflexible, unimaginative attitude. The realistic mind is a restlessly creative mind, free of naive delusions but full of practical alternatives. There are practical alternatives to our current relationships with both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

A vast ideological chasm separates us from them—and to a degree separates them from one another. There is nothing to be gained from our seeking an ideological rapprochement; but breaching the isolation of great nations like Red China, even when

that isolation is largely of its own making, reduces the danger of potentially catastrophic misunderstandings and increases the incentive on both sides to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force.

There are many ways in which we can build bridges toward nations who would cut themselves off from meaningful contact with us. We can do so with properly balanced trade relations, diplomatic contacts, and in some cases even by exchanges of military observers. We have to know where it is we want to place this bridge, what sort of traffic we want to travel over it, and on what mutual foundations the whole structure can be designed.

There are no one-cliff bridges. If you are going to span a chasm, you have to rest the structure on both cliffs. Now cliffs, generally speaking, are rather hazardous places. Some people are afraid even to look over the edge. But in a thermonuclear world, we cannot afford any political acrophobia.

President Johnson has put the matter squarely: By building bridges to those who make themselves our adversaries, "we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust, and a community of effort."²

With respect to a "community of effort" let me suggest a concrete proposal for our own present young generation in the United States.

It is a committed and dedicated generation. It has proven that in its enormously impressive performance in the Peace Corps overseas and in its willingness to volunteer for a final assault on such poverty and lack of opportunity that still remain in our own country.

As matters stand, our present Selective Service System draws on only a minority of eligible young men. That is an inequity.

It seems to me that we could move toward remedying that inequity by asking

every young person in the United States to give 2 years of service to his country—whether in one of the military services, in the Peace Corps, or in some other volunteer developmental work at home or abroad. We could encourage other countries to do the same, and we could work out exchange programs—much as the Peace Corps is already planning to do.

While this is not an altogether new suggestion, it has been criticized as inappropriate while we are engaged in a shooting war. But I believe precisely the opposite is the case. It is more appropriate now than ever. For it would underscore what our whole purpose is in Viet-Nam—and indeed anywhere in the world where coercion, or injustice, or lack of decent opportunity still holds sway. It would make meaningful the central concept of security—a world of decency and development where every man can feel that his personal horizon is rimmed with hope.

Mutual interest, mutual trust, mutual effort—those are the goals. Can we achieve those goals with the Soviet Union, and with Communist China? Can they achieve them with one another?

The answer to these questions lies in the answer to an even more fundamental question. Who is man?

Is he a rational animal? If he is, then the goals can ultimately be achieved. If he is not, then there is little point in making the effort.

All the evidence of history suggests that man is indeed a rational animal but with a near infinite capacity for folly. His history seems largely a halting, but persistent, effort to raise his reason above his animality. He draws blueprints for utopia. But never quite gets it built. In the end he plugs away obstinately with the only building material really ever at hand—his own part-comic, part-tragic, part-cussed, but part-glorious nature.

I, for one, would not count a global free society out. Coercion, after all, merely captures man. Freedom captivates him.

² BULLETIN of May 23, 1966, p. 794.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 17

Press release 114 dated May 17

I have no formal statement today. But I would like to comment briefly on the meetings we have had this week with Mr. George Thomson, a member of the British Government, who has been making a trip around a number of the NATO capitals to talk about the present issues before NATO.

We have seen a high degree of unanimity among the Fourteen and their attitude toward the recent announcements by France of certain withdrawals and certain actions which France proposes to take in NATO.¹

A number of issues are being discussed among the Fourteen in the North Atlantic Council in Paris and among governments.

Some of these are multilateral in character, such as the transfer or location of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Command Europe] Headquarters, the NATO military headquarters. Others are bilateral, such as some of the discussions—some of the arrangements we have with France on bases and pipelines and things of that sort.

We would anticipate that discussions with France would be undertaken as soon as a little further clarification is obtained.

We have reason to believe that the attitude of the Fourteen will be unified and they will be working together on these matters.

It would not be right to speculate along the lines of some speculation that I have seen that there are major differences or any significant differences between us, for ex-

ample, and our friends in Britain on these matters, or indeed among the other members of the alliance.

We have greatly valued Mr. Thomson's visit and feel that his excursion among the NATO capitals has been a very useful thing for the alliance as a whole.

Now I will take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday one of the Buddhist leaders, Tri Quang, addressed a request to the President, according to press reports, for assistance in his efforts in Viet-Nam. Can you tell us what the President's reply is?

A. Well, our representative in Hue has seen Tri Quang and has informed him that our attitude is that everyone should do their best to resolve their differences in South Viet-Nam and permit the processes for establishing a constitutional government to go forward.

We believe that in this situation it is very important that all of those elements who join in rejecting what Hanoi and the National Liberation Front are trying to do to South Viet-Nam should set aside lesser differences and pull themselves together for a national effort.

Now, when the military leadership last January 15 announced that they themselves wished to move toward a constitutional government, when they reaffirmed that at Honolulu, and where we were able to give it our own support and good wishes, we felt that was a major step in moving toward a type of consolidation in South Viet-Nam that we have not seen for the past 20 years.

Now, we do know, all of us, that there are some differences there that are longstanding

¹ For text of a joint declaration by the United States and 13 other NATO members, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536; for U.S.-French exchanges of aide memoire, see *ibid.*, Apr. 18, 1966, p. 617, and May 2, 1966, p. 699.

—those between the Buddhists and the Catholics, those between the Annamese and the Cochinese; perhaps some differences with the million refugees who came from North Viet-Nam back in 1955 and 1956 to escape that regime up there. We are aware of those differences and the importance of the issues involved to the people concerned.

But what is needed here is a basic constitutional agreement among all of these elements in order that they can have a free nation, a free society, a democratic society which can get on with the great revolutionary tasks in the economic and social field that are so desperately needed by the people in the countryside.

You can be sure that all of our influence will be used to try to persuade all elements there to set aside their lesser issues in order to get on with the great national tasks confronting the country.

Political Situation in South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your estimate of the effect, if any, of Marshal Ky's [South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky] action in Da Nang on the political situation in general, and on the progress toward elections in particular?

A. Well, I think there may be some further disagreements expressed in one form or another between now and the elections for the constituent assembly.

I do note that the committee which is working on the electoral procedures for electing a constituent assembly continues in session, is continuing its work. We hope that they will complete that work and that the arrangements for the election of a constituent assembly can shortly be announced.

But it is important for everyone to act with good will and restraint in order to let that process go forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your thoughts on whether General Ky was justified in moving his troops into Da Nang?

A. I would not want to pass a judgment

on that. He felt and the Directorate felt that it was necessary for the Government to restore its writ in Da Nang. They moved to do so. This is something on which they made the judgment. As you know, this was not a joint operation; it did not involve the United States—United States forces. But I would not wish to pass judgment on it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we said anything to Marshal Ky comparable to what we have said to Tri Quang in a direct way?

A. What I have just outlined is our attitude toward any of these, what I call, lesser differences, something that we have been saying to anyone and everyone whose ear we could get, with whom we are in touch, and that means a great many of them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some observers in Viet-Nam have expressed the view that Premier Ky's action may lead to a civil war of the kind that could jeopardize the entire American presence in Viet-Nam. Do you read it that way?

A. I do not see that prospect at the present time. There are considerable elements there who have not been in favor of the attitude expressed by Tri Quang, for example. When the Buddhist Institute called for a big rally—when was it?—yesterday, I think they had something like a thousand people there, out of a city of 2½ million.

The principal geographical area which is in control of the so-called resistance forces is now the town of Hue, which is the extreme northern part of the country. The back country around Hue is not apparently in the same mood as the people inside the town.

So I would not expect that this would lead to civil war. There could be civil strife of one sort or another. But we do not see the sides being drawn for a major conflict among the South Vietnamese around the country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you anticipating in this situation considerable tension at Hue if the Central Government tries to exert its authority there in terms of what you would call civil strife?

A. Well, I would not want to speculate on whether the Government might take any action with respect to Hue or what the effect would be were it to do so.

Thus far I am glad to be able to report that the organized units in that area are not battling each other. They are at something of a standoff. They are not intermingling with each other by force. And we would hope that these leaders could work these matters out without that kind of strife.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you think that the NATO Council could remain in Paris even after the removal of SACEUR to another place, and did you reach any understanding with Mr. Thomson on the subject?

A. Well, it would not be for Mr. Thomson and us to sit down, as a party of two, to resolve a question of that sort. That is a matter being discussed in the NATO Council, and I have no doubt that it will be discussed further at the ministerial meeting in Brussels in early June. It is possible that it might be resolved then. But I would not want to try to anticipate an answer there. That is a matter on which the governments are consulting now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are not saying that the United States does not have a position on that question, are you?

A. No.

Q. What is the United States' position?

A. Well, if I had wanted to say that, I would have said it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the administration intend to continue in its efforts to placate Mr. Nasser [President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic] with food, particularly in view of the recent rash of insults and threats from Cairo?

A. Well, we have certain requests in front of us at the present time which we are studying against the background of the entire situation. I wouldn't want to anticipate what the final results of that might be. We

are concerned about some of the things that have been said there recently and the general state of relationships between ourselves and the U.A.R. Government on matters of great concern to us, such as Viet-Nam and other issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the seriousness of the Chinese charge last Thursday [May 12], how do you read the relative silence from Peiping since that time on the issue of alleged intrusion into Chinese airspace?

A. Well, I think you will probably see some tickers on that later this afternoon. They are beginning to come in. The Chinese have returned to the charge. The only information that we have is information made available in Saigon the other day.

Peiping's Disarmament Proposals Inadequate

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that same connection, Chou En-lai claimed that the United States has turned down or rejected an offer by him or by China to agree not to strike each other first in a nuclear attack. Would you have any comment on that?

A. Well, we are aware of their proposal on that. But we did not—and that proposal has been made by others and it has been made publicly from time to time. But we did not accept the Chinese Communist proposal because we believe that these disarmament measures should be carried out under strict and effective international control so that all parties can be assured of honoring their obligations. Mere declarations on such matters would not be adequate.

And so we are very much concerned about that, that any measures that involve the prohibition or the control of nuclear weapons should deal with the question of verification and inspection. We have ourselves put forward some very far-reaching proposals about limiting nuclear weapons and freezing and possibly reducing nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. You recall that the first Chinese proposal was made in connection

with their own nuclear tests. They had refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty, and they have made certain suggestions which seem to be an attempt to soften the impact upon world opinion of their gross failure to cooperate in a worldwide effort to limit the further spread of these weapons.

Now, we have suggested that they ought to be associated with a preparatory committee, the so-called exploratory group, which might try to work out arrangements for a world disarmament conference. But we have had no indication from the Chinese that they are willing to do that. They have not responded constructively on those occasions when we ourselves have raised the disarmament question in our bilateral talks. We are prepared to sit down with them, as we have said many times, to talk about disarmament, such problems as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but we can't take up these great issues of war and peace solely on the basis of unverified declarations which may or may not mean anything.

We have had a fairly recent agreement with Peiping, the agreement of 1962 on Laos, and we can't find that Peiping has lifted a finger to assure that that agreement is complied with. Indeed, we have every reason to believe that they have encouraged its violation, both in terms of keeping North Vietnamese troops in Laos, contrary to the agreement, and using Laos as an infiltration route into South Viet-Nam, contrary to the agreements. So we would like to see an organized peace, arrangements which can be reliable, in order to get on with these great tasks of disarmament and assuring the safety and the independence of countries large and small.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the Chinese returning to the charge about the alleged penetration of their border. Is there anything further that can be said? The original United States response essentially amounted to a "No comment." Has investigation revealed anything further?

A. I think there was a statement from

Saigon on that matter which carried the information available at that time on the basis of debriefing and other types of information. There is nothing to add to what was said the other day from Saigon.

NLF Interference Not Welcomed

Q. Mr. Secretary, before the American troop buildup in Viet-Nam, even officials of the administration were heard to say that a troop buildup there would be poised on a foundation of quicksand as far as our political stability in the Vietnamese Government is concerned, and critics of the administration have made the same point since the buildup. Do you feel that these views of events of the past 6 weeks have been proved correct?

A. I don't recall officials talking about quicksand. Of course there have been problems there all along in this direction, but I think the element which holds them together at the end of the day is their common rejection of what Hanoi and the National Liberation Front are trying to do to them. And it would be interesting to see what response will be made to the attempt in the last 24 hours or so of the National Liberation Front to get in on this matter in South Viet-Nam and to try to throw its support to the so-called resistance forces.

I think there will be a number of those who have been opposed to the present government in Saigon who would not welcome this attempt by the National Liberation Front to get in on it, because we have found in our contacts with the leaders of all of these groups that they do have a common interest in seeing to it that the effort of Hanoi to take over the country by force does not succeed. And I think that—certainly our hope is that—that common element would cause them to sort these problems out and assure the stability which is very important.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, Senator Fulbright said today before the National Press Club that he did not find it very per-

suasive to proclaim a desire for a compromised peace while, he says, "we are escalating the war by such acts as bombing the biggest North Vietnamese electrical plant." What do you say to that?

A. Well, I think the record on this is to me pretty clear and pretty persuasive. We held off striking the North for 4 years or so, during which there was increasing infiltration from the North, including elements of the regular forces from North Viet-Nam. The 325th North Vietnamese Division came from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam before we started the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

Since that time, there have been two pauses, so-called, two suspensions of the bombing to provide some exploration of the possibilities for a peaceful settlement. Both those efforts came to nothing, even though many governments in different parts of the world made a major effort, certainly during the 37-day pause over the turn of this year, to move this matter toward peace.

Now, bombing is going on in the South. We haven't bombed anybody's embassy in Hanoi, but they have bombed our Embassy in Saigon. Arms continue to flow. Men continue to come. We have tried all over the earth to find an answer to the question, What else would stop if the bombing stopped? What would the other side do? What would their reciprocal action be? Would this be a step toward peace? Or would they simply take advantage of any such effort to build up their infiltration and to step up as much as possible their military effort?

So we are where we were before. We would like to know what else would happen. Now, I think it isn't as easy now to speculate about this as it might have been earlier, because we have had—we have tried it out. We have tried it out on two occasions. So we would like to have some indication from the other side that something else would happen that would move this matter toward peace before we feel that we can stop the bombing in North Viet-Nam.

East-West Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, we know it is something of a wrench to talk about NATO when you have a war going on in Viet-Nam. But, given the fact that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are in a certain degree of disarray 21 years after the end of World War II, do you foresee that the world is moving into a situation where it will be possible in the next year or so to open up the European dialog between the two sides and possibly come to some new conclusions or develop the détente; or are we totally frozen because of the war in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I think there is no doubt that Viet-Nam contributes to a general atmosphere which makes it somewhat more difficult to explore particular and further points of possible agreement between Eastern Europe and, say, Western Europe and ourselves. I think this is partly true because Peiping has been bitterly criticizing and abusing Moscow and leaving the impression that any effort made by Moscow to talk sense with the West or to reach new points of agreement will be looked upon as a betrayal of Hanoi. But I don't believe myself that we should approach it from that point of view.

I think we should continue to explore, as we have been doing, with representatives of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, what could be done on particular points—whether disarmament, or in trade, or whatever it might be.

Now, we do believe that the possibilities for far-reaching agreements between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries are greater if there is unity and solidarity in NATO. I myself do not believe that if the nation-states of the West go off and pursue divergent policies and are unable to act together that we can resolve such questions as disarmament, or the German question, or these other great issues between the East and West.

I think that the solidarity of NATO has had a good deal to do with reducing tension in Europe, in reducing the sense of threat from Eastern Europe and making possible

such agreements as, say, the nuclear test ban treaty. So I would like to emphasize that I think that the 14 members of NATO in no sense are indifferent to the possibilities of improving the East-West relations. Indeed, solidarity has great advantages from just that point of view, and we hope to explore that fully in the months to come, despite Viet-Nam.

Yes, sir.

Review of Vietnamese Situation

Q. Does the recent review at the White House,² with Lodge [U.S. Ambassador to South Viet-Nam Henry Cabot Lodge], of the Vietnamese situation indicate the need for any kind of a change in our policy or action there?

A. No. This review, which we were, happily, able to have with Ambassador Lodge this past week, went right through a very long agenda and gave attention to a great many details, as well as to some of the larger questions. I think the greater part of the time was spent on economic and social questions and how to get on as effectively as possible with the conclusions reached at Honolulu.³ Obviously, we were interested in and concerned about the more recent developments surrounding the differences about the constitutional process in which they are now engaged.

But I did not, before he came, anticipate the need for major changes in policy, nor did those emerge in the course of our discussions. It was a broad review of a great many things, with heavy emphasis on the civilian side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a large number of Members of Congress are reporting that no matter how understandable it may be—the turmoil in Viet-Nam, from your point of view—the American people are getting some-

what restive about the idea of shedding American blood on behalf of people who, for one reason or another, good or bad, don't seem to be able to settle their own quarrels. I wonder if you could tell us how, and in what way, you are conveying this idea to all the factions in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I think it should be obvious to our friends in South Viet-Nam that there is a restiveness here. And when the American people are called upon to make a major effort to support the independence, the safety, of a country like South Viet-Nam, that their own attitude, their own solidarity, their own effort, are crucial elements in the combined determination. That is being conveyed to them. As a matter of fact, they can read it for themselves. But that is being conveyed to them and is a part of our effort to emphasize to them that it is very important that they get on with this constitutional process and set aside some of these issues that appear to be secondary to the issue of achieving a safe country, about which they can perhaps quarrel at their leisure later on.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you amplify a little bit the reasons for Mr. Lodge's visit to Seoul on his way back to Saigon? Is that an alliance that needs some firming up, or would you—

A. No. As you know, Korea has a very large number of troops in South Viet-Nam and is in the process of sending more. We felt that it was desirable for him to stop by there briefly on his way back in order to bring them up to date on what has been happening in South Viet-Nam and in order to give them a chance to go into any questions they might wish to raise.

This is a matter, it seems to me, of a perfectly normal consultation between ourselves and Korea, given the fact that we are sharing the burdens there both on the military side and in other respects in Asia.

Q. Thank you.

² For remarks made by President Johnson following a National Security Council meeting on May 10, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 834.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

President Comments on Internal Developments in Viet-Nam

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

We are watching the situation in Viet-Nam very closely. We believe everything possible should be done to bring the various factions to an understanding of the need for unity while the constitutional process is moving forward. That is what our people are trying to do.

General [William C.] Westmoreland and Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge are both in Viet-Nam now. We are in very close contact with them by cable, and our lower-level people have other communication.

The South Vietnamese are trying to build a nation. They have to do this in the teeth of Communist efforts to take the country over by force. It is a hard and a frustrating job, and there is no easy answer, no instant solution to any of the problems they face.

We are not in Viet-Nam to dictate what form of government they should have. We have made it abundantly clear that it is our wish to see them increasingly able to manage their own affairs with the participation of an ever broader share of the population. We regret any diversion from that task and from efforts to defeat the Communist attempt to take over South Viet-Nam.

I will, of course, during the day and the week, and all the time that I am in this office, until we have a satisfactory solution of our problems in that area of the world, be in close touch with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rostow [Walt

¹ Read by the President at his news conference at the White House on May 21.

W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President] and other experts, both here and out there.

I know of nothing that I could add that would contribute to improving the situation. Therefore, I think I have said about all that I can on that general subject today.

Mr. Harriman To Supervise U.S. Actions on POW's in Viet-Nam

*Statement by Robert J. McCloskey*¹

The Secretary has informed me that he has asked Governor Harriman [Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman] to assume general supervision of Department actions concerning prisoners held by both sides in the conflict in Viet-Nam. Governor Harriman's recent discussions in Geneva with the International Committee of the Red Cross were his first actions in this capacity.

Now, the continuing policy of the United States Government is to do everything possible to assist and protect Americans held by North Viet-Nam and by the Viet Cong, to obtain their release at the earliest possible time, to encourage full compliance with the Geneva conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims, and to reduce to a minimum in Viet-Nam the inherent inhumanity of war.² Governor Harriman will insure the determined and effective pursuit of this policy.

¹ Made to news correspondents on May 18. Mr. McCloskey is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

² For the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to Samuel Gonard, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, see BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 447.

"... we are in an era which has been fundamentally affected by certain new phenomena on the human scene, which have propelled educational and cultural relations to the forefront of international relations. If I am right, we are entering an era that can properly be called 'the era of educational and cultural relations.'"

The Era of Educational and Cultural Relations

by Charles Frankel

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

It is my pleasant though somewhat imposing duty to give the concluding lecture in a distinguished series devoted to the human aspects of international relations. In inviting me to take part, Dean [Edmund A.] Gullion suggested that I might deliver not only the last lecture but a summary lecture which might perhaps draw the various themes on which you have touched into focus. I do not know whether I shall succeed, but it seems to me that a lecture on the subject of educational and cultural relations may well meet this purpose. For it seems to me that educational and cultural affairs draw together what is most distinctive and new about the current international scene and offer instruments for diplomacy and foreign policy whose potential ability is enormous and has as yet only begun to be felt.

Educational and cultural affairs, indeed, are not simply instruments of foreign policy. If the considerations I wish to put before you have any validity, they are an essential part of what foreign policy today is all about. They enter into the definition of its ends and

purposes and are not simply instruments for the achievement of ends that have been defined without regard to them. For we are in an era which has been fundamentally affected by certain new phenomena on the human scene, which have propelled educational and cultural relations to the forefront of international relations.

If I am right, we are entering an era that can properly be called "the era of educational and cultural relations." And I believe that President Johnson's recent initiatives in this area—his address at the Smithsonian Institution in September,² his message to Congress at the beginning of February,³ and his submission for consideration by the Congress of the International Education Act of 1966—are expressions of and responses to this era and efforts to stimulate a movement in our country which will help it to accommodate to what this era requires of it.

Educational and cultural relations between different peoples are, of course, not peculiar to our time. The first great epics in Western literature are devoted to the theme. The

¹ Edward L. Bernays Foundation Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass., on Apr. 25 (press release 96).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

³ For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on international education and health, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

Trojan War appears to have been provoked by an excessively eager exercise in cultural exchange—the abduction of Helen. And the Bible contains one episode after another of cultural exchange, and a variety of comments about it. By failing to resist the temptation of the Serpent, Adam and Eve, after all, found themselves transported from the Garden of Eden to a quite different way of life. This is only the first in a long series of instances in which people have identified cultural exchange as the work of the Devil.

On a somewhat less cosmic level, we now have reason to believe that even before the Roman Empire laid out its roads there was an extraordinary commerce between East and West. The traces of pre-Roman Celtic civilization can be found from Britain to the Balkans.

Christianity, as we know, is a standing monument to cultural exchange. St. Paul was a Greek-speaking Roman Jew; St. Augustine moved in the course of his life from North Africa to Britain and sampled, among other points of view, Eastern Manicheism, Greek Skepticism, and Platonism. And at its high point medieval Christianity was enriched by the scholars, teachers, and students from many countries who gathered together at the great centers of Christian learning such as Paris.

Nor has cultural exchange been a purely intellectual or abstract phenomenon. As a result of Marco Polo's voyages, what we now know as spaghetti came to Italy, and the diet and economy of that country were substantially changed. Legend has it that coffee and croissants, that delectable combination, was one of the lasting contributions of the Turkish invasions of Europe. The croissant is the Turkish crescent; and when the Turks were beaten back from the gates of Vienna in 1683, it is reported, they left strange green beans scattered around in their abandoned camps. Vienna was never the same. Whether this particular event is legendary or not, it does point to an important and unduly neglected truth; namely, that war has been one of the principal instrumentalities of cultural diffusion and that, after a war,

victors and vanquished have a way of exchanging their vices.

In the modern world, as we know, cultural exchange has become deliberate, planned, and widespread. The European nations for some centuries deliberately transported their cultures, or bits of their cultures, to the colonial areas. And well-established nations like the Japanese and the Turks, in an effort to avoid being Europeanized at the direction of the Europeans, systematically sent their leaders and young people to various parts of Europe and North America, combing the West for ideas and techniques and adapting them to their own uses.

To speak of educational and cultural relations, then, is certainly not to speak of anything peculiarly new or contemporary. It is to speak of an aspect of human history that has been present from the time that different groups of human beings first came into contact with one another. And as I have already suggested, these relations have been a consequence of war between human groups as well as of peaceful relations between them. A strong argument can even be made that most wars have been important in the long run only for the cultural exchanges they have initiated. In any case, whether in war or in peace, cultural exchange has been a major executive agent in the changes that constitute human history. A powerful school of anthropologists has maintained, indeed, that contact with external cultures is the most important single cause—some have even insisted, the only cause—of the movement out of social inertia into social change.

Nevertheless, there is a difference, and a difference of the greatest significance, I believe, in cultural relations as we know them today. Broadly speaking, I venture to suggest, we may distinguish three great stages in the history of cultural exchange.

In the first stage, which covered the longest period in human history, cultural exchange was simply an accidental byproduct of the contact between different groups. It was not usually sought, and it was frequently resisted.

In the second stage, cultural exchange—

or, at any rate, the triumph of one's own culture over the culture of others—was not accidental but was deliberately sought and promoted. It was a motive as well as a consequence of war, of commerce, of imperial organization and imperial rivalry, and the preponderant influence over it was exercised by government or government-sponsored activities or by churches. This is the period of the great explorations and of colonization, which came to its climax in the 19th century.

Characteristics of the New Era

The third stage is the one in which we have now entered. It is marked by an extraordinary flow of cultural traffic—of people, news, ideas, ideologies, fashions, machines, and passions—between almost all the human groups in the world. This cultural exchange, a good part of which is not deliberately planned or intended, goes farther and penetrates more deeply than any kind of cultural exchange known in the past. And while efforts can and have been made to resist the flow of this traffic, it is probably not fundamentally resistible but is an almost automatic consequence of changes in the character of human thought and work and in the conditions of human travel and communication. Most of us in most parts of the world simply live in a physical, psychological, and moral neighborhood that has an international color and dimension, and we live in such a neighborhood whether we know it or not, or like it or not.

Moreover, this is not all that characterizes this third, relatively new, stage in the history of cultural relations. What also characterizes it is that organized social institutions—churches, universities, foundations, voluntary associations, and governments—also play a heavier role than ever as initiators and regulators of the cultural traffic. In brief, in this third stage cultural exchange is the accidental but at the same time the inexorable consequence of the accelerating contact of different human groups, and it is also deeply affected by deliberately adopted social policies, official and unofficial.

Finally, this cultural exchange has a new quality. Not only do the powerful nations impose themselves on the attention of the less powerful, but the less powerful impose themselves on the attention of the more powerful. A century ago, an untutored inhabitant of an Asiatic city was likely to be made sharply aware every day that there really was a Europe, but a worker in a European factory might well not have the fact that Asia existed clearly in focus in his mind. That is not likely to be the case today. The flow of information, attention, and trouble is in both directions, and the flow is between cultures and peoples which have in the past regarded themselves as remote in history, experience, and destiny.

As in the case of any other so-called "stage" or "era" in history, we can, of course, trace the sources or prototypes of this new era to places and times fairly far back in the past. In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church promoted the idea of a European culture, crossing over the mountains and transcending even the intense feudal loyalties of the period. To some extent, and particularly through its support of learning, the church promoted not only this idea but indeed also its realization in practice.

In the postmedieval era, science and the organization of learned societies also fostered cultural exchanges, as did the gradual growth of the conception that humanists and scholars had a common vocation and a common audience. In the period of great imperial rivalries, artists, writers, philosophers, scientists, and students came and went as individuals to and from the great capitals of Europe. And in the 19th century, at the height of the period of cultural imperialism, in which the richer nations moved out toward the poorer ones, a very powerful countertendency emerged in the great flow of the poor and persecuted and unlettered from the Old World to the New.

Nevertheless, the most decisive characteristics of the new era of cultural relations have emerged only recently. In the present century, and particularly in the last 20

years, we have entered a period in which the internal history of every nation and the intimate daily experience of growing numbers of individuals have been vitally affected by certain radical changes. Among them are the revolution in knowledge and in the place that the man of knowledge occupies in society, the extraordinary revolution in the technology of travel and communication, the advent of the school as a major instrument of social development and social control, and the rapid and now almost universal acceptance of the egalitarian language and moral outlook of democracy. Whatever the practice of a people or a government may be and however various or even bizarre their interpretations of democracy may seem, there is hardly a people or a government in the world today which would not try to explain and justify its behavior in what it presents as democratic terms.

In these factors we have the major sources of the new era of cultural relations. They are of such magnitude that they imply a new era in international relations as well. They have changed the nature and conditions of national power, the character and function of diplomacy, and the very terms, I believe, in which the conception of "national interest" must be defined.

The Revolution in Knowledge

The revolution in knowledge, which is the first of the factors that affect the present scene, has had a number of significant consequences that are relevant to our present scene. In the first place, the massive development of science as a social institution—as a set of arrangements for acquiring, communicating, and assessing information—has advanced and solidified the growth of an international community of coworkers whose standards and temper of mind and, not infrequently, whose loyalties transcend purely parochial barriers. Given the existence of science, even if of nothing else, international affairs are not simply an arena for rivalry, disagreement, and misunderstanding. They are also an arena in which

some men speak the same language, seek the same goals, and have worked out a procedure for the rational resolution of differences of opinion.

Moreover, these men of science have new prestige and influence. For in the last few decades, the traditional relationship between science and technology has been altered. In the past, major technological innovations—like the wheel, the compass, or the steam engine—were often developed without the immediate support of any large body of basic theoretical research. Often, these technological innovations themselves provided instruments and analogies which were used by scientists.

Today, however, basic theoretical research is the indispensable prerequisite for the overwhelming proportion of technological inventions. Research and development is a major component of a modern industrial establishment. The power of the American industrial establishment, for example, probably turns more than anything else on our capacity to devote large numbers of people and large amounts of capital to basic research and development.

Science more than ever before, therefore, is an engine which drives human history along its imperfectly charted road. And with this change there has also come, quite naturally, a new role and influence for scientists and for their typical institutions like the laboratory and the university.

It is no longer possible, therefore, for any country that desires to prosper, and understands the conditions for such prosperity that must now be met, to ignore the peculiar demands and the peculiar mores of the learned community. And under the pressure of scientific standards of workmanship, these demands and these mores are becoming increasingly alike in all countries, increasingly transnational and international. Indeed, not the least of these demands is that the scientific communities of the different nations, if only in their own self-interest, must remain in touch with each other.

Moreover, we must not imagine that the changes which science has brought are only in the field of physical innovation. It is more than evident that the application of new technologies involves great changes in human behavior and the organization of society and that they demand a degree of flexibility and a capacity for quick adaptation on the part of the human animal beyond anything that has been demanded of this animal in the past. Indeed, many technical innovations are actually innovations in the field of human organization. The assembly line and traffic controls are only more obvious examples. And these changes in the ways in which human beings organize their joint ventures have come to be influenced increasingly by fundamental research in the social sciences.

It is true that we continue to depend much more on hunch, on ingenuity, and on folk wisdom in arranging our social affairs than we do in the physical sciences. Nevertheless, it is reasonably plain, I think, that just as the complexities and pressures of modern life have been generated very largely by organized research, the answers to these complexities and pressures, if we find them at all, are also likely to come in large part from organized research. And because organized research is increasingly international in its methods and practical consequences, this means, in effect, that we have systematized and galvanized the process of cultural exchange.

I do not take this, however, to be an optimistic utterance. It defines a problem; it does not offer a solution. For we have a natural interest in maintaining diversity in the world. A great many people in a great many nations resist such changes. A large number of them, given the preeminence of the United States in science and technology, blame these changes on us, even though they are rather the products of a secular change in human knowledge and in the relation of man to his environment. Not least, technology makes trouble because it makes trouble so visibly and noisily and communicates its impact so quickly and so far.

Ease of Communication

The revolution in the technology of travel and communication, indeed, is in itself a second major factor in the emergence of the new era in international affairs that I am attempting to describe. It has made the reporting of news itself a major influence on what actually happens. It has made foreign places realities at the breakfast table every morning. It has put the decisionmakers under extraordinary pressure to make decisions fast and to make half a dozen at once. It has placed a premium on planning and on the capacity to deliberate carefully about hypothetical problems, because the chance to deliberate about real ones is generally likely to be short and not very sweet. And not least, it fosters the impression that we know what is going on and why in other places because we see so much and hear so much about them.

A particularly troublesome example of this may well be our present relations with Western Europe. The natural flow of people, information, and ideas between the United States and Western Europe may well encourage the belief in many people's minds on each side of the Atlantic that they have an accurate understanding of the other side. Certainly, a reasonably large part of the news in European newspapers, for example, is devoted to the American domestic scene. But understanding does not consist in grasping isolated bits of information, numerous as they may be. It consists in knowing how to connect these bits and pieces of information, in being able to place them in the context that explains and illuminates them and guides us in drawing proper inferences from them.

And this understanding in depth cannot be brought into being by a series of reports flashed out into the night. It requires a slower process of education, personal communication, and systematic discourse among those who have the greatest influence in shaping the fundamental categories and habits of thought of a population. Precisely because the peoples of the Atlantic

area hear so much and see so much of each other, there is a strong necessity for systematic programs of educational and cultural exchange across the Atlantic. There is a job for schools and universities to do, and for teachers and students, and it is probably a larger job than before.

Role of the School in Social Development

The job of teachers, students, and educational institutions is perhaps even more evident when we turn to the developing nations. For it is plain, to begin with the most elementary fact, that if we are to have fruitful and mutually beneficial relations with the people of these nations, we must know more about them. Not enough of us know very much, and too many of us know nothing at all. It is in response to this simple fact that a basic element of the President's new program in international education is the International Education Act of 1966, a proposal whose intention is to strengthen the intellectual capacity and cultural imagination which we Americans can bring to any of our activities overseas.

But an even more powerful imperative stands behind the steps that the United States Government is now taking to sharpen and increase its efforts in international education. It is the imperative presented by a secular change in social structures of the greatest significance. The family, traditional religious organizations, and the neighborhood community have in the past been the most powerful social agencies with regard to the formation of human attitudes and the control of human behavior.

In both modern and modernizing societies, however, the power of these agencies must now be supplemented. They cannot by themselves cope with the pace of change or the disturbances of industrialization and urbanization. Neither are they capable of training people in the skills a modern economy requires or in the attitudes and national perspective which spell the difference today between a viable and unviable society. The school—primary, secondary, or advanced—has in consequence been projected

to the forefront of contemporary history. It has become an indispensable agency of social development and control.

The school is fundamental in our foreign relations because investment in human beings is an indispensable investment for development. It is fundamental because education is not only a capital investment but provides a consumer's good which a mounting number of people everywhere are demanding with greater and greater urgency for themselves or their children. It is fundamental because only the school can provide individuals with the means to understand and control their experience with all the elements it contains that signal the existence and importance of distant places in the world.

Last but not at all least, the school is fundamental because close association between the schools of different countries is a primary means for creating, for the long run, patterns of mutual respect and forbearance on the international scene. The close relation of education to development has been emphasized by the President in his recent message to the Congress, and is reflected in the greater emphasis which the Agency for International Development is going to give to education, along with health and food production, in its programs.⁴ But beyond the recognition of education as an instrument of development, there is an additional feature of the President's program that is equally important. Educational cooperation with other nations is conceived as part of the enduring national interest of the United States, a necessity for us and for others in building a firmer structure for peace.

The President's program is addressed not only to the emergency situation of the developing nations but to an aspect or characteristic of the human scene today that is going to be present even if—and after—the problems of the developing nations begin to recede. It adds a new dimension to the

⁴ For text of President Johnson's message on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, p. 320.

Federal Government's interest in education. That is why an important responsibility for the program has been lodged in the Cabinet department with the general and abiding responsibility for education, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Advent of Democracy

These considerations take me to the final characteristic of the present international scene which has pushed educational and cultural relations to the foreground. It is the advent of democracy and of the language of liberty, equality, and fraternity as the fundamental legitimation, real or professed, for contemporary government and for the struggles and aspirations of the inhabitants of this planet.

International affairs can no longer be conducted and no longer are conducted as affairs between the high and mighty, the crowned heads and elected presidents, alone. The heads of government speak over the heads of their fellows to the citizens who are the presumed source of authority. Every important move in foreign policy involves an effort not only to move another government but to move public opinion. And distant though public opinion may seem from the councils where the decisions are made, it has its effect, if not immediately then in the long run.

In the long run, international educational and cultural relations play a decisive role in the flow of public opinion. They work perhaps less dramatically than the more rapid techniques for effecting changes in opinion, and these latter, of course, cannot be neglected. But opinion is generally a reflection of character and outlook, of long training and education, and not simply of the most recent information that one receives. If public opinion in our nation and in the world is to be consistent with the interests of peace and of mutual tolerance between diverse systems and cultures, a substantial effort must be made in the field of mutual education and cultural exchange.

It is, of course, possible to adopt alternative approaches to this state of affairs. At least once before, the nations of Europe were faced by a secular shift in the conditions of national security and power. This occurred when improvements in navigation made it possible for them to move out into the open seas. They met this test by establishing a system of commercial rivalry and warfare with whose effects we are still struggling. In the emerging era of educational and cultural relations, the solidification of a system of educational and cultural warfare and ideological recrimination is of course a possibility. The school systems of the world, past and present, have made their contributions to chauvinism and insularity.

But there is an alternative. In an era in which men demand equality, in which the citizens of nations long subject insist on looking you in the eye, it is possible—and it is necessary—to seek cultural exchange on a basis of equality and in the spirit that each nation has as much to learn as to teach. It is possible—and it is necessary—to act on the principle that, where education is concerned, where a people's deepest values are at issue, the ear as well as the mouth should be brought into play.

Educational and cultural relations today, if they are to serve the common causes of humanity and if they are to serve our most enduring national interest, require a delicate touch and a cooperative international approach. They cannot rest on the presumption that our nation or any nation has a mission to educate the world.

Guidelines for the New Era

Chaucer wrote of the clerk of Oxford: "And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly teche." This is the spirit of the initiatives in international education that have recently been launched by President Johnson. They represent an effort on our part to make ourselves ready for a cooperative enterprise in which we will join with other nations, if they desire.

What are the basic guidelines for educa-

tional and cultural policy in this emerging era of educational and cultural relations? They are implicit, I think, in what I have said.

Educational and cultural programs should be bilateral or multilateral wherever possible, not unilateral.

They should rest on the established principle in all free educational systems that there is a difference between education and propaganda, and they must exemplify this principle in practice.

Their success should be measured against long-term goals, not short-term ones.

They should be geared, for practical reasons as well as for reasons of policy, to the needs, interests, and modes of behavior of the people most immediately concerned: scholars, teachers, artists, students.

They should be conceived and implemented as continuing programs, as responses to imperatives that are now permanent on the human scene. They should not be viewed primarily as a means for the achievement of passing objectives.

Finally, the educational and cultural programs of the Federal Government, though they are indispensable, should properly be viewed only as elements in a larger national enterprise. They should not be and cannot be substitutes for nongovernmental efforts. Their main purpose, properly, is further to release and stimulate the energies of the non-Federal and private sectors of our country, which are already leading the effort in international education and cultural exchange.

The Test and the Opportunity

This lecture, as you know, is the last in a series of lectures devoted "to the human aspects of international relations." I confess that, as a man who has spent most of his life as a professional teacher of philosophy, I had the temptation to ask the kind of troublesome question about this theme that has made philosophy notorious. For international relations, after all, are relations

between nations, and nations are composed of human beings. Even diplomats probably qualify as members of the species. What can possibly be meant, then, by speaking of the human aspects of international relations as though there were some aspects of international relations that were not human?

But there is, of course, a meaning that can be given this question. There are those, past and present, who have held that relations between nations must be measured by principles that transcend human interests. They have insisted that states or nations are superior things unto themselves, whose significance and destiny are not meant to be measured by the fate of the individual human beings who compose them. And in this century as much as ever, and perhaps more than ever, the language in which foreign policy is justified has become increasingly abstract. Moreover, much of what we have known and still know as "foreign relations" is official and formal. It is not the kind of relation that individuals have to their immediate neighbors, and often the same rules do not seem to apply.

To speak of "the human aspects of international relations" is to call attention to what is unstructured and unformalized, to what is a matter of personal psychology or social outlook, and to the intercourse between individuals and groups in different nations that takes place because the people concerned want it to and not because officials have said that it must. Educational and cultural relations are therefore a very large part of what we mean by "the human aspects of international relations." Today, an alert and responsive government cannot help but have a larger interest in them.

The dangers are plain. Government officials, even professors of philosophy on leave of absence, should be carefully watched at any time, and certainly when they suggest that they have an interest in matters that belong above all to private taste, judgment, and conscience, or to the free community of scholars and teachers. Yet a government policy in the field of

international education and cultural exchange is an inescapable imperative today, as inescapable as a policy on defense or commerce or outer space. It is inescapable because there has been a change in the human environment.

The response that a government gives to this imperative will test its alertness to new necessities and to something more besides. It will test its fidelity to a liberal view of human civilization. For, in the end, the free exchange of ideas, the free movement of people, the meeting of individuals as individuals without regard to the borders—none of these are simply instruments of national policy. The national policy of a free and civilized government is one instrument for achieving such ideals.

In brief, we are well into an era in international relations that deserves to be recognized as qualitatively new. It will test government, but it will test a great many people who are not in government as well; and it will test the capacity of people in and out of government to work together. But it is more than a test; it is an opportunity to go farther with ideals that have lit the history of our civilization and to appreciate them more deeply.

There is, however, a somber—or, at any rate, not entirely encouraging—aspect to the thesis I have put before you. If it is true that the era of educational and cultural relations implies that the human aspects of international relations will become even more pronounced than in the past, I am not sure that I have left you with an entirely reas-

• *Reprints of Mr. Frankel's address will soon be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.*

suring thought. The only consolation I have to offer is that it would be even less cheerful to say to you that our future was not at all in our hands.

Department To Hold Foreign Policy Conference for Educators

The Department of State announced on May 19 (press release 115) that it will hold a National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators in Washington, June 16 and 17. The Secretary of State is extending invitations to educators in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will address the conference. Among other officials expected to participate are Douglass Cater, Special Assistant to the President; William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

The conference will highlight current foreign policy issues and provide a forum for discussion of world affairs with high-ranking officers of the Department of State and other Government agencies. There will be an opportunity during the concurrent seminars on the afternoon of June 17 to exchange views on the role of education in foreign affairs. Seminar panelists will include leaders of American education and Government officials. Topics that will be covered in the panels are science and foreign policy, economic development and population pressures, foreign policy decision-making, international organizations, world affairs in teacher education, and case studies in teaching world affairs.

United States Role in a Changing Africa

Statement by Joseph Palmer 2d
*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

After a long absence, it is a great pleasure to appear once again before this subcommittee to discuss our relations with Africa. In the short time since assuming my duties as Assistant Secretary, I have been closely engaged in reviewing and updating myself on developments in this rapidly changing area of the world.

When I first went to Africa 25 years ago, I felt that far-reaching change was in prospect. The liberation of Ethiopia and the former Italian colonies, the exposure of so many African troops to nationalist aspirations in South Asia, and the wartime emphasis on self-determination all seemed to me to be setting the stage for the liquidation of the old colonial system in ways which I felt were both just and inevitable.

Over the intervening years Africa has indeed transformed dramatically. New nations have emerged with startling rapidity, and Africa's leaders have been suddenly faced with the challenging problem of converting traditional societies into 20th-century states. Progress inevitably has been uneven as local problems have complicated the situation. In many areas of the continent, however, substantial advancement has been made toward achieving the basic aspirations of the African people for a better way of life.

In certain parts of Africa, change has been accompanied by instability when the constituted authority failed to satisfy the hunger of the people for speed in moving ahead and, in some cases, resorted to authoritative, alien systems which were not responsive to national aspirations. The military, or groups backed by the military, assumed power in Algeria, Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria, and Ghana. In some instances the army stepped in at the request of the governing authority to reestablish order in a chaotic situation; in other cases they came to power because an impasse existed among contending political forces.

In these circumstances of change the Africans have continued to demonstrate that they do not want to lose their hard-won independence to a new form of foreign domination nor, as individualists, do they wish to subject themselves to regimentation. Although the Communists have made strenuous efforts to exploit Africa's problems, they have, by and large, signally failed to subvert the African Continent. Evidences of the extent of Soviet penetration that had taken place in Ghana were revealed after Nkrumah's overthrow, including evidence of facilities obviously intended as bases for subversion in surrounding nations. Since the coup in Ghana, Soviet and Chinese technicians have been asked to leave. In Dahomey and the Cen-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 10.

tral African Republic official Chinese Communist missions were also asked to depart.

Change is likely to continue to be the keynote to Africa, where powerful historical forces—based on concepts of majority rule, self-determination, the freedom and dignity of the individual, and economic and social justice and progress—characterize the aspirations of the people. The fact that these are free-world concepts has given us a tremendous advantage in building a viable relationship with Africa.

The realization of these principles is not simple in conditions of poverty, low literacy, and widespread disease. But there is abundant evidence that the African spirit of determination and perseverance is active and is prevailing. Success will not come quickly. The primary motivating forces must continue to develop from within the continent.

Our role must be one of responsiveness, of understanding, and of patience. We must not expect quick solutions in Africa to problems that have taken much time to achieve in other parts of the world. We must appreciate that the nations of Africa are seeking to express themselves in their own way and that this will doubtless involve further experimentation and change.

In short, the problems of nation-building in Africa—as elsewhere—are not easy and no one appreciates this more than the Africans. But problems also create opportunities, and it is in this positive and constructive sense that I believe Africa is dedicated to realizing its great potential. And it is in this same spirit of opportunity that we in the more highly developed countries of the free world must show ourselves responsive to Africa's needs and aspirations in a timely and effective manner.

American policy toward Africa has been both principled and realistic, providing Africans with a friendly noncolonial and non-Communist association. U.S. assistance and other relationships, along with those of Europe and international donors, have permitted African nations to chart an inde-

pendent course for progress in beneficial associations with the free world.

We are deeply concerned, of course, with developments in southern Africa, most immediately in Southern Rhodesia. As you know, representatives of the British Government and the Southern Rhodesian regime are just starting exploratory talks in London to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely exists. I shall not, therefore, comment further on this situation except to express the fervent hope that early means can be found to terminate this sterile rebellion and restore constitutional procedures, thus opening the way to majority rule based on government by the consent of the governed.

The Department's policy views about South Africa were given to the subcommittee by my distinguished predecessor, Governor Williams, on March 1.² I have read this statement carefully and agree fully with it. It only remains for me to welcome the initiative the subcommittee has taken in looking into the United States-South African relationship and to say how helpful these hearings should be in increasing public awareness of the vital questions of principle and practice that are involved in the South African situation.

The basic tenets of our African policy reach back far into our past, namely support for self-determination, government by the consent of the governed, racial dignity and equality, respect for genuine nonalignment, unity, African solutions to African problems, and political, economic, and social progress. It will be my determined effort to give constructive and meaningful application to these living principles in the timely manner that the fast-moving situation in Africa requires. By so doing, I am confident we shall continue to develop a true community of interest between Africa and the United States, a close relationship based on mutual advantage, mutual respect, and mutual devotion to principle.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1966, p. 430.

United States Calls for Treaty on Exploration of the Moon

Following is the text of a statement by President Johnson which was read to news correspondents at San Antonio, Tex., on May 7 by the White House Deputy Press Secretary, together with the text of a letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Kurt Waldheim, chairman of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Just as the United States is striving to help achieve peace on earth, we want to do what we can to insure that explorations of the moon and other celestial bodies will be for peaceful purposes only. We want to be sure that our astronauts and those of other nations can freely conduct scientific investigations of the moon. We want the results of these activities to be available for all mankind.

We want to take action now to attain these goals. In my view, we need a treaty laying down rules and procedures for the exploration of celestial bodies. The essential elements of such a treaty would be as follows:

The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and use by all countries. No country should be permitted to advance a claim of sovereignty.

There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies.

Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination.

Astronauts of one country should give any necessary help to astronauts of another country.

No country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be forbidden.

I am convinced that we should do what we

can—not only for our generation, but for future generations—to see to it that serious political conflicts do not arise as a result of space activities. I believe that the time is ripe for action. We should not lose time.

I am asking Ambassador Goldberg, in New York, to seek early discussions of such a treaty in the appropriate United Nations body.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4851

MAY 9, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to bring to your attention the following announcement by President Johnson on the need for a treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies:

[Text of President Johnson's statement of May 7.]

This proposal of my Government is based on our long-standing concern with the peaceful uses of outer space. You may recall that over seven years ago the United States inscribed the first item to appear on the General Assembly's agenda concerning the peaceful uses of outer space and introduced a draft resolution¹ sponsored by 20 States. This became the first outer space action taken by the Assembly. It was introduced in the First Committee by the then Majority Leader of the United States Senate, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.²

Action since that time has been heartening to all of those who believe in the role of the United Nations as a source of international law and peaceful development. Resolution 1721,³ of December 20, 1961, set forth the essential legal principles applicable to outer space in an enlightened fashion that has no precedent in any previous age of exploration. One of these principles was that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 32.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1958, p. 977.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

Another principle is that outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law, and are not subject to national appropriation. Building on this foundation, Resolution 1962,⁴ approved by the Assembly on December 13, 1963, set forth a number of additional points that will be remembered gratefully centuries from now.

Our current proposal for a treaty is designed to be another great step forward in the cooperative development of outer space

for peaceful uses. Because of its significance and urgency, I would greatly appreciate your taking the necessary steps for an early convening of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Outer Space.

I should like to take this occasion, Excellency, to express our continued appreciation for the admirable way in which you have presided over the work of this most important Committee and to assure you of our continued desire to extend the utmost cooperation in this field which is so important to the future of mankind.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1005.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Discusses Proposed Safeguards for Cutoff and Transfer of Fissionable Material and Nuclear Weapons Destruction

Statement by William C. Foster¹

In directing the attention of this conference to collateral measures, we are recognizing the urgency of achieving some real progress in our efforts to halt the nuclear arms race. We are seeking to accomplish such reductions as are possible in today's world, while awaiting agreement on how we can make progress toward general and complete disarmament.

¹ Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 14 (U.S./U.N. press release 4836 dated Apr. 21). Mr. Foster is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to the conference.

When we come to discuss the provisions of article III in the U.S. draft treaty on nonproliferation,² we shall be dealing with the safeguards that we seek to have nations accept in connection with their peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Whenever we discuss safeguards, the question inevitably arises as to a balance between the obligations to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states.

My discussion today deals precisely with the safeguards that would apply to the

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.

nuclear-weapon states under our proposal to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons use, to transfer a total of 100,000 kilograms of U-235 to peaceful uses under safeguards, and to destroy the thousands of nuclear weapons from which to obtain the material for such a transfer. The stated offer includes a willingness to add plutonium in agreed amounts obtained from the destroyed weapons to the transfer to peaceful uses, if the Soviet Union will do likewise. Thus the total amount of fissionable material transferred to peaceful purposes would be somewhat greater than 100,000 kilograms.

I stress this measure for two reasons. First, this measure is indeed most germane to the nonproliferation treaty that we are considering. I should point out that the U.S. position has not changed, that the entry into force of a nonproliferation treaty should not be conditioned upon entry into force of other measures which have been proposed to halt the nuclear arms race. At the same time, the United States recognizes that if we are to halt the nuclear arms race—not just for a moment but lastingly—we must have a program of related measures in addition to a nonproliferation treaty, and we must begin to work on them in the same detail as we have on a nonproliferation treaty.

This necessity is recognized both in the fifth paragraph of the preamble and in the second paragraph of article VI of the U.S. draft treaty. In the preamble the parties to the treaty would express their desire “to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals.” Article VI provides that after a period of time, which is to be agreed, following entry into force of the treaty two-thirds of the parties may call a conference of signatories “in order to review the operation of the Treaty.” I believe one of the topics the parties would be entitled to consider in this review would be how well we were carrying out the intention expressed

in the preamble of halting the arms race and reducing nuclear arsenals.

The second reason for emphasizing today the cutoff, transfer, and demonstrated destruction proposal is that it provides an excellent example of the kind of safeguards which nuclear-weapon states should be called upon to accept as part of the task of halting the arms race.

Problem of Adequate Verification

The problem of adequate verification of arms control measures has consistently thwarted our efforts to reach agreement. It is not altogether surprising that this should be so. From time to time within the U.S. Government, as we have studied possible courses of action in the direction of disarmament, we have had to consider how the intentional or inadvertent disclosure of classified information could be used against us militarily, and we recognize that other states may have similar concerns. For its part, however, the Soviet Union has branded virtually all of our efforts to design arrangements providing necessary assurances as attempts to gain an opportunity for espionage, apparently without any real analysis of the relative need and simplicity of these verification proposals.

We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will soon recognize that there is quite another perspective in which inspection for verification can and should be viewed. A state cannot responsibly enter into international commitments which limit its own freedom of action in important security areas unless it feels confident that its own restraint is being matched by the other parties to the agreement. Let us face this squarely. We are involved in an area where fundamental security interests are at stake: the area of nuclear weapons defense.

The United States earnestly seeks nuclear arms control measures to increase its own security and the security of other states. But for these measures to have their desired effect of increasing international

stability and decreasing the chances of a nuclear war ever taking place, it is essential that a party have reasonable confidence that the other parties are carrying out their end of the bargain. In the case of an agreement where purely national means of verification are not deemed adequate, we seek to define and obtain only the minimum amount of inspection needed to let the parties know that the agreement is being fulfilled.

In the case of the cutoff in production of fissionable material and destruction of weapons, the necessary associated verification measures are simple, practical, and unobtrusive. There is absolutely no basis for attempting to dismiss them as a scheme for espionage.

However, the United States does not propose any arms control measure merely because the verification would be simple and practical. We seek measures that have intrinsic value—that will contribute to peace and security and to our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

Most delegations here have acknowledged the importance of the cutoff and weapons destruction measure, but some delegations have voiced opinions that would seem to deny that what we are proposing is significant. To assert that the cutoff, transfer, and weapons destruction proposal “has nothing in common with disarmament” amounts to stating that slowing down has nothing to do with stopping. Had the cutoff of production of fissionable materials been negotiated when it was first proposed,³ the U.S. arsenal of weapons today would have been a fraction of its present size. Without a halt in the near future, nuclear stockpiles are bound to grow ever larger, adding to the vast amounts of potential death and destruction.

Our proposal goes beyond a halt, significant as that is, and seeks an initial reduction in these nuclear stocks. To assert that

“only obsolescent weapons would be destroyed” is to overlook the fact that a halt in production and the destruction of thousands of weapons adds up to a net reduction of these weapons. Included in the weapons to be destroyed would be bombs and warheads of a class that have a death-dealing potential the world fortunately has not experienced. Furthermore, the fissionable material in them, with a half-life of 700 million years in the case of U-235 and 24,000 years in the case of plutonium, will virtually never be obsolete as sources of great amounts of energy—whether used peacefully or in weapons.

We challenge also the validity of the Soviet assertion that the destroyed weapons would simply be replaced by utilizing the large remaining stocks of fissionable materials. Is the Soviet Union saying they have overproduced fissionable material beyond their weapon requirements to the extent that 40,000 kilograms of U-235 would not be missed? If so, we would be pleased for them to propose an increase in the amount to be transferred by their side. In proposing a transfer of 60,000 versus 40,000 kilograms the United States has sought to reach numbers great enough to make substantial cuts into the total stocks available for weapons. At the same time our proposal would not place either side in an intolerable situation of uncertainty in view of the limited amount of information that would be disclosed by the system of verification that we are proposing.

Suggested Inspection Methods

Let me now describe the kinds of safeguards that the United States believes are appropriate to the significance of the cutoff, transfer, and weapons destruction proposal. In doing so, I will not attempt to describe the complete system of safeguards. Rather I shall give a few additional details regarding the kinds of inspection that our studies have shown to be adequate. We would emphasize that these descriptions are to stimulate discussion and are not intended

³ For text of a letter of Mar. 1, 1956, from President Eisenhower to Soviet Premier Bulganin, see *ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

to present a fixed position. We welcome further discussion on the topic of inspection for verification of this measure. We are certain that the generation of helpful ideas to provide adequate assurances that agreements are being honored is not a capability to be found exclusively in any one country.

Our technical specialists have studied, for example, the problem of verifying that plutonium production reactors shut down in compliance with either a production cutoff or reciprocal plant-by-plant reductions remain shut down between visits of inspectors. Two alternatives have been investigated. In one case, access would be permitted to the working faces of the reactor itself. In the other, access would be permitted only to the exterior of the reactor building or buildings.

When access is permitted to the reactor, we believe visits by inspectors to the reactor could be scheduled at intervals separated by several months, requiring perhaps a week's time at the initial visit and 1 or 2 days for subsequent visits.

The shutdown monitoring system they would utilize basically includes four simple concepts:

First, target material is placed in a reactor core to become radioactive in the event of reactor operation.

Second, a "safing tape" or wire fixes the location of the target material within the reactor so as to be subject to the reactor's neutron flux, if any.

Third, the tape is so fabricated that it is unique and hence any substitution of the tape can be detected.

Fourth, an exterior seal at each end of the channel containing the tape provides the inspection team assurance that the wire or tape will have remained in its fixed location between inspections.

The target material—for example, cobalt—is introduced into the safing tape and would be activated approximately linearly with exposure to neutrons. The resulting radioactivity, if any, could be read with standard radiation detection meters.

This system is described in further detail

in a working paper which we are submitting today with the request that it be circulated as a document of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.⁴ Again I would emphasize that it is not our intent to insist on this or any other inspection method or procedure at this time. We offer the paper so that the details of what we have been studying can be considered and commented on by others.

We have studied possible alternative procedures where access might be limited to the exterior of the reactor buildings. Such a limit could possibly be the external fences surrounding the buildings, if such fences were within 100 or 200 meters of the buildings themselves.

Under such circumstances, we believe there is a reasonable chance that a reactor could be monitored satisfactorily by granting near-continuous random access to the perimeter fence. Such access would have to be available on about 1 hour's notice at any time. The field inspectors would be equipped with neutron and gamma ray detectors as well as equipment sensitive to radiation in the infrared portion of the spectrum. Each of these devices is of standard design and all are familiar to qualified electronic technicians the world over.

The inspection procedures we describe could be utilized by whatever inspection organization was charged with carrying out the inspections. The International Atomic Energy Agency has already developed some procedures for monitoring reactors in operation, and more needs to be done in this area. The working paper (ENDC/134) tabled by the U.S. in June 1964 outlines the procedures we believe to be necessary to monitor other facilities that would be involved in a cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons.⁵ We are continuing to study these suggested methods in order to provide greater detail at some fu-

⁴ ENDC/174.

⁵ For a statement by Mr. Foster on June 25, 1964, see BULLETIN of July 27, 1964, p. 125.

ture occasion, and we hope that other nations are also giving careful consideration to these problems.

Demonstrated Destruction of Weapons

Our proposal to destroy nuclear weapons to obtain fissionable material for transfer to peaceful uses is another example where the procedures we have suggested for consideration are designed to take proper account of the need to protect the sensitive elements of the design of nuclear weapons. These suggested procedures have been outlined before,⁶ but let me describe in somewhat more detail the kind of demonstration process we have in mind. Again I would emphasize that the United States does not intend to prejudice future discussion of this subject by advocating any one method of demonstrated destruction. Rather, it is our intent to encourage discussion by providing enough detail to focus attention on the kinds of problems that must be worked out if we are to reach agreements in which all parties can participate with confidence.

A facility for demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons would probably consist of a receiving compound, buildings for weapons disassembly enclosed by a security fence, and an assay laboratory for verifying the actual amounts of fissionable materials yielded by the destruction process. In this way, the total proposal—including cutoff, destruction, and transfer aspects—is keyed to the fissionable material.

Prior to the introduction of a batch of weapons for processing, inspection personnel would make a walk-through tour of the complete facility to observe that no weapon components or materials were inside. A batch of weapons would then be moved into the receiving compound and inspectors would be permitted visual access to the exterior of the weapons, affording an opportunity to count them and perhaps also to weigh them.

At this point, inspectors would retire beyond the security fence but continue to have access to the perimeter affording an opportunity to check all movements of material into and out of the external fences.

As a result of the disassembly and destruction process, fissionable material would be brought out through the security fence from time to time to an assay laboratory where it would be carefully weighed, its isotope composition determined, and then placed under IAEA or equivalent international safeguards to assure its use for peaceful purposes only. Nonnuclear components would be reduced to a state of rubble that would not disclose classified information and would be shipped out of the facility for final disposal. Such disposal could be, for example, deep ocean burial.

At the conclusion of the processing of a batch of weapons, inspectors would again be granted access to the inside of the entire facility to observe that no material had been withheld. This is a simple, straightforward procedure which allows no possibility for espionage, requires no visits to other sites or installations, and in fact protects that information properly classified in the interests of national security.

In conclusion, let me express the hope that in going into some detail about the operations of the type of inspection system which the United States would wish to have considered in connection with measures to halt the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals, we have made it clear that we are sincere in attempting to provide for only that verification necessary to meet the security needs of the countries participating. We apply this principle both to non-nuclear-weapon states and to states possessing nuclear weapons.

The obligation of all of us to reach an accord that can reduce the nuclear threat requires compromise by all sides. We hope that our remarks today will be viewed in a spirit of accommodation which will result in the acceptance of reasonable safeguards by the nuclear-weapon states. We further believe that the non-nuclear-weapon states

⁶ For a U.S. statement in the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 23, 1965, see *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578.

represented here will agree that such safeguards are in no way less appropriate than those we would seek to have accepted by them. We would welcome further comments on this proposed measure from all delegations and particularly from those non-nuclear-weapon states which have stressed the need to make a start in reducing existing nuclear arsenals.

United States Presents Views on Security Council Procedures

Following is the text of a letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Moussa Leo Keita, President of the U.N. Security Council during April.

APRIL 21, 1966

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to refer to the situation which arose between April 7 and 9 following the request of the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of April 7, 1966 for an urgent meeting of the Security Council on an emergency related to the oil embargo in Southern Rhodesia.

The views of my Government on the responsibility of the President under the Charter, the Provisional Rules, and established practice with respect to convening the Council in circumstances such as prevailed on that occasion are set out below. I referred to this planned statement of views at the 1277th meeting of the Council on April 9.¹

1. The Security Council is given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, according to Article 24 of the Charter, "in order to ensure prompt and effective action". It is required by Article 28 to "be so organized as to be able to function continuously". These two Articles establish the responsibility of the Council to be available for emergency action to maintain peace and security. The Provi-

sional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council are designed and must be interpreted so as to ensure that the Council can fulfill the responsibilities these Articles place upon it.

2. The dominant paragraph of the Provisional Rules of the Security Council accordingly is Rule 2, which states that "The President *shall* call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council". The Rule is mandatory and does not give the President the choice of convening or not convening the Council when a member so requests. This has been made clear on numerous occasions. At the 654th meeting of the Council on 27 December 1953, for example, the Distinguished Representative of Pakistan stated:

The calling of a meeting is not entirely in the President's hands. The President is the custodian of the Rules of Procedure. He is in a certain sense the servant of the Council and I am perfectly sure that Sir Gladwyn Jebb knows that he or his colleagues could request the President to call the meeting and that the President, under the circumstances, would have no alternative but to call the meeting.

Even if a majority of Council members are opposed to a meeting, the meeting must be held. Those members opposed to the meeting may express their views on the Agenda when the meeting is convened, may seek to adjourn the meeting, or to defeat proposals submitted to it, but the President is bound to convene the Council on a request under Rule 2, unless that request is not pressed.

3. Subject to Rule 2, the President is given, under Rule 1, the authority and responsibility to set the time of a meeting. In so doing the President acts not as a representative of his country but as a servant of the Council, and he does not exercise an arbitrary or unfettered discretion. His decision must be related to the requirements of Articles 24 and 28 and of Rule 2 and to the urgency of the request and situation. A request for an urgent meeting must be respected and decided upon on an urgent basis, and the timing established responsive to the urgency of the situation.

This position was clearly stated by the

¹ BULLETIN of May 2, 1966, p. 713.

President of the Council at the 746th meeting on October 28, 1956 in the following words:

... Under the Rules of Procedure the President is required to call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member or members of the Council. When a meeting is requested as a matter of urgency, the President is required to convene the meeting as a matter of urgency. . . . The Security Council is an organ that functions continuously; there has to be provision for convening it immediately, whenever necessary.

This meaning is also underlined by Rule 8 which indicates that in contrast to the normal rule requiring circulation of an Agenda at least three days before a meeting, "in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting".

4. The President customarily has consulted and is expected to consult members of the Council on their views as to the timing of a meeting; in circumstances of urgency he may also convene the Council without consultation when this might entail an inadvisable delay. In either case it is his responsibility to set the time of the meeting in keeping with the urgency of the request and of the factual situation. The President's obligation to act promptly on urgent requests is, of course, further underlined if on consultation he finds that a majority favor an immediate convening of the Council.

Although the President may receive views on scheduling a meeting from non-members of the Council whose interests are "specially affected", notably parties to a dispute before the Council, the views of the members must be guiding, as they are on all procedural questions in the Council.

This was clearly recognized in a membership case before the Council at its 1034th meeting on May 7, 1963 when the Representative of Iraq, after commenting that the meeting had been set "contrary to the wish of several members of the United Nations who are directly concerned", recognized that "the members of the Council are sovereign and are not bound by any desires expressed outside its membership".

In responding to these remarks the Dis-

tinguished Representative of Morocco referred to the consultations he had held and stated:

It is customary that as a result of preliminary consultations one does reach a consensus of opinion, and in this case, out of courtesy to the members of the Council in return for their courtesy to me, I had no further argument with which to insist on requesting postponement of this meeting. Therefore, having heard the request addressed by the Representative of Iraq to me and to the members of the Council regarding postponement, I wish to assure the Representative of Iraq that all members have shown every goodwill and have been extremely courteous in all the preliminary consultations. But the current which emerged from those consultations has to be taken into account too, and that is why it is not possible for me to do anything other than to show courtesy in turn.

I hope that the Representative of Iraq will take note of this fact. I feel sure that if he had been in my place, he too would have wished to defer to the wishes of the members of the Security Council.

The above principles and practices are, of course, applicable to the case at issue. In this instance the Council was faced with a request for an urgent meeting by a member; known facts about the situation which the request sought to redress indicated that Security Council action might be too late if not taken in a matter of hours rather than days. The majority of members of the Council, when consulted, supported an urgent session on the same day (April 7) as the request. Members were officially notified that the President had set the meeting for 5 p.m. Thursday. They were later notified, without further consultation, that it had been cancelled, and in the ensuing confused situation some members were under the impression that it had been reinstated. More than a majority of members felt sufficiently strongly about the urgency of the situation thereupon to convey in writing through the Secretary General their continued views in favor of a meeting that day. Although the explanation for further delay was based on a desire for more consultation, the majority of members were not consulted on the timing of the meeting finally decided upon, although non-members apparently were. Nor were they informed of the reasons for the cancellation or for the new timing estab-

lished at 48 hours after the initial request.

The United States does not believe this process, in the circumstances which prevailed, met with the criteria that have been described for the convening of the Council under conditions of urgency and we cannot accept it as a precedent for future action. Inasmuch as these are views which I would have expressed in the Council but refrained from expressing in the interests of more rapid attention to the business at hand, I would be grateful if they could be referred to the appropriate office of the Secretariat of the Council for inclusion in the next compilation of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, and I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Council.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

Letters concerning B-52 incident over Spain. U.S.S.R., S/7151, February 18, 1966, 3 pp.; United States, S/7169, February 26, 1966, 2 pp.
Letters on inclusion of Viet-Nam on Council agenda. Bulgaria, S/7174, March 3, 1966, 2 pp.; France, S/7173, February 28, 1966, 1 p.; Mali, S/7176/Rev. 1, March 3, 1966, 2 pp.
Situation in Dominican Republic:
Reports by the Secretary-General. S/7032/Add. 15, February 17, 1966, 3 pp.; Add. 16, February 25, 1966, 1 p.; Add. 17, February 28, 1966, 3 pp.; Add. 18, March 1, 1966, 2 pp.; Add. 19, March 2, 1966, 1 p.; Add. 20, March 4, 1966, 2 pp.; Add. 21, March 7, 1966, 2 pp.; Add. 22, March 14, 1966, 2 pp.; Add. 23, March 18, 1966, 4 pp.; Add. 24, March 23, 1966, 3 pp.
Cables from the Organization of American States. S/7148, February 17, 1966, 7 pp.; S/7163, February 23, 1966, 12 pp.; S/7217, March 22, 1966, 5 pp.; S/7227, March 29, 1966, 6 pp.
Exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the permanent representative of Brazil. Brazil, S/7171, February 28, 1966, 2 pp.; Secretary-General, S/7179, March 4, 1966, 1 p.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Communications concerning the "First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America." Cuba, S/7134, February 11, 1966, 3 pp.; Mongolia, S/7178, March 2, 1966, 2 pp.; U.S.S.R., S/7152, February 19, 1966, 2 pp.

Letter of February 11 from the permanent representative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-General concerning nonintervention. S/7142. February 15, 1966. 6 pp.

Letters of February 16 and 25 from the acting permanent representative of Thailand addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning Cambodia. S/7147, February 16, 1966, 2 pp.; S/7166, February 25, 1966, 2 pp.

Communications concerning territories under Portuguese administration. Bulgaria, S/7149, February 17, 1966, 2 pp.; Ethiopia, S/7209, March 16, 1966, 3 pp.

Reports from the Secretary-General concerning India-Pakistan dispute. S/6719, Add. 5 and Corr. 1, February 17, 1966, 15 pp.; Add. 6, February 26, 1966, 1 p.; S/6699/Add. 12, February 23, 1966, 2 pp.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Office for Relations With Canada Established by Department

*Department Announcement*¹

An Office for Relations With Canada has been established within the Bureau of European Affairs. This action constitutes concrete recognition of the increasing importance and complexity of U.S.-Canadian relations as set forth in the Merchant-Heeney report of June 28, 1965.²

The Canadian desk previously had been located in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs.

Establishment of the new office is consistent with the reorganization of the geographic bureaus of the Department of State as announced by the Secretary on March 4.³

Rufus Z. Smith is director of the new office.

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on May 3.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 193.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 28, 1966, p. 508.

Confirmations

The Senate on May 9 confirmed the following nominations:

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to be Ambassador to Portugal.

Findley Burns, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 113 dated May 17.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Argentina of June 22, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5125, 5660), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna December 2, 1964.

Entered into force: March 1, 1966.

Aviation

Protocol relating to amendment to convention on international civil aviation (to increase number of parties which may request holding an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly). Adopted at Rome September 15, 1962.¹

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29, 1965; China, January 31, 1966; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1966.

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963.¹

Signature: Norway, April 19, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Signature: Chad, May 12, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Convention for the unification of certain rules with respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Signed at Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into force for the United States March 1, 1913.

Adherence deposited: Iran, April 26, 1966.

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading for the carriage of goods by sea, with protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force for the United States December 29, 1937, subject to understandings.

Accession deposited: Iran, April 26, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Poland, April 29, 1966.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

Acceptance: Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.

Acceptance: Peru, March 18, 1966.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

Acceptance: Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19, 1964; for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.

Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960, as extended (TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964; for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733.

Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Niger, April 6, 1966; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734.

Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Kenya, December 20, 1965; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964; for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732.

Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Niger, April 6, 1966; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 1965.¹

Acceptances: Chad, April 5, 1966;² Rwanda, May 2, 1966.

Ratification deposited: Niger, April 18, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

Third procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966.

Acceptances: Austria, March 25, 1966;² Canada, February 18, 1966; Denmark, February 25, 1966; Ghana, April 5, 1966; Malawi, March 21, 1966; New Zealand, March 25, 1966; Niger, April 6, 1966; Pakistan, March 2, 1966; Upper Volta, April 7, 1966;² Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 21, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965.

Acceptances: Austria, March 25, 1966;² Canada, February 18, 1966; Denmark, February 25, 1966; Malawi, March 21, 1966; New Zealand, March 25, 1966; Niger, April 6, 1966; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 21, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965.

Acceptances: Austria, March 25, 1966;² Canada, February 18, 1966; Denmark, February 25, 1966; Ghana, April 5, 1966; Malawi, March 21, 1966; New Zealand, March 25, 1966; Niger, April 6, 1966; Pakistan, March 7, 1966.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 21, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: Mexico, May 17, 1966.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 20 and August 23 and 31, 1960 (TIAS 4593), for the loan of a submarine to Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 11, 1966. Entered into force May 11, 1966.

Honduras

Agreement supplementing the agreement of April 22 and June 10, 1955 (TIAS 3270), relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa February 24 and April 30, 1966. Entered into force April 30, 1966.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's contribution for United States administrative and related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1966 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 20, 1966. Entered into force April 20, 1966.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of November 26, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4137, 4257, 5331, 4353, 4426, 4469, 5606, 4794); April 11, 1960, as supplemented (TIAS 4470, 4579, 4720, 4743, 4772, 4778, 4794, 4829); October 14, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4852, 5228, 5415, 5524, 5707). Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi March 30, 1966. Entered into force March 30, 1966.

Philippines

Understanding relating to uses of the Special Fund for Education. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 26, 1966. Entered into force April 26, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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No.	Date	Subject
†112	5/17	U.A. Johnson: U.S. Seminar on Earth Station Technology, Washington, D.C.
*113	5/17	Burns sworn in as Ambassador to Jordan (biographic details).
114	5/17	Rusk: news conference of May 17.
115	5/19	National foreign policy conference for educators (rewrite).
†116	5/20	U.S.-Argentine trade and economic talks.
*117	5/20	U.A. Johnson: Dyess Air Force Base, Abilene, Tex.
†118	5/20	Guinea and Tunisia added to countries where U.S. citizens may buy local currency from U.S. Government.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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June 13, 1966

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"... none of us can be content when we measure what is being done against what could be done. We are anxious to work with you to fulfill your ambitions. Working with others, we are prepared to help build with you a modern Africa."

The United States and Africa: A Unity of Purpose

*Address by President Johnson*¹

Three years ago yesterday the heads of your governments signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. It was a memorable day for your continent and for all the modern world into which Africa has emerged as an indispensable partner.

The charter signed on that day declares that "it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny," that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives . . . of the African peoples." It pledged to harness the natural and human resources of Africa for the total advancement of your peoples.

My country knows what those words mean. To us, as to you, they are not abstractions. They are a living part of our experience as men and as nations. They sum up the basic aspirations which your people and mine share in common: to secure the right of self-government, to build strong democratic institutions, and to improve the level of every citizen's well-being.

We have learned that these aspirations are indivisible. If it takes self-determination to become a free nation, it also takes a climate of regular growth to remain one. And that means the wise development of human and natural resources.

Whether nations are 5 years old or 190 years old, the striving for these goals never really ends. No nation ever completes the task of combining freedom with responsibility, liberty with order—and applying these principles, day after day, to our new problems.

Because these principles are imbedded in the hearts of Africans and Americans alike, I have asked you to come here today to join me in commemorating the founding of the Organization of African Unity.

It is a good occasion to reaffirm a unity of purpose that transcends two continents.

As your charter and as our Declaration of Independence set forth, we believe that governments must derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. This is the core of political freedom and the first principle of nation-building.

In the past 15 years belief in self-determination has fired the swift momentum of Africa toward full participation in the community of nations. It has been a truly remarkable era in which more than 30 nations have emerged from colonialism to independence.

The road has not been traveled without difficulty. Its end is not even yet in sight. There have been ups and downs—and of course there will be more. But as one of your distinguished ambassadors has pointed out, "What matters most about new nations

¹ Made at a White House reception on May 26 marking the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (White House press release; as-delivered text). For an article on the OAU, see BULLETIN of May 3, 1965, p. 669.

is not that they have growing pains but that they are in fact growing.”

There is in Africa today an increasing awareness that government must represent the true will of its citizens. Across the continent the majority of people prefer self-government with peril to subservience with serenity.

This makes all the more repugnant the narrow-minded, outmoded policy which in some parts of Africa permits the few to rule at the expense of the many. The United States has learned from lamentable personal experience that domination of one race by another leads to waste and injustice. Just as we are determined to remove the remnants of inequality from our midst, we are also with you—heart and soul—as you try to do the same.

We believe, as you do, that denial of a whole people's rights to shape their national future is morally wrong. We also know it is politically and socially costly. A nation in the 20th century cannot expect to achieve order and sustain growth unless it moves—not just steadily but rapidly—in the direction of full political rights for all of its peoples. It has taken us time to learn this lesson. But having learned it, we must not forget it.

The Government of the United States cannot, therefore, condone the perpetuation of racial or political injustice anywhere in the world. We shall continue to provide our full share of assistance to refugees from social and political oppression.

Principles Guiding U.S. Policy

As a basic part of our national tradition we support self-determination and an orderly transition to majority rule in every quarter of the globe. These principles have guided our American policy from India to the Philippines, from Viet-Nam to Pakistan. They guide our policy today toward Rhodesia.

We are giving every encouragement and support to the efforts of the United Kingdom and the United Nations to restore legiti-

mate government in Rhodesia. Only when this is accomplished can steps be taken to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia—not just 6 percent of them.

The disruptive effects of current sanctions fall heavily upon Zambia, adding a difficult burden to that young Republic's efforts to strengthen its national life. I have informed President Kenneth Kaunda that we will work with him in trying to meet the economic pressures to which his country is being subjected.

The foreign policy of the United States is rooted in its life at home. We will not permit human rights to be restricted in our own country. And we will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law. We will not live by a double standard, professing abroad what we do not practice at home or venerating at home what we ignore abroad.

Our dreams and our vision are of a time when men of all races will collaborate as members of the same community, working with one another because their security is inseparable, and because it is right and because it is just. This vision requires ever-increasing economic and social opportunity.

Regional Cooperation in Africa

I know the enormous tasks that Africa faces in fulfilling its aspirations. I know how compelling is her need to apply modern science and technology to enrich the life of her people.

Much has been accomplished in the years since independence came to many members of your organization. You are proving what can be done when freedom and determination are joined with self-help and external assistance. We have been particularly heartened by the impetus toward regional cooperation in Africa.

The world has now reached a stage where some of the most effective means of economic growth can best be achieved in large units commanding large resources and large markets. Most nation-states are too small,

when acting alone, to assure the welfare of all of their people.

This does not mean the loss of hard-earned national independence. But it does mean that the accidents of national boundaries do not have to lead to hostility and conflict or serve as impossible obstacles to progress.

You have built new institutions to express a new sense of unity. Even as you grapple with the problems of early nationhood, you have sought out new possibilities of joint action: the OAU itself, the Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank, and subregional groupings such as the Economic Community of Eastern Africa.

Assistance To Speed Growth

Growth in Africa must then follow the inspiration of African peoples. It must stem from the leadership of African governments. Assistance from others can provide the extra resources to help speed this growth.

Such assistance is already under way. In the last 5 years aid from all external sources has amounted to over \$8 billion—the United States of America has extended approximately 2 billion of that 8 billion.

But none of us can be content when we measure what is being done against what could be done. We are anxious to work with you to fulfill your ambitions. Working with others, we are prepared to help build with you a modern Africa.

I can think of many missions on which America and Africa can work together.

First to strengthen the regional economic activities that you have already begun.

My country has offered the African Development Bank technical assistance funds to finance surveys of project possibilities and loan funds for capital projects. We are ready to assist the regional economic communities through technical assistance and through the financing of capital projects. These will help to integrate the various economic regions.

Second, to increase the number of trained Africans.

We have been devoting a large part of our aid funds for Africa to education. This proportion will increase.

This year we are assisting in the development and staffing of 24 colleges and universities. We are financing graduate and undergraduate training for over 2,000 African students in the United States. Altogether, almost 7,000 African students are studying with us now. We are helping some 40 secondary and vocational training institutions in Africa. We are aiding 21 teacher training institutions while also providing thousands of teachers, mostly through our Peace Corps.

But these efforts are not enough. One of the greatest needs is to overcome the frustration of many qualified students who are unable to obtain a higher education. To help meet that problem we propose:

—to assist your effort to make certain African universities regional centers of training and professional excellence;

—to explore with your governments an African student program for deserving students to attend African universities.

Third, to develop effective communications systems for Africa.

Africa is an immense continent embracing 37 states with still more to emerge. Their communications links were formed in colonial times and tie them more to the outside world than to each other. Africa's continental development needs a modern communications system to meet the regional requirements.

The United States has already financed several capital projects for communications facilities. We have provided technical assistance to communication services in a number of countries. I have authorized new surveys looking to the widening of existing telecommunications.

Communication satellites offer a striking opportunity to make even greater advances. To use these satellites effectively, ground stations must be built to bridge the conti-

nent. They would provide the essential links between the satellite and the conventional networks. The United States is prepared to assist in the building of these stations. We will examine the need for additional ground links to enable Africa to secure greater benefits from these satellites.

These immediate actions illustrate some of the opportunities for cooperative effort. Other possibilities deserve early study:

Africa's great distances require more modern road, rail, and air links. The continent's great lakes and rivers could provide an enormous internal transport network.

The development of regional power grids offers an exciting possibility for regional cooperation and national growth.

Opportunities for investment are still largely untapped despite the fact that African countries have welcomed private enterprise.

Africa's farm production does not meet the nutritional needs of its fast growing population.

African territories may need special help in training their people and in strengthening their institutions as they move toward self-government.

So we want to explore these and other ways to respond to African needs. I have instructed the Secretary of State and other American officials to review our own development policies and programs in Africa. We shall be seeking new ideas and advice from American scholars, businessmen, and experts concerned with Africa's problems. Our Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ed [Edward M.] Korry, will be working full time in the weeks ahead to follow through these initiatives. We wish to discuss new cooperative approaches and ideas with African governments, as well as with other governments and international groups.

The United States wants to respond in any way that will be genuinely helpful: from the private American citizen to a combination of many nations, from a bilateral effort with a single African country to African programs.

Above all, we wish to respond in ways

that will be guided by the vision of Africa herself, so that the principles we share—the principles which underlie the OAU Charter—come to life in conformity with the culture and aspirations of the African peoples.

Learning From Africa

It once was said of Americans that "With nothing are we so generous as advice. . . . We prefer being with people we do things for to being with people who do things for us." But it is no longer a case of what we can do for or even with the people of Africa. We have come to recognize how much we have to learn from you. As one of the great Africans, Dr. James Aggrey, wrote: "If you go to Africa expecting something from us, and give us a chance to do something for you, we will give you a surprise."

As we have deepened our relations with you, we have learned that Africa has never been as dark as our ignorance of it; that Africa is not one place and one people but a mosaic of places and peoples with different values and different traditions; that the people of Africa want to decide for themselves the kind of nations they wish to build.

We have learned not only about you but we have learned about ourselves. We have learned more about our debt to Africa and about the roots of so many of our American cultural values and traditions.

The human enterprise of which we are all a part has grown through contacts between men of different tribes, different states, and different nations. Through those contacts we have learned new ideas, new insights into ourselves, new ways of looking at the universe of nature, and—most importantly—new understanding of man's relation to his brothers.

It is this knowledge that endures. It is this deepening appreciation and respect for the diversity of the world—each man and nation in it—that increases the possibilities for peace and order.

Your Excellencies, I hope that during your stay in our country you will look in on the African programs at our universities, foundations, and institutes. These programs are

contributing to the mutual understanding we both seek.

In this connection, American publishers have produced hundreds of books about Africa in recent years. One of the most recent is this handsome volume on African art in American museums and private collections. This book was prepared for the U. S. Information Service in Africa, and it will help increase the understanding and the appreciation of your rich cultural heritage.

I would like you to accept a personal copy of this book as a memento of our meeting here in the East Room at the White House today.

The Organization of African Unity has become an important organ for building that peace and order. On this third anniversary my countrymen join me in asking you to come here this afternoon and join me in saluting you and the people that you so ably represent.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 27

Press release 129 dated May 27

I told you last time¹ that I hoped to meet with you again before I go to the NATO meeting.

I plan to leave Tuesday for a trip that will take me first to brief visits to Finland and Norway. I had hoped to make those visits last year, but those had to be canceled at the last moment. I am looking forward, of course, to a chance to visit both those countries, with whom my relations have been very good over the years.

Then I shall go to the NATO meeting in Brussels for the spring ministerial meeting, and on the way back I shall stop in Bonn briefly, where I shall visit the President and the Chancellor and have luncheon with the Foreign Minister before returning to Washington.

The Brussels meeting will have important matters to consider as a result of the decision of the French Government to withdraw from many of the activities of the NATO organization and to insist that other NATO governments remove their personnel and facilities from French soil.

The French Government's decisions pre-

sent the NATO ministers with problems to be solved but also with an occasion for examining the future course of the alliance and of the organization that gives reality to the alliance's commitments.

Apart from certain immediate practical problems that will require ministerial guidance, we shall also discuss measures directed to all three of NATO's objectives: to provide an effective defense of the Atlantic area; to maintain a powerful deterrent against aggression; and finally to preserve that unity of action necessary to the settlement of the great problems that still divide East and West.

I look forward to the occasion of this meeting and to the discussions that we shall be having there. While I hope we can make some solid progress and take some specific decisions on certain points, we cannot expect to solve all of our problems or make all of the decisions that will be required over the months ahead through a continuing process of review and consultation.

And of course there will be a series of talks with the French Government on a number of points that have been raised by the recent announcement of French decisions.

I am ready for your questions, gentlemen.

¹ For text of Secretary Rusk's news conference of May 17, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1966, p. 882.

Search for Reduction of Tensions

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to your third category of the measures to be discussed, the maintenance of unity to settle East-West questions, do you have anything you could tell us of a positive nature about anything new you plan to propose in that respect?

A. Well, I think it will be more positive than informative.

We have emphasized in NATO over the years that NATO is a defensive organization, that it has no desire to attack the East or to make relations with the East more difficult. And we have again over the years indicated that as far as the West is concerned that we are prepared to try to search for a solution of some of the larger outstanding problems that divide East and West.

Now, we do believe that it is important for Western Europe, the United States, the members of NATO, to continue that search for points at which there can be some reduction of tension. Obviously, there have been some major difficulties. And in the background is the unresolved problem of the unification of Germany. But we shall go over these in considerable detail at the Brussels meeting to see whether or not there might be some initiatives that we can take in the West to do something about it.

Now, there are some other things that we ourselves can do. For example, I would hope that the Senate could proceed with the consular agreement with the Soviet Union.² We would hope that despite the clouds that hang over the situation because of Viet-Nam that we could make some headway on the East-West trade legislation which we have sent to the Congress.³

We can understand that there is an atmosphere of tension because of Viet-Nam. It is serious and dangerous. But when Viet-Nam is settled, as it must be, there is still another world that has to be considered, still major problems that are going to re-

quire attention. And we would hope that we could get on with some of those problems, whether in disarmament or direct East-West relations, even though Viet-Nam is still unresolved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of us have gotten the impression that not only the Congress but the administration itself has been reluctant to press for congressional approval of the consular treaty. They kind of threw in the towel rather quickly on East-West trade; the air agreement with the Russians is stalled. Can we interpret your remarks just now as an indication that we are coming alive on the executive side on these issues?

A. Well, there is no doubt about the attitude of the executive branch of the Government on these questions. When we sent these matters down to the Congress, we hoped for action on them. What we would not like to see is for such matters to come up and be defeated. It is really a case of counting the votes, quite frankly. And we would like to be in a position where the prospect is that these matters can move forward.

Unification of Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think about the contention by Senator [Frank] Church that the reunification of Germany can only be a result of a détente in Europe and not vice versa?

A. Well, I do not know of any question which could contribute more to a *détente* than a resolution of the question of the unification of Germany. Certainly if you look back over this past period, since the end of World War II, this has been the great unresolved problem between East and West. The ability or the opportunity of the, say, 17 million Germans living in the Soviet Zone, for example, to decide their future has a major bearing on what happens to literally hundreds of millions of people, both in the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

If we could find a permanent settlement of that problem in Central Europe, it not

² For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1965, p. 375.

³ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

only would open the way for a stabilized security in that area, but it would also open the door to very far-reaching possibilities in the disarmament field. That does not mean that we will not look for other points, as we should, on which some agreement can be reached. We had hoped that the discussions on disarmament in Geneva could make some headway.

But I would not want myself to say that the question of reunification should be put off indefinitely into the future until somehow everything else is right, because my guess is that some things won't come right until that basic and elementary question in the heart of Europe has been solved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that General de Gaulle's visit, forthcoming visit, to Russia is going to help or hinder progress along the road to the détente in Russia?

A. I really don't know. I think you should put that question in Paris. I don't know what the effect of that visit will be.

Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, General Larsen [Maj. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen] was quoted today here in Washington as saying that there are now something like 10 regiments of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in Cambodia, preparing what looks like a monsoon offensive. Can you tell us whether this jibes with your information, and could you also comment on the aftermath of the political disturbances in Saigon and other cities?

A. On the first point, I have not had that information. I will try to find a way to ask General Larsen about it.

We do know that Cambodia has been used by the Viet Cong—and I suspect also some elements of the North Vietnamese—for infiltration into South Viet-Nam; and on occasion we know, from direct contact with them, they have used Cambodia as a sort of safe haven in the course of action originating in South Viet-Nam.

We have been very much interested in the suggestion that has been made, I think more than once, by Prince Sihanouk that the In-

ternational Control Commission should strengthen its personnel and its capabilities in order to assure the neutrality and the territorial integrity of Cambodia.

As far as we are concerned, we support fully both the neutrality and the territorial integrity of Cambodia. We have no interest in seeing Cambodia become involved in this situation. But the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese apparently have been abusing the neutrality of Cambodia by involving Cambodian space in some of their operations.

We think this ought to be a manageable problem. We think that it could be resolved if the right machinery—and I suppose that would be the ICC—could be strengthened to make its presence felt and to assure both sides that Cambodia is not involving itself or permitting itself to be involved in the problem in Viet-Nam.

Your second question had to do with the present political situation. I think that there is nothing that we know behind the scenes that adds very much to what you know from the press reports.

President Johnson has indicated that our feeling is that these leaders in South Viet-Nam should be in touch with each other and should try to find a basis on which they can resolve what we would call their lesser problems in order to be unified on the major problem, which is fending off the effort of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to seize the country by force.

As you know, there have been talks between the different elements in recent days. And we would hope that somehow they would come to some conclusions that would make it clear that the real problem there is the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese and not internal dissension in South Viet-Nam itself.

The committee drafting plans for the election in September is very far advanced in its work. It will be completing its action almost any time now. They have continued their efforts right through these appearances of—and realities of some dissent there.

We believe that it is important for them

to proceed with the elections for a constituent assembly so that you have a representative group from all sections and all elements in the population, they can draft a constitution and move toward that government which Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky in January indicated South Viet-Nam ought to have: that is, a constitutional government based upon popular elections.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you say, sir, whether the situation in Hue, where there has been an evacuation of some American personnel, still is in a state of suspense and uncertainty, or has this situation been altered any by the talks which took place between General Thi [Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi] and Premier Ky?

A. I think that in the case of Hue our personnel were evacuated from there because certain irresponsible elements resorted to violence and those who had authority did not seem to be able to assure the security of American personnel. I think some of those irresponsible elements, Mr. [Murrey] Marder, have been trying to put pressure on the government indirectly by putting pressure on the United States. We know that that is not going to succeed as far as we are concerned.

On the other hand, we felt that it would be better for us to withdraw our own civilians out of Hue in this present circumstance and see what comes out of these talks that have been in process.

U.S. Forces in Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go back to the NATO area for a moment and ask you what you think of suggestions in Congress for reducing the number of American divisions in Germany.

A. Well, we have indicated that our forces will remain there as long as they are needed and wanted. And we have also indicated to the NATO Council that we do not anticipate withdrawing major units from NATO.

Now, we will, of course, go through our annual review of the entire situation of NATO, the nature of the possible threats

that might be directed against NATO, the total military situation.

But at the present time I would think that unless there is some major change in the situation, some significant change throughout the European scene, that there would not be major reductions in our forces contemplated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, also NATO, do you think it would be opportune at a later stage to transfer the North Atlantic Council from Paris?

A. Well, that is a matter that will be discussed by the ministers in Brussels. And I would not want to anticipate the judgment of the Fourteen by indicating a judgment of one, because this is a matter that ought to be reached on the basis of discussion among the Fourteen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what's in prospect in the way of what has been sometimes referred to as a "blue ribbon" panel to redefine national goals and our machinery for dealing with them?

A. Well, I have heard a number of suggestions about "blue ribbon" panels. I think that this is one that I hadn't really focused on.

Q. Well, I'm referring to—

A. Are you referring to China now?

Q. Mr. Secretary, they just published an exchange of correspondence between the commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and President Johnson, in which President Johnson—the commander in chief suggested a "blue ribbon" panel to redefine, as I have said, and the President replied at the end of his letter, "We are undertaking steps in this direction which I trust will commend themselves to you."

A. Well, I have already indicated earlier that we have a number of panels working on different subjects. We have had a review of the China situation going on for quite some time. The President has an advisory committee of distinguished citizens in the general foreign policy field, and we consult in-

dividually and in groups as well as sometimes all together. And I indicated that we were contemplating drawing together somewhat more formally advisers that would be related to each of our geographic bureaus and major problem areas. I think perhaps those steps, of which the President is fully informed, would be what he was contemplating when he made that reply.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there a special group that is doing the policy on China? You mentioned this once before, about 2 weeks ago, that there was.

A. We have had an interdepartmental group working for quite some time now, I think at least a year, examining all aspects of the problem, and they in turn have been in touch with many people outside. They visited a number of the universities and talked to some of the specialists and this has been a very comprehensive examination and is continuing on the problems posed by the regime in Peiping.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the fighting in South Viet-Nam has slackened off considerably, and the monsoon offensive at least hasn't developed as of 4 o'clock this afternoon. Do you know of any political reasons why these lack of incidents?

A. We don't see any change in the pattern of operations from which one could draw any major political conclusions. There has been some reduction in recent weeks of what might be called large-scale attacks by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. But that has happened in earlier years in the period just preceding the monsoon.

Now, whether this simply repeats that experience and they are regrouping or bracing themselves for further action during the monsoon period, I just don't know. It may be that in certain areas they have been waiting out some of the political turmoil that has been going on, for example, in the First Corps area. But there has not been a significant reduction of terrorist incidents, of sabotage attacks, and incidents of that sort. Nor have we had more than 1 or 2 weeks

that have been free from an attack by an organized unit of the Viet Cong, such as a company or battalion.

So I think it's much too soon to draw any conclusions. I do not see any political conclusions to be drawn from the pattern that we have seen in the last 6 or 8 weeks.

Q. Can I follow that by asking more specifically whether we have had any fresh signals from Hanoi?

A. No.

Flexibility in Foreign Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about the limitations written into the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the aid bill?

A. Well, we hope very much that the Senate will not accept certain of the amendments that have been adopted in the committee thus far. For example, the limitation on the number of countries that could receive, say, development loans or technical assistance seem to us to be very unfortunate.

Now, we understand the general desire on the part of many people to take countries off of the aid list as soon as it is possible to do so. And I think there are some 27 countries who have at one time or another received aid who are no longer receiving aid. So we are all in favor of people graduating from the aid program.

But an arbitrary use of numbers doesn't take into account the artificiality of the structure of the world community of states. For example, 500 million people in India can be dealt with through one government; and when we are trying to be helpful to 500 million people there, there is one government on the list. But when you want to be of some assistance to about half that many people in the entire continent of Africa, you have over 35 governments to deal with.

Now, this is not of our making. This is a matter of historical development. So we think that it would be very unfortunate to put an arbitrary ceiling on the number of countries without taking into account the re-

lation between governments and people.

Similarly with technical assistance. I think a limitation of some 40 countries on that list was imposed by the committee thus far. Well, now, technical assistance basically is a way to open up our universities and our medical schools and our technical institutions for the training of the young people who are so desperately needed by the developing countries and assisting them and their institutions in this matter of training the essential manpower and leadership that are required if they are to make any progress.

This goes right back to President Truman's Point 4 idea. And we shouldn't close up these opportunities to those who desperately need them.

It's a relatively minor financial problem. It's a very small problem. And it seems to me that it is ungracious of this great nation to start closing the doors of our institutions, based upon some arbitrary ceiling with respect to numbers.

I am also concerned that the existing 5-year authorization for development loans and for the Alliance for Progress may be reduced to 1 year. We asked, as you know, for a 5-year authorization for the entire aid program, largely on the suggestions of some of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have had 5-year authorizations since 1961 or -2 for the development loan program and the Alliance for Progress. I think to retreat from that and to go back to a 1-year authorization would be unfortunate. And there are one or two other points.

But there has never been any question here about our readiness to meet with the committee as often and as frequently as the committee would wish and to have full hearings and discussions about any aspect of our aid program. But we do feel there should be a flexibility and there should be some longer range indication of the intent of the United States Government in these fields so that we can negotiate more earnestly and more responsibly with foreign governments who are all working on longer term bases, 5-year plans, that kind of thing, who must discuss

their longer range plans with other governments and with such institutions as the International Bank.

And, of course, we are urging our friends abroad, the other industrialized countries, to commit themselves to larger and longer term aid programs. So we would like to have our bargaining position strengthened in this field rather than diminished.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there appear to be important developments between Indonesia and Malaysia coming along in dropping confrontation. Simultaneously there are indications from Indonesia that they could use about \$1.3 billion in economic assistance. What role do you see the United States may play or being able to play in this?

A. Well, of course on the resolution of the difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia, no one could be more pleased than we if those matters could be resolved. We have been encouraged by the fact that representatives of the two countries are in touch with each other. My guess is that they are likely to be able to resolve these matters better without us than with us, and we are perfectly prepared to cheer from the sidelines on something like this and wish them well.

On the questions of aid, there are some very serious economic problems faced by Indonesia. They have substantial problems of debt and they have some problems of inflation. And we would suppose that they would be discussing these problems with a number of governments and institutions in the weeks and months ahead.

We ourselves feel that it would be for them to take the initiative on these matters and to consult other governments and international bodies on the basis of plans for bringing their economy into more order and to resolve their problems on a somewhat longer range basis.

We would hope to be able to play our part when this time comes, but we would be one of several who I think would be interested in doing so under the right circumstances.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are the casualties that we are taking now in Viet-Nam kind of a

holding operation, at best, or can we make real military progress there in spite of the unstable political base?

A. Well, the political problem thus far has been centered in the northeast corner of the First Corps, and at the present time primarily in the town of Hue and with a certain group in Saigon. The rest of the country has been proceeding in more or less normal fashion: the southern part of the First Corps and the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps areas.

On the military side, operations have been normal, although the problem has continued to be that of finding the other fellow. You don't have the pattern of a great land war in Asia, that some people sometimes talk about, with an enemy you can't find. And in some areas, apparently, the Viet Cong has been lying low here in recent weeks, for whatever reason.

So on almost any given day there will be between 20 and 30 operations of battalion size or larger on the initiative of the Government and allied forces; and on almost every day about two-thirds of those operations would be all South Vietnamese; the others would be U.S. or Korean or combined. Operations still go on. We have not had major fixed battles recently, because the engagements simply haven't worked out on that pattern; but the military operations continue to go forward.

Q. We could make permanent military progress there of a substantial nature, even given a continuance of the political volatility at its present level?

A. Well, what we very much hope for is that as the military operations succeed that there would be a capability of filling in behind the military operations with civilian government, with rural programs, with local organization, with police forces, in order to consolidate the areas in which military successes have been achieved.

I think, as a matter of fact, at the present time, it has not been possible for us to fill in behind the military operations of the South Vietnamese and allied forces with such permanent institutions as the military

operations might permit. This is a matter of training cadres—a lot more of those are going into the field; it is a matter of training police—that's being done in larger numbers.

I don't believe that throughout the country as a whole, Mr. [Jesse] Cook, that the present type of civil or political dissent has had a major effect on either one of these problems, partly because of the rather limited geographic nature of the political dissent.

Yes, sir.

Cuban Incursions Into Guantanamo Base

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Cuban government flew some correspondents to Guantanamo today in an effort to support its contention that the Pentagon version of the shooting of the Cuban soldier was not true. Could you comment on that?

A. Well, we have had since, as you know, a second incident of some Cubans coming into the base area, with some exchange of fire. We are protesting that through the available channels.⁴ We have had a few of these incidents since about March of this year. And my hope is, and my advice would be, that these incidents ought to be stopped by Cubans staying out of the base area. It would be better for all concerned if they should do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred a moment ago to certain areas where you say the enemy seems to be "lying low." Is there any evidence that in those certain areas the lying low is the product of a local truce between the two sides?

A. No; we haven't seen evidence of that. We have had reports of certain individual Viet Cong infiltrators into some of these areas of disturbance. But it is not our impression that these so-called "resistance forces" are working with or for or in support of the Viet Cong. Their principal leaders have repudiated the offer of the Viet Cong to give them support.

⁴ See p. 934.

No, I think that—well, perhaps I should not go too far in trying to judge what is in the other fellow's mind. I did point out that in previous years, at this period, just before the monsoon really got started, there has been a sort of drop in organized military action. It was resumed again during the monsoon. And I think it would be natural that some of them, say, up in the First Corps area, might just want to wait it out a little bit and see what happened out in Hue and Da Nang.

Chinese Nuclear Tests

Q. Mr. Secretary, the estimated force of the Chinese nuclear tests seems to be going up these days with each new announcement by the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]. Could you tell us what the latest estimate is, as to the force of this test, and has the size of the explosion changed in any way the previous estimates on when the Chinese might have a stockpile of nuclear weapons?

A. Well, on the first one, I would have to refer you to the announcements of the AEC on that matter. This had to do, I think, with the pulling together of detailed information from many different sources, and some later estimate that was, I think, more accurate than I think some of the earlier estimates could be, based upon the nature of the information.

On the second point, I should think that it indicates that they are proceeding with their weapons program, that they are making progress on it, that we should expect that they will go on from this to additional tests, and that, now that they have it, they will try to make something out of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify at all, sir, on your remarks concerning Cambodia? I realize you said you were not familiar with the statement made by General Larsen at the Pentagon. But it certainly did leave the impression that the Cambodian situation is rising to a state of considerable danger. In your references to the ICC and the possibility of expanding its

role, were you referring to a continuing state of feeling about that or any additional area of concern?

A. Well, we have made it clear to all concerned that we would be glad to see the ICC increase its activity, strengthen its personnel, get some mobility, put itself in a position to get into different parts of the country to have a look when the situation called for it, in order to assure everybody that Cambodia's neutrality is not being violated in this situation.

No, I did comment that I do not have information that would coincide with that that General Larsen gave. I will check with him to see whether he has some information that I have not had. But we are aware that the Viet Cong have been using Cambodia.

Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the still controversial May 12th incident, have any steps been taken to make sure that American planes do not intrude again into Chinese airspace?

A. Oh, they have instructions not to intrude into Chinese airspace.

Q. Have there been any instances in which our planes have intruded into Chinese airspace, sir?

A. Not according to the briefings we get from the pilots. I think there was an overflight—wasn't there?—over Hainan. I think we pointed out there was a navigational error over Hainan. But there is contradictory evidence on some of these matters. In any event, we have nothing to add about this last incident.

It is true that we do not instruct our pilots to overfly China.

Q. Well, is there contradictory evidence on the May 12th one, Mr. Secretary?

A. Well, the Chinese—

Q. I mean beyond the Chinese.

A. Well, no, I have said all that I can say on that. Because we had a full debriefing from our people involved, and I have nothing to add on that.

"It is much too dangerous to let antagonists draw the wrong conclusion, much too dangerous for any to believe that aggression succeeds upon aggression, much too dangerous to be negligent about one's commitments, much too dangerous to be indifferent to peace."

Organizing the Peace for Man's Survival

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK¹

The central object of our foreign policy can be simply stated, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Some may state it in other ways but I suspect without significant improvement. But one must add, in a modern world, that we must prevent a major war if possible. I recall that in August 1945, when learning of the atomic bomb, a professional officer on the General Staff exclaimed to a group of us, "War has devoured itself and can no longer serve any political purpose." And so our effort must be to organize the peace and not merely hope for it—and to eliminate war and not merely wish that it would go away.

And it is no longer possible to do that by defenses and policies confined to the North American Continent, the Western Hemisphere, the North Atlantic Basin, or any other geographical area. General George C. Marshall recognized this fundamental change in our security problem in his final biennial report as Chief of Staff of the Army. He pointed out that the war just concluded would be the last in which we would have space and time to arm after hos-

tilities broke out, that the technique of war has brought the United States, its homes, and factories into the front line of world conflict, and that therefore we are now concerned with the peace of the entire world.

He was led to that conclusion by intercontinental planes and fission bombs, but since then have come intercontinental rockets and thermonuclear warheads. The range and speed and power of modern weapons compel us to be concerned with the earth as a whole, and indeed even with adjacent areas of space.

There are some who have not revised their thinking in the light of the realities of modern weapons and communications, who cling to the obsolete notions of a bygone age, who think that what happens next door is necessarily more important than what happens halfway around the world. Some of them can see across the Atlantic, but the Pacific is too broad for them, even though it can be crossed in less time than could the Atlantic before the Second World War.

One of the notions which has come down to us from a simpler time is the idea of a sphere of influence. It has a certain superficial appeal. Lacking here the time for a more thorough analysis, I would merely suggest that there are some questions which need a searching answer. Who is to determine how many of these orbits of influence there are to be? Which are to be the master

¹ Made before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York, N.Y., on May 24; as-delivered text. (Excerpts from the advance text were released as Department of State press release 122 dated May 24.)

nations and which the satellites? And what happens when the master nations intrude on each other's self-designated orbits? Quite apart from the political and moral problems involved, it would be hard to devise a scheme more likely to lead to major conflict, and surely history does not certify as a structure for peace.

I see no rational or realistic alternative to a world order which recognizes the right of every nation, large or small, under institutions of its own choosing, to live in peace, free of coercion or threats from others, including its next door neighbors. And that is the kind of world order envisaged in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter—a document drafted while the greatest and most destructive war in history was still raging, when we and others were thinking deeply about the tragic lessons of the past and how to prevent another and still more frightful conflagration. Such a world order is the abiding goal of American policy. And we believe that it is in harmony with the aspirations and interests of a great majority of mankind.

Is this just a visionary dream? Gentlemen, it had better not be, because mankind cannot afford a war fought with thermonuclear weapons. We shall not have a chance to apply lessons learned from world war III. If civilization is to survive, those lessons must be seen and applied in advance in order to prevent it.

The achievement of a peaceful world order that is safe for freedom is not only our abiding goal but our daily concern. Most of the vast activity of the Department of State and related agencies is directed to that end. We work toward it not only through the United Nations and its specialized agencies but through a growing array of regional and functional organizations and other cooperative arrangements, through treaties and other international agreements, through negotiation and consultations, and by promoting exchanges of knowledge and people. Beneath the crises these constructive efforts proceed, day and

night, and most of them are seldom mentioned in the daily press. But in Raymond Fosdick's phrase, they are spinning "the infinity of threads which bind peace together."

Obstacles to Organizing Peace

One obstacle to organizing a reliable peace is, of course, excessive nationalism. In some cases this has appeared among those who only lately have achieved national independence and have not discovered that what nations—especially small ones—can achieve in isolation is severely limited. It has appeared also among a few who would try to recapture the glories of a vanished and, in part, imaginary past rather than face squarely the realities of the present and the requirements of the future.

But another and much more formidable obstacle to the sort of world we are trying to build is presented by those who are committed to a different scheme for organizing the affairs of mankind. And it is sometimes said that the underlying crisis of our time in this postwar period arises from the fundamental conflict between those who would impose their blueprint on mankind and those who believe in self-determination—between coercion and freedom of choice.

And significant changes have occurred within the Communist world. It has ceased to be monolithic, and evolutionary influences are visible in most of the Communist states. But the leaders of both the principal Communist nations are committed to the promotion of the Communist world revolution, even while they disagree—perhaps bitterly—on questions of tactics.

If mankind is to achieve a peaceful world order safe for free institutions, it is of course essential that aggression be eliminated—if possible by deterring it or, if it occurs, by repelling it. The clearest lesson of the 1930's and -40's is that aggression feeds on aggression. I'm aware that Mao and Ho Chi Minh are not Hitler and Mussolini, but we should not forget what we have learned about the anatomy and physiology of aggression. We ought to know

better than to ignore the aggressor's openly proclaimed intentions or to fall victim to the notion that he will stop if you let him have just one more bite or speak to him a little more gently.

Are there not many of us in this room who are a little skeptical when ideas are put forward in the 1960's as new ideas which were the conventional wisdom when we ourselves were students more than 30 years ago and led to the great catastrophe of World War II, with its tens of millions of casualties right around the globe? And skeptical that the revival of those ideas can prevent the casualties in the hundreds of millions of world war III? It's too far away, it's not our war. Anyhow the aggressor has been treated rudely and therefore he is something of a psychological problem and you must be kind to him. Or if he takes another bite, perhaps he'll be satisfied and will not take another. Do you remember all those—1930's—leading directly into World War II?

I believe it is widely understood that a thermonuclear aggression would not be a rational act. And I believe it is generally realized that aggression by moving masses of conventional forces across frontiers would entail the gravest risks. But what the Communists, in their familiar upside down language, call "wars of national liberation" are advocated and supported by Moscow as well as by Peiping. And the assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam is a critical test of that technique of aggression.

It is as important to deter this type of aggression in Southeast Asia now as it was to defeat it in Greece 19 years ago. The aggression against Greece produced the Truman Doctrine, a declaration of a general policy of assisting other free nations who were defending themselves against external attacks or threats. A clear understanding that aggression must not be allowed to succeed produced our support of Iran and our aid to Turkey and Greece, our aid to Western Europe, the Berlin airlift, the North Atlantic Treaty and the other defensive alliances and military establishments

of the free world, the decision to repel the aggression against Korea, and the decision to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia to preserve their independence.

The "Why" of Our Commitment

In the discussion of our commitment in Southeast Asia, three different aspects are sometimes confused—why we made it, how we made it, and the means of fulfilling it.

The "why" was a determination that the peace and security of that area are extremely important to the security of the United States. That determination was made first before the Korean war by President Truman on the basis of protracted analysis in the highest councils of the Government. The problem was reexamined at least twice during his administration and at intervals thereafter. And the main conclusion was always the same. It was based on the natural resources and the strategic importance of the area, on the number of nations and peoples involved, more than 200 million, as well as on the relationship of Southeast Asia to the world situation as a whole and to the prospects for a durable peace. Those of both parties—or of no party—who have had to bear the responsibilities of protecting the security of the United States during the last 20 years have never regarded Southeast Asia and Viet-Nam as "obscure" or "remote" or "unimportant."

The "How" of the Commitment

The "how" of the commitment consists of various acts and utterances by successive Presidents and Congresses, of which the most solemn is the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,² signed in 1954 and approved by the Senate in early 1955 with only one dissenting vote. I do not find it easy to understand how anyone could have voted for that treaty—or even read it—without realizing that it was a genuine collective defense treaty.

It says in article IV that each party rec-

² For text and protocol, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

ognizes that "aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area"—which by protocol included the nations which came out of French Indochina—"would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." And, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dulles said specifically that this clause covered an armed attack "by the regime of Ho Chi Minh." There was never any doubt about it when this treaty was signed. Article IV binds each party individually; it does not require a formal collective finding. And that too was made plain when the treaty was under consideration and has been reiterated on various occasions since then.

Now the assertion that we have only recently discovered the SEATO Treaty is just untrue. I have referred to it frequently myself, beginning with a public statement in Bangkok in March 1961³ that the United States would live up to its obligations under that treaty and would "continue to assist free nations of this area who are struggling for their survival against armed minorities directed, supplied, and supported from without," just as we would assist those under attack by naked aggression. President Kennedy referred to our obligations under SEATO on a number of occasions, including his last public utterance, and President Johnson has done so frequently.

In April 1964 the SEATO Council of Ministers declared⁴ that the attack on the Republic of Viet-Nam was an aggression "directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962." They declared also that the defeat of that "Communist campaign is essential" and that the members of SEATO should remain prepared to take further steps in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty. Only France did not join in these declarations.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.

⁴ For text of a communique of Apr. 15, 1964, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 692.

A few days later, in this city, President Johnson said that:⁵

The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is "essential" is a reality. To fail to respond . . . would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine worldwide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive. . . . So let no one doubt (he said) that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom.

The resolution of August 1964,⁶ which the House of Representatives adopted unanimously and the Senate with only two negative votes, said that "the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." It also said that "the United States is, therefore; prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Fulfilling Our Commitment

Now the third aspect is the means of fulfilling our commitment. These have changed with the nature of the problem and as the dimensions of the aggression have grown. The decision to commit American forces into combat was made by the President with understandable sobriety and reluctance and only because it became necessary to cope with the escalation of the aggression by the other side.

I have no doubt that a large majority of the governments of the free world are sympathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia and would be deeply concerned were they to fail. And gallant troops from the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are fighting at the side of our forces and those of the Republic of Viet-Nam. And Thailand and Laos are fully engaged in the larger issues of Southeast Asia.

⁵ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

You are familiar with our far-reaching, persistent efforts to bring the other side to the peace table. We shall continue those efforts. I have on occasion seen some signs carried by friends who greet me as I travel about—"Peace in Viet-Nam." But they seem not to understand that the President has carried that sign into all corners of the earth—repeatedly, repeatedly, repeatedly. I would be in Geneva tomorrow, literally, if there was anybody there with whom to negotiate peace. But I'm also confident that the United States will continue to do what may be necessary to assure that aggression in Southeast Asia does not succeed.

When the other side becomes convinced that they cannot achieve its purpose by force, then peace will come—and I think peace will come. But in our policy toward our adversaries or possible adversaries, the prevention or defeat of aggression is only the first step. We welcome, and ought to welcome, every opportunity for agreements or understandings which settle or blunt disputes, without sacrificing the vital interests of our allies and other free peoples. And so we continue most earnestly to seek reliable agreements and arrangements to control and reduce armaments.

And we welcome the evident desires of most of the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe for more normal relationships with the peoples of the West. The President hopes very much that Congress will grant the broader authority he has requested, for example, in negotiating trade agreements with those nations.⁷

Now it is true that Viet-Nam hangs as a cloud over what are called East-West relations. But I would hope that we on our side would not let that cloud become so dark as to paralyze our search for further points of agreement, even with those with whom we cannot agree as far as Viet-Nam is concerned. We know that these same obstacles apply in Eastern Europe. But we must think of the day when Viet-Nam is settled

and remind ourselves that there is a world whose business must be transacted, there is a peace to be built, and that we should get on with it in whatever way we can—in trade or exchange, or in disarmament, or wherever we can find points, large or small, on which we and those in Eastern Europe can agree.

And we're glad that the terror has been lifted in many of the Communist nations, and we have welcomed these trends toward more personal freedom. And we'll welcome, and shall do what we can to promote, friendly and natural relationships between the peoples of the Communist world and ourselves.

Wide Understanding of Basic U.S. Policy

In my years as Secretary of State, I have found that the central objectives of American policy are widely understood and respected and supported. I believe that a great majority of governments and peoples realize that we seek nothing for ourselves except the right to live in freedom. I don't believe there is any government that seriously believes that we're trying to take away from them anything that is theirs. There is no acre of ground which we covet, no people or population which we should like to annex. I believe a great majority of them want this sort of world order that we and they are trying to build and in which all men can live in peace and freedom and in fraternal association.

It's no accident that we took the lead in organizing the United Nations and many of its related institutions and have been the largest financial contributor to these institutions. At the end of the Second World War we demobilized the most powerful armed forces in the world, indeed so rapidly that by 1946 we did not have a division or an air group ready for combat. We offered to share our atomic monopoly with the entire world and eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world for purposes of peace. We supported Iran when its integrity and independence were threatened;

⁷ For text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to the Congress, together with proposed legislation, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

and when Greece and Turkey were threatened, we assisted them. We assisted Western Europe to recover from the war and to move on to unprecedented levels of well-being, and joined in organizing NATO and other alliances for the defenses of the free world.

When free Berlin was threatened, we organized an airlift which enabled it to live, and without war. We negotiated a peace of reconciliation with our enemies recently engaged in so bitter a war—Japan and Germany. We played a major role in repelling the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea.

We took the lead in organizing a great cooperative undertaking in the Western Hemisphere, the Alliance for Progress. We have encouraged and assisted many other cooperative undertakings for human welfare right around the globe, with 11,000 of our young people today serving in every continent in the Peace Corps. We've extended economic and technical assistance to most of the developing countries, to the extent of some \$120 billion of assistance. And this has included many billions of dollars in food, without which millions of our fellow men would have starved.

And since the end of the Second World War, our Armed Forces have suffered more than 165,000 casualties in the defense of freedom.

Those are some of the things the American people have done in the last two decades. Why? It's very simple—to build a little peace, to sustain the freedom of man, to lift the burdens of misery and ignorance and disease, and to bring some of this turbulence under law.

We are being tested today in a troublesome and dangerous situation in Southeast Asia. But we've been there before, and why? Because the power of the United States is harnessed to the decent purposes of the American people.

If there has been one principal change in our experience before World War II, and our experience since, it is that we've faced the utter and overwhelming necessity of

organizing a peace. It is much too dangerous to let antagonists draw the wrong conclusion, much too dangerous for any to believe that aggression succeeds upon aggression, much too dangerous to be negligent about one's commitments, much too dangerous to be indifferent to peace.

There are some burdens—there are some burdens—and the American people have demonstrated their willingness to bear the necessary burdens in this postwar period:

Burdens of firmness to demonstrate that aggression must be stopped at its earliest stages, before it grows into a great conflagration.

But also the burdens of restraint, for there is too much power in the world simply to be furious—and therefore an airlift instead of ground divisions into Berlin; and the wide-open door to a peaceful settlement of the Cuban missile crisis; and 4 years without bombing North Viet-Nam during increasing infiltration, including the infiltration of the organized units of the North Vietnamese army.

Firmness, for which we must be grateful to those men in uniform who perform their professional tasks with such courage and confidence on every day of the week. But the patience to try to keep the fury of man under control and to keep in mind that our genuine purpose is to make peace possible, to organize it, in order that man himself can survive.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

*John J. McCloy, Moderator:*⁸ Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that very fine and sober analysis of our foreign policy. We take renewed confidence in the fact that you are guiding our conduct in international affairs.

Now, a number of questions have been sent up to the platform. The Secretary hasn't seen these questions. I don't believe we'll have time to answer them all. I have selected some that I think are particularly pertinent,

⁸ Mr. McCloy is chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations.

and with your indulgence, Mr. Secretary, I'll read them to you and then you see if you care to reply to them.

The first question I have is: How serious is the civil war in South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Rusk: It would always be hoped that those who agree in their opposition to the National Liberation Front and to the effort of Hanoi to take over South Viet-Nam by force would tie themselves together in a common effort in order to take care of that overriding problem and postpone until later the lesser differences they have among themselves. We do not find among any of these groups in South Viet-Nam, except the Viet Cong itself, an interest in accepting the program of the Liberation Front or of Hanoi.

Last January the military government of South Viet-Nam announced that it wished to move to a constitutional system. This was on their initiative. They indicated that they hoped that during this calendar year a constitution would be drafted and submitted to the people for approval and that perhaps next year there would then be, under that constitution, a national assembly. In the course of discussion over the last several months, that time schedule has been foreshortened, but it is expected that in September there would be elections throughout the country for a constituent assembly in order to move South Viet-Nam toward a constitutional government.

The issue, therefore, of the present government is a temporary one by the solemn declaration of the present government itself. We believe that this constituent process can go forward. The committee devising plans for the elections will probably finish its job this week. The government has just, in the last 24 hours, reaffirmed its dedication to the idea of elections in September, and on the basis of those elections, there can gather those who represent all sections and segments of the population, with the possible exception of the Viet Cong, who've already announced that they will have nothing to do with the election.

Now there are longstanding differences

—historical, regional, religious, social—among some of the elements there, but I would emphasize that what they have in common is a rejection of the plans of the Liberation Front and of Hanoi. We have made it clear to them that we hope and expect that they will put aside these lesser differences in order to work in unity. And all of our efforts, private and public, will be directed to that end.

I think we may see some further indications of dissent in that country, but there seems to be a pretty general acceptance that elections ought to take place, can take place, and perhaps come to that basic constitutional agreement which is so important to the unity of the whole.

Moderator: Another question I have: What would be our response if a duly elected government of South Viet-Nam requested and insisted that we withdraw?

Secretary Rusk: I do not expect that to happen. When we commit ourselves to elections, as we did in our 14 points over the turn of the year,⁹ we commit ourselves to the results of those elections, but we do not see indications at the present time that under free elections the South Vietnamese people would want us to withdraw and open the way for the seizure of the country by the Viet Cong and Hanoi. So this is to a very considerable extent a hypothetical question, but, nevertheless, on the hypothesis, we're committed to the results of free elections, whatever they are.

Moderator: The United States Senator, speaking lately at the Council against the administration's policies, said the United States should not escalate but should retreat to a defensible coastal enclave. Is there anything wrong with this?

Secretary Rusk: Yes. This is a curious notion that somehow we can take charge of the process of escalation. For 4 years, as I intimated earlier, we held off bombing North Viet-Nam, despite the increasing buildup of infiltration of men and arms from

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

the North into South Viet-Nam. The 325th regular division of the North Vietnamese army moved into South Viet-Nam before we started bombing the North, over the turn of the year 1964-65. We have offered many times to talk about stopping this war. We have asked many times what else would happen if we stopped the bombing. We never got an answer. But even so, we tried on two separate occasions in the last 18 months to find out by stopping the bombing, and the answers in both cases were very clear.

Do not suppose that under present circumstances if we ourselves deescalate, the other side will deescalate. If they are prepared to do so, our contacts are such that we could find that out on very short notice indeed. Therefore, when you talk about withdrawing into certain enclaves, you're talking about drawing into enclaves in the face of every prospect of further extension of effort by the North by military means. I would suppose that that means greater casualties. I would suppose that would mean the seizure of South Viet-Nam by military means from the North, outside of the enclaves, and a reduction of your enclaves piecemeal at their convenience. Now, we have an enclave in Cuba, but Castro has Cuba; and six enclaves in South Viet-Nam would not in themselves prevent the other side, if they put in sufficient military effort, from seizing the country.

If this particular suggestion is looked upon as a step on the way out, then it should be described as such so it can be judged on that basis. But to speak of it in terms of either military or political profit seems to me to ignore the attitude of the other side and to show no prospect of bringing this matter to a conclusion.

Moderator: I'll put two more questions to you. I think a good many of the questions that have come up have already been answered. One is: Could you tell us something about the projected meeting of foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and a number of other Asian

countries mentioned in European papers? I don't know much about that—maybe you can speak—

Secretary Rusk: We've been very much interested in the drawing together of countries in the regions themselves to build, on a basis which they themselves might discover, regional solidarity without the complicating presence of the United States. For example, the ASA association [Association of Southeast Asia] between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. We're very pleased to see Japan organize a meeting of ministers of, I think, eight countries to talk about economic development in Southeast Asia. The ministers are considering another meeting shortly in Korea to talk about the general problems of the area. We not only do this in Asia; we do so in Africa and other areas. It is partly because we believe that regional solidarity itself offers mutual support and assurance and mutual cooperation that will be a useful part of the total structure of building some peace in the world.

We do not ourselves go around looking for business in crises in which we can intervene. If you look at the last 70 crises that have occurred, for example, in the world, you will find that we were involved in about 5 or 6 of them. We would be glad to see regional organizations, such as the OAU [Organization of African Unity] in Africa, or regional groupings in the Far East build up their own ties among themselves to achieve common purposes without entangling those efforts with what might be called the special interests, or perhaps the diverting interests, of the United States.

So we welcome these developments. We hope they will be extended and strengthened; and we see very considerable benefit coming from them, partly because one can see in Latin America, Africa, and in the Far East a rising strength of the voices of moderation, the voices of moderation that can have decent respect to the kind of world community that we have seen outlined in the United Nations Charter. So we'd be glad to take our chances on those developments

and give them our sympathetic if somewhat distant support—I say distant because we don't want to get in the way.

Moderator: I think one other question that came up you've just answered because it dealt with the same subject, but in respect of Africa. There's also one other question—this will be the last. Would you care to comment on U Thant's remarks today in Atlantic City and its implications for U.S. policy in Viet-Nam? Have you had an opportunity to see what he said?

Secretary Rusk: I've only seen the tickers summarizing the Secretary-General's statement. One of our disappointments has been that Hanoi and Peiping have not responded to any machinery for discussing the problems of Southeast Asia. They've rejected the idea that the United Nations has anything whatever to do with the present situation in Southeast Asia. They said that the Geneva machinery is the more appropriate machinery. When we say, all right, let's convene that machinery, they say, no, we don't want to do that either. So we say, all right, let's talk bilaterally. No, they don't want to do that. Well if you don't want to do that, let's talk through intermediaries to see what's going on and to see if we can find any points of contact. They don't want to do that.

I think the point of deescalation, which the Secretary-General mentioned, is one that ought to be pursued further. We've tried ourselves to pursue it for about 2 years. How can we reduce the mounting violence, how can we disengage, how can we get back to the agreements of 1954 and 1962? Now those efforts will continue, but I think we ought not to tease ourselves on this kind of problem. There is no gimmick, there is no pure device, there is no formula which is going to move us toward peace if Hanoi, with the backing of Peiping, is determined to seize South Viet-Nam by force. When all that is said has been said, when all of the frosting is off the cake, you've got to answer the question: If they keep coming, do you get out of the way, or do you meet them? We shall meet them.

U.S. Calls on Cuba To Prevent Incursions Into Guantanamo Base

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT¹

On May 27 the Department presented to the Czechoslovakian Embassy, in charge of diplomatic representation for Cuba in the United States, a note calling attention to two recent incursions by uniformed, armed Cuban military personnel within the perimeter of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We are releasing the text of this note.

Today representatives of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, acting on instructions from the Cuban Government, returned the note to the Department. It can only be assumed that Castro's reaction to the note is further evidence of his need to divert attention from the failures of his regime and increasing popular dissatisfaction in Cuba.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

Press release 130 dated May 28

The Department of State wishes to call to the attention of the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in charge of diplomatic and consular representation for Cuba in the United States, two recent incursions by uniformed, armed Cuban military personnel within the perimeter of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on the evenings of May 21 and May 23. The Department of State wishes to request that the Embassy transmit to the Government of Cuba the protest of the Government of the United States against these provocative actions which are described below:

(a) At approximately 1910 hours (Guantanamo Naval Base time) on May 21, a Marine sentry stationed along the Eastern fence line of the Naval Base detected an armed, uniformed Cuban soldier within the base boundary and challenged him. The Cuban soldier refused to halt. The Marine sentry

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on May 28.

fired a warning shot, and, upon the Cuban soldier's continued failure to halt, fired a second shot. The Marine sentry observed that the Cuban soldier appeared to have been wounded by the second shot.

(b) At approximately 2400 hours (Guantanamo Naval Base time) on May 23, a patrol comprised of three Marines sighted at least five armed and uniformed Cuban soldiers approximately 100 meters inside the Base boundary along the Northwestern fence line of the Naval Base. After being challenged, the Cuban soldiers opened fire on the Marine patrol which returned the fire. The Cuban soldiers moved away to the West and returned to the Cuban side of the boundary fence.

The above incursions were but the latest in a series of such incidents which began in March of this year. The Government of the United States assumes that the Government of Cuba is aware of these happenings and must accept responsibility for them.

The Government of the United States wishes to stress to the Government of Cuba that a deliberate, unauthorized entrance by Cuban military personnel into the Guantanamo Naval Base is a serious matter. Such incursions, if continued, can only result in further grave and regrettable consequences. The Government of the United States therefore calls upon the Government of Cuba to take steps to assure that they are not repeated.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington,
May 27, 1966.

U.S. Relinquishes 99-Year Lease to Atkinson Field in Guyana

Press release 124 dated May 26

The Government of the United States on May 26 relinquished its 99-year lease to Atkinson Field, a World War II airbase in Guyana, South America, and to other leased areas in the new nation. An announcement of the turnover of the base to the Government of Guyana was made at ceremonies at Georgetown, the capital of Guyana, shortly after the former British colony became independent.

The United States acquired the long-term leases in British Guiana from the United Kingdom in 1941. Atkinson Field was deactivated at the end of World War II, and the only significant United States use since that date has been for infrequent aerial survey missions.

Under an agreement reached with Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana, the United States will have certain rights to use Atkinson Field for a period of 17 years subject to cancellation thereafter by written notice 1 year in advance. Delmar Carlson, Chargé d'Affaires, who has been nominated as first American Ambassador to Guyana, signed for the United States. Atkinson Field is used as Guyana's international airport, and the Governments of the United States and Guyana agreed in 1965 to spend \$1.5 million in building a new terminal building and constructing new runways and other improvements.

The Rule of Law in an Unruly World

by Arthur J. Goldberg

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

To participate in this series of lectures would be a privilege in itself, but the privilege is all the greater because of the great man whom we thus commemorate. Adlai Stevenson was a warm and wise friend to many of us, including myself. He often told me he had a wish to become a teacher. That wish never came true formally, but in a larger sense he taught the whole world. His rare qualities won him a place in the hearts of university people, both faculties and students, such as has been attained by scarcely any other man in our public life. For all these reasons, the establishment of this lectureship under the aegis of his friend and United Nations colleague, Dean Andrew Cordier, is a most fitting memorial.

Although it fell to me to succeed Governor Stevenson at the United Nations, it does not seem to me that we who come after him stand in his shadow; rather, we stand in his light, and from that light we draw inspiration and reassurance.

My theme this evening is one of which I think Adlai Stevenson would have approved: the rule of law in an unruly world. Not only from his legal training and practice but from the whole inclination of his personality, he acquired an abiding concern for peace among men and for the law and the institutions which serve peace. He served the

United Nations at its birth in San Francisco, in its infancy when the first rules of procedure were written and tested in London, and in its turbulent years of growth on the East River. He saw in it an expression of the same ideals of ordered freedom that underlie the American Republic: the same belief in the equality of all men, before God and before the law. And he knew that those ideals, like the great documents that embody them, exist not to be kept in a glass case and admired by tourists but to be put to work in the real world, where order grows strong by trying its muscles against disorder.

I hold the same beliefs. When I left the Supreme Court to enter on my new duties at the United Nations, I made a statement² which may have sounded to some like mere rhetorical flourish; but it was entirely serious. The statement was that I was moving from one area dedicated to the rule of law to another dedicated to the same principle and that, to my mind, the effort to bring the rule of law to govern the relations between sovereign states—the central effort of the United Nations—is the greatest adventure in history.

These beliefs come naturally to me from a lifetime in the law and in the pursuit of the just resolution of conflicts through due process. The rule of law among nations is obviously more difficult than here at home; but it is even more necessary, and we have

¹ Adlai Stevenson Memorial Lecture at the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., on May 18 (U.S./U.N. press release 4860/Corr. 1).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1965, p. 240.

ample proof that it is possible—indeed in some measure it is an accomplished fact.

My purpose in this discussion, then, is to suggest in what sense and to what extent the rule of law is today a fact among nations and how, in our own American interest, we should seek to widen the areas of international relations that are susceptible to it. This is, I know, a subject of great interest to scholars and students of international affairs, here at Columbia as elsewhere. I do not propose to rival their scholarly work, but perhaps I can lend some encouragement by testifying that this subject is of great interest not only to scholars but to practitioners, too.

I am well aware that there are other views of this subject, even among people who have wide experience of diplomacy and world politics. We hear it said that what nations really respect is not law but political power. Besides, we are told, this is an age of revolutions, of deep splits of values between East and West and between North and South. And since law derives from values, this revolutionary era is said to be going through what one distinguished critic calls "a withdrawal of the legal order," in which sheer power is more decisive than ever in international affairs and law, especially that of the United Nations, has become little more than a mockery.

Law and Power

My own reading of the facts leads me to a very different conclusion, as I shall explain in a moment. But before specifically discussing international law, I would first like to make three observations about law in general.

First, we must beware of framing the argument in such a way that law and power become antithetical. In real life, law and power operate together. Power not ruled by law is a menace, but law not served by power is a delusion. Law is thus the higher of the two principles; but it cannot operate by itself.

This is true particularly of the United Nations, whose charter is lofty in purpose

but realistic in method. It recognizes the facts of power, as all good law does. But as far as possible, it subjects power to law: to an agreed rule of conduct and to procedures for putting that rule into effect in particular cases. And we Americans should not forget that since the rule is embodied in the charter, which is a treaty to which we are a party, it is thus a part of the supreme law of the United States under our Constitution. Our fidelity to it is therefore not a matter of convenience but of binding commitment, to continue even when it is inconvenient.

My second broad point is that law cannot be derived from power alone. Might does not make right. On the contrary, law springs from one of the deepest impulses of human nature. No doubt the contrary impulses to fight and dominate often prevail, but sooner or later law has its turn. In one of the decisive moments in the history of law, King John thought he could impose his arbitrary will by force; but the barons who mustered superior force preferred to substitute an agreed rule—Magna Carta—for any man's arbitrary will. Thus, the king became subject to the law, and new proof was given of the strong human impulse toward law and the peace that law brings. In American history, this impulse has been especially strong from the beginning, and found its highest expression in our written Constitution.

My third point flows from the second. Because law responds to a human impulse, it rests on much more than coercion. Law must have the police power, but it is by no means synonymous or coterminous with police power. It is much larger in its conception and in its reach. It builds new institutions and it produces new remedies: It tames the forces of change and keeps them peaceful. People obey the law not only out of fear of punishment but also because of what law does for them: the durability and reliability it gives to institutions, the reciprocity that comes from keeping one's word, and the expectation, grounded in experience, that the just processes of law will right their wrongs and grievances. All the police power

in creation could not long uphold a system of law that did not meet these affirmative expectations.

Examples in Our Domestic Scene

With these thoughts in mind, I turn now to the contention of the distinguished critic just referred to, that there has been a withdrawal of the legal order in this chaotic and revolutionary age. He has sought to bolster his case by citing two aspects of our domestic life—with both of which I have had considerable experience. Before turning to the world scene, let me therefore discuss these two examples briefly.

The first example given is the inadequacy of police forces to solve the problem of crime and violence in our cities. But this argument, if I may say so, contradicts itself, for good law, as we have seen, does not manifest itself solely in police forces and jails but also in just and equitable provision for the righting of wrongs. Any judge knows that the great majority of juvenile crimes are committed not by spoiled children of rich or middle-class parents but by the young victims of longstanding and deep-rooted evils: poverty, racial discrimination, and the rejection of society's values that these conditions so often breed. Any prison warden in a big city knows how high a proportion of his cells are filled with the poor, semi-literate youth of our racial ghettos. These evils were not created yesterday; they will not all be cured tomorrow; and even when they are cured the destructive attitudes they have generated are likely to persist for years. In the back lots of city slums, we are reaping the weeds that have germinated during generations of complacent neglect.

Much of the answer to such conditions as these lies in the law: not the law of the police blotter, inescapable though that may be, but the laws that govern education, jobs, housing, and public facilities of all kinds. It is up to the law promptly to create these facilities where they are lacking and promptly to secure equal access to them where race prejudice has customarily de-

nied such access. Such an affirmative body of law is being written and applied today. In it lies much of our hope for domestic peace and stability in future decades.

The second example given was in the field of United States labor-management relations, in which the role of law was pictured as being of minor importance. Actually, the last 30 years have seen a remarkable growth of labor law, and indeed it is my experience in precisely that area that gives me confidence in the possibilities of a comparable growth of the rule of law in the international realm. For in the affairs of labor and management also, revolutionary forces are at work: rapidly changing technology and working conditions, and the dying out of obsolete jobs. Moreover, as in international disputes, the stakes are often large and the contending forces are powerful.

In our free enterprise system, the law is properly reticent about the actual terms of labor contracts, which the parties are expected to settle freely. But our laws do not allow freedom to the contending parties to menace the national health and safety. The powers of government in such cases include factfinding, mediation, conciliation, mandatory "cooling off" periods—and finally, coercion.

All through the Second World War, the War Labor Board enforced its orders, where necessary, by both legal and military means. Few of us old enough to remember will forget the heavy fine imposed on the Mine-workers' Union and John L. Lewis, or the picture of a major industrialist being carried out in his office chair by soldiers in uniform.

Nor is this power confined to wartime. In recent years we have seen Congress pass an arbitration law to prevent a crippling national strike of railroad firemen; and that law was upheld in the courts. And more than 95 percent of labor contracts contain an arbitration clause under which arbitral awards are enforceable in the courts. This is scarcely a picture of the breakdown of law in labor-management relations.

These domestic examples contain clues to

the nature and value of law among nations. First, good law involves the necessary minimum of coercion and a maximum of affirmative, creative action—political, social, and economic—to correct the wrongs that underlie much of the violent conflict of our time. Second, where disputes threaten to get out of hand and injure the entire community, the community must possess the machinery to contain the dispute and prevent the injury.

Functions of Law Among Nations

When we study the functions of law among nations, we find both these propositions repeated on a larger scale. The international institutions that exist to give effect to them are much weaker and less cohesive than those of a national government. But we cannot afford not to use them to the full, because the consequences of international war, under modern circumstances, are even more unacceptable than those of civil insurrection. Our hope for world peace depends on our ability to extend to the international sphere a dual concept of law, both creative and coercive.

This extension of law into the international realm is not going to be achieved in one great utopian stroke of the pen. In the United Nations Charter, and in age-old norms of international law, the community of nations already has a set of fundamental rules which do not need to be rewritten so much as they need to be observed. Our task, therefore, is to make greater use of existing machinery and existing norms—to build on them and to broaden out the areas of international relations that are susceptible to them.

To keep the matter in perspective, let us first recall that the areas of international law and order are already very broad—and they are constantly broadening to fit the emerging common interests of nations. Without law, international mail would not be delivered; shortwave broadcasts would drown each other out; ships, or aircraft, would collide in the night; international business contracts could be violated with impunity;

travelers would lack the protection of their governments; infectious diseases and insect pests would cross frontiers all the time; and even we diplomats—who are supposedly full-time practitioners of power politics—would be unable to carry on our business.

These many functions of the international order are so familiar as almost to be taken for granted. Many of them long antedate the United Nations. But it would be a great mistake to underrate them or to dismiss them as merely “technical” and “nonpolitical.” They are bridges of common interest among nations, and the sum of these common interests is one of the great unseen inhibitors of political conflict and international violence. The specialized agencies of the U.N., and all its economic, social, and technical programs, continue to extend these bridges year by year. They are defended not by forcible sanctions but by an incentive just as powerful in its own way: the long-term self-interest of each member.

The United Nations and its agencies, through their economic, technical, and social programs, continue to add to this system of bridges. In doing so, they serve not only the technical convenience of nations but also their desperate need to cure the evils from which lawless action springs: poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, and deprivation of human rights. I believe that this multilateral system must be strengthened further wherever possible.

U.N. System of Peace and Security

Now I turn to the most difficult area, where law directly confronts political conflict and violence among nations.

The basic law here is in article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” As the charter embodies this law, so the United Nations as an organization should be, ideally, the court of last resort in seeing that it is adhered to. I say “last resort” because the charter itself

imposes on member states the prior duty to seek peaceful settlement of disputes through "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

The framers of the charter did not assume that even when these remedies had been exhausted the Security Council would always be able to meet its responsibilities. By providing for a great-power veto, they recognized the divisions of power and the paralysis that these divisions might cause. For situations in which the U.N. was unable to act, they reaffirmed in article 51 the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against aggression. The U.N. is certainly the preferred policeman, but where it cannot act, individual states must accept the responsibility—as the United States and others are doing in Viet-Nam today.

This United Nations system of peace and security, then, depends upon the individual actions of states as well as the collective actions of the organization. It is a fragile system, to be sure, but the record of its achievements in the past 20 years proves it far from impotent. In Korea it successfully met open, full-scale aggression. In the Middle East, in Kashmir, in Cyprus, it has kept smoldering conflicts under control—and when they leapt out of control, it has created new instruments to put out the flames. In the Congo it prevented a newborn nation, lacking most of the practical essentials of nationhood, from being torn apart, recolonized, or turned into a great-power battleground in the heart of Africa. And right now in Rhodesia, in a most complex and dangerous situation, the United Nations is exerting its influence for a lawful transition to self-government by all the people—which is the only possible and just basis for Rhodesian independence.

It is easy for a critic to say, "Well, some of these problems are nearly as old as the U.N. itself, and they aren't settled yet." This is quite true, and it points up the frustrating difference between the domestic

and the international realm. On the Court, I soon learned that the most satisfying words are four in number, and they appear at the end of a Court decision: "It is so ordered." Many of the greatest conflicts the U.N. must handle—the "chronic cases" on the international sick list—cannot, we have learned, be cured by issuing orders. Often the greatest success we can hope for is to prevent a relapse into violence until the disputants work the poison out of their systems. That process is normally measured in years and sometimes in generations.

These frustrations are all the more severe because the era in which the United Nations was destined to function turned out to be not a tranquil era but one of revolutionary turmoil. Yet the organization has faced that turmoil. It has contributed to the settlement, or at least the defusing, of some of the most dangerous problems of the cold war—including the Berlin blockade, aggression in Korea, the Cuban missile crisis, and the nuclear weapons tests. In the other great revolutionary movement of our time, the passage of so many colonial dependencies into nationhood, the U.N. has provided a framework that could contain the sudden expansion of the community of nations and the often explosive tensions which that expansion brought with it.

Let me examine with you some of the ways in which the U.N. has already developed and adapted the body of law and procedure in order to cope with these great political tensions.

On the closing day of the charter conference in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, President Truman spoke of the future of the new charter in these words:

This charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on. No one claims that it is now a final or a perfect instrument. It has not been poured into any fixed mold. Changing world conditions will require readjustments—but they will be readjustments of peace and not of war.

President Truman's comparison of the charter and our Constitution was correct.

Indeed, it could be extended, because in both cases the readjustments of which he spoke can be achieved by either of two methods: amendment or evolution. Since amendment of the charter is an even more difficult process than amendment of our Constitution, development of the charter's broad provisions has taken place in an evolutionary way. This fact does credit both to those who drafted the charter and to those who have applied it to emerging situations. Indeed, it could be said of the charter 'what our Supreme Court, in *Weems v. United States*, said of the Constitution:

Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meeting passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.

The United Nations Charter has been applied in precisely this way. Under it, for example, a great variety of influential bodies have been created, such as the committee on the implementation of the declaration on colonialism, the U.N. Emergency Force, the International Law Commission, the highly productive regional economic commissions, and many others. All these have become part of the U.N. institutional structure, positively responsive to the strongly felt needs of the time.

Moreover, the effective reach of the original U.N. organs, particularly the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat, has been increased substantially over the years by new practices—each adapted to meet new necessities as they arose, each forming a precedent for the future. For example:

—It has been established that a permanent member's abstention in the Security Council does not constitute a veto.

—From the mediating and conciliating powers under chapter VI of the charter and the powers to deal with threats to peace and security under chapter VII, there has developed a highly important capacity to dispatch U.N. peacekeeping forces and other lesser forms of U.N. "presence" to Kashmir, the Middle East, Cyprus, and numerous other points of international danger.

—Under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution it has been established that the General Assembly, convoked in emergency session by a veto-free majority of the Security Council, may undertake large-scale peacekeeping tasks which the Security Council itself could not undertake because of the veto.

—It has further been established that the Secretary-General, whom the charter calls the U.N.'s "chief administrative officer," is also its chief diplomatist and conciliator and its chief executive with wide discretionary powers under the charter and the mandates of duly adopted resolutions.

"International Law in Embryo"

In addition to these innovations in the working of the organization itself, the United Nations contributes to the growth of law in another way. Some of its resolutions have turned out to be international law in embryo. This is true of a number of famous resolutions in the field of human rights, which—most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—laid down principles later incorporated and refined in binding conventions. We hope it will also be true of President Johnson's new proposal for a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space, which we laid before the U.N. Committee on Outer Space last week for its consideration.³ This proposal, too, draws on certain principles embodied in earlier U.N. resolutions and declarations.

Other General Assembly resolutions on peace and security questions, even though they have no binding legal force, may provide a basis for peacekeeping operations.

³ *Ibid.*, June 6, 1966, p. 900.

and in any event, carry with them the weight of world opinion. If a party to a dispute acts contrary to such a U.N. resolution, it thereby assumes a considerable political burden to justify its action. How great that burden is depends very much on how many members, and which members, voted and spoke for the resolution in the General Assembly.

The U.N. has had to learn the hard way that words on paper can have force and effect only if there lies behind them the requisite political commitment. The World Court duly rendered an advisory opinion that peacekeeping costs incurred in the Middle East and the Congo were "expenses of the Organization" and that a member's failure to pay its share was therefore subject to the loss of vote under article 19. The General Assembly gave its verbal acceptance of this opinion in a resolution overwhelmingly adopted. Yet this very provision, having been accepted in words, proved for political reasons to be unenforceable in fact.

Nor can the Assembly force the growth of law beyond the realities of the time. Attempts to recodify the law of the charter have not thus far borne much fruit, chiefly because what is needed most is not a new statement of law but better compliance with the law that already exists.

Sometimes a proposal made in the Assembly is couched in legal terms but is essentially political in content and purpose. Last fall, for instance, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution on "nonintervention" as a platform from which to attack United States policy in Viet-Nam. This maneuver failed of its purpose when other delegations added language condemning many forms of intervention, including indirect aggression and subversion by proxy. The amended resolution passed by 109 votes to 0, and it is a good political document.⁴ But because of the tactical necessities of political compromise, its text was too imprecise and inconsistent to be adequate as a statement of international law.

Maintaining the Integrity of the U.N.

Before closing, I want to turn for a moment from the U.N.'s actions themselves—successful or not, as the case may be—to the procedures by which those actions are taken. I must report candidly that a real danger to the U.N. as an organization, and to the rule of law of which it is the highest embodiment, arises from a recent tendency to jettison normal parliamentary procedure for the sake of short-term political gains.

This was especially apparent last December at the end of the 20th General Assembly. Certain delegations, understandably impatient with the pace of decolonization, presented a draft resolution calling for strong measures against colonialism. One of its provisions concerned military bases, a subject clearly and undeniably related to international peace and security, which under the charter is explicitly classed as an important question subject to the two-thirds majority requirement. Yet the General Assembly declared this resolution, including the part on military bases, adopted by a simple majority.

What primarily disturbed us was not the substance of the resolution—with much of which we could agree—but the flouting of due process. When procedures laid down in the charter are not adhered to, the charter's integrity is impaired. Rules of procedure may seem to be dull things, but they are not: They are dikes against the flood of disorder. The observance of them, as I said in the Assembly at the time, is of the essence of liberty. It was my duty to point out to the Assembly the danger not just to some members but to all members, and to the organization itself, if the rules are not followed. And I announced that the United States would regard the resolution in question as having been illegally adopted and therefore as null and void.⁵ In taking this position, we were not repudiating an action of the Assembly; on the contrary, we were

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 164.

⁵ For text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement in the General Assembly on Dec. 17, 1965, see U.S. delegation press release 4762.

following a familiar principle of law; namely that unconstitutional action is no action.

It is clear that this impatience with rules arises from a passionate desire to achieve certain political objectives without delay—in this case, to make a declaration against colonialism; and I can readily understand the impatience with the vestiges of that system shown by those who have lived under it. This, as well as the fact that no constitution or laws, including our own, command universal observance, should teach us a measure of modesty and patience. But we cannot let patience deteriorate into a habit of laxity, or modesty into a condoning of clear violations of the charter; for what is at stake is the integrity of the world institution that serves us all.

Such, then, is my report on the extent of the rule of law today in the international realm, and specifically in the affairs of the United Nations. The daily headlines from every quarter of the globe are sufficient reminder of how tenuous that rule is. But, as Adlai Stevenson said, "Let none of us mock its weakness, for when we do we are mocking ourselves."

The World Law We Seek

Our efforts to extend the rule of law, through means both formal and informal, are continuing and will not be abandoned.

This year, the General Assembly will consider anew how best to improve its capabilities for keeping the peace—and how its peacekeeping activities should be financed.

It is our hope that a treaty on outer space will soon be written.

Human rights conventions, conceived and drafted in the United Nations, are before the United States Senate for ratification.⁶ It is my hope that they will be ratified, because the delay in doing so only confuses our friends and provides ammunition to our foes.

Very soon, the World Court will render judgment on one of its most historic cases, that dealing with the status of South-West

Africa. All member states must respect and implement the Court's decision when it is made—particularly the parties, which indeed are bound to do so under article 94 of the charter.

In Geneva the long search continues for treaties banning the underground testing of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of these weapons among nations.

All these are important ongoing efforts to extend and strengthen the rule of law among nations.

Our eyes are wide open to the difficulties. The genius of the United Nations is that its lofty principles are tempered by realism. They have been put to the test in conflicts of naked power and have been proved effective in enough cases to show their worth. To become increasingly effective, they must be applied with imagination and common sense to the real problems of our turbulent and revolutionary era. The more turbulent and revolutionary the world situation is, the more vital it is that we increasingly perfect the rule of law—not only its restraint of violence but also its remedies against injustice.

I believe the existence of the U.N. during the past 20 years, beset with the dangers of war and the persistent pressures of revolutionary change in every continent, has been a decisive blessing to mankind. It has been a meeting ground between East and West when hardly any common interests could be perceived save the interest in sheer survival. And today it affords coherent framework and a place of dignity and influence to some 50 nations, newly born from the colonial age. It is their international home, their badge of legitimacy, their disinterested helper and adviser, their training ground in the arts of diplomacy—the visible sign of their stake in the community of nations.

There are still some who dream of an international utopia in which a few civilized states could use their power to settle the affairs of the world, much as the major powers of Europe did in the century after the Congress of Vienna. But we should remember that, when the rule of the Concert of Europe finally fell apart, world war en-

⁶ For background and texts of conventions, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 320, and Feb. 7, 1966, p. 212.

sued. This happened in great part because, in large areas of the world, the international order of the 19th century did not redress grievances but merely submerged them—until in our own century they erupted in revolution and world war.

The world law we seek will be different. It will extend impartially to white and black, north and south, old and new. It will still be imperfect; it will still depend for its effectiveness on the willingness of the stronger nations to put their power at its service. But it will embrace in a spirit of equality all the races and cultures of the world and it will address itself to the real troubles of mankind: poverty, inequality, and the deprivation of rights. In that respect, it will surpass even the hundred years' peace of the Congress of Vienna, which was based on the subjection or impotence of half the world's peoples.

Our nation derives its great influence in the world not only from great physical power but also from the fact that our basic law and our national outlook are premised on the equality and dignity of all men. The way to peace in this turbulent age is to keep to that national vision; to work with all our might for the establishment of a structure of law that will be reliable and just to all nations. For though law alone cannot assure world peace, there can be no peace without it. Our national power and all our energies should operate in the light of that truth.

U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Initial Meeting

Following is the text of an announcement which was released at Buenos Aires and Washington after the meeting of the Joint U.S.-Argentine Trade and Economic Committee at Washington May 17-19.

Press release 116 dated May 20

The Joint Argentine-United States Trade and Economic Committee held its initial meeting in Washington from May 17 to May

19, 1966, to discuss problems in these fields affecting the two countries. The Delegation of Argentina was headed by the Secretary of State for Industry, don Y. Alfredo Concepción, and the United States Delegation by Mr. Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Trade Policy. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, participated in the inaugural session.

The discussions were held in an atmosphere of complete cordiality, and both Delegations agree that the talks have been of mutual benefit. Important problems involving bilateral commercial and economic relations were discussed as well as the present international economic situation and the multilateral trade negotiations currently taking place.

Special attention was devoted to the world food situation, particularly trends in food production, consumption and requirements. Both sides were in agreement on the imperative necessity of developing plans for food aid which take into account the various factors bearing on the problem. The important role which the Argentine Republic can fill was recognized, given its potential for the production of foodstuffs. The two Delegations agreed on the desirability of exploring the possibilities of cooperation in this field.

The prospects for the investment of private capital in Argentina were considered in detail, and it was agreed that there exist favorable opportunities for United States citizens and companies. It was agreed to increase cooperation in devising means to encourage investment in Argentina, a policy supported by the United States and Argentine Governments. In seeking means of achieving this objective, consideration is to be given, among others, to agreements on double taxation.

Bilateral commercial relations were considered with regard to the need for bringing about a general increase in the level of trade, particularly in Argentine exports to the United States. With reference to particular factors related to the exportation of certain Argentine products, it was agreed to con-

tinue conversations to develop solutions to the problems which have impeded their marketing in the United States.

The Committee will meet periodically and will hold its next meeting in Buenos Aires at a time mutually agreeable to the two Governments.

Treasury Department To Control Blocked Foreign Assets in U.S.

White House press release dated May 13

The President announced on May 13 the consolidation, in the Department of the Treasury, of jurisdiction over all foreign property in the United States which is "blocked" or "frozen."

The Treasury Department already administers controls over the property of North Viet-Nam, North Korea, Communist China, Cuba, and the nationals of those countries. Today's consolidation, accomplished by an Executive order¹ effective on May 15, 1966, will transfer from the Department of Justice to the Department of the Treasury jurisdiction over the foreign assets which were blocked during World War II and which still remain blocked.

The World War II blocking control program was initiated in the Treasury Department in April 1940. At the end of the war it was transferred to the Office of Alien Property, Department of Justice. The prospective termination of the Office of Alien Property makes necessary the reassignment of responsibility for the administration of the remaining frozen assets to the Treasury Department.

No changes in the licensing policies applicable to these assets are being made by the Treasury Department. All outstanding orders, regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, and other public documents issued with respect to this blocked property and in force on May 15, 1966, will continue in full effect until they are revoked or modified by

the Treasury Department. License applications not acted upon by the Office of Alien Property before May 15, 1966, will be processed by the Treasury Department in accordance with existing procedures without the necessity of filing new applications.

Inquiries with respect to blocked property should be addressed to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D. C., 20220. Matters relating to the World War II vesting program of the Office of Alien Property will remain within the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

- U.S. Policy With Respect to Mainland China. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. March 8-30, 1966. 657 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part II, March 29-April 5, 1966, 193 pp.; Part III, April 6-20, 1966, 147 pp.
- Emergency Food for India. Hearing before the House Agriculture Committee on H.J. Res. 997. March 31, 1966. 21 pp.
- Report of Examination of Financial Statements, Panama Canal Company, Fiscal Years 1965 and 1964. H. Doc. 427. April 25, 1966. 10 pp.
- The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Government Operations Committee. Part I, April 27, 1966. 34 pp.
- Chamizal Treaty National Memorial, El Paso, Tex. Report to accompany H.R. 7402. H. Rept. 1496. May 9, 1966. 12 pp.
- Donation of Two Obsolete German Weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany. Report to accompany H.R. 11980. H. Rept. 1518. May 10, 1966. 3 pp.
- Pan American Institute of Geography and History. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 108. S. Rept. 1156. May 11, 1966. 19 pp.
- Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Report to accompany S. Res. 179. S. Rept. 1155. May 11, 1966. 2 pp.
- Technical Amendments to the Act Creating the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. Report to accompany S. 2469. H. Rept. 1537. May 17, 1966. 10 pp.
- International Education Act of 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 14643. H. Rept. 1539. May 17, 1966. 24 pp.
- Review of the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Report to accompany S. Res. 251. S. Rept. 1169. May 18, 1966. 5 pp.
- Duty-Free Treatment for Certain Corkboard Insulation. Report to accompany H.R. 8376. S. Rept. 1170. May 18, 1966. 3 pp.

¹ Executive Order 11281; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 7215.

Interaction of Science and Technology and Foreign Affairs

Statement by Herman Pollack

*Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs*¹

The Department of State is pleased to have an opportunity to testify on H.R. 13696. This bill, which would broaden and clarify the functions of the National Science Foundation, reflects in part the very considerable interest of this committee in a more active role for the National Science Foundation in international affairs and in the support of international scientific activities. The Department of State welcomes this interest and would welcome a more active role for the National Science Foundation in the international field.

The requirement that activities supported by the National Science Foundation must strengthen science in the United States tends to obscure its authority to support international scientific activities which are designed to improve our foreign relations and attain our foreign policy objectives. As I have stated in previous testimony to this committee, these ends are not incompatible. We understand the consequence of the proposed revision of section 3(2) is to remove the ambiguity concerning the authority of the National Science Foundation to engage in international activities at the request of the Secretary of State. The Department of State believes this clarification of congressional intent is timely and desirable.

The authority which this subsection will make available will make it possible to deal

more decisively than heretofore with the opportunities afforded by scientific and technological developments for international cooperation and the pursuit of United States foreign policies. It will permit positive action in the so-called "gray areas" which have thus far proven difficult to come to grips with. Furthermore, it will make possible the inauguration of new bilateral and multilateral scientific relationships which could prove to be of overriding advantage to United States national interest, broadly conceived.

Since the committee is considering the functions and activities of the National Science Foundation, I would like to use the occasion to discuss several related matters of interest to the Department of State.

Preparing for Scientific Progress

The first of these relates to the fact that science and technology are hurtling the world into a future for which it is philosophically and politically ill prepared. The peaceful atom and its potential international implications, the impact of evolving space technology on weather prediction and control, the movement of man into the oceans illustrate typical developments which appear to be outpacing man's political readiness to deal with them. In its 14th annual report, the National Science Foundation stated:

Understanding of man in relation to other men as individuals, groups, and nations—the domain of

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on Apr. 19.

the social sciences—has not kept pace with man's knowledge and mastery of the physical universe, and is urgently needed in a world of increasing populations, emerging nations, and growing tensions.

Yet there is very little scholarly effort being devoted to the philosophical and political preparation of the world for the incredible technological progress that is taking place. In short, there is an urgent and imperative need for focusing multidisciplinary attention on creating the environment which will assure that the scientific and technological progress under way and that which lies ahead of us will be used for mankind's benefit rather than become a source of new and possibly intractable international problems.

This, of course, is not a novel point of view, and much thought has been given to the responsibility of the scientists for the social, economic, and political consequences of their discoveries. I do not wish at this time to join in the discussion of how large a share of this responsibility the scientists should bear but, rather, wish to suggest that it is perhaps not inappropriate for the National Science Foundation, which is so clearly charged with the promotion of science, to take on major responsibility for the promotion of academic interest and activity on the international consequences of scientific progress. Specifically, we would welcome a source of vigorous leadership backed up by financial resources that would encourage universities and research organizations to develop capacities in the field of the social sciences that could be beneficially devoted to the consideration of what might be called international accommodation to scientific and technological progress.

Such activity on the part of the National Science Foundation would appear to be authorized by the proposed new section 3(b) if the Department of State is correct in its understanding that the applied research authorized by that section applies to the social as well as the natural sciences. We find an eloquent statement of the need for an interdisciplinary approach to national

and international problems in the Director's statement accompanying the 15th annual report of the National Science Foundation, when he stated:

A continuing issue—one that can only be attacked and never disposed of—is that of using the methods and findings of the pure and applied sciences to help deal with pressing social problems of an increasingly complex society. In general, the major problems which loom large before the Nation are almost all related in one way or another to science and technology. But there is rarely a social problem which is the exclusive concern of a single scientific discipline, in the traditional sense of the term. Many problems can be dealt with in part by chemistry, or in part by other fields within the physical sciences; some problems clearly require the attention of engineers and social scientists. . . .

Search for Qualified People

The second matter I wish to discuss arises from the Department's search for scientific talent qualified to serve as policy officers in the Department and as scientific attachés abroad. It is now widely appreciated that an adequate understanding of scientific and technological considerations is essential if the officers of the Department of State are to deal effectively with international policy questions which have their origin in or are heavily affected by such considerations. This is a conclusion that the Department had earlier come to with respect to a wide range of other subjects, especially in the economic field, that are now recognized as part of the fabric of international affairs.

The need for policy-oriented scientific and technical competence is not met by having a cluster of such talent in my office or scattered at a dozen and a half missions abroad. It must permeate the entire organization, for the interactions are occurring in almost every aspect of the Department's work and in every corner of the globe. In effect, in addition to the need for a staff of full-time scientific attachés, the Foreign Service could make good use of 50 or more officers who could bring a measure of professional competence to scientific subjects with international policy implications.

Thus, there is an urgent and growing

need, utterly out of balance with the supply, for people who are well trained not only in basic scientific concepts and their applications but also in their social, political, and economic implications.

Until the present time, the few individuals who might claim to possess these attributes have had to work out a personal program of self-training. This is not sufficient. Carefully directed systematic training programs need to be designed for scientists interested in the sociopolitical environment and the nonscientists interested in science and technology.

Beginning Efforts

On the latter, the Department has a number of steps under way to prepare its officers for work in this field.

Two months ago Secretary Rusk inaugurated a scientific and technological exchange program in cooperation with NASA, AEC, NSF, and the Department of Commerce.² Under this plan, officers are being assigned to tours of duty with each other's agencies to increase the understanding of the nonscientist for the implications of science and the understanding of the scientist for the implications of international relations within the contexts of the missions of the various agencies. Last month the third of an ongoing series of seminars on science, technology, and foreign affairs was conducted. On this occasion the participants were 20 handpicked, high-quality, middle-grade officers of the Department.

The Department is also now actively seeking individuals with scientific training as entrants into the career Foreign Service.

This year the Department has also instituted a series of Secretary's "Science Briefings" as another step toward increasing the understanding within the Department of the important relationships between science and technology and foreign affairs. The initial briefing in February of this year, attended by the Secretary, Under

Secretaries, and other principal officers of the Department, was on the subject of desalination.

Approximately a year ago the Department designated science officers at Foreign Service missions at which a scientific attaché was not located. This concept, which has worked very well in several posts, offers considerable promise for the future provided an adequate supply of qualified Foreign Service officers can be developed.³

These efforts to equip the Department's officers with a capacity to deal usefully with the interaction of scientific and technological subject matter and foreign affairs are but a beginning, and much more will have to be done. At the same time an increasing effort will have to be made to recruit scientific and engineering personnel with understanding and talent for working in the policy field. I can testify that such persons are exceedingly scarce. Their non-scientific skills are developed more by accident than by design.

Need for New Body of Knowledge

It is only within the past 5 years or so that our institutions of higher learning have established programs in "science and society" or "science and public policy" which would provide an educational base for preparation of scientists for work on policy questions. The most celebrated of these is Dean [Don K.] Price's graduate seminar at Harvard. Courses of study in this area are also now available at the Case Institute, MIT, Purdue University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Princeton, Columbia, and possibly several other universities.

Again, the surface has been barely scratched. I suggest that consideration be given to the possibility that the National Science Foundation provide encouragement and leadership which will result in the large-scale development of undergraduate and graduate programs for the training of

² For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1966, p. 470.

³ For an article on "The United States Scientific Attaché Program" by William Howard Taft III, see *ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 113.

scientists and engineers for work in policy fields. This objective would be facilitated if it were made clear that such activity is encompassed in the words "education in the sciences," which are embodied in this legislation in several places.

This effort would help to create a new body of knowledge now lacking in this field, which lies neither within the discipline of the natural or the social sciences but which is being born as a union of the two. A truly interdisciplinary effort should be encouraged in which the scientist and his non-scientist colleagues work together to com-

bine the resources of science and technology and those of domestic and foreign policy.

In summary the Department of State believes that the changes contemplated by the revised language in H.R. 13696 will provide a substantial increase in the ability of the United States Government to make effective use of its scientific and technological capabilities in support of international policies and objectives. In this general connection moving ahead on the two areas of activity discussed above would in the Department's opinion represent constructive steps to be taken at this time.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Seminar on Communication Satellite Earth-Station Technology

A seminar on communication satellite earth-station technology, under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union, was held at the Department of State May 16-27. Following is the text of a statement made before the seminar on May 16 by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, together with a Department announcement of the seminar.

STATEMENT BY MR. JOHNSON

Press release 112 dated May 16

It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the Department of State on the occasion of our seminar on communication satellite earth-station technology.

While we have had considerable experience in this country with technical cooperation programs, we undertake today for the first

time the presentation of an extended seminar under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union. We have wanted to do this for a long time. The seminar approach affords an opportunity to explore a single subject in depth and to provide in an orderly way all available information on that subject. At the same time it provides a firsthand opportunity for a free exchange of ideas, the generation of pertinent questions, and perhaps, in some degree, progress toward answers to these questions. In any event this is a cooperative effort, and we hope to benefit from your presence in the same way that we hope you will benefit from your experience here.

At the outset we considered the possibility of holding a seminar on any one of a number of currently important topics. Very quickly, however, our choice narrowed down

to the general subject of satellite communications. In a world where those of us who are not technicians find it increasingly difficult to grasp fully the startling advances of scientific technology, few developments have appealed more dramatically to the imagination of all people than man's first steps into space. Communication by earth-satellite relays is an application of space technology which has already passed from the experimental to the practical. At the same time it offers the promise of rewards still dimly understood by most of us.

In recognition of this potential we have been engaged for several years in the promotion and establishment of a single global communication satellite system, owned by many nations, accessible to all members of the International Telecommunication Union. The initial germ of this concept has become a reality. Today 49 countries, many of which are represented here, share in the ownership and operation of the space segment of a satellite system through membership in an international consortium. These 49, shortly to be joined by others, represent at least 90 percent of the potential international telecommunications traffic which a global satellite system might serve in the next few years. The Department of State takes pride in the role it has played in the negotiation of the international agreements which have made this consortium a reality.¹ The countries represented here should take pride in the role they have taken in making the consortium an effective instrument.

Under the international agreements the Communications Satellite Corporation is the entity designated by law to participate for the United States. In addition, it acts as manager of the system for the consortium. I need hardly add that the corporation, or COMSAT as it is more familiarly known, has played a major role in the proceedings which commence this afternoon. The advent of commercial satellite communication was assured in April 1965 when Early Bird suc-

cessfully entered its orbit. Less than 3 months later inaugural ceremonies celebrated the beginning of actual commercial operations. I am told that Early Bird has a capability of transmitting 240 simultaneous telephone conversations or 6,200 teletype messages, or, as many of us have seen dramatically demonstrated on one or another of several historic occasions, live television. I am further told that Early Bird is only the forerunner of more advanced satellites to come. Commercial service will be expanded, using more versatile spacecraft, over the Atlantic and Pacific by the fall of this year. Plans are already under way for far larger satellites having a capacity of approximately twelve hundred two-way voice channels, five times the capacity of Early Bird.

Difficult though it may be for some of us to grasp the complexities of earth satellites and their delicately tuned packages, I understand that the earth stations which transmit and receive communications to and from communication satellites represent perhaps an even more crucial element of the total system. On the one hand, they must be able to detect the faint satellite signals and boost their power tens of billions of times. On the other, they must transmit strong signals for the satellite to repeat. The more we considered the possibilities of the field, the more it appeared to us that earth stations and their technology should be our choice for the topic of our seminar. This was especially true since many of you may expect to acquire earth-station facilities in the not too distant future.

As all of you know, one of the first and largest stations in the United States was constructed by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company in 1962 at Andover, Maine. This facility has served under the direction of COMSAT as the North American Early Bird Link. In addition, COMSAT is building earth stations in Hawaii and the State of Washington for the establishment of service with Japan, Australia, and other nations of the Pacific. Stations abroad are already located in England, France, West Germany, and Italy. Canada has a new sta-

¹ For background and texts of agreements, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 281.

tion at Mill Village, Nova Scotia, which those of you who are from other countries will be able to visit after the close of our program here. Programs are under way or under active consideration which by 1968 will assure the completion of earth-station facilities in a number of additional countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. By that time global coverage will essentially be achieved.

Very probably the technology of earth stations will play an important part in the plans of the communications interests which you represent. Our purpose here is to provide you with as much information as possible from our own experience to assist you in meeting problems of earth stations in your own countries. At the same time we hope to learn from you the kinds of problems which such projects might be expected to encounter. So for the next 2 weeks we will all be students and teachers together in a school established uniquely for this purpose.

The Department of State is honored to have you here. Obviously, however, we in the Department do not count among our numbers those best qualified to assist you with the technical sessions. Accordingly, we have called upon other Government agencies and, more especially, upon the United States communications industry for their cooperation, their support, and their technical resources. Their response and their generosity have been most gratifying.

COMSAT itself has acted as program coordinator. However, our contributions to the program have originated not only with COMSAT but with a considerable number of industry sources. More than 45 faculty members, if I may use that term, will present lectures. This same faculty will be available to deal with your questions and to discuss any matters of particular interest which you may wish to raise with them.

Under the coordination of the Department of Commerce, a number of exhibits related to topics of the seminar are displayed in adjoining rooms. They will remain on view throughout the seminar, and we trust that

they, too, will contribute to your experience here.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in coordination with the industry, has arranged a program of field trips which will follow the 2-week period of the seminar. We hope that as many of you as possible will take advantage of this program, which will include visits to earth-station installations and pertinent equipment manufacturing plants.

At the request of the Vice President of the United States I should like to read the following message which he has addressed on this occasion to you, our distinguished visitors from other countries.

I greatly regret that I am unable to be with you today. You represent countries sharing our interest in an exciting new application of space technology: global communication through earth satellites. I am confident that the great expansion of global communication promised by this capability will go far to foster the growth of cultural and trade exchanges so important to the development of peace and understanding among peoples throughout the world. I wish you every success in your endeavors and hope that you will find this seminar helpful and rewarding.

There is little I can add to the words of the Vice President. Ladies and gentlemen, I bid you welcome to Washington and to the Department of State. May your stay be satisfying and may you return to your homes with new insights on the future of satellite communication and the ways it may affect the lives of all of us.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on May 12 (press release 108) that the United States would be host for communications experts from about 40 countries and all continents at a seminar on satellite communications earth-station technology. The seminar, under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union, will be held May 16-May 27 in the International Conference Suite at the Department of State. It will be followed by a week of field trips which will

enable the visitors from abroad to see earth-station installations and pertinent equipment manufacturing plants in this country.

The purpose of the seminar is to provide new and developing countries with basic knowledge and practical information on earth-station economic and technical requirements, as well as access requirements to the satellite which will be useful to them in their respective earth-station programs.

Participants will include senior telecommunications administration officials and senior technical personnel who will be responsible for earth-station planning, construction, financing, and operation. In addition, as many as 300 experts from U.S. Government and industry are expected to attend the various sessions as observers in order to bring themselves up to date with the present state of the fast-developing art of communications via satellite.

U.S. Asks International Action on Passenger-Ship Fire Safety

*Statement by W. Averell Harriman
Ambassador at Large*¹

Three months ago this Committee met and considered the pressing problem of the fire safety of passenger vessels. The subject had been forcibly brought to world attention because of the burning not long before of the *Yarmouth Castle*, with its tragic loss of the lives of 90 passengers and crew. This followed by less than 2 years the burning of another cruise vessel, the *Lakonia*, with the loss of 125 lives. Even since the Committee's last meeting, the cruise ship *Viking Princess* was gutted by fire.

These disasters have made clear that something must be done. We must take

major and serious action to improve the safety standards of a number of the passenger ships which are sailing the seas as well as to improve standards of those to be built.

There have always been risks in sailing the seas, and there will always be some risk; but we cannot accept complacently the risks that we do not have to accept, nor can we fail to act to meet those risks that we can see and avoid or minimize. Another *Yarmouth Castle* is not necessary, and we must take action to avoid that possibility.

This Committee and the countries it represents responded as we hoped they would respond, and you are now meeting in an extraordinary session to deal with this problem.

This organization, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, has in the past made a fine record of progress in meeting the problems of safety and other technical problems in the maritime field. It has been ready to exercise leadership in pressing for ever-improving standards of safety and technical development. Yet recent events show that we cannot rest on this record. Much remains to be done.

There is no group of persons in the world—it probably would not be possible to assemble an international group better qualified to deal with safety of life at sea than the group that is assembled in this room today. I am sure that the Maritime Safety Committee and the subcommittee advisers who are present represent the most capable of the world's experts in this field.

We have come to lay before you the problem we now face. And, as my distinguished colleague, Admiral Roland [Adm. Edwin J. Roland, head of the U.S. delegation] told you in February, we do not think this Committee or IMCO has any task more important or more urgent to deal with than improving the fire safety of passenger vessels.

Early in March we sent to the organization and to the member governments a series of specific proposals to amend the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea² in order to deal

¹ Made at the opening session of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization's Maritime Safety Committee at London on May 3 (press release 105, advance text). For background, see BULLETIN of May 16, 1966, p. 782.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5780.

with this matter. These proposals³ deal primarily with the construction of ships, and the central element of our ideas is the use of materials that do not burn readily. It is not my purpose to deal with these proposals in detail. That is for the experts. I am sure you have all read and studied our proposals, and I will of course leave it to Admiral Roland and his colleagues to give any clarifications that may be wanted. I am here to emphasize to you the serious political aspects of the problem and to appeal through you to your governments and to those governmental agencies responsible for the political decisions involved in our taking adequate action.

We have proposed certain amendments to the convention, but we enter this meeting with open minds as to the technical details of these amendments but not as to our objectives. I would be less than frank and do a disservice to our deliberations if I were not to emphasize the serious concern on the part of my Government, the United States Congress, and the American people as a whole and the requirement for adequate action. There may be other ways of meeting the problem than those specific ways we have proposed; there may be other amendments or other concepts that can contribute to safety.

One thing that is very striking to the layman, however—and I am sure the experts would agree—is that the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea was intended and designed to improve safety of life at sea, and it cannot be permitted to stand as an obstacle now to further advances to safety. The convention of 1960 took a long step forward; but man progresses and aspires to better things and is capable of better things, and men are not and should not be satisfied now with what seemed good enough even a few years ago. The work this Committee undertakes today must reflect the experience and knowledge gained in the intervening period.

Since this Committee met in February

there has been another passenger ship disaster by fire: The ship *Viking Princess* burned almost totally on a cruise from our State of Florida. The *Viking Princess* was manned by fine officers and a fine crew; and thanks to their courage and their competence, the ship was abandoned without loss of life directly due to fire, although two elderly persons died from the shock of the experience. I wish to give the master of the *Viking Princess* and his crew the thanks of my Government and the American people for those many Americans they saved.

From the standpoint of maritime safety, the *Viking Princess* episode is an outstanding example of the importance of a well-trained crew. We would never belittle the importance of the crew to safety; quite the contrary, we hope the maritime nations of the world will take inspiration from this example and continue their efforts in this area.

But there is another lesson to be learned from the *Viking Princess*. That lesson is that there is much to be done to improve construction and structural standards for safety. Particularly we think it affirms the need for construction with noncombustible materials. Despite its sprinkler system and despite its fine crew, this ship burned. Had the fire occurred in rough weather, the result almost certainly would have been an appalling tragedy. And we do not see how we can or why we should continue to accept these risks.

The American concern, the concern of the public and of the Congress and of the executive branch, has been focused primarily on the older ships and on round-trip cruises which sail from and return to our ports and which carry American citizens predominantly. The cruise trade, which was virtually unknown until a few decades ago, has grown to be a major part of the ocean passenger-ship business. We want it to stay that way and increase, but with increased safety. We cannot tolerate the prospect of another *Yarmouth Castle* disaster.

My statement would not be complete if I did not tell you that there is strong sentiment in the United States—and there has been legislation proposed to the United

³ Not printed here.

States Congress—to control the safety standards of cruise vessels unilaterally under our laws. The Congress feels, and rightly so, a responsibility for the safety of our citizens embarking in ships at our ports. This concern is expressed by the presence here of several distinguished Members of Congress as advisers to the U.S. delegation. We do not want unilateral action. We want to handle this problem internationally. We are counting on your understanding and assistance to achieve satisfactory action.

Although the major concentration in the United States is on the safety of passengers and crews on cruise ships, our concern is not so confined. Life at sea should be af-

forded the maximum practical protection on all types of vessels with all flags. The world looks to IMCO for leadership in this area, and we are certain that all of your governments join us in this aim.

In conclusion, I want to thank this distinguished group for your attention and to express the confident hope that your deliberations will result in constructive action to meet the problem that concerns us all. The United States has made proposals which we believe are appropriate. The Committee may have other proposals, and we are ready to listen. However, we are here to face the problem and we must agree on effective recommendations to deal with it.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.K. Amend Bermuda Air Agreement

The Department of State announced on May 27 (press release 127) that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom had on that day concluded at Washington an exchange of diplomatic notes¹ amending the air services agreement between the United States and United Kingdom dated February 11, 1946, as amended (usually referred to as the Bermuda Agreement).² The notes were signed on behalf of the United States by Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and on behalf of the United Kingdom by Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador to the United States.

The agreement is the result of negotiations which took place at Washington from

February 28 to April 23, 1966. The talks represented the most far-reaching review of the Bermuda Agreement that the two Governments have undertaken since that agreement was originally signed. The British delegation was under the chairmanship of Robert Burns, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation. The U.S. delegation was headed by Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State.

The new agreement provides for a general updating and expansion of the routes exchanged by the two countries; routes currently operated are retained, while those not operated have in many cases been deleted. In addition, important new routes have been added for both countries.

The principal new routes gained by the United Kingdom are the following: (a) a trunk route from London via New York, San Francisco, Honolulu, and Fiji to Australasia; (b) the addition of islands in the eastern Caribbean, and of Guyana, to an ex-

¹ For texts, see Department of State press release 127 dated May 27.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1507, 1640, 1714, 3338, 3675, 3719.

isting U.K. trunk route via New York; (c) the addition of Chicago to the U.K. polar route to Los Angeles terminating on the U.S. West Coast (without traffic rights between Chicago and the West Coast); (d) the addition of points in the Yucatan Peninsula on the route between British Honduras, the Cayman Islands, and Miami; and (e) a new route from Hong Kong via Taipei to Okinawa and beyond to Japan (without traffic rights between Okinawa and Japan).

The principal new U.S. routes include: (a) new access to Hong Kong over a North Pacific route via Tokyo; (b) new access to Hong Kong from the west over a transatlantic route; (c) improved access to Hong Kong from Sydney (which will permit the establishment of an economic round-the-Pacific tourist service by U.S. airlines); (d) the extension of the present U.S. route via Fiji to Australia onward to South Asia and points in Europe other than the United Kingdom; (e) the addition of Paris, Switzerland, and Italy, for cargo and mail only, on certain U.S. airline services via the United Kingdom, without traffic rights between the new points and the United Kingdom; (f) the addition of Scandinavian points and Paris to the U.S. polar route from the West Coast to London (without traffic rights between Paris and London); (g) expansion of existing routes from the United States via the Bahamas to points in the Caribbean and South America, so described as to afford U.S. airlines a high degree of flexibility in serving the Caribbean area and including a New York-Bahamas-Jamaica route.

The following route grants were made reciprocally: (a) each side granted to the other a new nonstop route from Miami to London, on which operations are not to begin before January 1, 1970; (b) the New York-Nassau route descriptions will be amended for both countries to read "New York-Bahamas," thus making possible services from New York to many different points in the Bahamas, rather than to Nassau alone; (c) the two sides exchanged local service routes in the eastern Caribbean island chain; (d) confirmation of Boston as

being available on routes between the U.S.A. and Bermuda.

The two delegations agreed, furthermore, that discussions should take place in the near future concerning a possible exchange of local service routes in the southwest Pacific area centered around Fiji and American Samoa.

The two Governments believe that this accord constitutes a significant forward step in the development of effective worldwide air services in accordance with the principles of the Bermuda Agreement and that it is in the interests both of the traveling public and of the air transport industry.

U.S. To Continue Adherence to Warsaw Convention

The United States Government on May 14 formally withdrew its notification of termination of adherence to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air.¹ Following is a Department announcement of May 13, together with the text of a U.S. note from Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at the U.S. Embassy at Warsaw, to Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 110 dated May 13

The Department of State, in consultation and with the concurrence of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense, has concluded that the interests of the United States traveling public and of international civil aviation would be best served by continuing within the framework of the Warsaw Convention under a plan the essential features of which are:

¹ For texts of a Department announcement and the notice of denunciation, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 923; for background, see also *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1966, p. 580.

First. The limits of international carrier liability for passengers will be increased from \$8,300 to \$75,000 per person. Those travelers who wish to carry greater protection will be free to take out additional insurance to cover their needs. There will be no limit on liability where the carrier is guilty of willful misconduct.

Second. Airlines in international travel will be absolutely liable up to \$75,000 per passenger regardless of any fault or negligence. Recovery by those who need it most will thus be maximized and expedited. Long and costly lawsuits will be unnecessary in many cases.

Third. International airlines carrying well over 90 percent of Americans in international travel are participating in the plan. The recommendation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that no airline operating within the United States remain outside the plan has been substantially complied with. Those United States airlines which initially declined to come within the plan have now indicated their agreement to accept an increase in liability from \$8,300 to \$75,000.

Fourth. This is an interim arrangement terminable on 12 months' notice. In the months ahead public hearings will be held for the purpose of determining the definitive United States position in preparation for further international discussions concerning the Warsaw Convention.

Fifth. The international carriers who have notified the Civil Aeronautics Board of their acceptance of the interim arrangements are: Aeronaes, Air Canada, Air France, Air India, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, BEA, BOAC, Canadian Pacific, CMA, El Al, Icelandic, Iberia, Japan Air Lines, KLM, Lufthansa, Olympic, Philippine Airlines, Qantas, Sabena, SAS, Swissair, Varig, and VIASA; American, Braniff, Continental, Eastern, Northeast, Northwest, Pan American, Panagra, TWA, and Western. The following U. S. airlines mainly engaged in domestic carriage which have accepted the increased limits of liability but not the feature of absolute liability are: Delta, National, and United. It is

expected that other carriers will join the plan.

Sixth. Those guilty of sabotage and persons claiming on their behalf will not be entitled to recover any damages.

By acceptance of the plan the United States and all of the other participating countries have assured the continuation of the uniform system of law governing airlines, shippers, and passengers and have demonstrated again the viability of the system of international cooperation in civil aviation and in international law.

WITHDRAWAL OF DENUNCIATION

Press release 111 dated May 14

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor, on instructions from my Government, to give formal notification to the Government of the Polish People's Republic of the withdrawal by the United States of America of the notice of denunciation submitted on November 15, 1965 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air and the Additional Protocol relating thereto signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929.

At the time the notice under Article 39 was submitted, the United States Government stated that that action was taken solely because of dissatisfaction with the low limits of liability for death or personal injury provided in the Convention, even as those limits would be increased by the Protocol to amend the Convention done at The Hague on September 28, 1955. Since that time, intensive negotiations among carriers and among governments have succeeded in establishing a new interim arrangement in accordance with Article 22(1) of the Convention, whereby participating carriers have agreed, in cases of the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, to limits of liability of \$75,000 per passenger inclusive of legal fees and costs (or \$58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs in case of a claim brought in a State where provision is made for separate award of legal fees and costs) and have agreed not to avail themselves in any such cases of any defense under Article 20(1) of the Convention, or the Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. This arrangement is applicable to all international transportation by the carrier as defined in the Convention or the Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol which according to the contract of carriage includes a point in the United States of America as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed stopping place.

In view of the acceptance of this arrangement by the great majority of the world's international airlines, including all principal carriers serving the United States, the conditions which led the United States to serve its notice of November 15 have substantially changed. Accordingly, the United States of America believes that its continuing objectives of uniformity of international law and adequate protection for international air travelers will best be assured within the framework of the Warsaw Convention. The United States of America looks forward to participation by all carriers and governments in the provisional arrangement described above and to its acceptance on a world-wide basis. Further, the Government of the United States looks forward to continued discussions looking to an up-to-date and permanent international agreement on the important issues dealt with in the Warsaw Convention.

My Government would appreciate it if the Government of the Polish People's Republic would inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention of this notification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence: Singapore, May 20, 1966.

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

Adherence deposited: Tunisia, May 4, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Signature: Austria, May 17, 1966.

Fisheries

International convention for the conservation of Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966. Enters into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification, approval, or adherence by seven governments.

Signature: United States, May 14, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963. Entered into force April 29, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: May 23, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Ireland, March 4, 1966; Switzerland, February 4, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Denunciations effective as of May 26, 1966: Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptances deposited: Argentina, Lebanon, April 27, 1966.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: Argentina, April 27, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Approval deposited: Brazil, May 24, 1966.

Accession deposited: Malaysia, May 19, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Director-General, Telecommunications Department of Malaysia, May 25, 1966.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.

Adherence deposited: Honduras, December 31, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance or approval: Ecuador, May 18, 1966.

Notification of undertaking to seek accession: Libya, May 19, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

France

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris May 5, 1966. Enters into force July 1, 1966.

Greece

Agreement amending the agreement of July 17, 1964 (TIAS 5618), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 23, 1966. Entered into force May 23, 1966.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua May 9, 1966. Enters into force on date of notification from Government of Nicaragua that agreement has been approved in conformity with constitutional procedures.

Sierra Leone

Agreement to facilitate the conduct of litigation with international aspects in either country. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown March 31 and May 6, 1966. Entered into force May 6, 1966.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the air services agreement of February 11, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1507, 1640, 1714, 3338, 3675, 3719). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 27, 1966. Entered into force May 27, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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†119	5/23	U.S.-Greek bilateral cotton textile agreement amended.
*120	5/23	Requirements for passports.
*121	5/24	William C. Herrington awarded Superior Service Award.
*122	5/24	Rusk: Council on Foreign Relations, New York (excerpts).
†123	5/25	Bundy: Economic Club of Detroit.
124	5/26	Relinquishment of U.S. lease to Atkinson Field, Guyana.
†125	5/26	P.L. 480 currency for sale to U.S. tourists in Ceylon (rewrite).
*126	5/27	Stockberger Award awarded to Arthur Goldberg.
127	5/27	U.S.-U.K. air services agreement amended (rewrite).
†128	5/28	Rusk: "Mason and Jefferson Revisited," Williamsburg, Va. (excerpts).
129	5/27	Rusk: news conference of May 27.
130	5/28	U.S. note to Cuba on Guantanamo base.
†131	5/20	Treaty of amity and economic relations with Thailand.

* Not printed.

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United States Policy Toward Communist China

We must continue to contain Communist aggression in Asia, as in Europe, but at the same time, "we must continue to make it plain that, if Peiping abandons its belief that force is the best way to resolve disputes and gives up its violent strategy of world revolution, we would welcome an era of good relations." This is how Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarized U.S. policy toward Communist China in a major statement before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This pamphlet is the full text of the statement.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

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June 20, 1966

VIET-NAM AND U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE FAR EAST

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A WORLD SOCIETY OF EQUALITY AND BROTHERHOOD

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 971

MEMORIAL DAY, 1966

Address by President Johnson 962

"In Viet-Nam the United States is committed to a decent and limited purpose: to defeat aggression and to let the people of Viet-Nam decide in peace their own political future. So I pledge to those who have died there and to those who have been wounded there, to those who are now fighting there and to those who may yet fight there, that we shall help the people of South Viet-Nam see this through."

Memorial Day, 1966

*Address by President Johnson*¹

There is a special roll of honor that I would like to call today:

Lt. Col. Seldon R. Edner of San Jose, California

1st Lt. George B. Smith of Los Angeles, California

1st Lt. Leland Williams of Taylor County, Texas

1st Lt. Revier Harding of Fort Worth, Texas

Staff Sergeant William Goodwin of Tacoma, Washington

Lt. Col. Alfred Medendorp of Grand Rapids, Michigan

Lt. Col. Frank Lynn of Chicago, Illinois

Maj. Rudolf Anderson of Del Rio, Texas

Specialist Fourth Class James T. Davis of Livingston, Tennessee

Who were these men?

Edner was the first American killed in Greece, where in 1947 we decided to help the people of that country resist aggression.

Smith and Williams were killed in the airlift which prevailed over the blockade of Berlin in the winter of 1948 and 1949.

Harding and Goodwin were the first American soldiers killed in the struggle against aggression in Korea.

Medendorp and Lynn were killed on Kinman Island, when in 1958 aggression was attempted in the Taiwan Straits.

Anderson was the airman shot down over Cuba during the crisis of 1962, when an effort was made to place offensive weapons on that island.

Davis was the first American killed in the resistance to aggression in Viet-Nam.

These men represent all those Americans who have risked their lives—and lost them—in the peacebuilding efforts since 1945.

They were sent on their missions because this nation believes that peace is not something that just happens.

Peace does not come just because we wish for it.

Peace must be fought for. It must be built stone by stone.

In the first half of this century we learned that there can be no peace if might makes right—if force used by one nation against a weaker nation is ever permitted to succeed. We have learned that the time to stop aggression is when it first begins. And that

¹ Made at Arlington National Cemetery on May 30; as-delivered text.

is one reason that we are in South Viet-Nam today.

Modern weapons and means of communications, even more than common aspirations, have created a single world community. There is no going back. This is the way it will be as far ahead as any of us can see. We can only go forward to help make that community one in which nations respect the rights of other nations and live at peace with one another.

For the American interest will be well served if our children grow up in a world of independent nations capable of assuming collective responsibility for the peace. Our interest—and the interest of world peace—will not be served if nations continue to violate the independence of other nations.

So, as our men and our allies today fight in Southeast Asia, we are working on many fronts to build a mosaic of peace and human progress.

We are working to strengthen the Atlantic world and, from that firm base, to build bridges of cooperation to the East.

We are trying to assist the governments and peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa to work together to lift the burdens of poverty and ignorance and disease.

We ache to turn all our energies—more of our resources—and all our talents to building that kind of world community.

But there will be no community to build if aggression achieves in Viet-Nam what it has been denied from Greece to Korea to Berlin.

The Conflict in South Viet-Nam

The conflict in South Viet-Nam is confusing for many of our people.

The aggression there does not take the form of organized divisions marching brazenly and openly across frontiers.

It takes the form of men and equipment coming down from the North on foot or in trucks through jungle roads and trails or on small craft moving silently through the water at night.

It takes the form of well-organized assassination, kidnaping, intimidation of innocent

citizens in remote villages. Last year, more than 12,000 South Vietnamese civilians were murdered or kidnaped by terrorists.

That kind of aggression is just as real and just as dangerous for the safety and independence of the people of South Viet-Nam as was the attack on South Korea in June of 1950.

Without the flow of men and equipment from the North, the war would soon end. But what our people see looks on the surface to some of them more like a civil war than external aggression. Peace will never come to the world if the outcome of this kind of aggression—insurgency mounted from outside a nation—is accepted as a substitute or tantamount to free elections.

The Turmoil of Transition

There is a second source of confusion. The people of South Viet-Nam are now in the midst of a historic transition. They are trying to form, for the first time, a constitutional government that represents their own traditions and values.

Their country has deep in its history strong regional feelings—and equally strong religious groupings—which have sometimes been in conflict. As they try now to forge a constitutional system these differences seem to emerge sharply. Various groups clash as they seek to influence the shape of things to come. Turmoil results.

It is tragic, in the present turmoil, that some choose acts of desperation to express their political beliefs. This unnecessary loss of life only obscures the progress that is being made toward a constitutional government. It only clouds the sacrifices of thousands of lives that have already been made for the cause of independence and political hope in South Viet-Nam.

Seldom has a people been called upon to build a nation and to wage war against externally supported aggression at the same time. But I believe that South Viet-Nam is moving toward a government that will increasingly reflect the true will of its people.

That day will come sooner if the South

Vietnamese keep their internal quarrels and differences within bounds and concentrate on taking together their first steps toward constitutional government.

But there will be no transition to the politics of compromise and to the secret ballot if the external aggression against South Viet-Nam is not now defeated.

"We Must Persevere"

Our policy is devoted to that end. As President Kennedy said just 2 months before his life was taken, ". . . we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home."²

We have sought to bring the conflict in Viet-Nam from the battlefield to the conference table. Twice we have stopped the bombings of military targets in North Viet-Nam as a sign of our desire to negotiate. And we waited and listened for 37 days—to get no satisfactory reply.

We have sought the help of the United Nations in arranging international peace talks. We have sent emissaries to more than 40 nations asking them to urge our adversaries to reason with us. We have sent word privately to Hanoi and to Peking of our willingness to talk without conditions. We have told them that there are ways to end the bloodshed.

² At a news conference on Sept. 12, 1963.

Nothing has happened. Infiltration from the North has continued at an even higher pace. The fighting, as we speak, goes on. The infiltration is stepped up. The hordes come marching in.

So, until peace comes or the Communists are willing to talk about peace, we must persevere.

I know of no time in our history when our brave men in arms have performed with greater skill and courage than they have performed in Viet-Nam. They went into combat in a difficult climate, against a thoroughly professional enemy, in an unfamiliar kind of war. From the first day of combat they have not failed us once.

In Viet-Nam the United States is committed to a decent and limited purpose: to defeat aggression and to let the people of Viet-Nam decide in peace their own political future.

So I pledge to those who have died there and to those who have been wounded there, to those who are now fighting there and to those who may yet fight there, that we shall help the people of South Viet-Nam see this through.

On this Memorial Day it is right for us to remember the living and the dead for whom the call of their country has meant much pain and sacrifice.

And so today I remind all of my fellow countrymen that a grateful Nation is deeply in their debt.

Viet-Nam and U.S. Objectives in the Far East

by William P. Bundy
*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

My topic today is the problems that confront the United States in the Far East and the policies which we are pursuing there. I would prefer to spend a large share of my time talking about such constructive though underreported matters as the growth of regional ties through such activities as multination cooperation in the development of the Mekong Valley. Yet I know the situation in Viet-Nam is necessarily at the front of our thoughts.

Our policy in the Far East, which has been consistent and bipartisan through the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson is based on our vital national interests in that area.

Geography makes us a Pacific power. We care about the Far East partly because a nation with our traditions and our present power could hardly do otherwise. We also know in our hearts that it makes a great deal of difference to our most concrete national interests that the vast potential and talent of the Far East should be developed in healthy nations and that the Far East should not go through a second stage—as Europe had to do—of waves of domination by a power or grouping of powers that must at the end be met at the cost of vast human misery. We fought

the military leaders of Japan in World War II to prevent a hostile nation from aggressively expanding and dominating Asia, and more recently we have assisted first the Government of Korea and now the Government of Viet-Nam for that same reason.

We have, of course, specific interests in the Far East such as trade and investment, and we have military base rights and needs related to our role in assisting in the security of the area. But neither of these is an end in itself. The first will, we believe, flourish if the nations of the area are able to develop in freedom; the second must now be maintained but will over time, we hope, become susceptible of reduction and indeed, wherever possible, of elimination.

Our objective in the Far East is simple, at least to state: There, as throughout the world, we wish to see independent nations developing as they see fit in accordance with their own traditions. We may hope that their development will be toward democracy and economic systems that enlist the initiative of the individual, but we have long since outgrown the notion that we possess any blueprint which can be applied in any pat sense to other nations, particularly to less developed states with ancient and differing cultures. The free peoples of Asia have that same objective and generally understand that an American role is necessary even though they—as we—may look to the

¹ Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit at Detroit, Mich., on May 23 (press release 123 dated May 25).

day when that involvement, at least in its military aspect, may be reduced and the area have its own balance of power.

Three central problems exist in varying degrees in virtually all free countries of the Far East.

First, there is the problem of the security of individual nations. A grave threat to that security is posed by Communist China, driven by a combination of nationalistic and imperialistic motives and a very virulent version of primitive Communist ideology and uniting with other Communist nations with their own ambitions, especially North Viet-Nam.

Second is the problem of the economic and social development of individual nations, nations with a considerable talent and capacity for growth. In the last decade, we have been greatly encouraged by seeing what Asiatic nations can do if they have security: Japan, the highest sustained growth rate in the world; Korea, multiplying exports sixfold in the last 5 years and controlling inflation; great improvement in the Republic of China, Thailand, and the Philippines. The free nations of the area are moving forward.

There is certainly nothing like a one-to-one ratio between economic development and political progress, but clearly without a large measure of the former, the latter is infinitely more difficult. And as Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara pointed out the other day,² economic backwardness and destructive violence have a very close relation.

Third is the problem of political development, of the maturing of a healthy spirit of nationalism free of the scars of local rivalries and particularly of past colonial domination.

Our role is essential to the preservation of the security of the area. In March I visited

the Far East for 3 weeks. Without exception, the leaders of the free nations told me that our role was vital and that what we were doing in Viet-Nam was of critical importance to their continuing capacity to remain free from foreign domination.

Emergence From Colonial Control

Viet-Nam represents in a very acute form the security, the economic and social, and now, of course, in the most visible manner the political and nationalistic problems of the area. I will not attempt to detail the complex history of the Vietnamese struggle and of our role in it. I think that you can obtain the best factual narrative in Robert Shaplen's book *The Lost Revolution*. While I believe that Shaplen's criticisms of past United States policies exaggerate our ability to control the situation, the book very accurately frames the central issue, the emergence and fight for survival of genuine non-Communist nationalism.

The Vietnamese problem stems from an unfortunate history of emergence from colonial control: a failure by France to train the Vietnamese for the practice of self-government and a failure to promise a timetable for independence. Those failures in turn created a Communist security threat, for leadership in the nationalist movement fell to the toughest and most disciplined group, the Communist minority. Non-Communist nationalists within the reach of the Communists were dealt with ruthlessly and the leaders assassinated. These developments in turn have retarded and made infinitely more difficult a process of political and economic development which would normally have lent itself to rapid and relatively easy progress.

No one doubts that post-1954 Viet-Nam has had political difficulty and would have had such difficulty in the absence of Communist action. President Diem, who was an ardent nationalist in many ways comparable to Syngman Rhee in Korea, proved himself the kind of man so often necessary to set

² For text of Secretary McNamara's address at Montreal, Canada, on May 18, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1966, p. 874.

a country on its feet; but he nonetheless became narrower and narrower in his theories and application of government, began to lose touch with and finally lost the support of his people.

That change in Diem would undoubtedly have created internal discontents and difficulties. Yet had the North left the South alone, we could have looked, I think, to some process akin to what has taken place in Korea. There Syngman Rhee was eventually replaced, first by a popular but ineffective government, then by a military dictatorship, and then by the free, elected democratic government which exists there today. That is what I think would have happened in South Viet-Nam. North Viet-Nam did not wish it so.

Aggression From Hanoi

Hanoi thought it saw in Diem's increasing difficulties a fruitful opportunity for aggression. In preparation for such an opening, it had violated the 1954 accords by leaving behind in the South a network of cadres and had hidden thousands of weapons. Some appreciation of the scope of Communist preparations may be found in the discovery of 3,561 caches of weapons between September 1954 and June 1959.

Hanoi began to infiltrate thousands of well-trained cadres into South Viet-Nam.

A special report of the International Control Commission set up to supervise the Geneva accords, dated June 1962, sustained complaints made by South Viet-Nam against North Viet-Nam, concluding that the evidence showed "beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam.

By the end of 1964 a total of over 40,000 men had been infiltrated from the North. Before 1964, as detailed prisoner interrogations had shown, the bulk of the men infiltrated were native South Vietnamese who had gone north in 1954 to receive special training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare and then been reintroduced into the South.

In early 1964, for the first time native North Vietnamese began to appear in significant numbers in the South. Beginning, as we now know, in the middle of 1964 with the first organized units entering in December, North Viet-Nam began to send south not merely individual North Vietnamese but organized units—battalions, regiments, and divisions—of its own army. Hanoi obviously was trying for a knockout blow during 1965.

At that point, after so many years of provocation, the United States began carefully measured and precisely restrained aerial attacks in the North and introduced its own regular combat units into South Viet-Nam. We knew, and had always known, that in the last analysis the South Vietnamese must win their own struggle to determine their future. But, in quite simple terms, it had become clear that the vicious arithmetic of guerrilla warfare would have brought victory to the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese masters without these measures on our part.

Morale the Determining Factor

Today the military picture is an encouraging one. We are making considerable gains though the weight of our arms is only beginning to be felt. While the basic areas of control have not changed significantly, there no longer exists, as there did a year ago, the possibility—indeed, at that time the probability—of a Communist military victory. If we were to assume that the morale and fighting effectiveness of the opposing forces was a constant, then we could perhaps anticipate only continued escalation on both sides. But I would suggest, on the basis of my study of comparable situations—Greece, Malaya, the Philippines—that the underlying determinant of this conflict will be morale.

I was in Greece as a young lawyer during the heart of that conflict. I remember the desperate situation of late 1947 and early 1948. Then in 1948 the Yugoslavs broke

with the Russians and closed their section of the border. The Greek Communists were still able to obtain aid from neighboring Albania and Bulgaria, but their morale had been weakened and finally broke. By the end of 1949 the guerrilla war was over. Incidentally, Greece also had many changes of government during that conflict, and the Greek Communist forces at one point called themselves the National Liberation Front.

I am not suggesting anything as rapid as that is now in prospect in Viet-Nam. I am saying that there are traces of cracks in Viet Cong morale that could at some point become critical. The evidence of systematic prisoner interrogation that is now available shows that the percentage of Viet Cong prisoners asserting their confidence in ultimate or even short-term victory is extremely low. A year ago it was very high. Confidence in victory must be a critical ingredient in the life of men leading the kind of life these men lead. They are being severely hurt by aggressive allied ground moves. They are no longer safe anywhere; at any moment our troops may suddenly descend in helicopters, or they may be strafed or even bombed by planes they are unable to see. There are no longer any safe retreats where they can rest and regroup. There has been a slow steady growth in the number of Viet Cong who defect to the Government. There are many other straws in the wind, and almost all point in the same direction.

On the other hand, on the Government side, the common testimony of all observers is that morale is far better than it was a year ago. There is a sense, a real sense, that progress is possible and is being made, and this has been reflected in a clear improvement on the part of South Vietnamese forces.

I believe bombing of the North is essential to our effort both because of its cutting down, making vastly more costly, and delaying the infiltration of men and supplies

and because it places pressure on Hanoi to come to the conference table. Nevertheless, though I believe that bombing must continue, we should realize that this struggle will eventually be decided in the South.

The Political Struggle

Most on our minds at this moment is the political struggle within South Viet-Nam. We can get some perspective on this struggle by noting the different ways in which power has changed hands in South Viet-Nam during the last 2½ years. The changes range from the very crude physical coup of General [Nguyen] Khanh to the virtual consensus that produced the Huong government and to the civilian government of Dr. [Phan Huy] Quat, which found itself in such difficulty that it eventually asked the military to take over. That request, and not any coup, was the origin of the Ky government.

Prime Minister Ky on January 15 of this year announced a timetable that would have placed a new constitution before the voters in 1966 and pledged that elections for the legislature would be held during 1967.

With that announcement, serious politics began in South Viet-Nam. Tri Quang and his supporters, whose power base is largely in central Viet-Nam and who, while having ties to other Buddhist groups, are very far from being *the* Buddhists, prepared to take action. Their decision was made before Honolulu³ and before the dismissal of General Thi [Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi]. General Thi's dismissal did play a part because it added another element of discontent which Tri Quang and his followers skillfully exploited. Strident opposition groups took to the streets calling for elections and a constitution in the near future.

³ For background on meeting of U.S. and South Vietnamese leaders at Honolulu Feb. 6-8, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

The Government eventually went ahead and carried out its previous promises by convening a National Political Congress during the week of April 13, in which the Buddhists participated.

That congress was a remarkable event. From it emerged a virtually unanimous feeling and agreement, on the part of political leaders of all types, that in spite of the obstacles it was preferable to begin the process of constitution-making, of creating a legitimate base for the Government, rather than to continue with the previous uncertain situation. The Government and political leaders made their own decision to hold an election for a constituent assembly this fall. We fully support that determination.

There are many difficult problems raised by the holding of an election in a war-torn country. Yet, last May the Vietnamese held elections for municipal and provincial councils. Despite the Viet Cong efforts to prevent voting, approximately two-thirds of the potential voters in the areas controlled by the Government registered, and of those who registered 73 percent actually voted. The figures for voting in an American off-year election range from 33 to 47 percent of eligible voters. So I think that Vietnamese accomplishment was truly remarkable considering the obstacles.

However, those local elections, fought primarily on the basis of local issues, are vastly different from the oncoming national elections. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties involved, the consensus in South Viet-Nam is that elections should be held.

A natural question is the degree to which Tri Quang and his struggle movement is anti-American or represents a desire to discontinue the war or ask us to leave. I do not think that there is any likelihood of a freely elected legislature asking us to leave. I base that comment on a number of factors.

One of the most significant facts is that over the long period of time before and after the overthrow of Diem and up to and

including the current struggle, despite all their quarrels and difficulties, which are after all the birth pangs of a nation, there has never been a single political leader of any consequence in South Viet-Nam who has ever gone over to the Viet Cong. So far as we can tell, although there has been some Communist participation in the struggle movement, it has not been significant.

Recently a prominent American student leader, a man who had strong reservations about our policy in Viet-Nam, went to Viet-Nam and traveled throughout the country to obtain an insight into Vietnamese student opinion. He spoke with students at Hue, the center of Buddhist dissidence, and elsewhere. He concluded that 9 out of 10 of the Vietnamese students want no part whatsoever of any compromise arrangement that would admit the Viet Cong to the Government of South Viet-Nam.

The struggle forces in Hue over the weekend rejected reported offers of help from the National Liberation Front in saying "the first and immediate national reaction of the popular struggle forces for revolution is to reject if not utterly to deride this foolish proposal."

There are many other bits and pieces which fit together into an overall picture. The Vietnamese are a highly nationalistic people. There are frictions as there must be when there is a foreign presence as large as ours is. But what I think is striking is that despite these frictions, no observer that I know of has detected any deep sentiment among the Vietnamese for asking us to leave before we finish the job. As Tri Quang himself has said, "It is agreed by all that the struggle against communism here must be made with the assistance of the Americans."

The Viet Cong do not anticipate the election of a national assembly which will ask us to leave. For this reason, no doubt, they will do what they can to interfere with the elections.

So let us keep the present political diffi-

culties in perspective. They are serious, and it is obvious that the South Vietnamese themselves must develop unity of action as well as purpose, and attain a degree of effectiveness in their Government that will enable them to cope with the situation, particularly with such presently serious problems as inflation and with the necessarily slow and grinding process of restoring order in the countryside as the military situation improves. The necessary unity and effectiveness have been significantly impaired by the political crises of the last 2 months. Those political crises must be resolved, and we are using every bit of our influence to that end at this moment.

Yet we must recall always that the process of creating a broadly based government is an immensely difficult one. It was in Korea in 1963. Although the parallel is more remote, it was in our own confederation period before our own Constitution was made. As a South Vietnamese visiting this country put it the other day, there is bound to be trouble and confusion if a nation seeks a democratic base. As he said, there would be no trouble and confusion under Communist rule but nothing to live for either.

The Stakes in South Viet-Nam

So I think we should go on and must go on. I think we are making great progress on the military side. Although there are grave dangers on the political side, there also exist the possibilities of lasting gains.

For the stakes remain very great. There is the stake in helping to keep free the 15

million people of South Viet-Nam from the oppression and terror that would be their lot under the domination of Hanoi and helping them to fight for the opportunity to develop their own future.

There is in addition the strategic stake; for, without accepting the pat simplicities of the domino theory, none of us can doubt that preservation of the independence of Thailand, of Malaysia, of Singapore and Burma—and behind them, in the long run, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, and Australia—would become infinitely more difficult if this venture succeeds in South Viet-Nam.

There is the deep stake in preventing the success of what in this instance is a North Vietnamese effort fully supported by Communist China, which would advance the Communist Chinese view of the need for violence and which, if successful, would not only impel the Chinese Communists toward new aggression but might conceivably induce the Russians to resume a more violent general posture.

Finally, of course, there is the worldwide stake of showing that reliance on a United States commitment—in this case a commitment developed over the years and now very strongly expressed—is justified.

These are the crucial stakes and the reasons why we shall continue to do what is necessary to insure that Viet-Nam will be able to stand on its own feet and determine its own future. We will do so for the sake of the Vietnamese and for the sake of our overall policy in the Far East and indeed for the sake of the things we stand for throughout the world.

A World Society of Equality and Brotherhood

by Arthur J. Goldberg

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

Men have prayed for the dignity of the individual and for peace all through recorded history—and, in all likelihood, long before that, too. Yet it becomes more and more evident that we will not deserve nor receive God's most precious gift unless we also root out and eliminate all causes and instances of inequality and of man's inhumanity to man.

Up to now the human society which has managed to smash the atom and to conquer space has not succeeded in this most basic of its earthly tasks. The "fire of freedom and human rights" envisioned by Thomas Jefferson to cleanse the world has still not burned through the cords of oppression and prejudice that bind so much of our civilization to the past.

It is about the effort to break with the past—the effort to advance world society out of the shadow of discrimination and intolerance into the daylight of genuine equality and brotherhood—that I wish to speak to you tonight.

This is an effort wholly as vital to civilization as that of finding an effective means to end war; indeed, we shall end the threat of holocaust and doom on no other terms. And I can but repeat here what President Kennedy once said with all of his eloquence and depth of feeling:²

¹ Made before the American Jewish Committee at Washington, D.C., on May 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 4855).

² BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation, the right to breathe air as nature provided it, the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

Our nation's commitment to the cause of peace, therefore, necessitates a completely wholehearted dedication to the achievement of full human rights for all of our citizens not only in words but in deeds.

I have always profoundly believed—and I have not changed my mind in the 9 months since I have become the United States Representative to the United Nations—that the most important aspect of American foreign policy is the perfection of its domestic society.

I said at the U.N.,³ and I repeat here tonight, that the test of any country's dedication to human rights is not just what it says in the General Assembly for all the world to hear but in what it does at home for all the world to see. There can be no public face looking one way at the U.N. and a private face looking the other way at home.

In short, the better we do in civil liberties at home, the more persuasively our voice speaks in the councils of the world.

I hasten to add, however, that putting our domestic house in order by attacking discrimination and poverty and by assuring every citizen of his right to equal opportunity should not be motivated just because it will help our image abroad. We must do it be-

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578.

cause it is just and because it is right. And we must do it because our Constitution commands that it shall be done.

This is not to say that our domestic attitude toward civil rights does not have profound implication on our relations with other countries. No subject is more in the forefront of our foreign affairs.

U.S. Achievements in Area of Civil Rights

The world notes and long remembers both our achievements and our shortcomings in the area of civil rights. The name of Earl Warren is a household word in Asia and Africa, and the message of *Brown v. the Board of Education* has hurdled the barriers that separate us from Moscow and Peking.

I do not believe that we or history can ever accord sufficient honor to our Supreme Court for its role in establishing the legal foundation and the moral tone for this basically peaceful revolution in American life and values. I can make this tribute without embarrassment because the landmark decisions of *Brown v. the Board of Education*, and of *Baker v. Carr*, preceded my service on the Court.

There were men of good will who questioned whether judicial activism in enforcing our constitutional commands for equality would not paralyze the executive and legislative branches in their coordinate responsibilities. The record of the decade since *Brown* has shown those fears to be unfounded.

Stimulated—or, if you will, prodded—by the Court decisions, both the legislative and the executive branches have responded to the constitutional call after 100 years of inaction, and, as a consequence, we have seen the greatest volume of civil rights legislation since the days of the Reconstruction.

Now the Congress has before it a new civil rights bill; for, as President Johnson has pointed out, the job before us is far from finished, and there are still remaining evils of prejudice that must come under the jurisdiction of the law.

The highest manifestation of our American democracy and indeed the genius of our Con-

stitution is nothing less than the means by which the majority imposes restraints upon itself in order to protect the rights of minorities. The bill submitted by the President is another such manifestation, and it is vital that it be enacted in all of its essential parts if we would move closer to our goal of being a society that really practices what we preach.

In recognizing those in our Government who have led the way in our civil rights struggle we cannot overlook our private citizens, and perhaps leading all the rest here are America's Negro citizens themselves. They are playing their role under the greatest difficulty with great fortitude and with great patience.

But it is not enough to cry "patience" to the aggrieved parties. Theirs is the obligation to eschew violence, but this obligation must be marked by the discharge of the obligation that lies on all of us to grant the justice that is sought. And we must be ever mindful that constitutional guarantees are not merely hopes to some future enjoyment but warrants for the here and now.

We rightly think of law as a stabilizing influence—if not the most important factor promoting stability—in our society. We must not forget that the law promotes such stability and order not simply because it is law promulgated by authority but, rather, because in large measure it satisfies the reasonable expectations of those who live under it. When people's just expectations are satisfied, the law is accepted and respected and a peaceful, orderly, and harmonious society is possible. When these expectations are not fulfilled, confidence in the law is diminished, people are alienated from the law and society, and instability, unrest, and even violence can replace order. And one of the most reasonable expectations of any person is to have his legitimate grievances redressed. And the most legitimate of all grievances is being denied one's constitutional civil rights.

Justice Brandeis was surely right when he said that "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people." By their determined action, their wise and responsible leadership, their devotion to America's oldest and proud-

est traditions of free speech and peaceful assembly, the Negro people have strengthened and ennobled freedom for all of us.

And not the least of the proud achievements of the American Jewish Committee is that it has responded to the call of the Negro people in supporting it and helping make the American dream of liberty and justice for all a concern of every citizen.

Now having said this, I must also say what we all know: that we are not entirely free of prejudice and bigotry in this country. Although we have done much, there is still more to be done. The denial of equal opportunity, spanning many generations past, does not wear off in a day, a year, or a decade. And it will not be enough to accord equality prospectively; we must pay the price necessary to redress past inequities. And it is to this problem that we must now turn our thoughts, our energies, and our creative powers if we are not to make civil mockery out of civil rights.

This is the task now before us at home—to wipe out by legal means the last vestige of discrimination and prejudice. But even as we do, we must reach into areas where the law cannot reach.

Law can create a healthier climate for brotherhood and it can move us closer to its realization, but brotherhood, like the law of which the prophet Jeremiah wrote, must be “written upon men’s hearts.”

U.N. Human Rights Conventions

But even as we air out the dark closets in which discrimination has hidden so long and put our house in order, we must work in concert with other members of the United Nations to answer the international cry for human freedom here and now.

There should be no question of the United States answer. We are for human rights at home. We must be for human rights abroad. We must keep pace on the international scene with the outstanding record compiled in our domestic civil rights achievements. Therefore, all the more important is the ratification of the U.N.’s human rights conventions, which are pending before the Senate.

The Senate, which has the constitutional duty to advise and consent before this nation undertakes any treaty obligations, has had four conventions submitted to it. The first, the convention that would make genocide an international crime, one we took a leading role in formulating, was submitted by President Truman in 1949.⁴

Three others on slavery, forced labor, and the political rights of women—all dealing with rights covered by our Constitution or by Federal law—were submitted by President Kennedy nearly 3 years ago.⁵

We supported each of these conventions in the United Nations, and indeed some of their provisions were suggested by us. We spoke in favor of them and we voted for them, for we are deeply concerned with each of the human rights they defend; and indeed our Constitution requires that they be protected. Our delay in ratifying these conventions has confused our friends and provided ammunition against us by our foes.

Tonight I reaffirm the support of our Government for these conventions. It remains the position of our Government that they should be ratified.

I should like to add here that your very able president, Morris Abram, as the United States Representative on the U.N.’s Human Rights Commission, has played a key role in the formulation of another U.N. convention, one on racial discrimination.⁶

Our Government is now reviewing this convention, not out of any disagreement with its purposes and aims but out of understandable concern that nothing in it should qualify our constitutional commitment to free speech and a free press.

In my personal view, nothing in this convention poses any such danger. And it is my personal hope that, when the review is completed, the United States will also sign this convention and that it will be submitted for early ratification by the Senate.

I want to emphasize here that I am not

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 4, 1949, p. 844.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 322.

⁶ For text, see U.N. doc. A/C.3/L. 1327; for background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1966, p. 212.

voicing any criticism over the past. There have been honest differences of opinion over whether we should ratify human rights conventions, but these differences clearly do not stem from any lack of bipartisan support for the aims they embody. Rather they have their genesis in honest doubts by some that the principles of federalism permit us to participate in them.

However, it is my very strong belief that all the U.N. conventions submitted to the Senate are consistent with our Constitution and that we need have no fears that they contravene our domestic laws, which are more protective of human rights than anything the conventions provide.

Indeed, the criticism to which we have been subjected by Communist governments for our delay in ratification is hypocritical, to say the least. Their constitutional safeguards for human rights are still largely rhetoric although I am happy to note somewhat improved in practice over the days of the Stalin terror.

Our constitutional safeguards are law enforced by judicial decisions which vindicate the principle that the individual is entitled to protection against the state itself.

Our constitutional safeguards for human rights are judicial decisions and executive action.

Human Rights an International Concern

For those who wonder if human rights is a subject for international concern, or who question why we should take the trouble to participate in conventions that spell out what is already American law and tradition, I think the answer is quite simple.

We will build an international community of respect for law and justice only if we recognize that human rights are at the core of all we do. And surely there is something truly significant about worldwide progress in recognizing the interrelationship between the destruction of human freedom at home and that of overt aggression abroad. We have only to bear in mind the events leading up to World War II as proof of that interrelationship.

I would point out, too, that there is an inconsistency in our having ratified the Charter of the United Nations, which spells out human rights as one of the main purposes of the organization, and then hesitating to ratify conventions that give the charter force.

Above all, though, I believe ratification is entirely in the United States national interest. Concern for the welfare of all people is a vital aspect of our foreign policy, but other countries will not take our views seriously unless we demonstrate our willingness to join the international community in international commitments to safeguard human rights.

For we are a powerful nation not only because of military might but, perhaps even more, because we are a moral leader. What we do, therefore, cannot fail but to influence others who look to us for leadership. If we do not consider it important to sign the conventions, why should they? And more importantly, why should they implement the conventions?

I believe, finally, that just as it is in the United States interest to encourage the use of multilateral institutions and machinery to help raise the living standards of economically underdeveloped nations, so is it in the United States interest to do so in the realm of human rights.

We, and those who care as we do about the freedom of the individual and of his spirit, may thereby find success together. Our being empowered to try would be an appropriate complement to the human rights record Congress has already written here at home.

A little more than a year ago when I addressed this organization last, I said that with concern for human rights firmly embedded in our national life and in our hearts, Americans should be willing to compete with the Communist world not in material things—in which we are obviously superior—but we should be willing to compete in the market of human values and in the protection and realization of individual liberties, for in this area we are preeminent. This we owe to the great vision and faith of the Founding

Fathers, who wrote the Bill of Rights, to the American people, who would not ratify the Constitution without it, and to the Supreme Court, which day by day gives it fresh force and vitality.

I can but reaffirm tonight what I said to you before, for competition in ideals is the real challenge of our age, and in it no nation, no individual, can be neutral. The final measure of our success—or our failure—in this competition will be the extent to which we help improve the lot of man and upgrade his dignity and thereby contribute not only to the building of our own Great Society here at home but everywhere in the world.

For we do not believe that our vision of that Great Society is exclusively American. We do believe it belongs to all mankind, and we embrace the aspirations of a better life in which human misery and discrimination will one day be banished not because of our limited nationality but out of our common humanity.

P.L. 480 Currencies Available for Sale to U.S. Tourists

The Department of State (press release 118) and the Treasury Department announced on May 20 that United States citizens visiting Guinea may purchase that country's currency from the United States Embassy at Conakry and that U.S.-owned balances of Tunisian currency also may now be purchased by American visitors to that country from the Central Bank of Tunisia. United States citizens should specifically request that bank to sell them dinars from the United States Government's account.

In addition, on May 26 the Department of State (press release 125) and the Treasury Department announced that United States citizens visiting Ceylon may purchase that country's currency from the United States Embassy at Colombo.

Sales in the three countries will be made at the official rate of exchange.

Balances of the currencies of the three countries became available for sale to United

States travelers when Ceylon, Guinea, and Tunisia were added to the list of countries where official United States holdings of local currencies have become larger than required to meet the needs of the United States Government and where appropriate procedures were established. The currencies have been received by the United States from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities.

To reduce the outflow of dollars from the United States and thereby reduce the United States balance of payments deficit, the United States Government urges American tourists to purchase local currencies from United States holdings abroad in the six countries where they are available. When local currencies are purchased in this way the dollars stay in American accounts, and there is no outflow of dollars to foreign holders, although the transactions take place abroad.

In Ceylon and Guinea the local currency may be purchased at the United States Embassies in each country in exchange for United States currency, personal checks drawn on a bank in the United States, or for United States travelers checks. Purchasers must present their passports for identification. The same dollar instruments will apply in Tunisia, except that the purchases must be made at the Central Bank.

This brings to six the number of countries where American travelers may purchase local currencies from officially owned United States balances. The United States has been selling Indian rupees and Israeli and Egyptian pounds to United States citizens in those countries for some time.

The United States owns working balances in the local currencies of other countries, in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Far East; however, in most cases, these balances are not even adequate to cover official United States expenses.

As additional sales of United States agricultural products are made for foreign currencies, and as United States official requirements change, arrangements for sales to private United States citizens will be negotiated where possible and advantageous.

United Nations Day, 1966

A PROCLAMATION¹

1966 marks the twenty-first anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter.

Since 1945 successive administrations have reaffirmed this nation's commitment to the purposes of the United Nations.

For more than two decades the United States has worked to help the UN improve its peacekeeping capacity, expand its programs of economic development, and promote social justice and human rights.

The UN has been effective in containing local disputes which, if unchecked, could have led to general war. It has assisted scores of nations in meeting the challenges of the technological revolution. Above all, the UN has proved to be a place where constructive dialogues between rich and poor nations can lead to better understanding in today's world, and the promise of a fuller life for future generations.

Because we know that institutions, like men, must remain ever ready to cope with recurring crises, we will continue to do our share in keeping the UN's operations relevant to its problems, realistic in approach, and responsible in action.

Effective public support for the United Nations depends upon a sober appraisal of its accomplishments, and upon a sympathetic understanding of the problems, as well as the potential, of the world organization.


The General Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the date of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter in 1945, should be dedicated each year to making known the purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the United Nations:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Monday, October 24, 1966, as United Nations Day, and urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day by means of community programs which will contribute to a realistic understanding of the aims, problems, and achievements of the United Nations and its associated organizations.

I also call upon officials of the Federal and State Governments and upon local officials to encourage citizen groups and agencies of communication—press, radio, television, and motion pictures—to engage in special and appropriate observance of United Nations Day this year in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 11th day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Kaiser Named U.S. National Chairman for United Nations Day

Following is the text of a letter from President Johnson to Edgar F. Kaiser which was released by the White House on May 11.

White House press release dated May 11

DEAR MR. KAISER: I appreciate greatly your consenting to serve this year as U.S. National Chairman for United Nations Day.

UN Day should have special significance for Americans. The United States has provided both birthplace and homeplace for the United Nations; the UN has enjoyed warm bipartisan support from five U.S. Presidents, from the Congress and from an overwhelming majority of the American people. Support for the United Nations has been a major element of U.S. foreign policy since 1945.

As UN Day Chairman, I know that you, with the cooperation of the various State Governors, Mayors and other local officials, will encourage appropriate observances of this commemorative event throughout the country. This year the United Nations is twenty-one years old, and Americans should join other peoples of the world in welcoming it to majority.

I am happy that I can count on your outstanding talents and ability for this important job.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

¹ No. 3725; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 7107.

The Foreign Assistance Program for Latin America in 1967

*Statement by Lincoln Gordon
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

President Johnson has set the course for U.S. participation in the monumental task of helping to create modern democratic societies in Latin America. In Mexico City, less than 3 weeks ago, the President announced² that he will in the months ahead join with Latin American leaders in exploring a new meeting at the very highest level "to examine our common problems and to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum," to "give necessary impulse . . . to new and additional initiatives."

It will take time, faith, and stubborn effort (he said) to achieve together the goals that we set ourselves in the Charter of Punta del Este 5 years ago, but this we must do. This we will do. There is no other way, in our time and in this hemisphere, to show what free men and what free nations can do working together.

Nor is it necessary to stress the vital importance to United States security of the success of this effort. If our own children are to live lives of fulfillment and freedom, then a way must be found for the children of Latin America to do the same.

Our hemisphere cannot continue indefinitely half rich and half poor. No one ex-

pects a rapid closing of this gap, but Latin America rightly seeks its reduction through a process of accelerated and self-sustaining growth, together with a sense of greater control over its own economic destiny. This will require revolutionary changes, and the processes of such change—economic, social, and political—are already well begun. There are some who contend that this must be a violent and bloody revolution. This is the doctrine of the Chinese Communists and of the recent Tricontinent Conference of Havana. It is also the view of non-Communists who look to the Mexican Revolution of 1910 as a model for all to follow.

I do not accept this view. Mexican progress in the last 20 years has been admirable, but it is a fact that nowhere in Latin America today is there a social structure as rigid as that of pre-1910 Mexico. In the last half century there have taken place in the world an explosion of scientific and technical knowledge and an almost equally dramatic advance in understanding of economic growth. Our task is to help Latin America bring these new tools to bear in the cause of accelerated progress and social justice—to achieve revolutionary ends by peaceful means. There is no reason to emulate the violence which in Mexico two generations ago cost 1 million lives in a then population of 15 million, or more recently in

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 2. Mr. Gordon is also U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress.

² For text of President Johnson's address at Mexico City on Apr. 15, see BULLETIN of May 9, 1966, p. 727.

Cuba has cost a suffering nation its hopes for freedom without even beginning to meet its minimum material goals.

The Alliance for Progress is not merely a declaration of faith that this can be done. It is also a definition of goals and of ways and means to pursue those goals by national self-help and international cooperation. After 5 years, it can be said with confidence that both the goals and the methods are essentially sound. This is the considered opinion of all the governments concerned and of responsible leadership throughout the hemisphere. Men no longer discuss whether there should be an Alliance. But they are rightly dissatisfied with the rate of progress, even though it has advanced substantially during the past 2 years. They and we are seeking for ways to intensify the effort and to move more rapidly—and together—from plans to action and to results.

There are no simple shortcuts to economic and social progress. The Alliance must be comprehensive and sustained for the long haul. The bill before this committee is the minimum required for our own continued effective participation in this inter-American effort during the coming years.

Political Situation

On the political front the hemisphere shows a decided trend toward greater stability and strengthening of democratic institutions as well as economic growth. There are some fragile situations, to be sure. We know how swiftly adverse circumstances can develop. But the general trend is encouraging. The philosophy of the Alliance for Progress is making economic and social progress the central concern of political movements and of the new generation of political leaders. Development, stabilization, and reform are becoming the key issues of public life. There is also increasing awareness of the necessity to build democratic institutions at the grassroots level and to create the opportunity for democracy to

develop through expanded economic opportunity and increased social mobility.

More countries are adopting development programs built upon the determination of people to help themselves. As they work together and build schools, cooperatives, trade unions, local water systems, and meeting centers, people are learning the rudiments of self-government by confronting the economic and social problems of their own communities. There is an increasing appreciation of the necessity for full citizen involvement in national development efforts.

In Chile, Peru, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, there are community action programs designed to harness the energies of the people to improve their own lives.

Reviewing the political events of the past year, it is clear that there is a growing determination in the hemisphere to develop and improve democratic procedures and political stability. Reform-minded constitutional governments are demonstrating that political freedom and economic development can go hand in hand. And in the few cases of *de facto* governments, most of them are moving their countries rapidly toward elections and a return to constitutionality. In short, while the political practice in the hemisphere still falls short of stable representative democracy, this is increasingly respected as the pattern which should be sought in reality as well as on paper.

Much progress has also been made in combating Communist subversion. Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Central America have been able to reduce their guerrilla problems. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, the Communists show little, if any, gain from their efforts. This is due to several factors.

Public and official awareness of the danger has increased as Communist designs become more evident. Castro's repeated failures at home and his clumsiness in external relations have lost him most of the sympathy and appeal that he once enjoyed. Conflicts within the Communist movement

have weakened its effectiveness. The internal security capabilities of the Latin American countries also have steadily increased, supported by our military and police assistance programs. Continued vigilance and systematic preventive effort on this front, however, is essential. At the Havana Tricontinent Conference the Communists made clear that Latin America is to be a principal target for subversion and armed aggression. They should be taken at their word.

We are encouraged by the progress in establishing a climate in the Dominican Republic propitious for the elections scheduled June 1. Over the past few months violence has been sharply reduced. Economic activity is picking up. Three candidates—all former Presidents—are campaigning actively. In the task of preparing for elections, President [Héctor] García Godoy is receiving the full cooperation of all elements of the OAS [Organization of American States] in the Dominican Republic: the Ad Hoc Committee, the Inter-American Peace Force, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Technical Electoral Advisory Committee. A team of OAS observers is being invited for the election itself. The OAS is firmly committed to free and fair elections in the Dominican Republic and to the peaceful transfer of power to the newly elected government on July 1. We fully support this OAS commitment.

Progress Under the Alliance

This last year has been a year of hope and achievement under the Alliance for Progress. In addition to material advances of real significance, there has been continued progress in the creation of a sound institutional base for more rapid economic development. The basic concepts of the Alliance have become the dominant philosophy in the hemisphere. Self-help, systematic mobilization of domestic resources, rational priorities for investment programs, creation of modern institutions as a base

for more productive private enterprise, and reforms looking toward greater efficiency and broader social justice—these are not only the commitments of governments but in increasing measure the actual practice. Latin America has also been helped by more favorable price and market conditions for several basic commodities. Were this situation to change, the economic situation could deteriorate quickly.

At the fourth annual ministerial meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Buenos Aires 4 weeks ago,³ I had the opportunity to speak with colleagues from throughout the hemisphere. There was agreement that, while progress has been encouraging, especially in the last 2 years, there is no cause for complacency. Action on agricultural development and tax reform, it was agreed, has not proceeded quickly enough. Unemployment and underemployment are desperate problems, particularly among the people flocking into the urban centers in search of better lives. Ways must be found to strengthen the markets for Latin American exports of raw materials and to expand and diversify their exports generally. Production of food and of manufactured goods must be increased. The population increase may nullify too much of what is being accomplished in economic development. And more rapid progress is needed in the integration movement both in the Central American Common Market and in the Latin American Free Trade Association.

The meeting at Buenos Aires drew up an action program of the most important things we would all like to see accomplished in the coming year in the hemisphere.

It set in motion procedures which will enable it a year hence to review in depth the steps that have been taken during the year to carry forward this program. The program includes immediate steps to be taken to improve Latin American planning opera-

³ For a statement by Mr. Gordon at the meeting, see *ibid.*, May 9, 1966, p. 738.

tions, accelerate agricultural modernization and tax reform, stimulate the private sector, accelerate the integration movement, and secure a better interrelationship between trade and aid. Strong recommendations were also made for action in the education and health fields. In the course of the year the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) will review the progress made during its country-by-country reviews of performance and will serve as an increasingly effective multilateral executive agent to guide the actions of the participating governments.

All of us now recognize that the full achievement of the goals of the Charter of Punta del Este will take more than the 10 years originally envisaged. As Secretary Rusk has told you, our Latin American colleagues were both heartened and challenged when President Johnson proposed through the Secretary at the Rio Conference last November that the Alliance for Progress be extended on the basis of continued effective self-help actions by our partner nations and their own undertaking to join in mutual assistance commitments.⁴

The understandings reached at Rio are of great importance. There for the first time the Latin American countries formally recognized that the development efforts of each affect the development of all and the security of the entire hemisphere. Accordingly, they are now prepared to see that the obligation of self-help be recognized as a treaty commitment to the other members of the Alliance and in addition are prepared to assume treaty commitments to help one another.

We can already begin to see possibilities along this latter line. Mexico has made some significant commitments to Central America, pledging \$5 million of credit to the Central American Bank and the purchase of \$1 million of the Bank's bonds.

⁴ For texts of an address by Secretary Rusk before the Second Special Inter-American Conference on Nov. 23, 1965, a message from President Johnson, and documents adopted at the conference, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

Venezuela has undertaken technical assistance programs in several countries, and Brazil and Argentina are sharing in multinational projects of special interest to some of their neighbors. Governments in a position to do so are investing a portion of their reserves in the Inter-American Development Bank.

Further, it was agreed at Rio that the OAS Charter should be revised by incorporating in it the principles for advancing hemisphere development that were adopted by the American nations at Punta del Este in 1961.⁵ As the members of this committee know, there has been some disagreement as to the precise language which should be incorporated in the revised charter. This does not, however, reflect any basic divergence of principle, and I am confident that the remaining differences can be resolved in the near future.

Economic Integration

Latin American economic integration is one of the most important trends in the hemisphere. The Central American Common Market—within which trade has increased 123 percent in 2 years—is helping to illustrate the benefits that can come when Latin American countries work together. The Latin American Free Trade Association, which in 1965 more than doubled intra-Association trade over the 1959–1961 volume, illustrates by its difficulties with tariff reduction and trade agreements some of the hard decisions that must be made to secure continued progress in this movement.

The Inter-American Development Bank will soon broaden those of its activities that contribute to economic integration. Following up on a CIAP suggestion that a regional fund for multinational preinvestment studies be created, the IDB has completed studies for the establishment of such a fund. Many projects are waiting in the wings for which such preinvestment

⁵ For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

studies might be appropriate, notably in the fields of river basin development, transportation, and telecommunications.

The United States supports the integration efforts of the nations of Latin America. We will continue to work with the IDB to assure that high priority is given to projects that promise further integration of Latin American development efforts. Such integration will not only advance economic development but will help to lessen political tensions within the hemisphere.

Multilateral Assistance

The Charter of Punta del Este is itself a multilateral framework which serves as the basis for all U.S. aid to Latin America. In addition, AID [Agency for International Development] assistance to Latin America will continue to be responsive to the several multilateral institutions and arrangements that have been created to make external assistance in Latin America more effective. As Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, AID Administrator] has already told this committee, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress has become an increasingly vigorous organization for multilateral leadership and coordination. CIAP's annual review of each country's program and progress is a checkpoint that provides perspective on progress to aid recipients and suppliers alike. Pledges of performance to CIAP by Latin American nations weigh heavily in U.S. determinations to make assistance available. CIAP does not, however, formally approve national economic plans.

In keeping with the spirit of the amendment suggested by this committee's chairman, we would be happy to see a legislative reference to CIAP, providing that development loans under the Alliance should be applied to social and economic development projects and programs which are in keeping with the findings of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress in its annual review of national development activities.

The key multilateral financial institution of the Alliance is the Inter-American Development Bank. The Bank has been steadily increasing the scale and effectiveness of its operations. The World Bank has also been increasing its support for Latin American development. These international agencies, however, are complements to, and not substitutes for, the continuing direct assistance of the United States. Within the concept of the Alliance, each contributes its own unique skills to economic development in Latin America, and we and they are working increasingly together to maximize the effectiveness of our joint efforts.

Two less formal arrangements—known as consultative groups—have been coordinating development assistance on an even broader multilateral basis. The U.S. is a member of each. One is for Colombia and is sponsored by the World Bank. The other assists Ecuador and is sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank. Similar consultative groups are being considered for other Latin American nations.

Fiscal Year 1967 AID Program

In keeping with the approach to foreign aid that he instituted 2 years ago, the President has requested an overall AID program that is the bare minimum required to support United States policies in relation to the developing world. For the AID participation in the Alliance for Progress, this means a program in fiscal year 1967 of \$500 million for development loans, \$95 million for technical cooperation, and \$33.2 million for supporting assistance. As he did last year, the President has made it plain that should circumstances arise that require additional United States funds for the Alliance for Progress, he will submit a supplemental appropriation request to the Congress.

The President has reemphasized United States determination that the basis for our assistance will be support to countries engaged in serious efforts to mobilize and apply their own resources to development.

The nations of Latin America under the Alliance for Progress have been in the forefront of the developing areas of the world in taking steps of this character.

In his foreign aid message to the Congress on February 1, 1966, the President said:⁶

The keynote of the Alliance for Progress has always been self-help. The pattern of our assistance . . . demonstrates our determination to help those who help themselves.

The Congress is now considering legislation calling for a commitment of United States human and financial resources and food and fiber to help spur a revolution in education, attack with new intensity the problems of communicable diseases, and make available the agricultural skills and scientific advances that have made United States agriculture the most flourishing in the world. If hunger, illiteracy, and disease are to be eliminated, more resources, theirs and ours, must be applied to agriculture, education, and health. In Latin America, AID is already doing much in these fields, especially in the building of effective institutions that will become permanent elements of Latin American development. Here are some examples of such efforts:

—Through an AID contract with a group of associated Midwestern universities, the National University of Colombia and the Colombian Agricultural Institute will expand and improve the faculties of three agricultural colleges, reorienting the teaching toward applied research and extension. United States professors will assist in a modernization process whose ultimate objective is to increase and diversify agricultural production. The Ford, Kellogg, and Rockefeller foundations and the World Bank are also contributing to or plan to contribute to this program.

—Contract technicians from the University of North Carolina have helped Peru establish an outstanding land-grant-type college at the National Agricultural University

at La Molina. Eighty percent of the faculty is now teaching on a full-time basis, a rarity in Latin American universities. The United States has loaned \$4 million to help finance a \$9 million expansion of the physical facilities at La Molina, enrollment in which is steadily increasing.

—Some 10,000 farmers are expected to benefit from AID's loan to Chile for fertilizer imports. This loan supports an important part of Chile's overall program to increase agricultural production, which includes more favorable pricing policies, agrarian reform, and improved farm credit and marketing systems.

—As a short-term measure to increase the productivity of Brazil's farms and provide more food for its growing population, AID has made available a \$15 million loan to Brazil for fertilizer imports. Local currency derived from sale of the fertilizer is used in a selective agricultural credit program designed to increase basic foodstuff production.

—AID is working with the five Central American national universities in developing an integrated university system to service the region. Progress is being made toward the development of regional schools in sanitary engineering, veterinary medicine, and business administration.

—During the next year, AID is planning to grant the Pan American Health Organization \$1.3 million for malaria eradication, in addition to loans made in this field to several participating countries.

—AID will continue to respond favorably to requests from the nations of Latin America for assistance in population matters. In fiscal year 1965 AID provided \$400,000 to the Latin American Center for Economic and Social Development in Santiago, Chile, headed by the Reverend Roger E. Veke-mans, S.J., to establish a center for the study of family and population, and nearly \$200,000 for research and training in family sociology to Notre Dame University [South Bend, Ind.].

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

AID Lending Program

Program lending will again be a major method of providing economic assistance to Latin America by AID in fiscal year 1967. The program loan technique provides double dividends. Through letters of credit established with U.S. banks, the dollars provide exchange for imports from the United States by the private sector of the borrowing countries. The local currencies received by the borrowing governments against sale of the dollars are then invested in development activities of high priority for which domestic resources are inadequate, including the initiation or strengthening of key developmental institutions. For example, low-cost housing is constructed and mortgage insurance systems are strengthened; educational opportunities and facilities are enlarged; more credit is made available for agricultural modernization; campaigns are waged against disease; supplies of electric power are enlarged and new roads are built to serve farmers and open new areas for settlement.

The value of the program loan in economic development is well illustrated by the U.S. experience in Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, countries to which the U.S. this year has made program loans totaling \$295 million. In September 1965 the Government of Colombia instituted a comprehensive economic reform program that included substantial readjustment in exchange rates, new taxes, a balanced budget, a start toward liberalization of imports, and an anti-inflationary monetary policy. These actions led to negotiations by Colombia with a consultative group headed by the World Bank and including the United States and the IMF [International Monetary Fund], at the conclusion of which AID agreed to make a program loan of up to \$65 million in four segments. The Colombian economy is now moving forward.

Brazil and Chile are using program loans to support their measures of stabilization,

reform, and modernization, to bolster the private sector, and to expand public investment in roads, water and sewer systems, power plants, education, and agriculture. In Brazil the Castello Branco administration reduced the annual inflation rate from 140 percent in the first quarter of 1964 to 45 percent during 1965, with a downward trend during the year. At the same time, it pulled Brazil back from the brink of international bankruptcy and brought about a resumption of growth—to a rate of approximately 5 percent in 1965—after 2 years of near stagnation.

Under President [Eduardo] Frei, Chile is demonstrating that a developing country can achieve progressive reforms within a democratic framework. In the first year of Chile's "revolution in liberty," primary and secondary school enrollment increased 20 percent, primary school teachers in the classroom increased 150 percent, and tax reform and improved tax administration provided 23 percent more in government revenue. The rate of inflation was decreased from 38 percent in 1964 to 26 percent in 1965. Also, in 1965 alone approximately 4,000 families were settled on their own land, nearly as many as during the preceding 35 years. Chile, which will soon receive a large foreign exchange bonus as a result of a 50-percent increase in the price of copper, has indicated it will use much of this windfall to pay off short-term foreign debts and will studiously avoid its diversion into increased consumption or its monetization as an additional source of inflationary pressure.

Other Country Assistance

In the context of adequate self-help by the Peruvians, expansion of U.S. assistance to Peru is being considered. Peru is taking significant steps forward: Since passage of a comprehensive agrarian reform law in 1964, more than 200,000 people have benefited from the distribution of 1.5 million acres. An imaginative community develop-

ment program has had considerable impact among Indian mountain peasants.

Another expected major recipient of U.S. assistance in fiscal year 1967 is the Dominican Republic.

The information⁷ distributed to the members of this committee recounts country by country the program proposed for fiscal year 1967. In previous years we have shown country totals as a range between two figures. Although we are not doing so this year, the efficient use of our resources, the uncertainty as to the time by which specific feasible projects will be ready for support, and other factors make it essential to retain flexibility in the administration of the foreign assistance program.

Two specific development programs—the housing guaranty program and the use of the mission directors' special development activities fund—warrant special mention.

Housing Guaranties

The Congress has provided housing guaranty authority for U.S. investments in housing programs in Latin America. To date 30 projects have been authorized in 14 countries with guaranties totaling \$162 million. These provide for 28,500 dwelling units, 14,000 of which are under construction and 5,200 of which are occupied. Letters of reservation have been issued for three additional projects with 3,000 units and \$16 million in guaranties; 17 other projects with 14,000 units and guaranties of \$62 million are under review.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 increased the available guaranty authority from \$250 to \$400 million and added four new programs—credit institutions, lower income housing, housing sponsored by free labor unions and cooperatives, and local participation—to the original pilot demonstration housing program. Constraints in the money market and the executive branch's strenuous effort to reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit have had a decided im-

act on the implementation of the program. As part of its current effort the President's Committee on the Balance of Payments has established guidelines on the available authority providing that \$240 million in guaranty authority may be used for the demonstration program and \$100 million for the four new programs—\$30 million in fiscal year 1967 and \$70 million in fiscal year 1968.

Special Development Fund

The use of the special development fund has paid dividends far beyond the amount that has been invested. Each mission director is authorized to use up to \$50,000 in support of small, high-impact activities without prior Washington approval and without separate bilateral negotiations on each activity.

A small AID contribution to a cooperative, to a community development activity, to a rural irrigation project, or to a local effort generated by a Peace Corps volunteer has resulted in development (and also in good will) far in excess of the amount of U.S. assistance invested. In Bolivia \$250 worth of cement enabled a community to finish construction of a wing on a children's hospital, itself a self-help project. In Costa Rica 195 hand pumps were made available to rural communities that lacked potable water. Axes and machetes were provided for Indian communities in Nicaragua so that they might clear land for the production of subsistence crops. In Peru four hand sprayers and insecticides were given to a coffee-raising cooperative in a colonization area where the crop was in danger of being destroyed by insects.

Non-Federal Initiatives

The U.S. contribution to the Alliance consists in growing measure of the work and the concern of private individuals, private enterprise and organizations, and other non-Federal institutions. For example, under the Partners of the Alliance program, 30 States have cooperative arrangements with counterparts in 14 Latin American nations. Teachers are exchanged; books, equipment,

⁷ Not printed here.

and other resources flow between the Partners groups. Nearly 70 U.S. colleges and universities have had contracts with AID to give assistance in Latin America. The American Institute for Free Labor Development is sponsoring housing programs and labor training institutes. Assistance to the cooperative movement in Latin America has been given by the Cooperative Leagues of the U.S.A., the Credit Union National Association, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. The National League for Insured Savings Associations has helped inaugurate savings and loan associations in several Latin American countries. Each year, more non-Government organizations and individuals from the United States are taking part in the Alliance. Their contributions add materially to Latin American economic development and inter-American cooperation.

Latin America and U.S. Balance of Payments

The committee may be considering the possible influence of U.S. aid disbursements on our balance of payments. Official data, including recent Department of Commerce estimates of the U.S. balance-of-payments position, show that Latin America is not a problem area as far as potential dollar leakages to Europe and Japan from AID disbursements are concerned.

On the contrary, the triangular payments results have been working to the favor of the United States. Latin America has been running a trade and overall balance-of-payments surplus with Western Europe and Japan, and in 1965 several of the larger Latin American countries used a payments surplus with Europe and Japan to finance a balance-of-payments deficit with the United States.

While there has been some increase from very low levels in the gross foreign exchange reserve position of Latin America, the gold component of the area's reserves has been reduced by \$125 million during the last 3 years according to data published by the International Monetary Fund. Thus our Latin American friends have been helpful to the United States payments problem by their

willingness to sell some of their gold to our Treasury at a time when other countries in the world were converting dollar holdings to gold.

Military Assistance Program

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara has already testified in detail in support of the proposed military assistance program in Latin America in fiscal year 1967. I should like to join in support of that program. The objectives of the military assistance are being met. Latin American armed forces are developing an increased capability to meet internal security threats. They are contributing to development through civic action projects, at the same time demonstrating that the military will support and encourage the development of democratic institutions. President Johnson said at Mexico City that the United States will continue to concentrate its assistance mainly in economic and social fields and to encourage the nations of Latin America where possible to limit their outlays for military purposes. The modest military assistance program requested this year is in keeping with the policy stated by the President.

Conclusion

Significant advances have been made during the first 5 years of the Alliance for Progress. Although we may have been overly optimistic at Punta del Este 5 years ago, a strong groundwork for further progress has been laid.

Most encouraging, Latin America has achieved a 2.5 percent or better increase in per capita gross national product during the last 2 years, and every evidence is that at least this will be accomplished again in 1966. And behind these general economics figures there are the physical and human achievements: the tying together of farm and city by new roads, the attack on disease, the new opportunities for schooling and vocational and professional training, the introduction of modern industry and the skills that go with it—in short, the movement of once stagnant

societies into participants in the contemporary world.

The President has requested a 5-year authorization for the foreign economic assistance program, including the Alliance for Progress. Congressional approval of this request would give encouragement to the developing countries in initiating and carrying out their own sustained multiyear efforts to accomplish specific goals of economic development, reform, and stabilization. In the case of the Alliance, a long-term authorization would follow the precedent already established by the Congress in 1962.

The importance of an increasingly pros-

perous, stable, and democratically governed Latin America to a world environment conducive to our own liberty and prosperity should not require mention. Yet it is an unhappy fact that at various times in our history, preoccupation with other regions has made us forget this elementary truth. The Alliance for Progress was a compact with our sister nations which should put forever behind us any recurrence of such periods of neglect.

The program the President has proposed in support of the Alliance for Progress is both feasible and essential. I recommend and urge your favorable consideration.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Urges Security Council Unity on Rhodesian Problem

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

Our consideration of the Rhodesian problem, it seems to me, should be governed by one paramount consideration, and that is that this Council must not convert a victory of purpose and achievement which has characterized this Council in dealing with this problem into a defeat of disagreement and disunity.

In this Council we are unanimously resolved that the goal of self-determination for the majority in Southern Rhodesia is one we all share and that this Council is

united in the conviction that the illegal declaration of independence of the Smith regime shall not succeed. We have the obligation, all of us, therefore, to consider together what our course of action shall be so that this regime shall not receive encouragement but, on the contrary, shall at each step of the way know that the international community is at one in its commitment to the principle of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and in its commitment that the illegal declaration of independence, which we all condemn, shall not prevail.

I have been much impressed by what the distinguished foreign ministers and the rep-

¹ Made in the Security Council on May 18 (U.S./U.N. press release 4861).

representatives of the foreign ministers of Africa have had to say on this subject. And I have been much impressed by what my colleague, our distinguished colleague, Chief Adebo [S. O. Adebo of Nigeria], has had to say on this subject, and I have listened with great interest to the other declarations that have been made. Chief Adebo made, I think, a very pertinent point. In soberly considering where we stand and where we shall now go, what is important is what we do, and this is more important, indeed, than rhetoric and adjectives and debating points that may be scored in considering this situation.

I should like to recall to this Council what my country, as a firm supporter of what this Council has declared, has done with a single objective in mind, and that is to achieve the goal of self-determination for the majority in Southern Rhodesia. And these are actions—and actions in this area are far more important than broad and sweeping phrases which have to do, I think, more with other issues than the issues which confront us in Southern Rhodesia.

My country has at considerable cost taken a number of major steps in line with the Security Council resolution of November 20.² It has been said by one of our distinguished colleagues that there is a collusion between Washington and London. I plead guilty to that charge, but in quite a different sense. There is a collusion between Washington and London and every member of this Council that the illegal declaration of independence shall not succeed. And the steps we have taken have been in implementation of the collusion which we all share, a justifiable collusion in terms of our commitments under the charter. It is a strange way to make a conspiracy to take open actions for all the world to see which operate to the great cost and disadvantage of nations like my own, which seek to trade freely with various countries of the world. It is a strange conspiracy that these steps should result in

substantial financial loss to our country as well as to other countries in pursuance of our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

U.S. Response to U.N. Resolution

I should like to start with the first and basic point. In the diplomatic field, like other U.N. member states, we have refused to recognize the Smith regime. This is not an insubstantial fact, that all of the nations of the world, member states of the United Nations and those who are not member states, have responded to this call of the Security Council and have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Smith regime in Rhodesia. We ought to take satisfaction in the fact that we all recognize our international responsibilities and the declaration of the Security Council and that we have isolated that regime from the normal intercourse that takes place between states entitled to international recognition.

But we have gone beyond this—and I take no praise or credit for this—we have responded to the Security Council's resolution.

We have taken economic action, costly economic action, involving a wide variety of steps. And they reflect the broad nature of the economic links which under a constitutional regime Southern Rhodesia enjoyed with the United States, a major trading country. We have, when the Security Council acted, immediately suspended action on applications for United States Government loans and guarantees to our businessmen who carry on trade with Rhodesia. And we are issuing no further investment guarantees for investment in Southern Rhodesia.

Concerning steps to reduce our import trade with Southern Rhodesia, we have talked to our firms which formerly imported asbestos and lithium, two major products, from Southern Rhodesia, and we have their agreement at our request to find other sources, and indeed they are engaged and have found other sources.

The United States Government has informed United States companies that it rec-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.

ognizes the legal authority of the British Government to take steps to bar purchases of Southern Rhodesian chrome and tobacco, again two principal products of Rhodesia, and has told them that they should and must comply with the relevant British Orders-in-Council.

We have suspended the 1965 and 1966 Southern Rhodesian sugar quotas, and we have gone so far as to bar a shipment which was at the time already on the high seas, bound for the United States.

On the export side, we have instituted a total embargo on the shipment of military equipment to Southern Rhodesia, as well as of United States petroleum and petroleum products. And more recently, in keeping with the economic embargo which this Council called for, we have announced steps to cut off virtually all American exports of consequence, the only exceptions being of humanitarian importance and not significant from the standpoint of the Rhodesian economy.

In addition to these direct measures designed to bring unilateral declaration of independence to an end, we joined the United Kingdom and other countries in establishing an airlift of petroleum products to Zambia in order to aid that landlocked nation in maintaining its economy.³

Now we say this not to reap credit for this but merely to say that this is a concrete manifestation by actions, not words, of the loss in trade, the loss of dollars, we are willing to accept in support of the principles of legality, democracy, and self-determination in Africa and in support of the decisions made by this Council.

Soviet Accusations Refuted

Now, Mr. President, I have heard what has been said and I would like to point out that these facts are open, as they are in a democratic society. We have made them

known and they are readily verifiable. We do not ask that our statements of actions concerning Southern Rhodesia be accepted on faith; rather the aforementioned steps taken in actual implementation of our policies were announced at the time, and they are public information, and they are evidence of our Government's policy toward Southern Rhodesia and of our deep-rooted concern that the illegal regime shall not prevail and that the voice of the international community in this matter should be heard.

And I need hardly observe that they constitute the only sound basis for judgment rather than allegations and adjectives made in this chamber this morning by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. The accusations of bad faith against my Government by Ambassador [Nikolai T.] Fedorenko will not, I am sure, deflect the attention of this Council from the fact that the economic measures we have taken in response to Resolution 217 of the Security Council have perhaps hurt the Smith regime far more than the words that have been spoken by the Soviet Union, because it is actions in this area and not mere rhetoric which will bring Mr. Smith's regime to heel.

And I would like to say that in my 10 months of experience here it has not been my desire to enter into the stale polemics characteristic of another era with my distinguished colleague of the Soviet Union. Rather, I would like to join with him and the members of this Council in determining how in a realistic way we can achieve what we voted for, and that is that this illegal declaration shall not succeed. And to me it is far more important that we focus on that problem as responsible members of the Security Council rather than to engage in an exchange of debating points about old-fashioned concepts which no longer have any application in the modern world.

Now, my Government's views about Southern Rhodesia are these—and they are very plain and simple:

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 85; Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157; and May 16, 1966, p. 783.

We regard Southern Rhodesia to involve a basically moral issue, and we say this for all the world to hear. We want to see constitutional authority restored in Rhodesia so that all of its people—white and black—can join in determining the nation's future. And if my Soviet colleague used the term "one man, one vote," I should like to recall to him that that phrase was used by a distinguished colleague of mine in the Supreme Court in the United States in an opinion in which I joined and which represents our nation's commitment and our policy, not only for ourselves but for all countries in the world, including his own. We in this country are ourselves engaged in a vigorous nationwide effort to eliminate certain elements of inequality which we frankly admit have existed in the past with respect to our Negro citizens. And in these circumstances we could hardly pretend to ignore the deep and widespread inequality existing in Southern Rhodesia.

Second, the birth of our own nation has given us a strong anticolonial orientation. We have supported decolonialization and genuine self-determination of people throughout the world. And we did so recently and with full vigor, as members of this Council will recall, in the Philippines, in India, in Indonesia, in Africa, and in other parts of the world. And it is our firm conviction that we cannot stand aside and see this principle turned upside down in Rhodesia.

And third, as a founding member of the United Nations, we believe and we conceive that we have a special obligation to see the charter provisions on human rights upheld. Now, for us in the United States, these provisions are not mere exhortations but are solemn treaty obligations which, by virtue of express language of our Constitution, are the supreme law of our land.

And fourth, the success of a rebellion in Rhodesia creating a white minority state, we recognize, would have merely hardened the lines of political conflict in Africa

which all of us would deplore.

For these very powerful reasons the United States Government opposes the unilateral declaration of independence, and we oppose it as strongly today as we did when it was first issued. We oppose its underlying principle—the denial of an orderly transition to majority rule. And this we conceive to be the basic issue which this Council must deal with.

The British Position

The Government of the United Kingdom, as the responsible political authority, has stated in the most categorical terms through its Prime Minister that the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule have to be maintained and guaranteed; that there will have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution; that there will have to be immediate improvements in the political status of the African population; that there will be progress toward ending racial discrimination; and, what is more important and basic in this declaration, that the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; and finally, that there must be adequate insurance that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

Those declarations, the six points of Prime Minister Wilson, have been reaffirmed to us here today by the United Kingdom's distinguished representative to the Security Council, Lord Caradon, on the most solemn authority of his Government.

We support the application of these principles, sound principles, to the solution of the Rhodesian rebellion, and for this reason we have supported the United Kingdom in its efforts to restore constitutional procedures in Rhodesia.

If I remember correctly, at the last meeting of the Security Council, my distin-

guished friend, Ambassador Fedorenko, referred to the special relationship which exists between the United States and the United Kingdom. I do not apologize for this relationship. I think it is a relationship which is founded upon some common convictions our two countries hold, and that is a common commitment to freedom to the rule of law and to democratic processes. And I personally am very proud of that relationship, because I remember in my own time and in the time of all of us some principles for which the United Kingdom stood firm when it stood alone in the great challenge to freedom which was made by the Nazi regime. And if we have a special relationship, it is in recollection of that incident as well as many others in the proud history of our two countries. As long as these principles which have been enunciated—principles of majority rule—continue to govern the efforts of the United Kingdom, which we all recognize to be the responsible authority for bringing constitutional rule and majority rule to Southern Rhodesia, we believe that the sensible, the realistic course for the Security Council is to facilitate and not obstruct their application.

Talks at London

Now, reference has been made to the talks which are now going on in London. We are all experienced people. There was only one conclusion which can logically be drawn from what Lord Caradon has told us has been the reason for such talks, and that is that the Smith regime, evidently feeling the pinch from the economic restrictions as applied against it by most of the member states of this organization, has indicated a desire to discuss the question of negotiations with the United Kingdom. Is this not why we adopted the resolution that we did in November?

Now these are not negotiations. They are talks. And these talks are now under way in London, designed to determine whether

or not there is a prospect of entering into negotiations with objectives which would be within the framework of the principles I have just reiterated. And I should like to remind this body, in which I take such great pride in being a part, that, when a Prime Minister of a democratic country reiterates to its supreme parliamentary body his attachment to those principles, he is making a commitment of the profoundest significance not only to that parliamentary body but, since it is a free one covered adequately by the world press, to all of the world at large.

The United States is confident that, if negotiations flow out of such talks, the United Kingdom will be guided by the principles which it has publicly announced and to which it is committed and that it will pursue any such negotiations only if these principles can be preserved.

We all have recognized from the outset the primacy of British responsibility for Rhodesia. And rather than question the good faith of the United Kingdom, I have no hesitancy in saying that what it has done has demonstrated its good faith on this question. It has done so at great expense and sacrifice by those who have earned their livelihood—the British workingmen—in trade with Rhodesia. It was the United Kingdom, we must recall, itself, who in deference to international responsibility in this area introduced the recent resolution in this Council calling for action under chapter VII to prevent a wholesale breach of the oil embargo by tanker vessels chartered by Rhodesian interests.⁴

It is a very peculiar conspiracy, I must say, if the United Kingdom comes to this Council and says that we will use our international force under the sanction of this Council to prevent a breach of the oil embargo. Let us welcome many more of that type of conspiracy.

The United Kingdom has maintained con-

⁴ For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, May 2, 1966, p. 713.

tinuous pressures on the Rhodesian authorities. And if in consequence a request is now made for talks, it would be the height of folly for the United Kingdom summarily to reject it without establishing whether it is made in good faith.

It has been my lifelong experience that, where talks are requested, it is the counsel of wisdom to pursue whether or not talks can lead to meaningful results. I would say that, under the broad context of what we have declared, it is the duty of the United Kingdom to investigate any prospect of peaceful resolution of this problem consistent with the principles to which we are all dedicated. We must remind ourselves that the main objective of this organization and the Council under the charter is to bring about the solution of international problems by peaceful, not violent, means.

The United States therefore believes that this Council should and must remain united in dealing with the problem of Rhodesia. To fall apart would only give support to the Smith regime, and we do not want to support him. And, therefore, it is our belief that the only constructive procedure for this Council at this stage is to remain seized of this agenda item, this resolution,⁵ which out of proper concern for the situation our African colleagues have offered, and then to follow with close attention the progress of the talks now going on in London and to determine whether or not they show any prospect of advance toward the proper solution of the Rhodesian matter. And certainly we have the right to expect the United Kingdom to keep this Council adequately informed so that the Council can determine, being seized of the matter, in light of the circumstances, what further appropriate steps may be required to achieve the goal we all support.

⁵ U.N. doc. S/7285/Add.1. On May 23 the draft resolution was put to a vote and received 6 votes in favor, 1 against, with 8 abstentions (U.S.), and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 27 confirmed the following nominations:

Jacob D. Beam to be Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 19.)

Eugene M. Locke to be Ambassador to Pakistan. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 134 dated June 16.)

Elliott P. Skinner to be Ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta. (For biographic details, see White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated May 8.)

John W. Tuthill to be Ambassador to Brazil. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 138 dated June 8.)

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Thailand Sign Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations

Press release 131 dated May 29

Conclusion of a treaty of amity and economic relations between the United States and Thailand was announced on May 29. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman signed the treaty for Thailand and Ambassador Graham Martin signed for the United States at Bangkok on May 29.

The stability and growing prosperity of Thailand and its commitment to freedom despite political and military pressures from outside make the future of this country a matter of particular interest to all who want peace in Southeast Asia. The new treaty reflects the friendship and close cooperation between Thailand and the United States in

all spheres, especially the determination of both nations to encourage trade and investment as significant elements of economic growth and political understanding. The treaty records the acceptance by both countries of a body of principles designed to further already existing close relations along mutually beneficial lines.

The treaty replaces and terminates an old treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation which entered into force on October 1, 1938. The new treaty contains 14 articles. It is the short, simplified type of general treaty that the United States has been negotiating with a number of countries but contains the general substance of the normal treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Each of the two countries:

(1) agrees to accord within its territories to citizens and corporations of the other treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to carrying on commercial and industrial activities;

(2) formally endorses high standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests;

(3) recognizes the need for special attention to the stimulation of the international movement of investment capital for economic development; and

(4) affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

In addition, there was an exchange of notes relating to the rights and privileges of consular officers.

The conclusion of this treaty represents a further step in the program being pursued by the United States for the extension and modernization of its commercial treaty structure and the establishment of conditions favorable to foreign investment.

The treaty will be transmitted as soon as possible to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. When the ratification processes of both Governments have been completed, it will enter into force 1 month after exchange of ratifications.

U.S. and Greece Amend Cotton Textile Agreement

Press release 119 dated May 23

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

A revision of the 1964 bilateral agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles between the Governments of the United States and Greece¹ was announced on May 23 by the Department of State.

The revision is embodied in an exchange of notes which took place at Washington between Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon and Minister of Commerce Emmanuel Kothris of Greece.

The revision provides for the following changes in the agreement:

1. Extension for 3 years, through August 31, 1970.

2. Establishment of a joint ceiling for yarn categories.

3. Provision to transfer to the yarn group unused yardage in the other groups.

In addition, it was agreed that 2 million pounds of yarn may be exported from Greece to the United States during the agreement year which began on September 1, 1965, without being charged against the limitations of the agreement.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

MAY 23, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to our discussions concerning the exports of cotton textiles from Greece to the United States and to the cotton textile agreement between our two Governments effected by an exchange of notes dated July 17, 1964.

I propose that the amended agreement, effective as of September 1, 1965, shall read as follows:

"1. The Government of Greece shall limit annual exports to the United States in all categories of cotton textiles for the twelve-month period beginning September 1, 1964, in accordance with the following:

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5618.

- (a) Yarn (categories 1-4) 1 million pounds.
- (b) Fabrics and made-up goods (categories 5-38, 64) 1 million square yards equivalent.
- (c) Apparel (categories 39-63) 200,000 square yards equivalent.

2. The limitation on yarn may be exceeded in any agreement year after August 31, 1965 by the amount by which exports of other cotton textiles from Greece to the United States are less than the sum of the limitations applicable to fabrics, made-up goods and apparel for that year.

3. Within the ceiling for fabrics and made-up goods, exports in any one category shall not exceed 200,000 square yards equivalent in any agreement year except by mutual agreement of the two Governments.

4. In the second and succeeding twelve-month periods for which any limitation or ceiling is in force under this agreement, the level of exports permitted under such limitation or ceiling shall be increased by five percent over the corresponding level for the preceding twelve-month period.

5. The Government of Greece shall space exports in the yarn categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 as evenly as practicable within an agreement year except that exports in this group of categories may be permitted to reach 75 percent of the annual level during the first six months of the first agreement year.

6. In the event of undue concentration in exports from Greece to the United States of yarn in categories 2, 3 or 4, the Government of the United States of America may request consultation with the Government of Greece in order to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem. The Government of Greece shall enter into such consultations when requested. Until a mutually satisfactory solution is reached, the Government of Greece shall limit the exports from Greece to the United States of yarn in the category in question starting with the twelve-month period beginning on the date of the request for consultation. This limit shall be one hundred five percent of the exports from Greece to the United States of that category of yarn during the most recent twelve-month period preceding the request for consultation for which statistics are available to our two Governments on the date of the request.

7. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In the implementation of this agreement, the system of categories and the factors for conversion into square yards equivalent set forth in the Annex hereto² shall apply.

8. For the duration of this agreement, the Government of the United States shall not invoke the procedures of Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962

to request restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Greece to the United States.

9. The Governments agree to consult on any questions arising in the implementation of this agreement.

10. The agreement shall continue in force through August 31, 1970. As used herein, the term "agreement year" means a twelve-month period from September 1 through August 31. Either Government may propose revisions in the terms of the agreement, or may terminate the agreement at any time giving notice of at least 30 days prior to that proposed revision or termination."

In addition, in view of the special circumstances mentioned in our discussion I propose that, on a one-time basis, an additional two million pounds of yarn may be exported from Greece to the United States during the twelve-month period beginning September 1, 1965 without being charged against the limitations of the agreement.

If these proposals are acceptable to the Government of Greece, I shall appreciate receiving your note to this effect. This note and Your Excellency's note² indicating the acceptability of these proposals on behalf of the Government of Greece shall constitute an amendment to the agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
ANTHONY M. SOLOMON

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 1956 (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Luxembourg, June 1, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Signatures: Kenya, May 24, 1966; Netherlands, May 25, 1966.

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹

Acceptances deposited: India, May 10, 1966; Kuwait, May 11, 1966; Niger, May 9, 1966; Upper Volta, May 6, 1966.

² Not printed here.

¹ Not in force.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Singapore, June 3, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Telecommunications Department of Singapore, June 3, 1966.

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹

Signature: Telecommunications Department of Singapore, June 3, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.¹

Acceptances deposited: Belgium,² June 2, 1966; Canada, May 20, 1966.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement supplementing the agreement of September 19, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3900, 4368), relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi February 2, 1966. Entered into force February 2, 1966.

United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078, 5397, 5693, 5829), for cooperation on civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 2, 1966. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

¹ Not in force.

² Deposited in the name of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

Agreement for cooperation in the civil power application of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 2, 1966. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

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Quiet Warriors—Supporting Social Revolution in Viet-Nam. Illustrated publication describing the achievements and often hazardous lives of U.S. civilians who "toil unarmed and out of uniform" helping and teaching the strife-torn people of South Viet-Nam to build the social links and services and the common institutions without which no people can have and be a nation. Pub. 8041. Far Eastern Series 140. 48 pp. 40¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at London November 26, 1965. Entered into force November 26, 1965. TIAS 5941. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of December 30, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik January 25, 1966. Entered into force January 25, 1966. TIAS 5955. 3 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1408 PUBLICATION 8096 JUNE 20, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

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†132	5/31	Visa procedures for Cuban refugees.
†133	6/3	Delegation to NATO Council meeting.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The need to accelerate education in world affairs is the subject of *Around the Corner*, a Department of State publication featuring a special article by Secretary Rusk. Addressing parents and teachers of American high school students, Mr. Rusk points out that, after centuries of relatively steady advance, man's achievements—and his problems—have suddenly shot up on an accelerated curve. The world "around the corner" will be "even smaller, more complex, and more interdependent than today's," the Secretary adds, and that is the world teachers must anticipate as they prepare their students for future citizenship in the world community.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1409



June 27, 1966

WHERE NATO STANDS

Statement by Secretary Rusk 998

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OUR INTERNATIONAL PATENT POLICY AND THE WORLD PATENT CRISIS

Special Article by Harvey J. Winter 1006

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST TRADE

*Deputy Assistant Secretary Braderman at the American
Management Association, New York City 1013*

Ambassador McGhee at the Uebersee-Club, Hamburg, Germany 1019

Where NATO Stands

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

It is a pleasure for me to be before this subcommittee and to pay my respects to the public service you are rendering in your far-reaching and thorough examination of the present situation in NATO.

I think the most useful thing for me to do today would be to discuss with you in some detail the NATO ministerial meeting at Brussels, from which I have just returned.

It might be convenient, Madam Chairman [Edna F. Kelly], if you saw fit to put the communique² of this meeting into the record at this point.

By briefing you on this meeting, I will in effect also be telling you where NATO now stands and what seems to lie ahead.

The meeting had some very specific tasks. You are all aware that earlier this year the Government of France announced that it was withdrawing from participation in NATO's military activities. This meant primarily that it would no longer assign its forces in Germany to NATO.

The French Government also announced its decision that NATO and United States military establishments and bases should leave France.

Thus, the problems facing the Brussels meeting were these: to close ranks and fill the gaps left in NATO by the impending withdrawal of French forces; to relocate the NATO installations that must now leave

France; to take advantage of this relocation to reorganize NATO's higher military structure on a more efficient basis; to determine to what extent arrangements could be worked out for French cooperation with NATO on a basis acceptable to the other 14 countries; to demonstrate that NATO was not an outmoded defender of the *status quo* but was relevant to the eventual settlement of East-West differences; and, of course, to transact the normal business of the alliance.

I am most pleased to be able to inform you that the meeting succeeded in reaching these objectives to the fullest extent that might have been hoped.

The Group of Fourteen, that is, the NATO countries minus France, which held its own separate meetings at Brussels, gave a display of unity of purpose and showed an ability to unite for action that provided irrefutable evidence that the 14 countries consider NATO to be as essential as ever.

The Fourteen agreed on the relocation of NATO's principal military headquarters, SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] and AFCENT [Allied Forces Central Europe], and of the NATO Defense College.

You may have seen the announcement from Belgium that the Belgian Cabinet has now decided to invite SHAPE to Belgium and will submit that question to its Parliament. It is anticipated that the consolidated AFCENT headquarters will be in Benelux, or possibly in Germany, and that the NATO Defense College will move to Italy.

The Fourteen also agreed on a streamlining

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 13 (press release 143).

² See p. 1001.

of NATO's top military structure, involving the abolition of the Standing Group and the creation of an integrated international military staff.

On the question of the seat of the North Atlantic Council, again, the Fourteen showed a will to unity and a readiness for decision that fully met my expectations. It was agreed that the measures taken by the French Government create a situation in which the Council, if it remains in Paris, will be physically separated from all the military organisms of NATO after the departure of the military headquarters from France. There was also agreement on the importance of close cooperation between the political and the military institutions of NATO and that their collocation is one of the principal factors to be kept in mind when a decision is made on this question. The ministers therefore decided that, while awaiting the result of the negotiations which will take place on the connected questions, other eventual locations for the Council should be examined. I believe that when all of the factors are studied over the next few months, the Fourteen will agree to move the Council if it is clearly evident that this needs to be done.

Questions Between France and NATO

The question of arrangements between French forces and NATO forces proved to be the most difficult one that arose. The representative of France initially took the position at the meeting that political questions were for negotiation between France and Germany and that the questions posed between France and NATO as a whole were entirely technical and military in nature and should be worked out between French and NATO military commanders. The Fourteen, including the Federal Republic of Germany, did not agree with this view, since the questions between France and NATO are, in the first instance, clearly political in nature, involving as they do the extent to which France is committed to act with the other allies in a crisis and the extent to which France will enter into effective

command arrangements in time of war.

After considerable discussion, France agreed with the Fourteen that, and here I quote from the communique:

(a) The questions which need to be settled jointly between the Allies as a consequence of French communications will in the first instance be discussed in the Council in permanent session.

(b) Prominent among these questions are the tasks and missions of French forces in Germany, including their cooperation with NATO forces and command arrangements.

(c) Other questions such as French participation in NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environment] and NATO infrastructure projects will be discussed in the same way.

(d) The Council in permanent session may, of course, make any arrangements it wishes for discussion of these questions. It may, for example, decide to set up smaller groups to deal with some or all of the questions. When the political problems have been discussed and sufficient agreement reached on them, the elaboration of the necessary military arrangements will be referred to discussions between the French High Command and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe].

(e) If the Council in permanent session can make no progress, discussion will be resumed at Ministerial level.

All of the matters of which I have just been talking were approved by the plenary Council, including France.

I do not wish to suggest that the political problems raised by the France-NATO crisis have been solved. It remains to be seen whether political discussion in the Permanent Council on France's relationship to NATO will be productive and what France means in saying that it wishes to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Another result of the meeting was the demonstration by the Fourteen that France was expected to stand aside when the North Atlantic Council considers matters involving those alliance activities in which France has ceased to participate.

Search for Better East-West Relations

The meeting was not confined to dealing with the France-NATO crisis.

NATO has, of course, been actively concerned over the years with an improvement in East-West relations and with creating an

atmosphere more conducive to ultimate resolution of the fundamental European issues left over from World War II. It was clearly the sense of the ministers at Brussels that, even if the immediate outlook for new concrete agreements or arrangements is not altogether encouraging, the West should make it evident beyond any question that it seriously desires improved relationships and continues to hope that unremitting efforts on our side may evoke eventually favorable responses from the East. If there is to be genuine progress toward the eventual settlement of the tragic division of East from West, and particularly, the tragic division of Germany, the 14 countries at Brussels recognized that they must stand together. I want to underscore this point. There was no disagreement among the Fourteen that the progress we seek in our relations with the East will come as a function of our unity.

In this connection I suggested to the Council that it instruct the permanent representatives to continue to examine closely the prospects for healthy developments in East-West relations and to consider further initiatives which might be usefully undertaken by members of the North Atlantic pact, in addition to the numerous activities that are already being carried on. This was agreed, and the permanent representatives will report on the matter to the ministers.

I hope that member governments will be forthcoming in consulting intimately and frequently on these matters. There will be further consultation about the nature of the threat from the East, its implications for the West, the nature of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and their implications for the West. We shall also need to identify those areas where further points of agreement may be developed and in so doing further the process of trying to build a peace. The permanent representatives will take this up as a matter of continuing business.

In addition, very important and constructive regular alliance business was done. I

would like particularly to mention the following:

The Council heard a report from the Special Committee studying nuclear matters. The Committee will continue its activities and is expected to make a final report to the December ministerial meeting.

The organization that deals with cooperative research, development, and production was revamped, and conditions now seem promising for important interallied cooperation in this respect.

Attention was paid to the need of Greece and Turkey for support in their efforts to contribute to the common defense. Additional countries indicated a readiness to help.

I called to the attention of the Council the importance of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and stressed the need as emphasized by our own congressional members to strengthen the Conference's executive secretariat. I consider this a most useful activity that contributes a great deal to public understanding of and participation in the alliance.

Finally, although time was limited, I told our allies of the latest developments in the Dominican Republic and in Viet-Nam.

The Outlook for NATO

To sum up: I want to reiterate that the Brussels meeting provided a most impressive demonstration of the great value all members of the North Atlantic alliance except France continue to attach to NATO. I am persuaded that the allies will do whatever is necessary to preserve this system which they consider essential to their security. They hope that France will cooperate in this endeavor, but if it will not, the rest of us are prepared and determined to carry on. They are eager to put to use the strength NATO provides in order to improve East-West relations. They do not expect a grand European settlement in the near future, but they hope that if the East is prepared to cooperate, it will be possible through trade, cultural contacts, and scientific and tech-

nological exchanges to create a more favorable East-West atmosphere so as to facilitate eventual settlement of the fundamental, hard problems that continue to divide Europe.

Thus, the outlook for NATO, though unclear as far as France is concerned, is in no way cause for pessimism.

North Atlantic Council Meets at Brussels

The North Atlantic Council held its regular ministerial meeting at Brussels June 7-8. Following are the texts of a statement made by Secretary Rusk upon his arrival at Brussels on June 4 and the communique issued at the close of the meeting on June 8, together with a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

I am glad to return to this beautiful capital city of a nation to which the people of the United States are tied by deep sentiments and common interests and ideals.

Five years ago I participated for the first time as U.S. representative to a NATO meeting, in Oslo in 1961. Since then I have attended all regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council held in various NATO capitals.

None, I believe, has been the subject of such intense preparation as this one—the 37th ministerial meeting of the Atlantic alliance.

The present meeting takes place at a time when members of the alliance must face decisions that will affect the well-being of the Atlantic community for years to come. One of our number has decided to withdraw from the integrated organization which has been built with so much care. The other 14 have responded with a clear declaration of intent to carry on, to maintain and strengthen our partnership for peace.¹

However, certain practical readjustments must be made.

All of us realize that some of these will be inconvenient. But this will not prevent us from taking the hard decisions. I am confident all of us are prepared to make the effort that will be required of us to safeguard the peace. Only by maintaining our cohesion and our ability to act collectively for the common good can we effectively develop opportunities to achieve lasting settlements that will guarantee the peace and security of the NATO and adjacent areas.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 140 dated June 9

1. The Council met in Ministerial Session in Brussels, the 7th and 8th of June, 1966.

2. The Council reviewed the state of the Alliance. After a frank exchange of views, the Ministers agreed that the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance is as necessary today as ever, in order to safeguard the freedom and the common heritage of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The first aim of the Atlantic Alliance is the common defense of all member countries; to this end its members are pledged, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

3. The Ministers agreed to examine, in the light of the principles and obligations of the Treaty, and in a cooperative manner, the problems raised by the French memoranda of last March,² in order to reach as soon as possible solutions acceptable to all concerned and which assure continued security. At this meeting the Council:

(a) Noted the statement made by Mr. [J.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

² For texts of exchanges of aide memoire between the United States and France, see *ibid.*, Apr. 18, 1966, p. 617, and May 2, 1966, p. 699.

A. H.] Luns at the discussions which had taken place on the 6th of June among the fourteen Ministers;

(b) Agreed to transfer the military headquarters of NATO from France;

(c) Extended a unanimous invitation to the Benelux countries to provide a new site for SHAPE;

(d) Agreed that some simplification of the command structure should be carried out. This will be achieved in the first instance in the centre by combining under a single Commander and in one headquarters the staffs now divided between the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Central Europe, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Land and Air Forces in Central Europe. This headquarters will be moved to a new location either in Benelux or Germany;

(e) Agreed that further studies will be necessary in order to establish the precise requirements and the possibilities of hospitality in the different countries, noted that the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic, the Secretary General and the NATO military authorities had been requested to undertake these studies forthwith; and further noted that as soon as the required information was available, final decisions would have to be taken as a matter of urgency;

(f) Extended a unanimous invitation to Italy to provide a new site for the NATO Defense College;

(g) Agreed that the Standing Group will be abolished and replaced by appropriate alternative arrangements, including an integrated international military staff;

(h) Noted the statement by Mr. Luns in connection with the site of the Council and also the statement of the French Foreign Minister on this subject.

4. With regard to the procedures for negotiation, the Ministers agreed that:

(a) The questions which need to be settled jointly between the Allies as a consequence of French communications will in the first instance be discussed in the Council in permanent session.

(b) Prominent among these questions are the tasks and missions of French forces in

Germany, including their cooperation with NATO forces and command arrangements.

(c) Other questions such as French participation in NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environment] and NATO infrastructure projects will be discussed in the same way.

(d) The Council in permanent session may, of course, make any arrangements it wishes for discussion of these questions. It may, for example, decide to set up smaller groups to deal with some or all of the questions. When the political problems have been discussed and sufficient agreement reached on them, the elaboration of the necessary military arrangements will be referred to discussions between the French High Command and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe].

(e) If the Council in permanent session can make no progress, discussion will be resumed at Ministerial level.

5. In reviewing the international situation the Ministers discussed the relations of their countries with the Soviet Union and the East European countries.

6. In view of the basic aims of the Soviet Union, the level of its armed forces, and its continuing allocation of a high proportion of economic and technological resources for military purposes, the Ministers concluded that it is imperative for the West to maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defense.

7. The Ministers had an extended discussion about the main problems affecting European security. They reaffirmed the terms of their Declaration of the 16th of December, 1958 with regard to Berlin.³ They regretted the absence of progress on the important question of German reunification and the continued attempts to discredit the Federal Republic of Germany. Taking note of the positive initiative taken by the German Government in their note of 25 March, 1966⁴ the Ministers reaffirmed that the solution of the German problem is one of the

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

⁴ Not printed here.

central issues in East-West relations, and they agreed on the necessity of a continued and unrelenting search for a peaceful solution that would give satisfaction to the German people's fundamental right to reunification.

8. The defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty is indisputable. It is clearly stated in the undertaking by the signatories to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter by refraining from the use of force to settle international disputes. Furthermore, the defensive character of the Alliance has been repeatedly proved by the restraint and moderation shown by its members in the last seventeen years, even when confronted by provocation and hostile actions affecting the Treaty area. Owing to the conditions of security created and maintained by an effective common defense of the North Atlantic area, political consultation among partners allows initiatives to be taken which can contribute not only to the stability of East-West relations but also to the general well-being of mankind.

9. If progress is to be made with regard to the complex problems of a European settlement, a determination to resolve the issues must exist on all sides. The peaceful ending of the division of Europe remains a principal purpose of the Alliance, the objective being a Europe that will once again be one, and a Germany that will once again be united.

10. Meanwhile, member countries are seeking further to improve relations between the peoples of Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and to diminish mutual suspicions and fears. They are convinced that further tangible results could now be obtained in the cultural, economic, scientific and technical fields.

11. The Ministers directed the permanent representatives to continue to examine closely the prospects of healthy developments in East-West relations, and to prepare a full report on these questions for meetings to be attended, as far as is practicable, by the Foreign Ministers of the various countries. This report, which should deal with all

possible initiatives in this field, would cover, *inter alia*, problems connected with European security and German reunification.

12. The Ministers expressed their continuous interest in progress towards general, complete and controlled disarmament. They expressed great concern over the problem of nuclear proliferation in its world-wide implications and their determination to continue their efforts to solve this problem. In particular the governments concerned in the 18-Power Geneva Conference reaffirmed their intention to do their utmost to achieve positive results.

13. With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, the Ministers took note of the Secretary General's report on the "watching brief" and confirmed their support for the continuation of his activities in this respect. They welcomed the announcement made by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey to the effect that "the Governments of Greece and Turkey, inspired by a sincere desire to facilitate a peaceful and agreed solution of the Cyprus problem and to improve their relations, have decided to proceed to contacts and exchanges of views on the Cyprus question and on Greek-Turkish relations. The procedure to be followed during these contacts will be decided in common." The Ministers reiterated their appreciation of the continued presence of the United Nations force in Cyprus and expressed their support of the efforts of the United Nations for safeguarding peace and improving the situation in the island.

14. The Ministers reaffirmed their desire to promote economic cooperation in the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. They acknowledged the need to join efforts in order to promote research in the scientific, technical and production fields, and achieve a wider cooperation and exchange of information so that in a world of rapid scientific progress the gap in technological achievement between Europe and North America can be narrowed.

15. All economically advanced countries, those of East and West alike, have a common responsibility to cooperate in attacking

the fundamental problems confronting the developing countries. Progress towards political settlements and disarmament will contribute to this end by releasing resources and energies which are so badly needed for the advancement of human welfare.

16. The Council, agreeing that efforts should be continued to supply Greece and Turkey with defense assistance within the framework of the Alliance, in order to help them maintain an effective contribution to the common defense, adopted a resolution recommending wider participation in this aid program.

17. The Ministers received a progress report on the activities of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers which was created by the Council in 1965.⁵ A further report will be submitted to the Council during the Ministerial session in December.

18. In view of the importance of science and technology to the military strength of the Alliance and the economic vitality of its members, the Ministers noted with satisfaction the recently agreed improvements in procedures for cooperation among members of the Alliance in research, development and production of military equipment. They encouraged member countries to bring suitable projects forward for cooperative action.

19. They noted that a meeting of Defense Ministers will be convened in July to review and carry forward the institution of force planning procedures for projecting and adjusting annually a five-year program.

20. A meeting of the Council at the Ministerial level will be held in December 1966.

U.S. DELEGATION

Press release 133 dated June 3

Representative

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (*chairman*)

U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Harlan Cleveland

⁵ For text of a final communique issued at the close of a meeting of the Special Committee on Nov. 27, 1965, see BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1965, p. 939.

Advisers

Richard W. Boehm (*deputy coordinator*), Officer-in-Charge, Political Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Brig. Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, U.S.A.F., Director, European Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Philip J. Farley, Deputy U. S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Paris

John I. Getz, Deputy Director, Office of Political Affairs, U. S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organization, Paris

Robbins P. Gilman, Officer-in-Charge, Defense Policy Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Representative, U. S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Ridgway B. Knight, American Ambassador to Belgium

J. Robert Schaetzel (*coordinator*), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Edward J. Streator, Jr., Staff Assistant to the Secretary of State

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large, Department of State

George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Secretary of Delegation

William G. Jones, Director, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

U.S. Support for Central American Common Market Reaffirmed

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated June 3

On this fifth anniversary of the Central American Common Market, we salute our Central American friends for what they have accomplished by placing the common good of the region above more narrow interests.

The facts speak for themselves: Trade between the five partner nations has more

than quadrupled since the Common Market came into being 5 years ago. In 1960 intra-regional trade amounted to \$32 million; in 1965 it amounted to \$130 million.

This is a triumph for idealism plus good business sense.

It is no coincidence that in 1965 the Central American region as a whole achieved an increase of 2½ percent in gross national product per capita, which is the yearly minimum target of the Alliance for Progress. This achievement stems from the same spirit of enlightened statesmanship and imaginative self-help which has made the Central American Common Market one of the brightest success stories in Latin American development.

We hail the Central American Common Market as a giant stride toward the eventual goal of Latin American regional economic integration. What it has accomplished in so short a time should serve as a stimulus for the achievement of the larger goal. We pledge our continuing support for this young, progressive Central American institution and for the Latin American regional movement, which are so fully in keeping with the Charter of Punta del Este.

President Hails Success of Free Elections in Dominican Republic

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Héctor García Godoy, Provisional President of the Dominican Republic.

White House press release dated June 2

JUNE 2, 1966

Few Presidents have had a more complicated task than the one you successfully accomplished yesterday.

You led the Dominican people from the turbulence of civil strife to the tranquility of free elections. There can be no greater tribute.

On behalf of the United States Government and people I express sincere admiration for your wisdom, courage and tenacity.

New Procedures To Admit Cuban Refugees From Third Countries

Following is a joint announcement issued by the Departments of State and Justice on May 31.

Press release 132 dated May 31

Under new procedures Cuban refugees in Spain, Mexico, and other countries who are the parents, spouses, or minor children of Cuban refugees in the United States will be granted admission to this country without the labor certificate required for a visa.¹

The Departments of State and Justice agreed upon the procedures in carrying out the President's pledge of October 3, 1965,² to the people of Cuba "that those who seek refuge here will find it."

The new procedures will use the Attorney General's authority under section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to parole into the United States people without visas. Up to now, the authority has been limited to refugees coming directly from Cuba to the United States.

A number of Cuban refugees have fled and are continuing to flee to third countries although members of their immediate families are in the United States in parole or indefinite voluntary departure status. Thereafter family reunion within the United States in some cases has been prevented by the requirement of section 212(a) (14) of the new law that they obtain a labor certification. The result has been that many of the parents, spouses, or minor children of Cubans who have been paroled into the United States for an indefinite stay have been separated from their closest relatives.

This situation will be remedied by an extension of the present "parole" procedures to permit the reunion of all such families, just as the Immigration and Nationality Act now makes special provision for the immediate families of citizens and resident aliens.

¹ For procedures established on Nov. 6, 1965, for the movement of Cuban refugees to the United States, see BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 850.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

"If the international community, including governments and private interests in the developing and developed countries, can cooperate . . . the United States is convinced that the patent system will continue to play a very important role in the future in the economic development of all nations," concludes Harvey J. Winter, Adviser in the Department's International Business Practices Division, in this article written especially for the Bulletin.

Our International Patent Policy and the World Patent Crisis

by Harvey J. Winter

In 1965 the United States celebrated the 175th anniversary of the enactment of its patent system.

When the law setting up the patent system was enacted in 1790, the economy of the United States was predominantly agrarian, and, naturally, for some decades to come attention was focused almost entirely on the domestic patent field. In the latter half of the 19th century, as foreign commerce increased, American firms and those of other industrialized countries recognized that it was necessary to obtain patent protection not only in their own country but also abroad in order to protect foreign markets.

The diversity of national patent laws and the discriminatory character of many of these laws at that time were painfully apparent to the patent owner seeking protection outside his own country, essentially because prior to the creation of the Paris Union in 1883, there was no sound basis for the international protection of industrial property rights.

Stephen Ladas in his monumental work on international protection of industrial property points out that, although there were no less than 69 bilateral arrangements negotiated during the second half of the 19th

century which had specific provisions in them on the protection of industrial property, these arrangements were generally unsatisfactory.¹ It became apparent that the answer to this problem was a multilateral convention which would establish some general principles for the protection of industrial property in each member state. After preliminary meetings in 1878 and 1880, the International Conference of 1883 negotiated the Convention of Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).² The convention came into effect in 1884, and the United States has been a party to it since 1887.

International Patent Arrangements

The Paris Convention applies to industrial property in its broadest sense, including patents, trademarks, trade names, industrial designs, utility models, indications of source, and appellations of origin. Member states of the convention guarantee to one another under various convention provisions "na-

¹ Stephen P. Ladas, *The International Protection of Industrial Property* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 54-69.

² *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* 4931.

tional treatment" and certain special rights. In addition to these basic provisions other clauses establish certain principles of uniform law to be followed by member states. Under the "national treatment" provisions, each member state guarantees to the nationals of each other member state the same treatment it gives its own nationals.

Undoubtedly the most important special right member states grant one another is the "right of priority." Thus, when a first application is filed in one of the convention states, the applicant may, within a specified period of time (12 months in the case of patents), apply for protection in any of the other member states; these later applications will then be treated as if they had been filed on the same date as the first application.

Finally, a few uniform principles, or common rules, of law are laid down in the convention which all member states must follow. For example, in the field of patents, patents granted in different member states for the same invention are independent of each other; that is, any action taken in one state with regard to a patent cannot be taken into account in another state on the corresponding patent.

There have been five revisions of the Paris Convention since 1883, the latest being the Lisbon revision in 1958. The United States has adhered to all five revisions.

As of March 1, 1966, the Paris Convention had 74 member states, including developing and developed countries in every area of the world. It is truly a worldwide convention. Among the states that have recently adhered to the convention, it is significant to note the adherence of the Soviet Union effective as of July 1, 1965.³ The United States views this adherence as an important action with respect to our trade and industrial property relations with the U.S.S.R.

The United States regards the Paris Convention as the keystone of the structure of our foreign industrial property relations. Not only is the convention significant from the

point of view of guaranteeing certain rights and establishing minimum standards of protection in the member states, but meetings of convention countries are becoming more important as a forum for discussing patent problems of mutual interest to member countries and even for nonmember developing nations. These meetings are sponsored by the United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, known as BIRPI, in its increasingly active and effective role as the secretariat for the Paris Convention.

An important diplomatic conference will be held at Stockholm in 1967 to deal with two specific aspects of that convention.

In the first place the Stockholm conference will consider the structural reorganization of BIRPI in connection with its administration of the Paris Convention, the Berne Copyright Convention, and other industrial and intellectual property arrangements. The United States supports in principle the proposal for a new administrative structure for BIRPI. This support is based on our belief that the modernization of BIRPI or its successor organization, tentatively called the International Intellectual Property Organization, will provide an administrative framework which will strengthen international cooperation and assist in the attainment of the principal objectives of the conventions under its administration.

Secondly, the conference will consider a possible limited revision of the Paris Convention with respect to inventors' certificates which exist alongside patents in the Soviet Union and some of the other Eastern European countries.⁴ A meeting of a Com-

³ In those countries which have inventors' certificates, patents are also issued and the conditions to be fulfilled for issuance are the same for both. However, the rights and obligations arising from an inventor's certificate differ markedly from those of a patent. As regards a patent, the patentee is allowed to exploit it or to license it for use by others. In the case of an inventor's certificate, the holder has no right to exploit the invention and no right to grant licenses to others; instead these rights belong to the state. If the state uses the invention, however, it must compensate the owner [author's note].

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 758.

mittee of Experts was held at Geneva in March 1965. This committee, which included the United States, agreed that the Stockholm conference should consider a possible amendment of article 4 of the Paris Convention in order that applications for inventors' certificates in a country granting such certificates shall be treated in the same manner as applications for patents for the purpose of the right of priority in another convention country. The matter is now being studied in connection with this Government's preparation for the Stockholm conference.

Another multilateral patent arrangement which should be noted is the Buenos Aires Convention on Inventions, Patents, Designs and Industrial Models of 1910,⁵ to which 13 Latin American countries and the United States are parties. This convention essentially adopted the principles of the Paris Convention on national treatment and the right of priority. Since the convention is the only basis for our relations in the patent field with 10 of 13 Latin American member states which are not also parties to the Paris Convention, the Buenos Aires Convention is an important and integral part of our international patent relations.

Today's Patent Crisis

Although the Paris and Buenos Aires Conventions are important as vehicles for limited harmonization in the patent field, these conventions were not designed nor intended to deal with many of our current patent problems. Effective action must be taken to deal with the so-called world patent crisis of today if the patent system itself is to continue to perform its basic function of stimulating technological innovation and economic growth.

There are a number of factors contributing to this crisis. In the first place, there has been an unprecedented expansion of international trade during the past two decades. Second, there has been at the same time a rapid acceleration of technological progress.

Third, the increasing number of newly independent nations want and need the technology that is essential to their economic growth.

The United States is convinced that this patent crisis cannot be resolved by national action alone. It can be dealt with far more effectively, and in the long run more economically, through international cooperative solutions. We are not alone in this conclusion. Many other nations are equally convinced that international cooperation is absolutely essential to finding a solution not only to the problems of today but to the even more difficult ones of the years to come. Without such cooperation, indeed, the nations of the world will face a weakening and possibly even a withering away of the patent system itself.

In recent years the very substantial increase in the total number of patent applications filed throughout the world can be attributed in large part to multiple filings of the same invention in a number of countries. Further patent applications filed on the same invention in countries which have an "examination system" (i.e., the invention is examined to determine whether it meets certain conditions for patentability) must be separately filed, prosecuted, and examined in each country. Roughly half of the estimated 650,000 applications filed in 1965 were duplicates or substantial duplicates of other applications filed elsewhere.

This duplication of effort required in prosecuting and examining applications for the same invention in more than one country is the first of two basic problems confronting developed countries in the international patent field.

The applicant who must undertake the task of obtaining protection on his invention throughout today's international marketing areas is faced not only with the burden of prosecuting the same application in several countries but also with the additional burden of prosecuting each application under different national patent laws and procedures. United States applicants

⁵ Treaties Series 595.

struggle with this problem on nearly 90,000 applications filed each year in foreign countries. And the same problem assumes equally major proportions for British, French, German, Swiss, and other foreign applicants who file widely outside their own country. The complex maze of divergent patent laws and procedures through which the applicant seeking foreign protection for his invention must find his way is, then, the second basic problem that developed countries must attempt to resolve.

International Cooperation a Solution

Steps have been taken in recent years both nationally and regionally to solve these problems. Several countries have already made or are presently considering changes in their patent laws. In addition, many countries, including the United States, have initiated changes in their procedures and practice aimed at increasing examining efficiency and have increased personnel in an effort to control backlogs.

But none of these steps alone will provide a long-term solution to the problems of the patent offices or to the problems of the applicants. Thus the member states of the Council of Europe and the Scandinavian countries have for some time recognized the need for seeking solutions to certain international patent problems among themselves and in cooperation with other developed countries, including the United States.

This Government also strongly favors international cooperation as the only practical and realistic means of dealing with such problems. Further, we wholeheartedly agree with the remarks made on October 20, 1965, by John R. Shipman, a well-known patent attorney from private industry, at the Department of State's "International Day" program in connection with the 175th anniversary of the U.S. patent system. He emphasized that the responsibility for seeking improvements in the patent system through international cooperation "does not rest solely with the Patent Office or the governments but must be shared by in-

ventors, attorneys, industry, and all who use or profit from the system."

Areas for Cooperation

The long-range goal of the United States in the international patent field is the development of an international system under which a single patent would be effective in many countries. Although this might be regarded as a utopian goal, note should be taken of the Nordic Patent System providing for mutual recognition of patents granted by the four national patent offices and the proposed European Patent Convention under which there would be a single patent for the six Common Market countries. The Nordic system is scheduled to come into effect this year and the European convention is under consideration.

As initial steps directed toward the solution of the fundamental patent problems of developed countries, the United States, primarily through the Patent Office of the Department of Commerce and in coordination with the Department of State, is developing programs along three lines:

- (1) cooperation between patent offices in the field of documentation;
- (2) the exchange of search results and other information concerning corresponding patent applications;
- (3) the harmonization of laws and procedures with other countries.

In the field of documentation the United States Patent Office actively participates in the International Committee on Information Retrieval Among Examining Patent Offices, known as ICIREPAT. ICIREPAT programs are directed toward the development and maintenance of mechanical search systems for shared use by the member countries. Most examining countries participate in ICIREPAT activities, and a number of systems have already been adopted for shared use.

Further, the Patent Office is well along with its study of the feasibility of the United States adopting the International Patent Classification established by the

European Convention on the International Classification of Patents for Inventions. The adoption of this classification would greatly facilitate international cooperation in the field of mechanized searching, and, perhaps more importantly, it would be a steppingstone in the path toward our long-range goal in the international patent field.

If progress is to be made toward the resolution of some of the immediate problems in the international patent field and also toward our long-range goal, then the requirement of effective documentation must be met. Some national patent offices today have comprehensive search files of issued patents and technical publications which are used in the determination of whether an invention is "new." However, since the cost of maintaining an up-to-date worldwide search file is substantial, it is likely that only a rather limited number of patent offices will be willing to pay the cost of maintaining such a file.

Fortunately, there is a central search office which expects to be able to handle the searching requirements of those patent offices which do not have a worldwide search file, namely the International Patent Institute at The Hague. This will enable patent offices with limited search files to participate in cooperative programs of exchanging patent information among various patent offices. Looking toward the future the Institute is actively studying how a thorough search of worldwide literature can best be carried out, taking into account all factors including that of languages.

Also in the field of documentation, the U.S. Patent Office is cooperating with BIRPI, the secretariat for the Paris Convention, in studying the feasibility and desirability of establishing a World Patent Index which would correlate corresponding patents and applications for patents on the same invention in different countries. The index would be of primary value to industry but might also be of assistance in the

proper maintenance of patent office search files.

In the area of exchanges of search results on patent applications between examining patent offices, the patent offices of the United States and Germany have recently completed an exchange of search results on a trial basis of 1,000 corresponding applications filed in each country. The results are currently being utilized and evaluated in both patent offices.

Presently, the United States is considering arrangements for similar exchanges with a limited number of interested countries. Should such exchanges prove successful these bilateral arrangements might be broadened to cover multilateral exchanges among a number of countries and thus further eliminate duplication of effort among examining patent offices.

These exploratory exchanges of search results are, of course, only the first step of several that could be taken toward the development of a truly international patent system. However, the important thing is that this first step is being taken. Further steps which could evolve into an international system were spelled out last year by the United States Commissioner of Patents, Edward J. Brenner, at ceremonies celebrating the 175th anniversary of the U.S. patent system. However, as the Commissioner noted, it would be possible to omit some of these steps and thus "leapfrog" into a type of international system such as the proposed Nordic Patent System.

The possibilities for progressing toward an international patent system with a central office, or regional offices for groups of countries, will, of course, be greatly enhanced if there is a substantial degree of harmonization of the laws and procedures of the developed countries.

We recognize that harmonization will be a difficult task since the patent laws in most countries are deep rooted. On the other hand, a number of countries today, including the United States, are taking a long and hard look

at their patent laws from this point of view not only in terms of their domestic interests but also with an eye on the laws and proposed laws of other countries. There is a practical and realistic basis for the interest of the United States in harmonization. We do not want to be isolated from the mainstream of international patent developments.

One instrument of international patent harmonization is already in existence, that is, the Council of Europe's Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions. Although no government has ratified this convention to date, it is a significant milestone on the road to harmonization. If and when the convention does come into force, the Council of Europe can thereafter invite any member state of the Paris Convention to accede to it. Further, a country may, of course, harmonize its patent law with that set forth in the Council of Europe Convention without acceding to it. Thus, the Nordic Patent System is in accord with this convention. The convention also might become one starting point for a broader effort to negotiate a completely new international patent agreement.

The U.S. Patent Office is presently making a number of important studies of our patent law and procedures in relation to harmonization with foreign laws and procedures, including a comparative analysis of our patent law and the Council of Europe Convention on this subject. Joint studies on harmonization are planned with foreign patent offices. Such studies also might very usefully be carried out on a multilateral basis through the secretariat for the Paris Convention.

Particular mention also should be made of the very important work and studies being undertaken by the President's Commission on the Patent System created by Executive Order 11215 of April 10, 1965. The preamble to the Executive order stresses, among other things, the necessity for the Government to take "a leading role in international cooperation for the protection of industrial property." The work of this Commission will be of great assistance to the Government not

only as regards our domestic goals but also our foreign policy objectives in the international patent field.

Patent Problems of Developing Countries

Although the developing countries are confronted to some degree with the same problems of the industrialized nations in the international patent field, the more immediate problems of developing countries are related to their interest in and need for technology. These countries know that technology is an important element in economic development and that much of it is protected by patents owned by firms in the industrialized nations.

Developing countries have been most concerned about the effect that patents may have on the transfer of technology from industrialized nations. In this connection a number of developing countries introduced a resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1961 asking the Secretary-General to undertake a study on this subject. In 1964 the Secretary-General issued a comprehensive and useful report⁶ on the subject which emphasizes that "the question of patents can be best seen in the broader context of facilitating the transfer of technology, patented and unpatented, to the developing countries, and enhancing the ability of the latter to adopt and use such foreign technology in the implementation of their development programmes."

In June 1964 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development approved a recommendation on the "transfer of technology" which, among other things, called on industrialized countries to encourage the holders of patented and nonpatented technology to facilitate the transfer of such technology to developing countries.⁷ As a matter of policy, this Government recognizes that the transfer of technology to de-

⁶ U.N. doc. E/3861/Rev.1.

⁷ For texts of the preamble and recommendations contained in the Final Act, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150.

veloping countries is essential to the economic growth of these countries.

Most American technology is privately owned, and in this connection it is important to note that, under our bilateral foreign assistance program, we encourage not only the transfer of patented and unpatented technology to developing countries but, in addition, goods and capital. This transfer is encouraged through United States guaranty insurance for investments in developing countries, Government grants for surveys of investment needs and opportunities, and Government grants and loans to these countries. Further, the Department of Commerce provides direct assistance to foreign businessmen seeking U.S. investment participation, technical assistance, and licensing arrangements. In addition, provisions in our various tax treaties with developing countries are designed to provide favorable treatment to payments for the use of patents and related technology.

The importance of patents and related technology to the economic growth of developing countries, which has been highlighted in the Secretary-General's report and other studies, undoubtedly has been a factor in stimulating a number of countries to undertake or consider a revision of their patent laws. As a matter of general policy, the United States has pointed out to these countries that revisions tending to restrict or reduce the value of patent rights could have an adverse effect on the ability of the country to attract foreign investment and facilitate the inflow of technology. Further, we have continued to emphasize the real importance of foreign investment as a direct cause and stimulus for technological development and economic growth.

At the same time, this Government recognizes that particular countries may undertake a revision of their patent laws in order to meet their specific needs. The United States has on occasion commended to developing countries for consideration the BIRPI publication *Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions*. The Model Law Committee, composed of representatives of 22

developing countries, adopted a recommendation which, among other things, expressed the view that the Model Law "respects the special needs of developing countries and represents a useful model for legislation in these countries."

We believe that private interests in the United States also have a role to play in this area. Many American firms doing business in developing countries are generally familiar with the needs and problems of these countries in relation to patents. If these firms can devise ways and means of alleviating such needs and problems, the pressures for restrictive patent legislation will be considerably lessened.

A Period of "Creative Ferment"

It is clear that the international patent field is in a period of "creative ferment"—to use the descriptive phrase of the National Association of Manufacturers "Conference on World Patent Systems" (June 11, 1965). What the effect of this "creative ferment" will be on the patent system is uncertain. As far as the United States is concerned, our policies in the international patent field reflect the belief that the patent system has been and will continue to be an important element in the economic growth not only of the United States but of the world at large. The universality of modern patent laws which are not limited by geography, politics, or economic systems suggest that many other nations share this view.

But there are extremely complex problems that must be faced up to in the years ahead. These problems which directly affect the aspirations of both developed and developing countries cannot be solved by governments alone. The advice and assistance of industry and the legal profession is essential. If the international community, including governments and private interests in the developing and developed countries, can cooperate in resolving these problems, the United States is convinced that the patent system will continue to play a very important role in the future in the economic development of all nations.

United States Policy on East-West Trade

by Eugene M. Braderman

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities*¹

It is a privilege for me to have this opportunity to discuss with you some aspects of East-West trade from the viewpoint of the Department of State. Because this is a rather complex and sensitive issue with foreign policy implications going beyond purely commercial considerations, the Department of State—and indeed the administration—welcomes public discussion of this subject. Our East-West trade policy will be successful largely to the degree that it is understood and supported by the American people.

East-West trade can be a misleading term. Let me, therefore, make it clear at the outset that I am speaking only of the possibility of expanding *peaceful* trade with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have no intention of modifying in the least our embargo on arms and other military items and equipment to any Communist country. We believe it would be useful to liberalize trade only in nonstrategic peaceful goods.

Furthermore, we do not include Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba in the proposed expansion of peaceful trade. So long as these Communist countries continue their aggressive policies the United States will continue its total embargo against them. With respect to Cuba, however, there is an exception to

permit some small transactions in food and medicines on humanitarian grounds.

What I would like to do this morning is, first, to review briefly with you where we are today and how and why we got there and, second, to indicate where we expect to go.

Our policy in regard to trade with countries having Communist governments has as one of its most important premises the fact that these countries differ very considerably among themselves, both in their internal systems and in their relations with one another and with the non-Communist world. In consequence, United States policy expresses itself in different ways toward different Communist countries according to the circumstances at a given time.

Historically, the United States has considered trade in peaceful goods a normal and desirable part of its relations with other countries. We also normally have not decided whether or not to trade with a country on the basis of whether we approved or disapproved of its forms of government or conduct. Thus, we traded with the Soviet Union even before we recognized it. In 1935, after recognition, we concluded a bilateral commercial agreement with the U.S.S.R. which continued in force with some modifications until it was terminated in 1951.

As part of our opposition to Communist aggression, in 1948 we found it desirable for the first time to apply instruments of economic denial in a time of cold war. The United States imposed controls on strategic

¹ Address made before the American Management Association at New York, N.Y., on June 8 (press release 136 dated June 7).

trade with the Soviet Union and the countries it then dominated in Eastern Europe. Other principal trading nations of the free world joined us in establishing a system of parallel strategic controls. These are commonly called the COCOM controls, COCOM standing for Consultative Group/Coordinating Committee. Japan and all the NATO countries except Iceland cooperate in these strategic controls on trade and financial transactions with Communist countries (the Soviet Union, the Soviet-oriented countries of Eastern Europe, and the Communist countries of the Far East).

At times these COCOM controls have been intensified, as during the Korean war, or they have been revised in the light of developments, such as the improvement in the international atmosphere following the death of Stalin. As Secretary Rusk has pointed out:²

From the beginning we have adjusted our policies toward trade with Communist countries to the prevailing realities of our political and military relations with those countries.

United States trade policy toward Communist countries is a key aspect of *total* United States policy toward international communism. It must be examined and judged in this context.

Secretary Rusk has described our overall policy toward international communism as having three objectives:³

To prevent the Communists from extending their domain; and to make it costly, dangerous, and futile for them to try to do so;

To achieve agreements or understandings which could reduce the dangers of a devastating war; and

To encourage trends within the Communist world making for an evolution toward greater national independence, peaceful cooperation, and open societies.

To advance these objectives we must be flexible in applying our trade policy as well as other elements of our total policy. In some instances the behavior of a Communist country will warrant our denying trade with

it completely, as now is the case for the Communist countries of the Far East and virtually so for Castro Cuba.

Developments in Eastern Europe

In other instances it best serves the United States interest to encourage trade with a Communist country. For example, this might be the case if we note signs of internal liberalization or improvement in relations with the United States or with other Western countries. The most notable example of such a policy is provided by Yugoslavia, which asserted its independence of the Soviet Union in 1948. At that time, the then otherwise still monolithic Soviet bloc broke off its trade with Yugoslavia in reprisal for this unprecedented rebellion against Soviet authority. The United States and other Western countries stepped in with both economic and military aid to help Yugoslavia maintain its independence of the bloc. Today about 65 percent of Yugoslavia's trade is with non-Communist countries.

Yugoslavia also is in the early stage of an economic reform program designed to effect basic economic changes which the United States Government considers significant and worthy of support. Yugoslavia is a member of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund and has cooperated closely with the IMF in developing Yugoslav economic policies. Yugoslavia participates actively in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It has been a provisional member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1962. Now it is negotiating full contracting party status in the GATT.

All these developments are consistent with Yugoslavia's policy of remaining independent of the control of any other country. The Yugoslav example of internal liberalization, independence in domestic and foreign affairs, and its relatively more prosperous society compared with most other East European countries have encouraged the movement toward greater independence and internal change which is evident in those countries today.

² For Secretary Rusk's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 13, 1964, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 474.

³ *Ibid.*

Poland, since the death of Stalin, has shown more independence in its internal affairs and external relations, although events there have followed a very different course from those in Yugoslavia. Not all the developments in Poland have been to our liking, nor has there been a steady and uninterrupted trend in the direction of what we would regard as improvement. Nevertheless, Polish agriculture has not been forced down the road of collectivization; Polish intellectual life has been vigorous and in some ways unorthodox; the influence of religious institutions and beliefs remains strong; and travel to the West is comparatively free. Poland is relatively open to influences from the West; the United States carries on an extensive information program there, and Americans can maintain wide contacts with the people of Poland. The jamming of the Voice of America and other free world broadcasts has been discontinued.

Poland has, during these years, built up a wide range of commercial as well as cultural relations with the West. The United States responded to the changes in Polish policies with sales of agricultural products through P.L. 480 programs and credits through the Export-Import Bank. We have adopted a more liberal policy in licensing exports to Poland. In connection with a claims settlement we restored most-favored-nation treatment to imports from Poland. As a result, trade in both directions has grown and Poland is paying its debts to the United States Government.

Romania, which has the fastest industrial growth rate among the East European Communist countries, for the past few years has demonstrated a desire to expand its relations with the West. It also successfully rejected proposals of the Communist Council for Economic Mutual Assistance which would have restricted its industrial expansion and would have subordinated its economic interests to the needs of other Communist countries.

In 1964 the United States and Romania concluded negotiations in Washington to increase trade and improve relations between the two countries.⁴ Consequently, we are

now following a more liberal export policy toward Romania also. Romania, in turn, has given assurances that it will not permit the reexport of United States goods or technology and will protect industrial property rights and processes. As a result of these developments, Romania has expanded its commercial relations not only with the United States but also with other free world countries.

In Czechoslovakia and Hungary there also have been growing trends toward expanded relations with the West and some internal liberalization.

In Bulgaria there have been some faint stirrings of change. In Albania they seem nonexistent.

In the Soviet Union, too, some economic reforms have been put into effect within the past year. The emphasis on profit as a prime indicator of economic performance, which had been tested in 1964 in certain factories in Kiev, Lvov, Gorky, and Moscow, has attracted particular attention in the West. Under this system, of course, profits will accrue to the state, not to private individuals, for redistribution as new investments and incentive rewards. While I would not wish to suggest that the Soviet Union is advancing toward capitalism, it is important to note that even there the winds of change are blowing. One of the most interesting developments in the Soviet Union recently has been their decision to embark on a program for increasing automobile production with all that implies in terms of related facilities and sources.

Expansion of East-West Trade

These varying programs and experiments with economic reform have been accompanied by efforts by these European Communist countries to expand their trade with non-Communist countries. In 1964, the latest year for which complete statistics are available, trade between the free world and the European Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, was about \$5.5 billion each

⁴ For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 924.

way. But the United States share in this trade was small. United States exports to these Communist countries represented only 1.3 percent of our total exports in 1964. Our total imports from these countries was only one-half of 1 percent of our total imports.

The greater growth of Western European trade with the Eastern European Communist countries stems from geography, centuries-old traditional trading patterns, and a greater interest on the part of Western European importers than on the part of American importers. The Communist countries also have been able to sell Western Europe and Japan more than enough to finance their purchases from them.

Up until this year the reverse was true in the case of the United States. Our sales to these Communist countries regularly have greatly exceeded our purchases from them. Our exports to them in 1964, bolstered by our sale of about \$259 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities, climbed to \$340 million. Our imports from these Communist countries were \$99 million that year. In 1963 our exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist countries totaled about \$167 million and our imports from them about \$81 million. Last year, however, United States exports to these countries totaled somewhat more than \$139 million while our imports from them rose to more than \$137 million.

It is quite clear that the European Communist countries would like to buy agricultural and some consumer products, machinery, equipment, complete plants, and advanced technology from the United States. With relaxation of our restrictions on trade in peaceful goods, some deals certainly would be concluded by American businessmen rather than by competitors in friendly countries. But we would not expect U.S. exporters to do a land office business. Over the long run the volume of our sales would probably be limited by the Communist countries' ability to sell to us. And our American market requires products and marketing methods that are more sophisti-

cated and varied than most of those they now offer in trade.

Proposed Legislation

As you may know, President Johnson last year asked a distinguished group of business, labor, and academic leaders to explore all aspects of expanding peaceful trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries. In its report to the President,⁵ this committee—often called the Miller committee after its chairman, J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the board of the Cummins Engine Company—concluded that political, not commercial or economic, considerations should determine the formulation and execution of our trade policies. It expressed the belief that “peaceful trade in non-strategic items can be an important instrument of national policy in our country’s relations with individual Communist countries of Europe.”

More particularly, the committee recommended the coordinated use of all the potential American assets—export licensing, most-favored-nation tariff authority, and guarantees of commercial credit—in “periodic Government-to-Government trade negotiations with individual Communist countries” as a means of getting the most advantageous results possible from such negotiations. The committee identified tariffs as the principal potential bargaining area where the President is denied any possibility of negotiating flexibility under present law and where new legislation would be required. In the other areas—export licensing and credit guarantees—there is already sufficient discretion provided to the President.

Early last month, President Johnson instructed Secretary of State Rusk to transmit to the Congress the administration’s proposed legislation to permit an expansion of peaceful trade between the United States and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Secretary did so

⁵ For text, see *ibid*, May 30, 1966, p. 845.

on May 11,⁶ and the East-West Trade Relations Act has been introduced into both houses.

The proposed act would give the President authority to use trade policy toward countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as a flexible tool in the conduct of relations with these countries. It would be a companion to existing provisions of law which use the negative power of trade denial: the Export Control Act, the Battle Act, and restrictive provisions of other laws. The proposed legislation would equip the President to use the positive aspects of trade to serve our national objectives.

The major substantive provision would be authority to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to certain individual Communist countries when this is determined to be in the national interest. The authority could be exercised only in a commercial agreement with a particular country in which such MFN treatment would be granted in return for equivalent benefits to the United States. MFN treatment for the products of any country would stay in effect only so long as the commercial agreement with that country would be in effect.

Such an agreement would set the framework for trade. Trade itself would depend on the decisions of individual firms. Such agreements would not provide for balancing trade levels and for bilateral clearing of financial accounts. In the broad sense the primary purpose of a bilateral agreement incorporating the nondiscriminatory tariff provision would be to afford the United States an opportunity to advance United States interests with respect to individual Communist countries through the medium of periodic trade negotiations.

Clearly of interest to the United States would be such matters as provision for protection of industrial property, provision for settlement of commercial disputes, the promotion of trade and tourism, improvement of consular relations, settlement of outstand-

ing claims, and other matters generally in the field of trade and commerce.

The act would provide that before the President would enter into any agreement under the act, he should seek information with respect to it from all of the United States Government agencies concerned, interested private persons, and other appropriate sources. Since the act would not authorize negotiation on individual tariffs and would not authorize reductions in tariffs below the prevailing most-favored-nation rates, there is no special provision for pre-negotiation procedures. However, the procedures for adjustment assistance and escape-clause relief set forth in the Trade Expansion Act would be applicable in the case of articles imported in increased quantities as a result of most-favored-nation tariff treatment extended to a country in accordance with an agreement pursuant to the act. Antidumping laws and all other laws for the protection of United States industry, agriculture, and labor would remain in full effect. In addition, problems of interest to American businessmen could be dealt with under the consultation procedures or in the periodic negotiations to be provided for in agreements under the act.

Any initial agreement would be limited to 3 years and could be renewed for periods not to exceed 3 years each. Any agreement could be suspended or terminated at any time on reasonable notice. MFN would apply only while an agreement was in effect. The President would be directed to suspend or terminate MFN whenever he determined that the other party was no longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement or that the suspension or termination was in the national interest.

In anticipation of an understandable question, let me say that there is no contradiction between our military action to help the South Vietnamese repel the aggression against their country and our willingness to consider the mutual advantages of increased trade with Eastern Europe. We are no longer facing a monolithic Communist bloc

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 838.

systematically and zealously pursuing an agreed-upon and supposedly unchanging blueprint for world conquest. Rather, we have witnessed in the past few years growing disagreements among Communist nations, not only the split between the Soviet Union and Communist China but a growing pragmatism and awareness of national self-interest in Eastern Europe.

A willingness on our part to trade with these Eastern European countries under proper conditions can play a small but important role in influencing the continuing policy debates that take place in their governments and academic communities. The possibility of more trade with the United States is not in itself likely to change perceptibly the policies of the Soviet Union with its huge economy. It can, however, be of more than marginal importance for some of the Eastern European countries. With their limited resources, their evolution toward independence can be encouraged by expanding trade with the West.

As I have indicated, we should not exaggerate the possibilities of trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there will be economic advantage to us in more trade with this part of the world. Certain of our industries and our agriculture undoubtedly will be able to make significant sales.

Our "Balanced Strategy for Peace"

At least equally important, however, is the basic economic and political message we wish to transmit. There is now a great debate going on in the Communist world as to how best to conduct their relations with the free world. There are those, such as Communist China, who advocate predominantly aggressive tactics involving military force and subversion, and there are those who are less militant and favor peaceful ideological and economic competition. We are giving our answer to aggression in Viet-Nam, where we intend to make it clear that force will not be allowed to succeed. We would, of course, prefer peaceful economic or ideological competition.

It may seem inconsistent to talk of increasing trade with the Russians when it is apparent that they as well as the Chinese are sending weapons to North Viet-Nam. But I think it is not as inconsistent as it may seem, because our basic purpose is to convince the Russians both that aggression cannot succeed and that they have most to gain by living in peace with us. It is in our interest, at the same time we are stopping Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, to demonstrate that we are in fact willing to engage in peaceful trade and that the Soviets' true interests lie in that direction. As Secretary Rusk pointed out in transmitting the East-West trade relations bill to the Congress, this demonstration is an important element in our "balanced strategy for peace."

With respect to the Soviet Union, we do not believe expanded peaceful trade would increase its military capability. The United States Government will continue to use its export licensing authority to prevent the sale of goods and technology which would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States. The sale of peaceful goods and technology would depend upon decisions by American businessmen as to whether they would find such sales profitable and upon the Soviet Union's interest in obtaining them and its ability to pay for them in real resources of value to us.

Finally, I would like to say a few words on an aspect of existing as well as future East-West trade which I believe is of proper concern to all Americans. It is the problem of threats and campaigns of economic intimidation that have been directed against some who engage in lawful, peaceful business with Communist countries.

An example of this problem was provided last fall when certain organized pressure groups sought, by economic intimidation, to compel American cigarette companies to discontinue the purchase of Yugoslav tobacco. Your Government attached such importance to the principles involved in this case that the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce sent a joint letter to the six major American tobacco companies clearly stating

the Government's views.⁷ Without repeating all the points made in this letter, I would like to quote a portion. It stated:

... your Government regards commerce in peaceful goods with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, as completely compatible with our national interest. No American business enterprise should be penalized for purchasing or selling such goods. In fact, any individuals or groups that seek to intimidate, boycott, blacklist, use or threaten economic reprisals against such American enterprises for carrying on lawful trade with Eastern European countries act harmfully and irresponsibly. To yield to such groups is to encourage capricious interference with the vital processes of our Constitutional Government—interference that would at the end of the road make it impossible for our country to conduct a coherent foreign policy.

In conclusion, let me cite a statement by Secretary Rusk⁸ which makes very clear the importance we attach to the proposed legislation.

"To fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy in this complex era," the Secretary stated, "the President must have available to him every appropriate bargaining tool. Nowhere is this need more critical than in our relations with the Communist countries. Granting this flexible authority to the President would not be a concession to the Communist world. Rather, it would give him a valuable instrument of foreign policy to be used where and when it will advance the interests of the United States."

East-West Trade—A Realistic Appraisal

by George C. McGhee

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*¹

East-West trade is a subject which, in the past months, has come more and more to occupy the thoughts of the leaders of both of our nations. It is one which we hope can make an important contribution to a lessening of world tension. It seems to me especially appropriate to speak on this subject in this city.

Hamburg became a pioneer in East-West trade when, in 1229 as a leading member of the Hanseatic League, it concluded a treaty with Novgorod and established trading rights with that city. For many centuries thereafter Hamburg played a prominent role

in promoting trade with its partners, from London and Antwerp in the West, to Cracow and Vitebsk in the East. Today, Hamburg's commercial ties reach from one corner of the globe to the other. Hamburg grew and prospered—and contributed to the growth and prosperity of Germany—because it believed that the promotion of world trade would provide benefits for all mankind and lead to greater understanding among peoples, notwithstanding differences in their political and economic outlook.

More recently, Hamburg has in the post-war years moved vigorously and successfully in the renewed pursuit of these same goals. Despite the tragic division of Europe, which separates Hamburg from much of its natural hinterland, Hamburg now handles, I am

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1965, p. 700.

⁸ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

¹ Address made before the Uebersee-Club at Hamburg, Germany, on March 31.

told, more Czechoslovakian goods, for example, than it did in the years before the war. I noted with great interest that in 1965 Hamburg was represented at the fairs in Posen and Budapest, the German Industrial Fair in Bucharest, and the Chemical Fair in Moscow. The establishment last spring of a Standing Committee on Trade with the East by the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce seems to me to be a further indication of this great city's interest in expanding its ties with that area.

But, most of all, it seems appropriate to speak on this subject to you, the business leaders of Hamburg. You, perhaps better than anyone else, are in a position to understand not only the advantages but also the problems and tasks that face us in furthering trade with the Eastern European countries. We Americans often find conflicting reactions to our trade policy. One day we hear the accusation that we are too negative in our approach to the question of trade with the Communist countries. On the same day we might also hear the contrary accusation: that we are planning to displace the Western European countries, and especially Germany, from their traditional position in the commerce between Eastern European countries and the Western World.

On closer examination, I hope you will find that our points of view on the question of trading with the Eastern European countries have more similarities than differences. In any event, I shall state the American point of view and let you make the comparisons.

Let me at the outset make certain distinctions in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding. There are certain areas and countries toward which United States trade policy is totally negative: These are the Communist-governed mainland of China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Cuba, with which virtually all trade, shipping, and financial transactions are prohibited. We have maintained a total embargo since 1950 against all transactions with Communist China and North Korea, and since 1954

we have embargoed exports to North Viet-Nam. Similarly, the United States embargoed all imports from Cuba and nearly all exports to Cuba. This is to reduce the ability of the Castro regime to export violence and subversion to other Latin American countries and to threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere.

One additional distinction must be made to avoid misunderstanding. When I speak of improving trade relations with the Eastern European countries, I am not speaking of the Soviet Zone. We do not encourage and do not intend to encourage trade with the zone, even of nonstrategic goods. We do not provide any credit guarantees for exports to the zone and have no intention to do so. We have not permitted the regime in Eastern Germany to establish a trade office in the United States, and we do not intend to do so. The United States maintains strict controls on trade with the zone. They are much stricter than those maintained by any other country and more restrictive than our controls on exports to the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. We understand that trade with the Eastern part of Germany has a very special significance for the Federal Republic, and we consider it appropriate to consult fully with the Federal Republic with respect to our commercial dealings in the zone.

We have not, however, sought to prohibit all private trade with the zone. U.S. exports to the zone over the past 5 years have averaged \$8.7 million per year. These sales are largely agricultural products; nonagricultural exports have averaged only \$1½ million. Our average imports from the zone were even less than our average exports, about \$4.4 million per year. Except for the last 2 years, when there have been larger than normal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to the zone, our sales there have been less than 2 percent of the total sales of NATO countries to the area. We seek no increase above this level.

What concerns us here today, therefore, is the policy of the United States with

respect to trade with the Soviet Union and with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

It is interesting to take a close look at what trade with these countries actually means to us today and to attempt to analyze what it could mean under different circumstances. Last year little more than one-half of 1 percent of total United States imports came from these countries; the value was about \$130 million. We found markets in those countries for less than one-half of 1 percent of our total exports; the actual value was \$126 million. In 1937, nearly 30 years ago, when our total trade volume was only a fraction of what it is today, the actual values for United States imports and exports to Eastern Europe were about 3 percent of our total trade.

By comparison, these areas accounted for approximately 12 percent of the trade of Germany in 1937; today they account for about 3½ percent of the trade of the territorially smaller Federal Republic. I do not want to burden you with statistics, but it is well to keep these figures in mind when we speak about increasing the flow of trade. They may serve as guideposts when we ask ourselves what possibilities exist for improving our trade relations.

Encouraging Peaceful Trade

The impression seems to exist that when President Johnson, in May of 1964, first spoke of building bridges to Eastern Europe,² or when in his recent state of the Union address³ he spoke of improving trade relations with Eastern Europe, he was announcing a reversal of U.S. policy. This was not the case. What he did was to give new emphasis to a basic policy of the United States: that trade is a normal element of relations between countries. We carried on

trade with the Soviet Union long before we were prepared to give formal diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government. In the boom years of 1926–30 it reached an average annual export volume of \$78 million compared with \$44 million last year. In 1937 our trade with the U.S.S.R. was almost exactly one-third as large as our trade with Germany. Last year it was one-thirtieth of our trade with the Federal Republic.

We would have been glad to resume a normal trade relationship with the U.S.S.R. after World War II. It was Soviet Russia that chose to separate itself in 1947 from the Western countries. It set up subservient regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria while the Red Army was still encamped in these countries. It forced these satellite regimes to reject, against their own judgment, the Marshall Plan—which had been offered to them on the same terms as it was offered to Western European countries. It organized the economies of these countries to serve the needs and interests of the Soviet Union.

The aggressive expansion of Soviet Russian control in Eastern Europe, the establishment in the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany of the most obedient vassal regime of them all, the attempt to take over the free sectors of Berlin by military bluff and blockade, the progressive increase in Soviet military power at a time when the Western Allies had dismantled their World War armies in the hope that peace would follow those years of war, and finally the aggression against South Korea in 1950—all these events led to measures to control Western trade with the so-called Soviet bloc. Such measures were not taken by the United States alone but also by her allies in NATO and by Japan and other free-world countries.

Comprehensive controls were established by the 15 countries which joined together in an informal consultative group. Their purpose was, and is, to assure that strategic commodities—goods which increase the military potential—do not reach the Soviet

² For remarks made by President Johnson at the dedication of the George C. Marshall Research Library at Charlottesville, Va., on May 23, 1964, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1964, p. 922.

³ For excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

Union or the other areas under its domination. The definition of what is strategic has varied from time to time. The definition followed by the United States has generally been more inclusive than that agreed to by the Allies. United States controls have tended to be stricter and to affect a longer list of commodities. The lists of embargoed or controlled commodities have been submitted to periodic reviews and revision. One such review of the international lists began in Paris in November of last year and is not yet concluded. The basic principle, however, remains: to deny to the Communist countries those military and strategic goods which would endanger the security of the West and the peace of the world.

When we speak of encouraging and expanding trade with the Communist areas we are, therefore, not speaking of trade in these strategic commodities. We are speaking only of enlarging the possibilities for the exchange of goods which are designed to improve the living conditions of the people of the Eastern European countries, which will make available to them a more abundant supply of commodities of good quality at a reasonable price. We have not in the past tried to deny such goods to these Communist areas. What is new—call it a new policy, if you wish—is the decision to give active encouragement to such trade, to take steps to remove some of the obstacles which hinder trade in both directions.

Hopeful Trends in Eastern Europe

There has been some comment that we intend to establish closer commercial connections with the southeastern European countries in order to disrupt their affiliations with one another or with the Soviet Union. This is not the case. It is, however, a fact that the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, have conducted most of their trade with one another. The position which the Western countries, specifically the NATO countries, have occupied in the total trade pattern of the East Euro-

pean countries has been relatively minor. But it appears likely that this pattern will change, as the countries of Eastern Europe increasingly find that Moscow- or "Soviet bloc"-oriented trade policies do not adequately supply their needs or provide markets for their productive capacities.

The progressive tendency on the part of Eastern European countries to expand and diversify their economic and commercial relations has, therefore, resulted from a recognition of their needs and their self-interest. It has not been the result of a Western effort to divide them through trade or political influence. Interestingly, this tendency has been accompanied by subtle changes in the political and economic structure and a loosening of centralized control, which have tempted us to think in terms of a tendency toward a cracking apart of the once monolithic Soviet bloc.

In looking at Eastern Europe it is apparent that the slow but steady trend toward diversity and autonomy, or what Raymond Aron has called national affirmation, has gone on. Only Albania, the hermit of Europe, and the Soviet Zone of Germany, whose imprisoned residents have no chance to manage their own affairs, have been unable to pursue increasingly independent policies based on their own immediate interests. The men in power in the other states, notwithstanding their allegiance to Marxism, have displayed a noticeable propensity to act as representatives of their own nations. Each has championed his country's unique culture and striven to fulfill its own special requirements. I believe each has sought to gain a greater degree of freedom of action. We shall watch with interest where this trend will lead.

One hopeful result of this "national affirmation" may be that Eastern European states, and their leaders, can again make a constructive contribution to the international political scene. Efforts such as this are desirable—indeed essential—if a safer and more hopeful situation is to be created

in Europe and in the world.

Can we in the West play a constructive role in advancing these hopeful trends in Eastern Europe? The answer is certainly "Yes"—but this "Yes" is dependent upon our ability to understand the nature of the individual differences which exist in Eastern Europe. It depends also on our capacity to devise programs flexible enough to be responsive to this diversity. One kind of diversity arises from the different stages of economic development through which each of these countries is passing. Romania, for example, is at the stage of industrialization where it has been possible to continue with relatively simple central planning methods. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, is beginning to face the same difficulties encountered in the most complex developed industrial economies. None of these economies can easily dispense with price and market mechanisms, which the doctrinaire Marxists reject as capitalistic. They are now evidently seeking in one degree or another to adapt their systems to this simple fact.

A second kind of economic diversity relates to land. Poland has not followed its Communist neighbors by collectivizing agriculture. There are other differences in the manner in which agriculture is managed among those East European countries that have collectivized. It would be a mistake for us to assume that their policies are identical or immune to further changes based on the requirements of the individual economic systems.

Political Diversity

The third, and most interesting, category of diversity is in the political and intellectual field. Although political life in each state has remained concentrated in a single party, each of these parties has become increasingly responsive to purely national aspirations. More importantly there has been—in some countries more than others—a relaxation of the restrictions on writing, speaking, and traveling. Whatever form this

diversity takes and whatever results it achieves, its very existence and the stirring which underlies it are proof that the national identity of these states was not destroyed by nearly two decades of Soviet dominance.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are patently not convinced that all of the social and economic institutions built up in the Soviet Union since 1917 are worth emulating. It is clear that the regimes owe whatever popularity they enjoy not to the Marxist orthodoxy they still preach but to the extent they have been able to identify themselves with national goals and the national welfare. In terms of commerce this means that every government of Eastern Europe, at least to some degree, now decides for itself what its trade and cultural relations with the West will be. Moreover, it makes these decisions in accordance with its own requirements and circumstances.

There are, of course, some built-in restraints. There is, in the first place, the ideological discipline created by a leadership which believes in Marxism. There is also the fact that the economies of Eastern Europe have traditionally been linked to one another—and to the U.S.S.R. Moreover, they share a similarity in trading practices resulting from their membership in the Communist trade and currency system. The Communist states of Eastern Europe would find it very difficult to leave this system. In a word, the margin of autonomy which each of the East European states possesses is real, but it is narrow.

In the light of these complexities and subtle balances I believe that we in the West must be particularly careful to avoid two pitfalls. First, our policies must not be aimed at exacerbating relations between individual East European states and the Soviet Union. We seek, as Vice President Humphrey told the NATO Parliamentarians in New York last October,⁴ to overcome the

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 650.

divisions of Europe—not to create new ones. Secondly, I believe that we should not overrate the possibilities of utilizing economic means to gain immediate political ends. We are, however, confident that a willingness to make certain adjustments to permit a greater flow of trade will help to build a foundation for better relations between us and the Eastern European countries.

Some Special Problems for the U.S.

Let me now point frankly to some of the special problems which must be resolved, if we are to hope to bring about a greater commercial exchange between the United States and Eastern Europe. These problems are in several respects different and more difficult than the problems which you face in your business dealings with the East here in Germany. We are under no illusions that our export possibilities can be significantly expanded without great effort on our side.

As you know—and as we are constantly reminded in our own official export promotion activities—American manufacturers are far less export-minded than German industry. Our principal market is the domestic market. Some manufacturers, of course, depend quite heavily on foreign markets, but few, if any, concentrate on Eastern Europe. In most cases the line of least resistance leads the exporter first to the American market and Canada, then to Western Europe, and perhaps last to the Communist countries. If we are to increase our exports to these countries, the United States Government must play a role—perhaps the dual role of scout and publicist.

In September of last year a group of American businessmen traveled to Romania and Poland under the auspices of the United States Department of Commerce. They went there to make a firsthand study of trade prospects. They found opportunities, but they also reported that considerable pioneering efforts must be made by American exporters to develop these opportunities. More trade missions to Eastern Europe will be

required to increase our knowledge of the techniques of doing business there. In this respect you German businessmen, who have a long tradition of trading with Eastern Europe, and other European businessmen have an advantage which it will not be easy for us to overcome.

It is, of course, true that certain American products are much in demand in the Communist countries. These tend to be the more sophisticated products of modern technology, which we are not yet prepared to share with those countries and which are still affected by our unilateral export controls.

The most important hurdle is the lack of foreign exchange available to the Communist countries. Their purchases from the United States already exceed their sales to us by a considerable although varying amount. Their purchases of grain in 1964, for example, resulted in a trade deficit with the United States of about \$240 million. For the same reason, their deficit with Canada was over \$400 million. It appears that this was not an exceptional occurrence but may be repeated from time to time. The current year will be another year of heavy grain imports by Eastern Europe, although a smaller amount may be purchased from the United States. A substantial increase in our imports from Eastern Europe would be necessary to balance trade accounts.

Greater U.S. imports of East European goods, on the other hand, face three major obstacles: a relatively inflexible demand for the bulk commodities and raw materials which these countries have traditionally offered, quality deficiencies in the manufactured goods which they hope to sell in larger amounts, and a differential tariff rate. We do not have quota limits for the products of Eastern Europe. However, with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia, we apply to them the full customs duty rates of the 1930 Tariff Act, without the benefit of the reductions which we have made in all the tariff negotiations which have been held since

1934. In other words, they do not have the benefit of most-favored-nation treatment. For manufactured goods, particularly, this can be an unsurmountable handicap.

The President has indicated his intention to seek legislation which would authorize him to undertake negotiations, on a selective basis, with the countries of Eastern Europe.⁵ In such negotiations we would expect to exchange concessions in the field of import tariff rates for equivalent commitments by the other side. Legislation of this kind has been proposed by several important and representative groups of American businessmen, including the National Foreign Trade Council and the Committee for Economic Development. The President's Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European countries and the Soviet Union, which made its report⁶ to the President in April of last year, similarly recommended such legislation. Each of these groups has also supported the retention of export controls over strategic commodities and continued restraint in granting commercial credits to the Communist countries.

In your country and in mine the businessman has often been the pioneer, the man who has led the way for the politicians in the capitals. Such men exist in Germany (many are in this room), in the United States, and throughout the free world. Their initiative is needed—indeed indispensable—if we are to make progress in the difficult area of trade with Eastern Europe. But it is somewhat romantic, and perhaps dangerous, to believe that the businessman working alone can take great strides in dealing with the Communist functionaries of Eastern Europe. The businessman needs the support provided by a sound national policy. Without such a policy, there can only be false starts and disappointments.

What I am suggesting is that the businessman and his government work together to

insure that commercial activities coincide with the national interest. You, as exporters and foreign traders, have many connections in foreign countries and have frequently traveled to those countries, including the countries of Eastern Europe. You have no doubt frequently had the experience of developing a genuine respect and liking—on a personal basis—for a foreign business associate and of thinking better of his country because you think well of him. If such business friendships can be multiplied, it is my hope that existing tensions may be eased and ill will reduced.

Embargo on U.S. Trade With Communist China

Before I close this speech, I believe I owe this group a fuller explanation of the reasons and purposes for the total embargo on American trade with the Communist countries of the Far East, which I have only mentioned in passing. The U.S. press and congressional reaction to the recent decision of the Federal Republic to give a credit guarantee for a very large and important business deal with Red China also makes this appropriate.

You already know from the press that the United States is not enthusiastic about the reported contract to build a DM600 million steel mill in China, of which German firms will have a share of about DM300 million.

Part of the argument for freer trade with the Communist world is that a willingness to trade is evidence of a desire to promote constructive and harmonious relations. But there needs to be some evidence that the other side also has such a desire. So far, the Chinese Communists have given no such evidence. The Peking regime has exported subversion to Viet-Nam, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and as far as Africa. The regime blatantly expresses its readiness to engage in military aggression—and has proven it in Korea and on the northern border of India. At the time of the recent unfortunate clash between India and Pakistan, Peking was fanning the fires of war there. These

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 845.

actions by Peking have justified in our minds the continuation of our total embargo, not only on trade but on all transactions.

We recognize that other countries see the question differently. We know from experience that it is difficult to deny opportunities to your own industry when neighboring countries are not prepared to do likewise. We appreciate that a multilateral trade embargo depends for its effectiveness on co-operation among the suppliers. The COCOM rules and Berne Union guidelines serve that purpose. It is true that when the German Government first approached us regarding the steel mill project, we reluctantly did not object since there was no formal violation of COCOM or Berne Union rules involved. However, in light of the current U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam and in light of our assessment of Peking's continued aggressiveness, we could not help but be disappointed at a decision to promote the sale to Communist China of a large steel rolling mill. It should not have surprised anyone that there has been a public reaction in the United States. We have our sensitive points just as you have yours.

I would recommend for further reflection by all of our friends and allies these comments made by Secretary of State Rusk:⁷

"We would hope that our friends in Western Europe who have been engaging in these conversations about a steel mill would, when the time comes for action, take into account the problem of peace in the Pacific Ocean area and consider whether in fact Peiping is willing to live at peace with its neighbors in the Pacific. Trade, as such, is not an insuperable obstacle. . . . But we are concerned about anything that would lead Peiping to believe that their policy is successful or anything that would add to the strength of Peiping until there is some indication of change in their policy."

⁷ For transcript of a television interview with Secretary Rusk on Mar. 20, see *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1966, p. 565.

President Johnson Urges Senate To Ratify ILO Convention 122

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated June 2

I have today transmitted to the Senate, with the request for the advice and consent of that body for its ratification, Convention 122 of the International Labor Organization concerning employment policy. This convention, adopted at the International Labor Conference in 1964, is thoroughly in accord with this nation's economic and legislative goals.

ILO Convention 122 provides that each member state shall declare and pursue, as a major national goal, an active policy designed to promote full and productive and freely chosen employment. A major aim of this policy, as enunciated in the convention, is the fullest possible opportunity for suitable employment irrespective of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national abstraction, or social origin.

The Government of the United States can and does wholeheartedly associate itself with the philosophy and intent of Convention 122.

The convention parallels our own Employment Act of 1946. That act declared the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to be the use of all practical means to foster and promote conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities—including self-employment—for all those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment.

This policy has been strengthened by a number of our country's statutory and administrative actions. The 1964 Manpower Report declared the aim of the Government to insure all men the self-respect and economic security that flows from full use of their talents.

This aim, reiterated in the 1965 Manpower Report, has been given much impetus

in recent legislation. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with its equal employment provisions, and the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965—all are directed toward the goal of affording all our workers the opportunity of participating in our economic life on a full and non-discriminatory basis.

It is in the spirit of this philosophic and legislative history that I express the hope that the Senate of the United States will, in its wisdom, give favorable consideration to ratification by our Government of Convention 122 of the International Labor Organization.

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet at Kyoto July 5-7

The Department of State announced on June 9 (press release 141) that the fifth meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs would be held in Kyoto July 5 through 7.

The Committee was established following the meeting between the late United States President John F. Kennedy and the late Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda.¹ Its first meeting was held in Hakone in November 1961, the second meeting in Washington in December 1962, the third meeting in Tokyo in January 1964, and the fourth meeting in Washington in July 1965.²

At the coming fifth meeting Japan will be represented by Etsusaburo Shiina, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Takeo Fukuda, Minister of Finance; Eiichi Sakata, Min-

ister of Agriculture and Forestry; Takeo Miki, Minister of International Trade and Industry; Torata Nakamura, Minister of Transport; Hisao Kodaira, Minister of Labor; and Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency.

The United States will be represented by Secretary Rusk; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce; W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor; Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury; and Arthur W. Okun, member, President's Council of Economic Advisers.

Ryuji Takeuchi, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, and Edwin O. Reischauer, United States Ambassador to Japan, will also be present at the meeting.

The agenda of the meeting is as follows:

I. Economic situation in Japan and the United States (including the financial, monetary, and balance-of-payments situation)

A. Economic situation in the United States

B. Economic situation in Japan

II. Developments in trade and economic relations between Japan and the United States

A. Expansion of Japan-United States trade relations

B. Developments in Japan-United States economic relations

III. Developments in international trade and economic relations

A. Kennedy Round negotiations

B. Trade with less developed countries and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

C. East-West trade

IV. Cooperation in the economic development of less developed countries

A. Aid policies and activities of Japan and the United States

B. Economic cooperation for Asian development

V. Other matters

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134.

² For texts of joint communiques issued at the conclusion of the meetings, see *ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 891; Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959; Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235; and Aug. 9, 1965, p. 247.

U.S. Supports Viet-Nam Request for U.N. Election Observers

Following is an excerpt from an address¹ made by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, in which he comments on U.S. support of the South Vietnamese Government's request for U.N. observers of the forthcoming elections there.

One important step in the process of self-determination is the forthcoming election for a constituent assembly. In this phase there can be a most important role for the United Nations; namely, to provide impartial international observers to check on the validity of this election. The South Vietnamese Government has made a request to Secretary-General U Thant for such observers, and the United States strongly supports that request. For our own part, I repeat what I have said before: that the United States is prepared to accept and abide by the results of these elections—as well as the reunification elections contemplated by the Geneva agreements—whatever these results may be.

Date Extended for Filing Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses

Press release 139 dated June 8

The American Embassy at Santo Domingo has informed the Department of State that the Government of the Dominican Republic by Law Number 243 of May 31, 1966, extended the date for filing claims with the Special War Claims Commission to June 30, 1966.

American nationals who have not previously filed their claims for losses resulting from damage to or destruction of property in the National District of Santo Domingo as a result of the civil strife which began

on April 24, 1965, and who now desire to file a claim, should write with the least possible delay to: Comisión Depuradora de Reclamaciones por Daños de Guerra, Calle Las Damas esq. El Conde (Altos de Rentas Internas), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

The Department of State is informed that claims are required to be filed on official forms of the Commission.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

International Education. Hearings before the Task Force on Education and Labor of the House Committee on Education. March 30–April 7, 1966. 453 pp.

Foreign Assistance, 1966. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. April 6–May 11, 1966. 741 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part IV, April 21–28, 1966, 168 pp.; Part V, May 3–5, 1966, 151 pp.

Europe Today. Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Frank Church on a study mission, May 1966, 8 pp. [Committee print.]

The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 2. May 5–6, 1966. 57 pp.

The Secretary of State and the Problem of Coordination—New Duties and Procedures of March 4, 1966. Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. May 9, 1966. 23 pp. [Committee print.]

United Nations Financial Situation: Background and Consequences of the Article 19 Controversy Over the Financing of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations. Report of the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, together with hearings before the subcommittee, March 29 and April 19, 1966. May 14, 1966. 139 pp. [Committee print.]

Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic Acid. Report to accompany H.R. 10998. S. Rept. 1171. May 18, 1966. 2 pp.

Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Natural Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 11653. S. Rept. 1172. May 18, 1966. 3 pp.

Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 12262. S. Rept. 1173. May 18, 1966. 2 pp.

Continued Suspension of Duty on Crude Chicory and Reduction in Duty on Ground Chicory. Report to accompany H.R. 12463. S. Rept. 1174. May 18, 1966. 2 pp.

¹ Made at The Catholic University of America at Washington, D.C., on June 5. For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4868 dated June 4.

United States Favors Creation of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights

*Statements by Morris Abram*¹

STATEMENT OF MARCH 25

Our field of work—human rights—is one of frustration. On the one hand we keenly feel the urgency of our task, and, on the other hand, we know only too well our limitations. The Commission's means, and indeed those of all organs of the United Nations, are simply insufficient to the magnitude of the task of promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," as the U.N. Charter provides.

There is a natural progression in the development of any new concept of international cooperation. In the beginning there must be developed a general consensus of the principles to be accepted and applied. During the past 20 years the United Nations has made great progress in arriving at this consensus in the human rights field. We have been able to move from international declarations of principles to conventions setting up legally binding obligations which apply to them. This is a remarkable achievement, but it is limited by the scope of the subjects covered, by the absence of imple-

mentation features in many particular conventions, and the cumbersome nature of the remedies which apply to conventions in general.

As I have indicated, substantial consensus has developed on some principles. As I have also indicated, some conventions have been written, but ratifications have not kept pace with their adoption by the U.N. And, of course, for the reasons I have already suggested and others, conventions have their inherent limitations as a means of protecting human rights.

In candor, we are bound to admit that more remains to be done than has been accomplished thus far in the promotion of human rights through international action. The pace of human rights development—in the member states and in the international organizations—has quickened. The time has come when we must honestly survey the opportunities and the means of achieving them in however modest a way.

At the outset we are met by a fact that we cannot ignore, the juridical fact of national sovereignty. Only through internal reform can human rights violations be remedied. Because we reject the use of physical force, moral force is the chief international instrument for the promotion of human rights, however inadequate it may be. However, the adequacy of moral force is proportionate to the means at hand to sharpen

¹ Made during the 22d session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Mr. Abram is U.S. Representative in the Commission. The statements have been condensed by Mr. Abram; full texts are available as U.S./U.N. press releases 4826, 4828, and 4829.

its focus, to increase its visibility, to institutionalize it, and to elevate the platform from which it is exercised.

We have computerized many aspects of society, but we have not invented, and I believe we never shall invent, a mechanical or electronic substitute for conscience. Therefore, the institution we should develop must be centered in human beings, hopefully in an exceptional man who would occupy a very unusual and exceptional office. There is, I believe, great potential in embodying the cause of human rights in a single person, a person who has earned respect and trust, in whom all have confidence of the sort that is not generally enjoyed by faceless committees or other groups where people are usually expected to represent their national or ideological interests.

I do not see this office as one of organic power. I see the High Commissioner for Human Rights as possessed of keen eyes and ears and persuasive voice and with a conscience so alert, a reputation for objectivity so recognized, as to command the respect of all states. And since he would act in most matters on the request of a government or of a U.N. body, he could not assume powers beyond those delegated by the member states or U.N. organs.

Successful and enduring institutions of government and society, whether at the national or international level, are not created in an instant, even by the wisest of men. Such institutions are the product of experience. The proposal for a High Commissioner embodies a valid concept. I would not presently attempt to completely delineate his authority. Experience must show us how such an office should develop.

A High Commissioner could render many services to the Commission on Human Rights, other U.N. bodies, and to member states without duplicating responsibilities and tasks already assigned. He could apply his expert knowledge to assist interested governments in establishing institutions, such as the Ombudsman. He could also maintain information about the status of

ratification and implementation of human rights conventions, and he could advise appropriate national authorities about more effective use of such instruments. He could assist the Secretary-General on request, as an intermediary in inflamed situations. He might, for example, be useful to U.N. committees dealing with problems in dependent territories. He could collate the vast amount of information submitted on human rights and formulate fruitful generalizations about human rights situations throughout the world.

I believe, however, that the High Commissioner should be established with essentially advisory authority. More precise jurisdiction can be explored after governments have had experience in working with him. Experience will no doubt demonstrate some areas in which his mandate should be expanded and others in which it should be limited. As time passes, the High Commissioner may by common consent come to occupy a place and play a role which cannot now be forecast.

The day may come when such an office may be able to prevent bloodshed or even help belligerent powers come to a peaceful accommodation otherwise impossible. Many international crises today involve human rights issues, whether those crises arise from religious, ethnic, or racial disputes or from attempts by one country, or one group within a country, to impose its will or economic and social system by force on another country or group within a country. In each case, widespread denials of human rights may ensue. It would not be difficult to accumulate a list of instances in which either the deprivation of human rights or the fear of such deprivation has contributed to conflicts in which the United Nations has become involved.

No one claims that such a Commissioner will be a panacea for our frustrations as we survey our unmet needs in the international protection of human rights. It is, however, a proposal, modest, innovative, and possessed of great potential. How can we possibly fail to grasp the opportunity to move forward?

STATEMENT OF MARCH 28

Mr. Chairman, I am certain that all of those who have spoken before me so eloquently and so carefully, with such precision and with such thoughtfulness on behalf of the proposal of Costa Rica,² have demonstrated the seriousness with which this proposal is viewed by so many peoples. I did not anticipate the reaction of my friend, the distinguished representative from the U.S.S.R., Mr. [P. D.] Morosov, who placed the matter in a context different from the context in which we had discussed it to date. Because the U.S.S.R. had joined in unanimous approval by the General Assembly plenary of a study of the proposal which we are now considering, I was surprised when the U.S.S.R. dealt with the proposition in a different way in this forum. He said of it that it was "intolerable," and he said the purpose of those who advanced it, and, I presume, those who support it, was to divert the Human Rights Commission from its true purpose and its legitimate functions.

We believe that reform cannot take place in a society which regards itself as perfect. For, as the precondition for reform, there must be the critical self-examination which recognizes and admits the imperfections in society. There can be no change, we believe, in a society which already considers itself completely perfect, which represents itself as a paradise without any imperfections.

Now, Mr. Chairman, on the merits I do not view, and I do not think any of my colleagues here have ever viewed, the proposed High Commissioner for Human Rights as a kind of superorganization or superinstitution. We see the High Commissioner for Human Rights as an office not of organic power so much as of moral power. And, Mr. Chairman, for my country we welcome the establishment of moral power and moral authority outside of the United States. We do not believe that article 2, paragraph 7, of the charter in any way inhibits the United Nations from the establishment of a moral force.

² U.N. doc. E/CN. 4895.

The distinguished representative of the U.S.S.R. said in his concluding remarks: "Let us leave matters of implementation as they have been for a thousand years." In these thousand years people have been tortured on the rack, burned at the stake, eviscerated, and made victims of mass slaughter. Because things have not been right for a thousand years, and because we have the capacity to improve and to learn and to grow, we are not content entirely with the old forms and the old institutions.

The United States believes that we have the capacity, the opportunity, the need to provide an institutional foundation for moral authority and conscience. And it is for those reasons that we support ardently the proposal which emanated from Costa Rica.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 30

Mr. Chairman, my delegation has now heard a considerable variety of opinion regarding the proposal for a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. We believe, and are very happy to notice, that a general consensus is emerging from our discussion, at least a consensus among a very large number of delegations. I have listened with considerable interest and attention to the remarks of those few delegates who have serious reservations about the merits of the proposal. I have heard it said, for example, that the responsibilities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights would exceed the capacity of one man and therefore there was some reluctance in one delegation to support the proposal.

Some have said that it would be more appropriate to use the Secretary-General instead of a High Commissioner for Human Rights. May I point out that the support which the office of the Secretary-General has behind it today is something that was not established through one act of organic foundation but that this office has grown in power and prestige because of the felt necessities of the times and because of the experience that member states have had in

dealing with that office—and, I might also add, because of the high stature and character of the men who have occupied that office.

Those who feel that the Secretary-General might do the job are recognizing, it seems to me, the inherent validity of having an office occupied by a single individual. The analogy is perfectly clear here; the Secretary-General's Office is an office occupied by an exceptional man, and the functions and usefulness of the office have illustrated precisely the role in international life that a single man who is independent of national instructions can play.

Some have said perhaps the work should be entrusted to a Deputy Secretary-General. This proposal has the danger of involving the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the administrative apparatus. The worst thing that one can do with an office of this nature, an office based on moral authority, is to involve it in all kinds of administrative shrouds.

Some have said that perhaps the function some of us envisage for the High Commissioner for Human Rights could be carried out by a body of experts. Mr. Chairman, my experience is that experts coming from the various states are seldom able, as is the Secretary-General, for example, to vault above their national origins, their national viewpoints, their national ties.

Mr. Chairman, some have said that they look with the gravest suspicion upon this proposal because, if the office is to be occupied by one man, they presume that the one man will not come from their ideological, political, social, or economic system. Of course one man can't come from all systems. But the Secretary-General has proved that one man can be above all systems in terms of his ability to grasp broad concepts for the general good.

I say on behalf of my country that, knowing full well that a High Commissioner for Human Rights could not conceivably be tied to the United States and granting that the High Commissioner for Human Rights might be chosen from a country with a dif-

ferent form of social organization, the United States does not believe that its integrity, its existence, its sovereignty, would be challenged thereby; we do not believe that a man chosen by the Secretary-General and confirmed, for example, by the General Assembly, would be a man who would be prejudiced or subjective in his judgments. My country is prepared to have such a man appointed.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has said that if the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is created, if it is finally approved by the General Assembly, then his delegation will disassociate itself from the process. He has said that they would not finance it and would not contribute to it. I further understand that they have taken the position that they will not work with any *ad hoc* committee of this group established to study further the role of such a High Commissioner. I regret this with all my heart.

The United Nations is a collective process. We work under democratic procedures. Sometimes we are able to persuade our colleagues, and sometimes not. However, I should have thought that the democratic process is central to human rights. In the field of human rights I should have thought there would not have arisen any suggestion of boycott by any group merely because its will had not prevailed after fair discussion and majority vote.

How can we have a collective process? How can we have international institutions in which states are represented and work together if every time one particular group does not get its way it tries, like Samson, to bring down the whole house rather than abide by the decision of the majority?

Therefore, I appeal to the representative of the Soviet Union to reconsider and I hope very much that we will have the advice of the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union in the Working Group on this important item.

Mr. Chairman, we are, I think, entitled to the consultation, the best thoughts, ideas,

and proposals of every state represented around this table. It is only in the context of honest debate, honest disagreement, honest discussion, full consultation, that we can make our job worthy of the purposes for which we strive. If, after an honest discussion and a free exchange of ideas, the ideas that we believe in do not prevail, let me assure you that we will not pick up our marbles and leave the game. We will abide by the judgment, the democratic judgment, of our peers.

I have been a party to many discussions here with those who have a different viewpoint. Because of the desire to accommodate the widest possible consensus, we have tried to reach mutually agreeable results.

I plead therefore for the cooperation of all members to reach a consensus on this very important proposal, a proposal so fraught with hope and possibility and so necessary in view of the times in which we live.³

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.

Notice of denunciation withdrawn: United States, May 14, 1966.

³ On Mar. 30 the Commission decided to establish a working group of nine states (Austria, Costa Rica, Dahomey, France, Jamaica, Philippines, Senegal, United Kingdom, and United States) to study the Costa Rican proposal and report the results to the Commission at its 23d session.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 16, 1966.

Ratified by the President of the United States: June 1, 1966.

Signature: Malagasy Republic, June 1, 1966.

Trade

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965.

Acceptances: Brazil, April 28, 1966; Federal Republic of Germany, May 3, 1966; South Africa, May 6, 1966; Turkey, April 29, 1966.

Third procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966.

Acceptances: Brazil, April 28, 1966; Federal Republic of Germany, April 19, 1966;² Turkey, April 29, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965.

Acceptances: Brazil, April 28, 1966; Turkey, April 29, 1966.

Protocol for accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966.¹

Acceptances: Austria, May 5, 1966;² Peru, May 9, 1966; Switzerland, May 4, 1966;² United States, May 4, 1966.

BILATERAL

Burma

Agreement on the use of kyats accrued under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended. Signed at Rangoon June 1, 1966. Entered into force June 1, 1966.

Denmark

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of December 16, 1944, as amended (58 Stat. 1458, TIAS 3014, 4071). Effected by exchanges of notes at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force June 7, 1966.

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913, 5965). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi May 27, 1966. Entered into force May 27, 1966.

Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreements of April 28 and October 29, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade December 29 and 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. TIAS 5945. 2 pp. 5¢.

World Meteorological Organization. Amendments to article 13 and certain other articles of the convention of October 11, 1947. Adopted by the fourth congress of the World Meteorological Organization, at the seventh and sixteenth plenary meetings, Geneva, April 11 and 27, 1963. Entered into force April 11, 1963, with respect to article 13; entered into force April 27, 1963, with respect to renumbered article 13 and certain other articles. TIAS 5947. 18 pp. 20¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of November 22, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade January 21, 1966. Entered into force January 21, 1966. TIAS 5948. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vietnam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon January 17, 1966. Entered into force January 17, 1966. TIAS 5949. 3 pp. 5¢.

sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with an exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 6, 1966. Entered into force June 6, 1966.

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 6, 1966. Entered into force June 6, 1966.

Malagasy Republic

Agreement amending the agreement of October 7, 1963 (TIAS 5473), providing for the establishment and operation of a space vehicle tracking and communications station in Madagascar. Effected by exchange of notes at Tananarive April 27 and May 2, 1966. Entered into force May 2, 1966.

Norway

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of October 6, 1945, as amended (59 Stat. 1658, TIAS 3015, 4072). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force June 7, 1966.

Pakistan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Karachi May 26, 1966. Entered into force May 26, 1966.

Poland

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 18 and 20, 1966. Entered into force May 20, 1966.

Sweden

Agreements amending the air transport agreement of December 16, 1944, as amended (58 Stat. 1466, TIAS 3013, 4073). Effected by exchanges of notes at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force June 7, 1966.

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

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No.	Date	Subject
*134	6/6	Locke sworn in as Ambassador to Pakistan (biographic details).
†135	6/7	Amendment of air transport agreements with Denmark, Norway, Sweden.
136	6/7	Braderman: "U.S. Policy on East-West Trade."
*137	6/7	Bennett sworn in as Ambassador to Portugal (biographic details).
*138	6/8	Tuthill sworn in as Ambassador to Brazil (biographic details).
139	6/8	Extension of date for claims, National District of Santo Domingo.
140	6/9	NATO communique of June 8.
141	6/9	U.S.-Japan Trade and Economic Committee (rewrite).
†142	6/10	Harriman: "The Growing Strength of Freedom."

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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